Why Did God Create Some Humans Only To Damn Them?

[johndoe]

I accept both determinism and free will. God is sovereign, and yet holds His creation accountable for its actions, for sin.

I'm afraid I'm still not certain I follow you.

If you accept determinism, together with God's omniscience and omnipotence, then it seems to me that this is functionally equivalent to the Reformed view of election. I don't see that free will plays a role here that is any different than man's freedom per a Reformed understanding.

Are you familiar with Plantinga's theodicy in response to the Problem of Evil? It hinges on our having free will being of more intrinsic value than the loss of the souls that do not end up with salvation.

Perhaps I could sum this up with a couple of questions that may help clarify things for me. Do you believe that God wants all to be saved? If so, then why aren't all saved?

Pulling from one of your later posts:

Is the response due to a person's ability to respond in faith to the grace of God in recognition of his inability to be righteous and subsequent regeneration by grace through faith, or does God automatically regenerate or damn those who were chosen from before the foundation of the earth, regardless of their culpability?

I would say that with God's omniscience and accepting determinism, the response in either view is ultimately due to God's choice, either through direct decision or by the mechanics of creation of the individual (i.e. God could have chosen to create the individual in such a way the he/she would have responded or not).

[Alma Bound]

I'm afraid I'm still not certain I follow you.

If you accept determinism, together with God's omniscience and omnipotence, then it seems to me that this is functionally equivalent to the Reformed view of election. I don't see that free will plays a role here that is any different than man's freedom per a Reformed understanding.

The difference, I think, is in whether the "elect" is individual or corporate. If corporate, faith becomes the means through which one enters into the elect, has access to grace.

An example could be seen in Ruth, who "became part" of Israel:

Ruth 1:14 And they lifted up their voice, and wept again: and Orpah kissed her mother in law; but Ruth clave unto her.

15 And she said, Behold, thy sister in law is gone back unto her people, and unto her gods: return thou after thy sister in law.

16 And Ruth said, Intreat me not to leave thee, or to return from following after thee: for whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge: thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God:

In this sense, the elect is Israel, and Ruth, a non-Israelite, has become one with the Israel by faith and not birth.

From a Reformed standpoint, Ruth could be seen as depraved, unable to make herself clean, unable to "elect" herself, because the elect is Israel and not her as an individual. Yet she has been granted access to enter into the elect by faith, as was her sister-in-law, who did not enter, but went back to live with her family.

1 Peter 2:6 Wherefore also it is contained in the scripture, Behold, I lay in Sion a chief corner stone, elect, precious: and he that believeth on him shall not be confounded.

In this sense, I see "entering into" the elect as something people are enabled to do and held accountable if the person does not do so.

Another example could be seen in Israel in the desert - there was grumbling, with some wanting to return to Egypt rather than proceed into the promised land. I see this as a desire to return to a righteousness is attained through efforts to be obedient to the law and not entering into the promised land - which could be seen allegorically as entering into the elect - by faith.

Are you familiar with Plantinga's theodicy in response to the Problem of Evil? It hinges on our having free will being of more intrinsic value than the loss of the souls that do not end up with salvation.

I haven't read Plantinga's work, though I skimmed one of his papers, "Free Will Defense." Thanks for pointing his work out to me, it looks interesting.

In "Free Will Defense," Plantinga asks the question of why God would allow evil, and while I haven't taken the time to thoroughly study his paper, what immediately leapt to my mind was the following:

Deuteronomy 13:3 Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the LORD your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul.

I don't know if Plantinga references Deut 13 in his paper, but as part of a "Free Will Defense," I think an argument could be made for God allowing evil in the world to "test" His creation, to "prove" whether we love the Lord with all our heart and all our soul.

Perhaps I could sum this up with a couple of questions that may help clarify things for me. Do you believe that God wants all to be saved? If so, then why aren't all saved?

We are going to be judged on that day; some love the darkness rather than the light.

