Deborah Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 Now, if you deny that men have libertarian free will, you open up another can of worms, such as the justice of punishing someone for doing something when they had no power to do otherwise (for starters).Where do you get that they had no power to do otherwise? They still have the power of choice and once again God knowing what the outcome will be doesn't change that choice for the person making it.
Zeta-Flux Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 zerinus,I changed the argument slightly. The part about God not lying is irrelevant. But it appears you took issue with a different part anyway, so let's explore that.You agree that God knew and revealed in the past information about the future. Would you also agree that this information was infallible?
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) Where do you get that they had no power to do otherwise? They still have the power of choice and once again God knowing what the outcome will be doesn't change that choice for the person making it.Deborah,Libertarian free will is the power to do otherwise than you actually do. If you don't have power to do other than what you actually do, then you are not free in the libertarian sense. If God has infallible foreknowledge, then you are not free in the libertarian sense, which means you do not have power to do other than you actually do.I wish to clarify another misconception. God's infallible foreknowledge, should he possess it, is logically incompatible with libertarian free will. This is not a causal relationship. This is an "if A, then it is not the case that not A is true" relationship. Edited March 23, 2012 by Log
Mudcat Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 The valid, and I believe sound, argument to show that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will is as follows: 1. It has always been true that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: Omnitemporality of Truth).2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any truth (Assumption: Infallible Foreknowledge).3. God has always believed that I will sin tomorrow (from 1 and 2).4. If God has always believed a certain thing, then it is not in anyone's power to do anything which entails that God has not always believed that thing (Assumption: Fixed Past).5. It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow (from 3 and 4).6. That I refrain from sinning tomorrow entails that God has not always believed that I will sin tomorrow (necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness).7. Therefore, it is not in my power to refrain from sinning tomorrow (from 5 and 6).8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow, then I also have it within my power to refrain from sinning (assumption libertarian free will).9. Therefore, I do not act freely when I sin tomorrow (from 7 and .The argument fails on 7. Specifically on "Therefore". "Therefore" points toward God causing you to sin tomorrow rather than any other possible reason for you to sin, like you freely choosing to sin. The argument still doesn't address foreknowledge in such a way that it specifically points to causation, also. You misappropriate free will in 8. Point 8 assumes that in order for free will to exist you have to have the power to actually act other than you would actually act. It's sort of like saying something like, "because I don't like oranges, I don't have free will."
zerinus Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 zerinus,I changed the argument slightly. The part about God not lying is irrelevant. But it appears you took issue with a different part anyway, so let's explore that.You agree that God knew and revealed in the past information about the future. Would you also agree that this information was infallible?I am typing this from my iPod lying in bed! So you will have to wait until tomorrow for a more complete answer. But to give a tentative answer, I would say yes, that information was infallible.
Deborah Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 I wish to clarify another misconception. God's infallible foreknowledge, should he possess it, is logically incompatible with libertarian free will. This is not a causal relationship. This makes no sense. You still have the choice to do either one. The fact that God know what you choose doesn't negate your choice.
rongo Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 I haven't read through the thread, so I apologize if this has already been brought up.Merely from the thread title, there is good scriptural precedent for sending people to report back not denoting lack of knowledge. Remember when John the Baptist sent his disciples to follow Jesus around and report back to him on what they witnessed? I don't think anyone would argue that he doubted Jesus and anxiously awaited their report so that he could assess/reassess. Wouldn't everyone agree that John sent them on this task *for them* ? They reported back about Jesus' miracles (their initial question was whether Jesus was the Messiah, or whether they should look/wait for another).I don't think it takes a great stretch to hold that God assigning His children to report back does not denote lack of knowledge on His part. In the Garden of Eden, when He asks Adam and Eve what they've been doing, does anyone seriously claim that He didn't know? Isn't it really a rhetorical question for their benefit (to give them the opportunity and occasion for reflection and accountability)?Wouldn't similar things be regarded as *for us* rather than reconnaisance or "fact-finding" missions for God?(I believe in limited foreknowledge, by the way, not absolute omniscience ----- I just wanted to point this out as far as the thread title goes).
