Lying

[wenglund]

Sometimes semantics are important.

The entire point of this thread is semantic.

Exactly. And, I see that as a possible problem. You seem more intent on how to define a word than how to understand God's actions. In a way, that was my point.

The question is how we should rightly define the word lying.

Your question presupposes that there is a "right" way to define "lying." I don't know that there is. To me, the "rightness" of a word isn't so much in how it is defined, but in what it is able to accomplish, particularly in terms of understanding. Again, this is kind of my point.

As for letting the article speak for itself, here is what it said.

http://www.fairlds.o...rication#head08

So if the Lord was "advocating some degree of deception" when He told Moses and the Israelite leaders to request permission to go three days’ journey into the wilderness to sacrifice, and He doesn't lie, how should we define lying?

That's just it. To me, your effort in trying to "rightly" define the word "lying" misses the point of God's actions. To me, it doesn't so much matter how you want to call or define it (you can call it deception or lying or prevaricating or misleading or tactful or discrete or protective or clever, or whatever, etc.), what is important is grasping the good that God did.

How does God define it?

I don't believe that God is all that concerned with "rightly" defining that word. Rather, he is concerned that people grasp the beneficial principle conveyed by his actions.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[inquiringmind]

Okay, yes, I can see what you're saying now, but I was trying to show you those examples you used didn't include any untrue statements.

If by "untrue" you mean factually inaccurate or misleading, the examples I gave certainly did include untrue statements.

The first thing God said to Moses in the third chapter of Exodus was that He was gonna deliver the children of Israel out of their bondage in Egypt and bring them to the land of Canaan, which was about a month away, so any talk of just going for a three day journey was factually inaccurate and misleading.

A mere three days journey wasn't in the game plan.

Given my definition of lying that doesn't matter, because the intention wasn't to permanently harm or deceive.

It was factually inaccurate to tell Hezekiah he was on his death bed, and would not recover, when he would live another fifteen years, but it apparently had some desired result, and God's purpose wasn't to ultimately or permanently deceive Hezekiah.

So (given my definition) it wasn't lying.

It was factually inaccurate and misleading to say that Nineveh would be destroyed in forty days, when it would last another hundred years, but the threat worked repentance and saved that generation.

And it wasn't lying (given my "overly liberal" definition) because God's intent wasn't to ultimately or permanently harm or deceive.

If you don't like my definition, please give me yours, and explain how it is that the examples we've been discussing aren't "lying" given your definition.

Sheesh. I thought I gave you a pretty good definition before and I don't want to take the time to go find it now.

I don't think you gave any definition, and I'm certain you didn't consistently apply any definition you gave to the examples we've been discussing.

At the time our Lord sent Isaiah to tell Hezekiah he wasn't going to recover from his illness, which I think meant the illness wouldn't automatically go away after running its natural course, it was true that Hezekiah was going to die, in those circumstances. And then Hezekiah prayed for our Lord's help to be cured from that illness, and Isaiah went and told him that the illness would be taken away and he would then live another 15 years.

Hezekiah was told "get your affairs in order, for you will die, and not live."

And if God knows the end from the beginning (and everything is one eternal round for Him), He knew that Hezekiah would pray and ask for His help after he got that news.

And He knew that He'd then add fifteen years to his life.

So the "get your affairs in order, for you will die, and not live," was factually inaccurate.

But given my definition of lying, it wasn't a lie, because God's intention wasn't to ultimately or permanently harm or deceive.

What was your definition again?

Edited February 22, 2013 by inquiringmind

[Alvino]

So how would you define a "lie,"

I haven't given the issue much though before, to be honest, but as you seemed to want to define it looks good to me. To lie is to make a statement one knows to be false with the intent to harm or deceive.

and how do you understand passages like Numbers 23:19?

I don't know because I don't know what they meant by "lie" in that passage. I suppose they meant God doesn't do what we take to be to lie.

What would you think of this definition?

Any false statement knowingly made with the intent to ultimately and permanently harm or deceive..

"Ultimately and permanently" is too unclear to criticize the definition.

Given this definition, do you see any conflict between God's dealings with man (Ex. 3; 2 Kings 6;7;20; Jonah, etc.) and what's said of Him in Numbers 23:19?

I would say the definition without the "ultimately and permanently" was good enough for me.

Regarding the cases you mentioned, and taking into account your definition, I would say we just don't know God's intent in doing what he did so we don't know whether he lied or not.

[inquiringmind]

I haven't given the issue much though before, to be honest, but as you seemed to want to define it looks good to me. To lie is to make a statement one knows to be false with the intent to harm or deceive.

I don't know because I don't know what they meant by "lie" in that passage. I suppose they meant God doesn't do what we take to be to lie.

"Ultimately and permanently" is too unclear to criticize the definition.

I would say the definition without the "ultimately and permanently" was good enough for me.

Regarding the cases you mentioned, and taking into account your definition, I would say we just don't know God's intent in doing what he did so we don't know whether he lied or not.

Thank you.