John 3:17 For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved.

18 He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.

19 And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.

I read this as while all are able to respond to the light, some love darkness rather than light, and therefore do not enter.

I would say that with God's omniscience and accepting determinism, the response in either view is ultimately due to God's choice, either through direct decision or by the mechanics of creation of the individual (i.e. God could have chosen to create the individual in such a way the he/she would have responded or not).

I can agree with this assessment - the second definition is most interesting to me.

I hope this helps better explain my position.

What happened to cksalmon? Is he around?

[johndoe]

Thanks for the response. I think the 2 questions I had have been the most helpful for me.

In response to them:

Perhaps I could sum this up with a couple of questions that may help clarify things for me. Do you believe that God wants all to be saved? If so, then why aren't all saved?

You wrote:

We are going to be judged on that day; some love the darkness rather than the light.

I read this as while all are able to respond to the light, some love darkness rather than light, and therefore do not enter.

I feel like we have come full circle. This gets at what I perceive to be a logical inconsistency. Why do some love darkness rather than light? If we follow the deterministic causal chain, we inevitably come to God, the First Cause. So we have a situation where God desires that all be saved, yet is unable to acheive that desire (and in fact, acts in such a way that His own desire is frustrated). I find no logical reason why God couldn't create everyone such that they freely choose the light rather than the darkness (accepting creatio ex-nihilo and God's classical omnipotence and omniscience, together with a compatibilist view). This is, in fact, the problem that Plantinga addresses. By the way, Plantinga is a philosopher, not a theologian. He approaches the issue from a purely philosophical standpoint. No scriptures are referenced that I recall.

It also seems problematic to me to assert both that all are actually able to respond to the light and (through acceptance of determinism) that there are some who really cannot respond to the light based on the causal chain that leads them to choose darkness. My own view runs up against this one. When I speak in terms of all being able to choose between good and evil, I generally do so in the sense that we don't know what the outcome will be, and whatever choice we make will be consistent with our characters. Perhaps you meant this in a similar way.

In a prior discussion with rhinomelon about this, he made some statements that struck me as very libertarian. I think this is where I got the idea that Arminians embraced libertarian free will.

What happened to cksalmon? Is he around?

Perhaps busy with the holiday? I'm guessing he may have travelled for Thanksgiving. I imagine he'll pop in within a few days.

[Alma Bound]

I feel like we have come full circle. This gets at what I perceive to be a logical inconsistency. Why do some love darkness rather than light? If we follow the deterministic causal chain, we inevitably come to God, the First Cause. So we have a situation where God desires that all be saved, yet is unable to acheive that desire (and in fact, acts in such a way that His own desire is frustrated).

Or allows resistance in order to test or prove His creation.

What are your views on "soft determinism?"

It also seems problematic to me to assert both that all are actually able to respond to the light and (through acceptance of determinism) that there are some who really cannot respond to the light based on the causal chain that leads them to choose darkness.

To my mind, it is not that they "cannot," rather that they "do not." I don't believe we have been constructed in such a way that we cannot come to the light, nor do I think we are coerced to come to the light. From a soft-determinist point of view, all are "drawn" to the light, rather than coerced or forced, as would be the case from a "hard-determinist" point of view.

My own view runs up against this one. When I speak in terms of all being able to choose between good and evil, I generally do so in the sense that we don't know what the outcome will be, and whatever choice we make will be consistent with our characters. Perhaps you meant this in a similar way.

I see choosing between good and evil and having faith in what has been done for someone in a salvific sense as distinct issues - separate, yet related.

In the letter to the Romans, this line may be of interest in helping explain my position:

Romans 7:18 For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not.

The person speaking wants to do good, but how to go about doing good seems to escape him. He desires to do good, even delights in the law, but cannot find it within him to carry out the good.

In both Calvinist and Arminian thought, this inability to do good - in the sense of perfection through obedience to the law - is due to his fallen nature.

