smac97

Have you ever taken one of those personality tests that tries to give you insights into why you are the way you are? You have made a number of attempts to steer the discussion about the topics - the Kansas law, men in women's bathrooms, etc. - toward inquiries and critiques of me as a person, my motives, and so on. I’m happy to keep the discussion on the policy itself: whether sex or identity should be the criterion for these spaces. Personality diagnostics aren’t required for that. Thank you, but I am not interested. I would prefer to discuss the topic(s) at hand. Thanks, -Smac

But if the point of the law is to increase both the safety and the perception of safety for women and girls in general, Yes. Here you refer to women who have taken cosmetic, medical and sartorial measures to deliberately appear and "identify" as men, correct? The category of persons excluded from women's bathrooms under the Kansas law is: males. A statistically small percentage of males have taken cosmetic, medical and sartorial measures to deliberately appear and "identify" as women. However, the Kansas law is categorical, and so does not apply only to these men. Your question assumes the policy requires people who “look predominantly male” to use the women’s room. That is not what a sex-based rule does. A sex-based rule requires people to use the facility that matches their sex. Biological females use the women’s facility; biological males use the men’s. Appearance is not the criterion. Most biological females do not look predominantly male, and the ordinary social and visual cues that have always operated in sex-separated spaces continue to function. I acknowledge that edge cases exist, that is, biological women who are tall, broad-shouldered, have a deeper voice, or otherwise present in ways some people may find ambiguous. Those individuals can encounter awkwardness or unfair scrutiny under any system that notices sex. That is a real cost, and it should be acknowledged, and I do. However, it does not convert the rule into a requirement that males use the women’s room, nor does it erase the reason the spaces were separated in the first place. The safety and privacy interests that justify sex separation are tied to sex-based patterns of strength, criminality, and vulnerability in spaces involving undress, not to a pure "appearance" test. A rule that tracks sex still serves those interests for the large majority of women and girls even if a small number of females occasionally draw second looks. Replacing the sex criterion with self-identification or appearance would admit men into the space, which is the outcome the safety rationale is meant to avoid. In short, the policy requires people to use the facility that matches their sex. Residual social friction for a small number persons is a genuine downside worth managing with good complaint procedures and common sense. But I think it is not a reason to abandon the sex-based boundary that protects the group for whom the spaces were created: women and girls. Thanks, -Smac

The Constitutionality of the law itself matters, too. You are quite right. I think we may differ on what the outcome of a constitutional challenge might be. Not really. Difficult, perhaps. But not "impossible." Do you think women and girls who want sex-segregated bathrooms, but who are in jurisdictions which allow men de jure or de facto access to women's bathrooms are "in an impossible situation"? I would like to better understand what you are saying here. "{T}hey'll predictably need to explain to terrified women and cops that they are 'women'" because they (the women in your photos) look like men, right? Aren't women being "terrified" about men in women's bathrooms now? Consider a situation where (A) people who look like men and (B) are actually women going into women's spaces which (C) "predictably" results in "terrified women," which circumstance (D) you presumably feel is problematic. Am I correct in understanding your position? Alternatively, consider a situation where (A) people who look like men and (B) are actually men going into women's spaces which (C) also "predictably" results in "terrified women," which circumstance (D) you presumably feel is not problematic. Again, am I correct in understanding your position? Yes. So as between the seemingly competing and incompatible interests and preferences of (A) biological women and girls and (B) biological males who, having taken cosmetic, medical and sartorial measures to deliberately appear and "identify" as women, which set of interests and preferences should prevail? In my view, I think the prevailing group should be the one for whom sex-segregated spaces were created: biological women and girls. In your view, I surmise that you feel that the opposite should hold, or else that there should be no legal steps taken at all. Is that a fair characterization? The ACLU of Kansas statement is advocacy rhetoric, not a developed legal brief. Its core constitutional assertions are: The law constitutes “governmental overreach” that the Kansas Constitution protects against. It undermines “strong constitutional protections” and subjects people to “unacceptable privacy violations.” Discriminatory laws of this type “violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by the state constitution.” AFAIK, a freestanding “right to use the restroom matching one’s gender identity” has not been recognized as a fundamental right under the U.S. or Kansas Constitutions in a way that would trigger strict scrutiny for this kind of rule. I assume the ACLU will be making an "Equal Protection" argument, namely, that the the law classifies on the basis of transgender status and therefore requires heightened constitutional scrutiny. I'm not sure that works. The Kansas law classifies on the basis of biological sex (not "gender identity"), which is an established, constitutionally permissible basis for separating intimate facilities and for recording sex on identity documents. Whether intermediate scrutiny applies, and whether the state’s interests in privacy, safety, and accurate identification satisfy it, is the real legal battleground. Multiple federal circuits and state courts have upheld analogous sex-based facility and records rules, while some others have been more skeptical. The issue remains unsettled at the Supreme Court level in the precise posture of bathroom access and driver’s-license markers. Sex classifications typically receive intermediate scrutiny. The state interests in bodily privacy, safety in spaces involving undress, and administrative clarity are, I think, the kind of interests the Court has historically treated as important. A SCOTUS majority would probably find those interests sufficiently served by a sex-based rule and uphold it. The Court is unlikely to hold that “gender identity” itself is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification requiring heightened scrutiny across the board. United States v. Skrmetti (2025) is the clearest signal. The 6–3 majority (Roberts, joined by Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) held that Tennessee’s restrictions on certain medical interventions for minors did not classify on the basis of sex or transgender status in a way that triggered heightened scrutiny. The Court applied "rational basis" review and upheld the law. Critically, it declined to treat transgender status as a suspect or quasi-suspect class and rejected the broadest readings of Bostock v. Clayton County (2020) outside the Title VII employment context. I guess we may need to wait and see. Thanks, -Smac