I think His intent in the examples given was to deliver His people from slavery while showing Pharaoh to be an unreasonable tyrant, to help David see what he had done, to prevent a war, to deliver a city from a besieging army without any bloodshed, to teach Hezekiah something, and to bring a city to repentance.

In no case was His intent to harm or permanently deceive.

So if that's any part of what we mean by lying, I think we can safely say that He doesn't lie.

Edited February 22, 2013 by inquiringmind

[Ahab]

If by "untrue" you mean factually inaccurate or misleading, the examples I gave certainly did include untrue statements.

No they didn't, at least according to how I define what is true and untrue. They were accurate and you can just drop the misleading bit. People mislead themselves based on their own ideas about what somebody else meant and you can't honestly blame the person who tells the truth for that mess.

The first thing God said to Moses in the third chapter of Exodus was that He was gonna deliver the children of Israel out of their bondage in Egypt and bring them to the land of Canaan, which was about a month away, so any talk of just going for a three day journey was factually inaccurate and misleading.

Where are you getting the idea that God told them it would take 3 days to get there? I'm not seeing any record of that.

A mere three days journey wasn't in the game plan.

I'm not saying it was.

Given my definition of lying that doesn't matter, because the intention wasn't to permanently harm or deceive.

Your definition is bad for several other reasons, though. Try coming up with a better definition.

It was factually inaccurate to tell Hezekiah he was on his death bed, and would not recover, when he would live another fifteen years, but it apparently had some desired result, and God's purpose wasn't to ultimately or permanently deceive Hezekiah.

You don't seem to hear well, so I'm about done talking to you. As I explained earlier, what God told Hezekiah through Isaiah was accurate, in those circumstances, and then later something else came into the picture. God can tell us what is happening and what will happen at any point in the timeline, so the fact that something was going to happen one time and a different thing was going to happen later doesn't make God a liar. He told the truth every step of the way.

So (given my definition) it wasn't lying.

You might as well say it wasn't a lie because he didn't mention fruitcake and you have to use the word fruitcake before something can be considered a lie. What's the difference if it's just substituing one bad definition of what a lie is for another bad definition.

It was factually inaccurate and misleading to say that Nineveh would be destroyed in forty days, when it would last another hundred years, but the threat worked repentance and saved that generation.

There was nothing inaccurate about what God meant when he said what he said. Try to get that through your head, please.

And it wasn't lying (given my "overly liberal" definition) because God's intent wasn't to ultimately or permanently harm or deceive.

If you don't like my definition, please give me yours, and explain how it is that the examples we've been discussing aren't "lying" given your definition.

I already have.

I don't think you gave any definition, and I'm certain you didn't consistently apply any definition you gave to the examples we've been discussing.

Then I might as well stop talking to you since you don't seem able to see what I've said.

[Alvino]

Thank you.

I think His intent in the examples given was to deliver His people from slavery

Which is a good thing but doesn't show he didn't intend to achieve this by deception.

while showing Pharaoh to be an unreasonable tyrant,

This, like the previous, doesn't show he didn't go on about doing this by knowingly deceiving people with intent.

to help David see what he had done, to prevent a war, to deliver a city from a besieging army without any bloodshed, to teach Hezekiah something, and to bring a city to repentance.

Even if accurate, these are things God accomplished, not what he used to achieve them. I could lie to spare an innocent life but that doesn't mean I didn't deceive with intent to accomplish it.

In no case was His intent to harm or permanently deceive.

As I said previously, this "permanently" business is too unclear. Let's say God tells us a lot of false things to deceive us (He may deceive us purposefully towards the good, it really doesn't matter because he already had the intent to deceive which is one of two sufficient conditions to lie) but in the afterlife he tells us what was going on (He intended to tell us in the afterlife all along, let's suppose). It certainly wasn't permanent but, does that means he wasn't lying because the deception didn't last forever or because He didn't intend it to last forever? That seems wrong.

Edited February 22, 2013 by Alvino

[inquiringmind]

No they didn't, at least according to how I define what is true and untrue. They were accurate and you can just drop the misleading bit.

It's misleading and factually inaccurate to say you want to go for a three day journey when the intended destination (from day one, read Exodus 3) is over a month away, and you have no intention of coming back.

And if a mere three days journey was never in the game plan, and you're not saying it was, how can you say there was nothing misleading or factually inaccurate in the request made?

Your definition is bad for several other reasons, though. Try coming up with a better definition.

You still haven't given me yours.

There was nothing inaccurate about what God meant when he said what he said.

There was nothing inaccurate about what God meant when he said what he said?

So does your definition of lying have more to do with what you mean than what you say?

If you trust me to chaperone your daughter, and I tell you I'll take good care of her, is what I mean more important than what I say?

You might as well say it wasn't a lie because he didn't mention fruitcake and you have to use the word fruitcake before something can be considered a lie. What's the difference if it's just substituing one bad definition of what a lie is for another bad definition.