This is also why I do not think of faith as a meritorious work of righteousness. Faith in a righteousness that is given rather than earned is not a work, rather it seems to be a response to an awareness that one cannot perform the required work - perfect righteousness in obedience to the law - through his own efforts.

[cksalmon]

Hi Bernard--

I invited you to start this thread, and I've yet to respond several days later. That's due, partly, to a sort of Calvinism overload, so to speak, on my part (one gets tired discussing the same things--both here and mostly elsewhere), and partly because I wanted to hang back and see what other sorts of responses the thread would generate.

Let me attempt briefly to state a summary of the "hardcore" Calvinistic answer to your question that first got me over the hurdle of my objection to a thoroughgoing Calvinism, so-called. It's a distillation of the answer proposed by Puritan pastor Jonathan Edwards. It's an answer he drew from Romans 9.

Some brief notes:

I take the question in Romans 9.22-23 to be largely rhetorical, rather hypothetical (as did Edwards). Here're the verses:

22 What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, 23 in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory--

What I mean is that I don't take Paul here as suggesting the conditional, "What if God did X; what would thereby be entailed?" or some such. Rather, I take him here as introducing a difficult idea rhetorically. We might, on this reading, paraphrase him as saying, "God did/does X. Have you considered that?" I believe reading the above verses in context makes this fairly clear, though not uncontroversial.

A propositional rephrasing:

(1) God prepared vessels for destruction because he desired to show his wrath (against sin).

(2) God prepared vessels of mercy to make known (to reveal) the riches of his mercy.

What Edwards drew from this understanding of Romans 9.22-23 (and its surrounding context) was something like what this:

God desires to reveal two things about himself (surely, there are more, but these are the relevant attributes from this passage): (1) that he is utterly opposed to, different than, and wrathful against sinners (which I think can be construed broadly as that which is opposed to him); and, (2) that he is merciful to sinners.

The only context in which these two self-revelatory desires can be realized is within a matrix of sin. In order for God's wrath against sin and mercy toward sinners to have proper objects, sin (and sinners) must be.

God's wrath against sin is demonstrated first in the death of his son and secondarily in the damnation of those who are not identified with his son. God's mercy toward sinners is demonstrated first in the atoning death of his son for the elect and secondarily in the eternal lives of his elect as he transforms them (from one degree of glory to another--heh) into the image of his son.

So, God creates some destined for damnation in order to demonstrate his wrath against what is unholy. God creates some destined for eternal life in order to demonstrate his undeserved mercy toward sinners who would otherwise be damned for their unholiness.

For Edwards, then, the point of the creation was to reveal God's characteristics to his creatures.

The obvious objection is neatly summarized by Paul: "You will say to me then, 'Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?'"

Why indeed?

Paul's answer is something of a non-answer: "But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, 'Why have you made me like this?' Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honored use and another for dishonorable use?"

In other words, God does as he pleases and to question his fairness in the disposition of his sovereign will is impudent.

As I said, that's the explanation that initially won me over from sort of a latent Calvinism to more thoroughgoing form. It's not as neat and tidy as it once seemed to me, but I still take it as something of a working hypothesis.

Best.

CKS

[cksalmon]

Hi Alma Bound--

I'd like to echo a question posed by johndoe. I'm also unsure what it would mean for an Arminian to affirm a compatibilist view of human agency.

As I take it, the point of compatibilism is to reconcile belief in causal divine determinism with the lack of libertarian free will. So, I must say, I'm a bit confused as to how you're using the term here.

Best.

CKS

[Alma Bound]

Hi Alma Bound--

I'd like to echo a question posed by johndoe. I'm also unsure what it would mean for an Arminian to affirm a compatibilist view of human agency.

As I take it, the point of compatibilism is to reconcile belief in causal divine determinism with the lack of libertarian free will. So, I must say, I'm a bit confused as to how you're using the term here.

Best.