The compilation of video screen caps was fairly off-the-cuff. But your correction/clarification is noted. It does not seem to affect the overall point, namely, that legislatures are justified in passing laws prohibiting males from entering women's bathrooms. I don't think I have done that. You are probably right. It's a term of art that typically refers to action taken with the appearance or pretense of legal authority, but usually by a state actor. In hindsight, using it for private individuals who are simply taking advantage of a permissive policy or the absence of a prohibition arguably stretches the phrase beyond its ordinary meaning. Some better ones: “pursuant to policy” or “under the governing policy” “with the permission of current policy” “as permitted by the applicable rules” / “as permitted by law” “under a self-identification policy” “because the jurisdiction has adopted identity-based access rules” “in the absence of a sex-based restriction” “by institutional permission” “under rules that treat self-identification as sufficient” The underlying point remains the same: In the absence of laws enacting limiting principles, and under your preferred laissez fair regime, a jurisdiction - in a de jure or de facto sense, would effectively allow anyone to lawfully enter into women's bathrooms. I think there are a lot of women and girls, based on safety and dignity and privacy concerns, who do not want men in women's bathrooms. And given that a jurisdiction needs to address such matters at scale, a statutory approach is reasonable. I hope that clarifies things. I am not sure if you want to continue the discussion. I am open to doing so if you are, but perhaps the discussion has run its course. We have both expressed our viewpoints. And although you have not persuaded me to your point of view, I do feel that I have a better grasp of it. There is value in me listening to you explain your conclusions and the reasoning and evidence you are using to reach them. I hope you feel the same way. This is a difficult topic. Although we continue to substantively disagree, we have mostly expressed that disagreement with civility and decorum. I appreciate that. Thanks, -Smac

Those are fair practical questions. A sex-based rule does not require every woman to carry proof or submit to interrogation as a routine condition of using the restroom. In ordinary operation the rule works the way sex-separated facilities have long worked: clear designations, social expectation, and response when someone is observed to be out of place. Most uses never involve any challenge. When a challenge occurs, the person who is actually female is not required to “prove she is not transgender”; the relevant fact is sex. In the large majority of cases that is resolved by ordinary observation or, if necessary, by the same kinds of identification already used in countless other contexts (driver’s license, etc.). The law does not create a standing obligation for every woman to litigate her sex at the door. That said, edge cases exist (is the case for most laws). Women who are tall, broad-shouldered, have deeper voices, or otherwise present in ways some people find ambiguous can face awkward or unfair scrutiny under any system that notices sex. A sex-based statute does not invent that social friction; it can, however, become the occasion for it if people weaponize complaints. Good implementation therefore matters. I think complaint processes will require more than a vague suspicion, institutions will train staff to handle reports proportionately, and repeated bad-faith complaints should carry consequences. On the private right of action and the $1,000 figure: any private enforcement mechanism can be misused. That is a design issue worth taking seriously. Whether Kansas’s specific drafting is well-calibrated on those points is a legitimate subject for debate and, if needed, refinement. The possibility of misuse does not by itself prove the underlying sex-based rule is unjustified; it is an argument for careful enforcement design. In short, the day-to-day expectation remains ordinary use of the facility that matches sex, not continuous self-defense of one’s sex. Edge-case friction and the risk of opportunistic complaints are real issues to manage (though candidly, I think risk of misuse of the statute is low). They are not unique to this law, and they are not a reason to replace a clear sex-based boundary with an identity-based one that has no stable stopping point. Thanks, -Smac