Not really,

Philosophers have long recognized there's some difficulty in defining what we mean by lying, the discussion goes back at least as far as Socrates and Plato, and this is from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

There is no universally accepted definition of lying to others (Kagan 1998, 113)...a lie “in the strict sense” is “harmful” (Grotius LWP, 614). This definition of lying is as follows:

To lie =

df

to make a believed-false statement to another person, with the intention that that other person believe that statement to be true, violating that person's right of liberty of judgment, with the intention to harm that other person.

http://plato.stanfor...ing-definition/

Which is a good thing but doesn't show he didn't intend to achieve this by deception.

But the ultimate intent, the motive, wasn't to deceive.

What if Pharaoh or his people needed to be sown how unreasonable they were.

In the end even his magicians and advisers told Pharaoh the country was ruined, and all the Hebrews really asked for was to go on a three day journey so they could offer sacrifices to their God.

What if the intent, the motive wasn't only to deliver His people, but to show the Egyptians something about themselves?

Something true?

Even if accurate, these are things God accomplished, not what he used to achieve them. I could lie to spare an innocent life but that doesn't mean I didn't deceive to accomplish it with intent.

But if you misinformed the Gestapo to save Ann Frank, would you're primary intent be to deceive them, or to save her?

And if you had no intent to harm, would you be lying?

As I said previously, this "permanently" business is too unclear.

Than wouldn't you have to say that Nathan lied to David (apparently on God's instructions) when he told him the whole story about the poor man whose pet lamb ended up on his rich neighbor's dinner table.

He really had David's dander up, and David doesn't seem to have had any idea that it was a parable until after he said "as surely as the Lord lives, the man who did this deserves to die...because he had no pity," and Nathan answered "you are the man."

For the moment, David was deceived, but was it God's intent (or Nathan's) to deceive David, or to lead him to see a greater and more important truth?

There was a reason I included the word "permanently" (or ultimately) in my definition.

David thought some rich fat cat took the only thing the poor man had, a pet lamb he loved like a child, and killed it to save himself the expense of feeding an unexpected guest, and David was deceived in this until the veil was lifted from his eyes, and he was revealed as the man he himself had pronounced judgment on.

If the right and proper definition of a "lie" doesn't include the intent to ultimately deceive, how do we excuse Nathan (who was acting as God's mouthpiece)?

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[inquiringmind]

To me, it doesn't so much matter how you want to call or define it (you can call it deception or lying or prevaricating or misleading or tactful or discrete or protective or clever, or whatever, etc.), what is important is grasping the good that God did.

The only problem with that is that scripture does say that God cannot lie, so if He has at times used what we might call deception or prevarication to accomplish some good, there must be some difference between this and "lying."

The only way I can see to clarify the difference is by defining what we mean by the term.

I don't believe that God is all that concerned with "rightly" defining that word. Rather, he is concerned that people grasp the beneficial principle conveyed by his actions.

I don't want to deny the beneficial principle conveyed by his actions, but I think it might be important to rightly define the words we use (other than that, I don't think we have any real disagreement here.)

Thank you.

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[Ahab]

It's misleading and factually inaccurate to say you want to go for a three day journey when the intended destination (from day one, read Exodus 3) is over a month away, and you have no intention of coming back.

But the question to the Pharoah wasn't if he wanted to let them go forever, but for only 3 days. He could have said yes to that while saying no to the other option. There was nothing deceitful in asking if he would let them go for 3 days.

And if a mere three days journey was never in the game plan, and you're not saying it was, how can you say there was nothing misleading or factually inaccurate in the request made?

The request was for 3 days. That is what he was to request, regardless of whatever else he would ask for later.

You still haven't given me yours.

Yes I have. I gave you several, and I'll repeat one again now. A lie is an idea that is not true.

There was nothing inaccurate about what God meant when he said what he said?

Right.

So does your definition of lying have more to do with what you mean than what you say?

Yes, and I explained that earlier. A person's choice of words isn't always as good as it could be, but all people always mean what they mean when they say something.

If you trust me to chaperone your daughter, and I tell you I'll take good care of her, is what I mean more important than what I say?

Yes.

Not really,

I don't think you understood what I meant, and I'm not quite sure I understand what you mean, either.

[Alvino]

But the ultimate intent, the motive, wasn't to deceive.

What definition are we using? I told you already what I'm going with (let's call that definition 1). Are you rejecting that one and using the one you wrote in bolds (let's call that 2)?

You seem to be using 2 when I said I took 1. So, let's get what "ultimate" means clear. Was the intent to deceive in some small way but not in the most important way?

Under definition 1 the examples you mention don't indicate God intended to not deceive (which is one of two sufficient conditions to lie). Under 1, if God's "ultimate" intent was not to deceive but still to deceive about a few things, then he lied.

What if Pharaoh or his people needed to be sown how unreasonable they were.

In the end even his magicians and advisers told Pharaoh the country was ruined, and all the Hebrews really asked for was to go on a three day journey so they could offer sacrifices to their God.

What if the intent, the motive wasn't only to deliver His people, but to show the Egyptians something about themselves?

I don't see how this changes anything given what I've said. You can achieve great, even praiseworthy things through lies and deception, but that doesn't mean you didn't lied.

Something true?

There is nothing impossible to me about showing people the truth by instrumentally using some lies.