CKS

Hi CKS,

From my point of view, a compatibilist definition of free will states that free will is not the ability to choose completely free from prior cause, but that a person is not forced or coerced to make a choice.

In other words, a person could choose to read this post, and it could be argued that the choice to do so was determined from the beginning of time that he or she would read it, but the person was still not forced or coerced to decide to read it, and in that sense, the person is free to do so.

There are causal factors that led the person to come to this message board and influenced the person to open and read this post. You could have heard about Mormonism from a co-worker, or from a missionary, and decided to come and "check it out" on this message board. There are any number of different causal factors which influenced your decision to come here.

In terms of those causal factors, I see a parallel in God influencing His creation to conform to His will, not through a hard-determinist point of view in that the person was not free to make a choice, but rather that God created mankind with the ability to believe and respond to Him.

God may have known from the beginning of time who would believe the gospel, but having a foreknowledge of who does so, to my mind, is not the same as forcing or coercing a person to do so.

I think of it like this, God created mankind with the ability to reason, with a conscience, to hear, to read, understand and respond to His promptings - all causal factors in creation. Another causal factor in this relationship is the law - there is an emphasis on the moral in God's dealing with mankind, mankind will be held accountable for our actions. He has influenced His creation through the use of the law and other factors such as reason, etc, to prompt His creation to turn to Him for salvation.

Yet this is not a forced response, people retain the ability to resist His promptings, to resist the Holy Spirit.

By way of a probably woefully inadequate illustration, it could be said that man, due to his fallen nature, is inside of a dark, closed room, but he can see enough to read a note that says there is a window and has the ability to hear when another man comes into the room who had been in the room before points out to him that there is a window with a shade that, when opened, will allow light into the room. The person, having been influenced by the words he reads and even another man telling him, is under no coercion to open the window or leave it shut, but has been influenced through causal factors that will lead him to a decision - he can either open the window or stay in the dark. The causal factors for his decision are not limited to the external word on the note and by the messenger, he is also influenced by the things he has been doing in the dark, and whether he wants the light to expose those things.

In this way, mankind has been influenced by causal factors, from a soft-determinist point of view, and yet can be justly held accountable before God because his decisions were free in the sense that they were not forced or coerced.

[johndoe]

Yet this is not a forced response, people retain the ability to resist His promptings, to resist the Holy Spirit.

In this way, mankind has been influenced by causal factors, from a soft-determinist point of view, and yet can be justly held accountable before God because his decisions were free in the sense that they were not forced or coerced.

Hi Alma Bound,

I'll respond to this post. Your last post to me additionally addressed what it means to choose/resist light, which I equate to choosing good/evil. I did mean this in the same sense that you proposed - a choice of whether to receive or resist divine will/influence, rather than choosing to perform or refrain from good acts based on one's independent understanding of what is good.

Now, regarding soft determinism, this is what I adhere to. As a compatibilist, I do agree that while our decisions are completely caused, they still can be free in the sense that they are not the result of coercion. I would express this simply as being consistent with the nature of the individual. Ultimately, for both the LDS view and (Reformed and Arminian) nonLDS Christian views, one cannot choose one's own nature. In that sense, I think the way I view our freedom is consistent with our freedom per Reformed thought. This is not the issue that I was discussing, however.

I am more concerned with logical consistency of the view in question from the point of view of God's actions, not man's freedom.

Consider the following:

1. God desires the salvation of all humans.

2. God is omniscient, omnipotent and creates ex-nihilo.

3. Determinism is true.

4. Not all humans achieve salvation.

It seems to me that 4 is not logically consistent with 1, 2 and 3. What prevents God from achieving His desire that all humans be saved? At this point I expect an Arminian to object that God doesn't coerce anyone into choosing light rather than darkness, but allows everyone to exercise free will. So in that sense, it would seem that 1 would be modified to state:

*1. God desires that all humans freely choose salvation.