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) Remember when John the Baptist sent his disciples to follow Jesus around and report back to him on what they witnessed? I don't think anyone would argue that he doubted Jesus and anxiously awaited their report so that he could assess/reassess. Actually, I have heard exactly that recently, strangely enough.I don't think it takes a great stretch to hold that God assigning His children to report back does not denote lack of knowledge on His part.The reason I chose the thread title is because I'm thinking the way God gathers information is by sending his servants to observe. Think "whether by my eyes, or by the eyes of my servants, it is the same."There are other thoughts I've had along these lines which I'm not sure I want to bring up... oh, what the hey.You know how our interactions with the servants of the Lord proceed in a hierarchical manner - is it possible that some of the revelations we receive are not directly from Father or Christ, but from another servant of lower station with jurisdiction over us, just like we don't have the Prophet in each ward, but deal rather with the Bishops and so forth? Edited March 23, 2012 by Log
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) This makes no sense. You still have the choice to do either one. The fact that God know what you choose doesn't negate your choice.Deborah,At this point, I'm not entirely sure what you mean, other than you deny the conclusion of the argument. I know you do, in fact, deny it. However, if the conclusion is false, then at least one of the premises must also be false. It is finding out which premises are false that is the work that must be done if you reject the conclusion of the argument.Or, you might consider that the argument might be correct. Edited March 23, 2012 by Log
TAO Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) Can you illustrate your point with an example?Well it depends on what you are talking about.In terms of most things having influenced consequences? Yes, I can show you that. You decide to make a decision your mother doesn't like, and she acts in a way that isn't very nice around you. Is she restricting your free will by not acting nice around you? Not really. She is merely making the consequences of one action more negative.In terms of free will of the compatibility of free will and foreknowledge? No, but kinda sorta in a way. Suppose that the same mother knew beforehand that you were going to do that, but still acted in the same way (that is, she acts in a way that isn't very nice). Is she restricting your free will? No. Even if she knew beforehand that you were going to do that, it isn't a restriction of free will, as you are still making the choice. Things can be known in advance, but it doesn't change the matter that we are all still making a choice and exerting the free will God gave us.What would be a restriction of free will, is God stepping in to stop something. Which he does occasionally. Are we unhappy about it? Not really... I actually appreciate it kind of. He has the higher goals in mind, and steps in only when it is necessary, which is fine for me. Edited March 23, 2012 by TAO
zerinus Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) Well it depends on what you are talking about.In terms of most things having influenced consequences? Yes, I can show you that. You decide to make a decision your mother doesn't like, and she acts in a way that isn't very nice around you. Is she restricting your free will by not acting nice around you? Not really. She is merely making the consequences of one action more negative.In terms of free will of the compatibility of free will and foreknowledge? No, but kinda sorta in a way. Suppose that the same mother knew beforehand that you were going to do that, but still acted in the same way (that is, she acts in a way that isn't very nice). Is she restricting your free will? No. Even if she knew beforehand that you were going to do that, it isn't a restriction of free will, as you are still making the choice. Things can be known in advance, but it doesn't change the matter that we are all still making a choice and exerting the free will God gave us.What would be a restriction of free will, is God stepping in to stop something. Which he does occasionally. Are we unhappy about it? Not really... I actually appreciate it kind of. He has the higher goals in mind, and steps in only when it is necessary, which is fine for me.In theological terms, freewill is intimately tied up with accountability. God Himself would not restrict our freewill, but where there are factors in this life which may limit the exercise of our freewill, God will not hold us accountable for those actions. Edited March 23, 2012 by zerinus
CV75 Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 Your statements do not ring true based on what God has already revealed. I can only go by what God has already revealed, and they are unequivocal that God has all knowledge past, present, and future; and that "he knoweth all things, and there is not anything save he knows it" (2 Nephi 9:20).That is fine for you to say that according to your understanding, but my question was:Do you see any way that God expands in knowledge, such as when He generates new exalted offspring and they in turn generate their own? Or, when in using faith in the creation process, He generates and experiences new knowledge with the realization of the end of that faith?Regarding such scriptures as 2 Nephi 9:20, to “know” means to possess “knowledge,” which is described in some places in scripture as something very different from how it is commonly used, just as the words “intelligence” and “light” are. I think “he knoweth all things, and there is not anything save he knows it" means He has “been there, done that” as far as mortal probation goes.
CV75 Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 I am not sure I am understanding the meaning you are trying to convey here; but if it is meant to imply that we are like the students sitting an exam, while God the examiner has done all he needs to do to enable us pass that test, but doesn't know who will pass and who won't; then I disagree with you. It contradicts what God has revealed about the foreknowledge of God.I am trying to convey that the word “knowledge” is described in some places in scripture as something very different from how it is commonly used, just as the words “intelligence” and “light” are. These definitions are fundamental to understanding “agency” and “existence.”The offending conclusion seems to be that where God uses His faith to create, His creations (forms of existence) represent new knowledge (forms of existence) to Him, and as the precursor of His perfect knowledge, His perfect faith is perfect “foreknowledge.”We have and exercise our agency no matter how much He knows.
Zeta-Flux Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 zerinus,Okay, so here is what I understand your current position to be.God sees the future in the past.It is impossible for this foreknowledge to be mistaken. God really does see the actual future.You also agree that it is impossible to change the past, which is fixed. So we cannot change what it is God saw.Therefore we cannot do other than what God saw us do. There is only one possible outcome.But you also agreed with libertarian free will: that freedom requires the power to do otherwise.Yet, apparently we don't have the power to do otherwise, since we don't have the power to change the past.In your response to me earlier you said it was possible for the atonement to fail. How so? God saw the future, and you admit that God's knowledge is infallible.You also say that (7) (in the previous numbering) did not follow. How so? How could Christ have had the power to change the past?