But if you misinformed the Gestapo to save Ann Frank, would you're primary intent be to deceive them, or to save her?

Now "primary intent"? If you really want to inquire, inquiringmind, you'll have to be more precise and don't change terms without explicit reasons for doing so. You were using "ultimate and permanent". Will you change your definition or is saying "ultimate and permanent" the same as "primary intent" (if they are you still have to clarify)?

And if you had no intent to harm, would you be lying?

Under 1 (the one I adopted) you could be lying because it had two sufficient conditions: you make a false statement with intention to either deceive or harm.

Under 2 I don't know because you haven't clarified (and have even added new terms you also don't clarify) the idea of lying here. I don't know what 2 means by the two sufficient conditions: you make a false statement with intention to ultimately and permanently deceive, or with the intention to ultimately and permanently harm.

For the moment, David was deceived, but was it God's intent (or Nathan's) to deceive David, or to lead him to see a greater and more important truth?

As I think I've made clear my position was, those two intentions are not mutually exclusive. I can intend to deceive you by telling you something I know is false so you will later on come to a more important truth (or even realize I lied to you later on). I still would call what I would have done in that case a lie (and it would be a lie under 1).

There was a reason I included the word "permanently" (or ultimately) in my definition.

No, not "or ultimately". You said "ultimately and permanently" which means that both have to be there. Are you changing it now?

If the right and proper definition of a "lie" doesn't include the intent to ultimately deceive, how do we excuse Nathan (who was acting as God's mouthpiece)?

I don't know what "ultimately" and "permanently" deceive means nor have you clarified these concepts. I can't answer this question.

Edited February 23, 2013 by Alvino

[inquiringmind]

But the question to the Pharoah wasn't if he wanted to let them go forever, but for only 3 days. He could have said yes to that while saying no to the other option. There was nothing deceitful in asking if he would let them go for 3 days.

The request was for 3 days. That is what he was to request, regardless of whatever else he would ask for later.

Yes I have. I gave you several, and I'll repeat one again now. A lie is an idea that is not true.

Right.

Yes, and I explained that earlier. A person's choice of words isn't always as good as it could be, but all people always mean what they mean when they say something.

Yes.

I don't think you understood what I meant, and I'm not quite sure I understand what you mean, either.

You cant seriously think that whether I'm true to what I mean when I say something to you has more to do with whether I'm guilty of lying than whether I'm true to what I say?

Suppose what I meant when I said I'd take good care of your daughter was that we'd get a first class motel room, and i was true to that, would you say I didn't lie to you (even if I knew you understood my words to mean that I'd guard her morals, and watch out for her the way you would if you were there)?

I'm still not sure you've defined what you mean by lying, but if your definition has more to do with what I mean than what I say, it seems to me it must be one of the worst of all possible definitions.

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[inquiringmind]

As I think I've made clear my position was, those two intentions are not mutually exclusive. I can intend to deceive you by telling you something I know is false so you will later on come to a more important truth (or even realize I lied to you later on). I still would call what I would have done in that case a lie.

Alvino, do you believe in the passages of scripture that say that God does not (or cannot) lie?

If you do, and assuming that Nathan was inspired by God when he went to David, and that David was meant to take his parable literally and pass judgment on himself before Nathan revealed he was "the man," can you offer me some definition of lying that wouldn't make God a liar?

You say here that you could intend to deceive me by telling me something you know to be false so that I will later come to know a more important truth, and you would still call that lying.

But if your ultimate motive and intention was to lead me to some truth (in the most effective way possible, or perhaps in the only way possible) why would you still call that lying?

I don't think that it is.

David was deceived into passing judgment on himself, but this helped him see himself as he was, and led to his repentance.

Did God (or Nathan) lie to David?

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[Alvino]

Alvino, do you believe in the passages of scripture that say that God does not (or cannot) lie?

I don't believe in God, inquiringmind. I have been assuming God does exist as far as the discussion goes but I didn't start assuming whether he lied or not.

can you offer me some definition of lying that wouldn't make God a liar?

Not one that seems acceptable to myself but that may be because I haven't given the issue much thought to begin with.

You say here that you can intend to deceive me by telling me something you know to be false so that I will later come to know a more important truth, but if your ultimate motive and intention is to lead me to that truth (in the most effective way possible, or perhaps in the only way possible) why would you call that lying.

Because I told you something I knew was false and I told you that thing so you would be deceived into believing it was true (which is an intent to deceive). That does not mean I couldn't have also intended you to believe other true things with that deception. Since I wanted to deceive you with something I knew was false, however, I meet the condition for having lied. But this is under definition 1. You haven't clarified what definition 2 said, so...

[inquiringmind]

You haven't clarified what definition 2 said

To knowingly state something that's factually untrue, with the ultimate purpose of deceiving (and/or doing harm.)

Example.

When Satan lies, his ultimate purpose is to deceive and do harm.