It seems to me that 4 is still not logically consistent with *1, 2 and 3. Per soft determinism, each chooses or rejects the light based on the causal chain leading up to that choice, consistent with his/her nature. I'll call a nature that chooses light a salvific nature. However, God has chosen at the moment of creation of each individual whether to give said individual a salvific nature or not, knowing full well in that moment his/her eternal destiny. So for those that are eventually damned, why couldn't God have chosen to give them a salvific nature at the moment of their creation?

From past discussions, it has seemed to me that Arminians try to accept both determinism and libertarian free will, though acceptance of determinism has been denied (from my previous experience). From the current discussion, it appears as if you openly embrace determinism, but seem to want to retain at least the Principle of Alternate Possibilites from libertarian free will. At least, that is my impression.

[Alma Bound]

From past discussions, it has seemed to me that Arminians try to accept both determinism and libertarian free will, though acceptance of determinism has been denied (from my previous experience). From the current discussion, it appears as if you openly embrace determinism, but seem to want to retain at least the Principle of Alternate Possibilites from libertarian free will. At least, that is my impression.

You've summed up my position fairly well, with the exception of libertarian free will - I agree with your thought here with regard to a compatibilist view:

As a compatibilist, I do agree that while our decisions are completely caused, they still can be free in the sense that they are not the result of coercion. I would express this simply as being consistent with the nature of the individual. Ultimately, for both the LDS view and (Reformed and Arminian) nonLDS Christian views, one cannot choose one's own nature. In that sense, I think the way I view our freedom is consistent with our freedom per Reformed thought.

Libertarian free will is incompatibile with a world-view that accepts causal relationships - those that result in faith - between a creator and the created.

I don't think those who believe are somehow given a "salvific nature" from the moment of creation. Rather, all have been given a nature that is able to respond to God, though it is a fallen nature.

In Titus, we're told:

Titus 3:3 For we ourselves also were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful, and hating one another.

4 But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared,

5 Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost;

The way I read this is it is the love of God towards us, in spite of what we have done, that influences us to respond to His love and mercy.

I'll take a closer look at the remainder of your position - I understand the gist of it and will endeavor to explain how classical Arminianism is not Pelagianism, that man somehow has salvific power within himself through his own efforts, because that is not my position.

Man cannot save himself, for God is salvation.

More later,

AB

[cksalmon]

You've summed up my position fairly well, with the exception of libertarian free will - I agree with your thought here with regard to a compatibilist view:

Libertarian free will is incompatibile with a world-view that accepts causal relationships - those that result in faith - between a creator and the created.

I don't think those who believe are somehow given a "salvific nature" from the moment of creation. Rather, all have been given a nature that is able to respond to God, though it is a fallen nature.

In Titus, we're told:

The way I read this is it is the love of God towards us, in spite of what we have done, that influences us to respond to His love and mercy.

I'll take a closer look at the remainder of your position - I understand the gist of it and will endeavor to explain how classical Arminianism is not Pelagianism, that man somehow has salvific power within himself through his own efforts, because that is not my position.

Man cannot save himself, for God is salvation.

More later,

AB

Hey AB--

While the above is directed at John, I'd like to clarify something further if you don't mind.

I don't think John is suggesting (and I certainly don't believe) that Arminianism, properly understood, constitutes a form of Pelagianism. (On on a bad day, I might suspect it to be a very weakened sort of semi-Pelagianism, but I certainly don't expect you to take that as an accurate summary of your belief. And I don't really think it's accurate, either, for what it's worth.)

Believing the gospel/accepting the gospel is not "a work."

My own position (or at least the thoroughgoing Calvinistic position) is that God eternally predestines some to salvation and some to reprobation. All whom God has elected to salvation will unfailingly be saved. All whom God has elected to reprobation will unfailingly be damned. God's election is active rather than passive. It is not that he merely foreknows the future, but that he causally determines the future.