Deborah Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 It is finding out which premises are false that is the work that must be done if you reject the conclusion of the argument.The premise that is false is that God's foreknowledge limits our actions. The conclusion is that we have choice that is not affected by God's foreknowledge just because he knows the outcome. I really don't know what you want. 1
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) The premise that is false is that God's foreknowledge limits our actions. In this post, I gave the argument that infallible foreknowledge is logically incompatible with libertarian free will. Which premise said that God's infallible foreknowledge limited our actions? Because none of those premises, so far as I can tell, assert any such causal relationship.The conclusion is that we have choice that is not affected by God's foreknowledge just because he knows the outcome. I really don't know what you want.Simply to know which premise - 1 through 8 in the post linked to above - is in error, and why?The argument fails on 7. Specifically on "Therefore". "Therefore" points toward God causing you to sin tomorrow rather than any other possible reason for you to sin, like you freely choosing to sin. The argument still doesn't address foreknowledge in such a way that it specifically points to causation, also.You misappropriate free will in 8. Point 8 assumes that in order for free will to exist you have to have the power to actually act other than you would actually act. It's sort of like saying something like, "because I don't like oranges, I don't have free will."Hi Mudcat,Premise 7 follows directly from premises 5 and 6; in other words, if you accept 5 and 6, then you must accept 7. The word "therefore" simply means 7 is a conclusion that follows from the specific premises 5 and 6. The argument does not address causation at all. That's why I posted earlier "this is not a causal relationship." By way of (a maybe bad) example, 2 + 3 = 5, but 2 and 3 do not cause 5 to exist.With respect to 8, no, that's simply a particular definition of free will known as "libertarian free will." If you deny libertarian free will, then you are stuck having to explain the justice of punishing someone for actions wherein they had no power to do differently. Edited March 23, 2012 by Log
asbestosman Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 To be honest, even if we allow for God not to know the entire future with certainty I'm still not sure how libertarian free will could work. If we make choices according to deterministic rules, then we need to ask who set those rules. If it wasn't us then we didn't choose. If it was us, then we're still left with the question we're trying to answer: why did we choose the rules we chose (turtles all the way down)?If we choose randomly, then it's not libertarian free will. I must have missed a possibility, but I'm not sure what it is.
Zeta-Flux Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 asbestosman,Most philosophers nowadays reject libertarian free will, and some do it for the very reasons talk about.
wenglund Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 Then, like I have with Deborah, I invite you to show which of the premises of the argument Ostler makes are false.Specifically, which argument are you referring to? And, what part of it do you believe is in conflict with what I said?Thanks, -Wade Englund-
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 I can't imagine assigning moral culpability to a deterministic process, neither can I imagine assigning moral culpability to a random process. That might simply be a failure of imagination on my part.
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) Specifically, which argument are you referring to? And, what part of it do you believe is in conflict with what I said?Thanks, -Wade Englund-This argument. The conclusion of the argument is in conflict with what you claimed is your belief. The argument, of course, does not conflict with the fact that you hold that belief, so, in that sense, I believe none of the argument is in conflict with what you said, which was that you think you've said elsewhere that you hold that belief. Edited March 23, 2012 by Log
asbestosman Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) I can't imagine assigning moral culpability to a deterministic process, neither can I imagine assigning moral culpability to a random process. Me either, but I'm not sure what sort of thing would be neither deterministic nor random. One thing I have wondered about is whether something could be deterministic, but never have a beginning (so no initial state set by anything). Could such a thing be held morally culpable? If so, the LDS doctrine of pre-mortal existence becomes very interesting. Edited March 23, 2012 by asbestosman
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) An impasse, as it never becomes clear at what point or why moral culpability would ever be assigned to a process known to be deterministic, whatever the source of its initial state.Here's another question, inspired by the latest episode of Awake on Hulu - is it possible to design an experiment to confirm or disconfirm libertarian free will? Edited March 23, 2012 by Log
wenglund Posted March 23, 2012 Posted March 23, 2012 (edited) This argument. The conclusion of the argument is in conflict with what you claimed is your belief. The argument, of course, does not conflict with the fact that you hold that belief, so, in that sense, I believe none of the argument is in conflict with what you said, which was that you think you've said elsewhere that you hold that belief.Blake's argument only speaks to "tomorrow." In order for it to conflict with what I said, then his argument would likewise have to speak to and apply to "yesterday." Does it?By applying Blake's argument to the past, I believe the flaws in his argument will be made self-evident.Thanks, -Wade Englund- Edited March 23, 2012 by wenglund
Log Posted March 23, 2012 Author Posted March 23, 2012 Wade, to be blunt: I haven't a clue what you're talking about.
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