When God presumably altered the visual input into the brains of the horsemen and charioteers in 2 Kings 6, so Elisha could lead them into Samaria without their knowing where they were going, His ultimate purpose was to open their eyes, protect the prophet they were sent to arrest, prevent a war, give them a good meal, and send them back to their king with a story that would further the cause of true religion.

There was no malicious intent (and ultimately no intent to deceive.)

When David was led to believe that some rich man in his realm had stolen the pet lamb his poor neighbor loved, and served it to his guests to save himself the expense of serving one of his own lambs, the purpose was to get David to see the truth about himself.

The story was presumably an invention, factually untrue, but the ultimate intent wasn't to deceive, but to illuminate.

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[rodheadlee]

Concealment of knowledge is not lying. Why are you trying to put God in a box, so that he cannot be merciful?

[inquiringmind]

Concealment of knowledge is not lying. Why are you trying to put God in a box, so that he cannot be merciful?

I'm not.

And I'm not saying He lies.

I'm saying the common definition of lying is inadequate to explain what scripture means when it says He doesn't lie. .

Nathan was sent to David by God, and he came with a long elaborate story that was factually inaccurate (I e. even if the poor man's lamb represented Bathsheba, David didn't kill Bathsheba, and the rich man in the story didn't kill the poor man--the details were unimportant and literally untrue, the purpose was to elicit an emotional response from David.)

These details were presented to David as factually true (and that's more than just concealing information), and David took them literally when he unintentionally pronounced judgment on himself (in other words, he was tricked, fooled, or deceived.)

Am I saying God (or Nathan) lied?

No.

The purpose of the story (though this was not revealed until after the fact) was to get David to think, and feel, and see the truth about himself in a way that allowed him to repent.

I'm not saying that that was lying.

I'm not saying that altering the sensory input of an army, so that the follow a man they can't recognize down a road that looks like it's leading somewhere else (all of which is much more than simply concealing information) until they enter the enemies capital city, and are surrounded by his troops was lying.

Perhaps it would have been if the King of Israel had been allowed to kill them like he wanted to, but they were given a good meal and sent back to their king knowing more about those they considered their enemies, and more about God then they did when they left.

Why are you trying to put God in a box and say that He can't do such things (when scripture says He has)?

Do you think God would consider it a "lie" to do more than conceal information from the Gestapo when they went door to door looking for Jews in Nazi occupied Europe?

Would it be a sin that required the atonement to give them false information (so that they didn't just push their way past some fool who thought he could get away with not answering their questions, and search the whole house, and find the Frank family hiding in the attic)?

Is that why the God-fearing Egyptian midwives were praised for giving factually incorrect information to Pharaoh, and Rahab was praised for telling the king's officers that the spies had already left when she had them hiding on the roof?

The Mormon apologists at FAIR say.

The “public stance” of Moses and the Israelite leaders is to be that they only want to go three days’ journey to sacrifice. So, here the Lord is advocating some degree of deception. This extends to even deceiving their Egyptian neighbors:

21 And I will give this people favour in the sight of the Egyptians: and it shall come to pass, that, when ye go, ye shall not go empty:

22 But every woman shall borrow of her neighbour, and of her that sojourneth in her house, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment: and ye shall put them upon your sons, and upon your daughters; and ye shall spoil the Egyptians.

Because they are just going to make sacrifices, in the public version, the Israelites are to “borrow” valuable goods from the Egyptians. But, the true intent is clearly spelled out: they are to “spoil” (i.e. “loot”) the Egyptians.

http://www.fairlds.o...rication#head08

If that's true, and we know that God doesn't lie, how should we define lying?

That's the question I'm asking here (and the whole FAIR article begs the question.)

Why don't more of you try answering it?

How would you define lying redheadlee?

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[inquiringmind]

P.S. I just looked up the word translated "borrow" in Strong's Concordance, and the word seems to have a wider meaning than the FAIR article implies. It can mean "to ask, enquire, borrow," or "beg," so it may be going a bit too far to say (as the FAIR article does) that "This extends to even deceiving their Egyptian neighbors...Because they are just going to make sacrifices, in the public version, the Israelites are to “borrow” valuable goods from the Egyptians."

[inquiringmind]

Concealment of knowledge is not lying. Why are you trying to put God in a box, so that he cannot be merciful?

As I said, I'm not.

But let me ask you another question.

My earthly father has known my all his life.

Why did he think I was his younger brother after he had back surgery in 2008?

Why did I have to tell him that his mother (who died about 20 years before, and who he grieved at the time) had died?.

After they discovered he had hydrocephilitis, and they put a shunt in his head, he got his memory back and knew who I was, but I watched him cry like a baby that day, and I don't think we were ever close until then.

My mother use to say that God works in strange and mysterious ways (and I'm still trying to figure out how He works), but I kinda believe He was at work in some way there.

And I'm not dad's brother, I'm his son.

Why did God cause (or allow) my father's senses to deceive him?

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[inquiringmind]

Anyone?

[kenporay]

Of course philosophers have difficulty defining words...words already have definitions. The "classical" examples of lies previously mentioned are silly...it presupposes that every question deserves an answer.