Compatibilism is invoked at this point precisely because the outcome is predetermined and yet man is described as choosing and, indeed, commanded to choose salvation. If one's salvific endpoint is predetermined by God, how can one choose? The compatibilist would suggest that we have freedom in our choices just so long as we are able to choose what we most desire at any given time, regardless that the totality of our choices are predetermined by God.

Thus, on compatibilist view of human agency, it is not actually possible (ultimately) for an elect individual to successfully resist God's drawing (the logical possibility of such notwithstanding).

Does the above square with your understanding?

Best.

CKS

[johndoe]

Hey AB--

While the above is directed at John, I'd like to clarify something further if you don't mind.

I don't think John is suggesting (and I certainly don't believe) that Arminianism, properly understood, constitutes a form of Pelagianism. (On on a bad day, I might suspect it to be a very weakened sort of semi-Pelagianism, but I certainly don't expect you to take that as an accurate summary of your belief. And I don't really think it's accurate, either, for what it's worth.)

Thank you Chris. You have understood me correctly - I am not proposing that Arminianism is a form of Pelagianism. Perhaps my choice of words regarding the nature of those who choose not to resist divine influence was unfortunate, but I did not mean to imply that such individuals possess saving power within themselves.

[Alma Bound]

Believing the gospel/accepting the gospel is not "a work."

Hi CKS,

I completely agree here.

My own position (or at least the thoroughgoing Calvinistic position) is that God eternally predestines some to salvation and some to reprobation. All whom God has elected to salvation will unfailingly be saved. All whom God has elected to reprobation will unfailingly be damned. God's election is active rather than passive. It is not that he merely foreknows the future, but that he causally determines the future.

I understand.

I think where we differ is in exactly who the elect is - I see the elect in a corporate sense - I believe that, on a large scale, Jesus is the elect, and those who are "in Him," are in Him by faith and not by any works of their own. It is being by "in Him," the elect Israel of God, that one is saved, relying upon His imputed righteousness within them and not their own.

Isaiah 42:1 Behold my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my spirit upon him: he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles.

Isaiah is talking of the Messiah here, of Jesus. And below we are told that we are "in" Christ, and if in Him, then we are in Abraham's seed and heirs, even joint-heirs according to the promise, and not according to our righteous works (as seen in Romans):

Galatians 3: 28 There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.

29 And if ye be Christâ??s, then are ye Abrahamâ??s seed, and heirs according to the promise.

Reprobation, from this view, can be seen as those who refuse to come to the elect to be saved, but rather rely upon their own righteousness, in a sense, or disregard any sense of righteousness whatsoever through the "searing of their conscience." From a compatibilist point of view, they do not desire righteousness.

The reprobate are said to be "given over" because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge:

Romans 1:28 And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient;

It is a direct cause and effect - they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, so they were "given over" to a reprobate mind.

Compatibilism is invoked at this point precisely because the outcome is predetermined and yet man is described as choosing and, indeed, commanded to choose salvation.

I think it is the outcome that is foreseen - what is predetermined is those who by faith are in Christ who is the elect will be saved.

If one's salvific endpoint is predetermined by God, how can one choose? The compatibilist would suggest that we have freedom in our choices just so long as we are able to choose what we most desire at any given time, regardless that the totality of our choices are predetermined by God.

Thus, on compatibilist view of human agency, it is not actually possible (ultimately) for an elect individual to successfully resist God's drawing (the logical possibility of such notwithstanding).

Forgive me, but this sounds like it leans more towards a hard-determinist position, in which the agent is ultimately somehow coerced. In a soft-determinist position, an agent is able to resist and not "enter into the light," into Christ the elect, by faith. And from the Romans 1;28 point of view, this is due to their own unwillingness to retain a knowledge of God, though they have been constructed to do so, and even influenced by God through nature, so that none will have any excuse.

Seen from a compatibilist point of view - that in which the choices are made according to desire and not coerced:

compatibilist would suggest that we have freedom in our choices just so long as we are able to choose what we most desire at any given time

I would respond, blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be filled. They desire righteousness, and though they may not have it within them, they will be filled, whereas those who do not desire to retain a knowledge of God, are given over to a reprobate mind.

[cksalmon]

...

Forgive me, but this sounds like it leans more towards a hard-determinist position, in which the agent is ultimately somehow coerced. In a soft-determinist position, an agent is able to resist and not "enter into the light," into Christ the elect, by faith. And from the Romans 1;28 point of view, this is due to their own unwillingness to retain a knowledge of God, though they have been constructed to do so, and even influenced by God through nature, so that none will have any excuse.

Seen from a compatibilist point of view - that in which the choices are made according to desire and not coerced.

Hi AB--

I would characterize my position as merely a deterministic view simpliciter (rather than a "hard determinism" vis-a-vis "soft determinism").

I'm not sure what it would mean for one to believe in divine determinism if one doesn't believe that God ordains all things--and instead believes that man's choice, independent of a supervening decree of God, determines one's salvation.

I'm not sure how you're using the term 'soft' determinism, I think. To my understanding, the soft determinist merely denies that inexorable causal chains render a given act unfree (or, indeed, coerced). Thus, the soft determinist is a compabilist by virtue of the fact that he views all humans acts as both caused (in our discussion, by God) and yet free.

At any rate, I'll let it rest. I appreciate your input.

Best.

CKS

[gadianton]

The following quote is from a Church article I found on lds.org.

QUOTE

"We do not believe in a deterministic Godâ??that is, one who determines in advance the eventual fate of His children. Rather, we believe in a God who has perfect foreknowledge of the choices His children will make. He may use this foreknowledge to guide us or even to warn us, but He does not use it to preempt our agency. He allows us to become what we truly desire to become. As Elder James E. Talmage (1862â??1933) of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles wrote: â??[God] knows what each will do under given conditions, and sees the end from the beginning. His foreknowledge is based on intelligence and reason. He foresees the future as a state which naturally and surely will be; not as one which must be because He has arbitrarily willed that it shall be.â? 1

Most Christian churches believe God created His children ex nihiloâ??out of nothing. If this were true, then God might be held accountable for any evil we would do because He created us with flaws and weaknesses. But we know our Heavenly Father did not create us out of nothing, and He is not responsible for our weaknesses or sins. He merely places us, His spirit children, in spheres where we can learn and grow by exercising our agency, if we employ it correctly." (â??The Fulness of the Gospel: Agency,â? Ensign, Mar 2006, 18â??19)

Seems to be a distinction without a difference.

[johndoe]

I'm not sure how you're using the term 'soft' determinism, I think. To my understanding, the soft determinist merely denies that inexorable causal chains render a given act unfree (or, indeed, coerced). Thus, the soft determinist is a compabilist by virtue of the fact that he views all humans acts as both caused (in our discussion, by God) and yet free.

I agree with the above. It feels like Alma Bound may have a somewhat different understanding. I don't view any given individual's being unable to act contrary to that which is caused by God's initial creative act as being contrary to a soft determinist view, since it doesn't strike me as coercive.

[johndoe]

Seems to be a distinction without a difference.

I find a significant difference - not in the freedom that we enjoy, but rather in the degree of responsibility that can be attributed to God for the existence of evil.

[Bernard Gui]

In other words, God does as he pleases and to question his fairness in the disposition of his sovereign will is impudent.

As I said, that's the explanation that initially won me over from sort of a latent Calvinism to more thoroughgoing form. It's not as neat and tidy as it once seemed to me, but I still take it as something of a working hypothesis.

If I understand you, the short answer is, "Yes, God creates some humans

for damnation, and they are impudent if they object."

Is this correct?

Bernard

[Helmuth]

FWIW, I am an LDS determinist.

What does this mean?

[johndoe]

What does this mean?

(Just in case, FWIW means For what it's worth...)