[inquiringmind]

Of course philosophers have difficulty defining words...words already have definitions. The "classical" examples of lies previously mentioned are silly...it presupposes that every question deserves an answer.

Thank you.

What do you think of this?

ALMOST all authors, Catholic and Protestant, admit, that when a just cause is present, there is some kind or other of verbal misleading, which is not sin. Even silence is in certain cases virtually such a misleading, according to the Proverb, “Silence gives consent.” Again, silence is absolutely forbidden to a Catholic, as a mortal sin, under certain circumstances, e.g. to keep silence, when it is a duty to make a profession of faith.

Another mode of verbal misleading, and the most direct, is actually saying the thing that is not; and it is defended on the principle that such words are not a lie, when there is a “justa causa,” as killing is not murder in the case of an executioner.

Another ground of certain authors for saying that an untruth is not a lie where there is a just cause, is, that veracity is a kind of justice, and therefore, when we have no duty of justice to tell truth to another, it is no sin not to do so. Hence we may say the thing that is not, to children, to madmen, to men who ask impertinent questions, to those whom we hope to benefit by misleading.

Another ground, taken in defending certain untruths, ex justâ causâ, as if not lies, is, that veracity is for the sake of society, and that, if in no case whatever we might lawfully mislead others, we should actually be doing society great harm.

Another mode of verbal misleading is equivocation or a play upon words; and it is defended on the theory that to lie is to use words in a sense which they will not bear. But an equivocator uses them in a received sense, though there is another received sense, and therefore, according to this definition, he does not lie.

Others say that all equivocations are, after all, a kind of lying,—faint lies or awkward lies, but still lies; and some of these disputants infer, that therefore we must not equivocate, and others that equivocation is but a half-measure, and that it is better to say at once that in certain cases untruths are not lies.

Others will try to distinguish between evasions and equivocations; but though there are evasions which are clearly not equivocations, yet it is very difficult scientifically to draw the line between the one and the other.

To these must be added the unscientific way of dealing with lies,—viz. that on a great or cruel occasion a man cannot help telling a lie, and he would not be a man, did he not tell it, but still it is very wrong, and he ought not to do it, and he must trust that the sin will be forgiven him, though he goes about to commit it ever so deliberately, and is sure to commit it again under similar circumstances. It is a necessary frailty, and had better not be thought about before it is incurred, and not thought of again, after it is well over. This view cannot for a moment be defended, but, I suppose, it is very common.

I think the historical course of thought upon the matter has been this: the Greek Fathers thought that, when there was a justa causa, an untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with great misgiving; and, whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that there can be no just cause of untruth. In these later times, this doctrine has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely taught that, though all untruths are lies, yet that certain equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.

Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says that equivocations, &c. after all are lies, and another which says that there are untruths which are not lies.

And now as to the “just cause,” which is the condition, sine quâ non. The Greek Fathers make it such as these, self-defence, charity, zeal for God’s honour, and the like.

St. Augustine seems to deal with the same “just causes” as the Greek Fathers, even though he does not allow of their availableness as depriving untruths, spoken on such occasions, of their sinfulness. He mentions defence of life and of honour, and the safe custody of a secret. Also the great Anglican writers, who have followed the Greek Fathers, in defending untruths when there is the “just cause,” consider that “just cause” to be such as the preservation of life and property, defence of law, the good of others. Moreover, their moral rights, e.g. defence against the inquisitive, &c.

http://the-american-...ion/#more-28580

Isn't the FAIR article on "Polygamy, Prophets, and Prevarication" basically saying the same thing?

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[kenporay]

I think it is verbose.

I prefer "let your communication be yea or nay."

[inquiringmind]

I think it is verbose.

I prefer "let your communication be yea or nay."

Does that mean you disapprove of oaths?

And was it any more verbose than this?

In any discussion of polygamy during the Nauvoo period–particularly as it relates to the secrecy and purported lies that surround its introduction–questions inevitably turn toward the biblical record. Critics often indicate that biblical prophets were never called upon to engage in lying or to make public statements at odds with private behavior.

LDS authors often cite the examples of Abraham and Isaac, both of whom deceived others about their marital status for their own protection, as biblical precedent for polygamy and its deceptions. There are, however, examples recorded in Exodus that are more on-point to the situation in Nauvoo.

The first is an example of civil disobedience sanctioned by God. It involves Pharaoh’s murderous instructions to the Egyptian midwives:

16 And he said, When ye do the office of a midwife to the Hebrew women, and see them upon the stools; if it be a son, then ye shall kill him: but if it be a daughter, then she shall live.

17 But the midwives feared God, and did not as the king of Egypt commanded them, but saved the men children alive.

18 And the king of Egypt called for the midwives, and said unto them, Why have ye done this thing, and have saved the men children alive?

19 And the midwives said unto Pharaoh, Because the Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women; for they are lively, and are delivered ere the midwives come in unto them.

The midwives are confronted with a command from the head of state which offends their personal/professional morality. They decline to participate, and actively deceive the Pharaoh–they even lie to him or his officers so that the deception may continue, as well as to (one assumes) spare themselves his punishment. The subsequent verses indicate God’s approval of their action–honesty is not the primary moral value: obedience to the will of God is.