This was my answer to Paul when he wanted to know more about my views:

Of course we LDS believe solidly in free will, so I am a compatibilist. Still, I personally see no evidence in the scriptures that the sort of free will we enjoy must necessarily be libertarian. I hold to the view that limiting God's omniscience and accepting libertarian free will is less compatible with the scriptures than holding a deterministic view together with God's (classical) omniscience. It seems to me that adding the apparent randomness that libertarian free will requires doesn't truly add to freedom in any significant sense.

It also seems to me that the Arminian view has problems with logical consistency that the Reformed view does not.

The last sentence led to the latest discussion.

[Helmuth]

(Just in case, FWIW means For what it's worth...)

This was my answer to Paul when he wanted to know more about my views:

The last sentence led to the latest discussion.

Does that mean: "We have freedom to choose, but God, being all-knowing, knows exactly what we are going to choose, and what is going to happen in the future"? Or put another way "Anything can happen, but only one thing will"?

[cksalmon]

If I understand you, the short answer is, "Yes, God creates some humans

for damnation, and they are impudent if they object."

Is this correct?

Bernard

Well, I think for Paul that the impudence comes in when man, in general, presumes to critique God's actions.

But, yes, that's close to being the very short, rather acontextual, answer.

Best.

CKS

[johndoe]

Does that mean: "We have freedom to choose, but God, being all-knowing, knows exactly what we are going to choose, and what is going to happen in the future"? Or put another way "Anything can happen, but only one thing will"?

I would say that's fairly accurate.

[Bernard Gui]

Well, I think for Paul that the impudence comes in when man, in general, presumes to critique God's actions.

Is the statement, "Why did you create me for damnation?" impudent?

But, yes, that's close to being the very short, rather acontextual, answer.

Well, I guess that's what I am hoping for - A short answer that anyone can

understand. There have been some very lengthy and convoluted responses, some with questionable scriptural reference. From your answer, I detect some dissatisfaction with the short "yes." Can you express the answer contextually in a short paragraph?

Does God create some humans only to damn them?

Bernard

[cksalmon]

Is the statement, "Why did you create me for damnation?" impudent?

Hi Bernard--

(Emailed the family artist, by the way. Thanks.)

Let me attempt an answer to this first question first.

I'm not sure that I'd characterize that particular question as impudent. I think I would consider it misguided, in the light of Romans 9. Paul is dealing with a more general question--not, "Why did God create me for damnation (or, indeed, for salvation)?" but rather, "How can God find fault with man if he [God] ultimately determines man's fate?" That's a different question, to my mind.

To ask the question you've posed, one would need to assume: (1) God created me; (2) God created me for damnation.

My counter questions would be: (3) Do you believe that God created you for damnation? If not, then the question is probably not particularly germane. (And I do realize that your asking that question sort of rhetorically while assuming, for the sake of argument, a Calvinistic view of salvation as well as a traditionally-Christian rejection of Mormonism, but still.) (4) Why, ex hypothesi, would you think God created you personally for damnation (not that you personally, currently believe this. I realize you're asking in light of Calvinistic framework)? Is it because traditional Christianity rejects Mormonism? That may or may not be a germane consideration, depending on a whole host of ancillary questions and issues.

I don't and wouldn't presume to suggest that God created you, Bernard Gui, for damnation. I don't know that. I'd suggest, though, that merely by the act of posing the question you have changed your relationship to the question. In other words, from a Calvinistic perspective, the question ceases to be, "Why did God create me for damnation?" and becomes something more like, "How do I make my calling and election [to salvation] sure?"

Frankly, I don't know that, if I believed that I had been predestined to damnation, I'd view the question, "Why did God predestine me for damnation?" to be impudent. But, again, that's not the question Paul places on the lips of his hypothetical interlocutors. The question is something like, "Why does he find fault if no one can resist his will?" Again, that's a different question.

I hope I don't come across as dodging the issue. I'm just attempting, perhaps feebly, to contextualize it.

Best. (And more to come.)

CKS