The second example comes from the prophetic call of Moses. The Lord speaks to Moses and says:

17 And I have said, I will bring you up out of the affliction of Egypt unto the land of the Canaanites, and the Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, unto a land flowing with milk and honey.

The Lord announces His intention to liberate the Israelites from slavery. But, in the very next breath, He tells Moses what to tell Pharaoh–what the “public story” should be, if you will:

18 And they shall hearken to thy voice: and thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and ye shall say unto him, The LORD God of the Hebrews hath met with us: and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days’ journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice to the LORD our God.

The “public stance” of Moses and the Israelite leaders is to be that they only want to go three days’ journey to sacrifice. So, here the Lord is advocating some degree of deception. This extends to even deceiving their Egyptian neighbors:

21 And I will give this people favour in the sight of the Egyptians: and it shall come to pass, that, when ye go, ye shall not go empty:

22 But every woman shall borrow of her neighbour, and of her that sojourneth in her house, jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment: and ye shall put them upon your sons, and upon your daughters; and ye shall spoil the Egyptians.⁷⁴

Because they are just going to make sacrifices, in the public version, the Israelites are to “borrow” valuable goods from the Egyptians. But, the true intent is clearly spelled out: they are to “spoil” (i.e. “loot”) the Egyptians.

Pharaoh is, of course, nobody’s fool. He seems to strongly suspect that there is more to the story than Moses is publicly admitting. He offers all sorts of compromise positions, seemingly designed to assure that the slaves will return after fulfilling their duties.

Things proceed to the point that Pharaoh threatens Moses’ life despite the plagues and signs.The people are finally freed, but once they have left Pharaoh and his councilors decide to resort to violence and slaughter:

5 And it was told the king of Egypt that the people fled: and the heart of Pharaoh and of his servants was turned against the people, and they said, Why have we done this, that we have let Israel go from serving us?

6 And he made ready his chariot, and took his people with him:

7 And he took six hundred chosen chariots, and all the chariots of Egypt, and captains over every one of them.

8 And the LORD hardened the heart of Pharaoh king of Egypt, and he pursued after the children of Israel: and the children of Israel went out with an high hand.

We are not told why the Lord instructed Moses to deal with the Egyptians in the way that he did. It is significant that Moses did not take such an approach on his own; only a direct command motivates his less-than-forthright behavior.

One can speculate, however–it is certainly reasonable to think that the Egyptians would have murderous intent toward their slaves who presumed to leave. They are willing to act on such inclinations, despite the plagues, when it becomes indisputable that Israel has left for good. If Moses had announced that Israel was leaving, what would the reaction of Pharaoh’s court have been? Moses’ failure to tell the whole story may well have saved Egyptian life, as well as Israelite. To be sure, God could have used another way. But, in this instance, deception was the specific tactic which He commanded.

Anti-Moses authors could doubtless exploit this situation to great rhetorical effect–they could mock Moses’ “ethical lapse” here, and insist that he did it all for monetary gain. They could contrast his behavior here with the “thou shalt not covet,” “thou shalt not bear false witness,” and “thou shalt not steal” commands given later at Sinai, and point out that “borrowing” when you don’t ever intend to come back looks a lot like “stealing.”

But, all these attacks–like the attacks on Joseph–beg the question. They presume at the outset that Moses is not a prophet. The highest duty for a prophet–or anyone–is to obey the word of the Lord.

Lying for the Lord?

Critics have long charged the LDS with organizationally and systematically “lying for the Lord,” equating such with a policy of using any means necessary to achieve some “good” goal. I do not believe that the biblical record advocates such a policy, but it does advocate obeying the Lord. One does not use ethically questionable tactics because one believes the “end justifies the means.” Elder Dallin H. Oaks repudiated any such doctrine within the Church, specifically in the context of polygamy:

Some have suggested that it is morally permissible to lie to promote a good cause. For example, some Mormons have taught or implied that lying is okay if you are lying for the Lord… As far as concerns our own church and culture, the most common allegations of lying for the Lord swirl around the initiation, practice, and discontinuance of polygamy. The whole experience with polygamy was a fertile field for deception. It is not difficult for historians to quote LDS leaders and members in statements justifying, denying, or deploring deception in furtherance of this religious practice.<a name="enloc79">⁷⁹

http://www.fairlds.o...rication#head08

I would again ask all who actually read the above article (from the LDS "FAIR" website) what they think of this?

ALMOST all authors, Catholic and Protestant, admit, that when a just cause is present, there is some kind or other of verbal misleading, which is not sin. Even silence is in certain cases virtually such a misleading, according to the Proverb, “Silence gives consent.” Again, silence is absolutely forbidden to a Catholic, as a mortal sin, under certain circumstances, e.g. to keep silence, when it is a duty to make a profession of faith.

Another mode of verbal misleading, and the most direct, is actually saying the thing that is not; and it is defended on the principle that such words are not a lie, when there is a “justa causa,” as killing is not murder in the case of an executioner.

Another ground of certain authors for saying that an untruth is not a lie where there is a just cause, is, that veracity is a kind of justice, and therefore, when we have no duty of justice to tell truth to another, it is no sin not to do so. Hence we may say the thing that is not, to children, to madmen, to men who ask impertinent questions, to those whom we hope to benefit by misleading.

Another ground, taken in defending certain untruths, ex justâ causâ, as if not lies, is, that veracity is for the sake of society, and that, if in no case whatever we might lawfully mislead others, we should actually be doing society great harm.

Another mode of verbal misleading is equivocation or a play upon words; and it is defended on the theory that to lie is to use words in a sense which they will not bear. But an equivocator uses them in a received sense, though there is another received sense, and therefore, according to this definition, he does not lie.

Others say that all equivocations are, after all, a kind of lying,—faint lies or awkward lies, but still lies; and some of these disputants infer, that therefore we must not equivocate, and others that equivocation is but a half-measure, and that it is better to say at once that in certain cases untruths are not lies.

Others will try to distinguish between evasions and equivocations; but though there are evasions which are clearly not equivocations, yet it is very difficult scientifically to draw the line between the one and the other.

To these must be added the unscientific way of dealing with lies,—viz. that on a great or cruel occasion a man cannot help telling a lie, and he would not be a man, did he not tell it, but still it is very wrong, and he ought not to do it, and he must trust that the sin will be forgiven him, though he goes about to commit it ever so deliberately, and is sure to commit it again under similar circumstances. It is a necessary frailty, and had better not be thought about before it is incurred, and not thought of again, after it is well over. This view cannot for a moment be defended, but, I suppose, it is very common.

I think the historical course of thought upon the matter has been this: the Greek Fathers thought that, when there was a justa causa, an untruth need not be a lie. St. Augustine took another view, though with great misgiving; and, whether he is rightly interpreted or not, is the doctor of the great and common view that all untruths are lies, and that there can be no just cause of untruth. In these later times, this doctrine has been found difficult to work, and it has been largely taught that, though all untruths are lies, yet that certain equivocations, when there is a just cause, are not untruths.

Further, there have been and all along through these later ages, other schools, running parallel with the above mentioned, one of which says that equivocations, &c. after all are lies, and another which says that there are untruths which are not lies.

And now as to the “just cause,” which is the condition, sine quâ non. The Greek Fathers make it such as these, self-defence, charity, zeal for God’s honour, and the like.

St. Augustine seems to deal with the same “just causes” as the Greek Fathers, even though he does not allow of their availableness as depriving untruths, spoken on such occasions, of their sinfulness. He mentions defence of life and of honour, and the safe custody of a secret. Also the great Anglican writers, who have followed the Greek Fathers, in defending untruths when there is the “just cause,” consider that “just cause” to be such as the preservation of life and property, defence of law, the good of others. Moreover, their moral rights, e.g. defence against the inquisitive, &c.

http://the-american-...ion/#more-28580

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[inquiringmind]

BTW: If history ever repeats itself, do you think a saint's communication should be "yea," or "nay" when the Gestapo knocks at the door and asks the saint who knows there are Jews next door if he knows where any are?

Do you think it would be a sin to say "yea," or a sin to say "nay"?

Once again, since the FAIR article says this (Regarding Exodus 3:17-18)

The “public stance” of Moses and the Israelite leaders is to be that they only want to go three days’ journey to sacrifice. So, here the Lord is advocating some degree of deception.

http://www.fairlds.o...rication#head08

And i presume we'd all agree that God doesn't lie, is it safe to say that not all deception is lying?

And is it possible there is some value in these observation?

ALMOST all authors, Catholic and Protestant, admit, that when a just cause is present, there is some kind or other of verbal misleading, which is not sin. Even silence is in certain cases virtually such a misleading, according to the Proverb, “Silence gives consent.” Again, silence is absolutely forbidden to a Catholic, as a mortal sin, under certain circumstances, e.g. to keep silence, when it is a duty to make a profession of faith.

Another mode of verbal misleading, and the most direct, is actually saying the thing that is not; and it is defended on the principle that such words are not a lie, when there is a “justa causa,” as killing is not murder in the case of an executioner.

Another ground of certain authors for saying that an untruth is not a lie where there is a just cause, is, that veracity is a kind of justice, and therefore, when we have no duty of justice to tell truth to another, it is no sin not to do so. Hence we may say the thing that is not, to children, to madmen, to men who ask impertinent questions, to those whom we hope to benefit by misleading.

http://the-american-...ion/#more-28580

Edited February 23, 2013 by inquiringmind

[kenporay]

Having reread some portions of exodus I see that you have drawn conclusions (more likely quoted someones else conclusions) which are not wholly supportable. I dont see where there was a plan to run away after a three day journey...my own conclusion, based upon the same evidence is that the request for time to journey and sacrifice was more likely a deminstration to help lower the ratings of egypt in the slaves.

Execution when performed by society for crime, is certainly not murder. One of my favorite examples of leadership is how geo washington handled a mutiny.

You quote bunches, though.