It's not a bounty. It's a private right of action.

Or you could have asked. I culled them from YouTube videos of men in women's bathrooms. I think the pictures demonstrate a few things. First, I think the overwhelming focus on "trans" persons in bathrooms is about men going into women's bathrooms. Far less attention is paid to the reverse situation of women who identify as "trans men" going into men's bathrooms. I have a few thoughts as to the basis for this asymmetry. Second, over a number of posts you have posted numerous photos of women who identify as "trans men," apparently with the presupposition that they are a more important issue than the first item above (and/or to distract from the first item above). I posted pictorial examples of men caught in women's bathrooms because, well, that's the primary area of concern. I'm not sure that your pictures support your position in the way you apparently intended. I think many women and girls oppose men in women's bathrooms, but they are being subjected to it in many places anyway. Some jurisdictions, such as Kansas, are prioritizing the interests of women and girls over the interests of a much, much smaller group of persons (women who "identify" as men). Again: Sex-separated bathrooms, locker rooms, shelters, and prison units exist because of persistent differences in strength, patterns of sexual offense, and the reasonable expectation of privacy from the opposite sex. These are not arbitrary preferences. They are responses to material realities that affect safety, fairness, and dignity at scale. Third, the pictures I posted are comprised of a variety of men caught in women's bathrooms. Some are apparently self-identified "trans women" (including, e.g., Lily Tino) : We can't really say if they are "trans women" because, well, there is no way to objectively differentiate between A) men who "identify" as "trans women" and B) men who may or may not so identify. We've had this "whatever the individual declares about his/her 'gender identity' is correct, and there is to be no questioning of it" rule drilled into the public consciousness for years: The above pictures demonstrate the lack of any functioning and coherent "limiting principles," which in turn may explain why some jurisdictions, such as Kansas, have elected to create a coherent limiting principle: biological sex. Other pictures were less clear about "trans" identity, and perhaps showed instances of bad actors going into women's bathrooms: We really don't know whether any of these men is "trans," do we? After all, all they have to do is say "I identify as a woman" or "I am a trans woman" and they fit within what I understand to be your preferred laissez faire "anyone can do whatever they want" approach to allowing access to women's bathrooms. In fact, they would not even need to bother with the "trans" identity thing at all, since you reject any limiting principles re: men going into women's bathrooms, and you would instead have society allow anyone to go in under the color of law. The Kansas legislature, recognizing this, and also recognizing that bad actors could, under color of law, enter into women's bathrooms, and so decided to apply a limiting principle, namely, biological sex. I agree. Here is where I disagree. I think there are plenty of women and girls who find men in women's bathrooms "objectionable" (see, e.g., here and here). I believe so, yes. Any person can use such a claim, or else the "I identify as a woman" one, or else use no claim at all (since, again, you reject any coherent limiting principles) as a basis for entering into women's bathrooms. And there is no way to differentiate legitimate and illegitimate claims because these claims are almost always internal and subjective. I think women and girls are entitled to have safety among their concerns about men going into women's bathrooms. Do you think otherwise? I think there is a lot of disagreement about men going into women's bathrooms. Unfortunately, some of that may spill over into anger, or even "hate" in some quarters. While anger at overtly bad acts is understandable, a society of laws must govern by law. And what counts as "bad acts" is going to vary a bit (I think plenty of folks think that men entering into women's bathrooms is inherently bad/improper). In any event, if a man is caught doing something nefarious, or suspected of doing something nefarious, then he ought to be treated like any other person under the law. Yes. And your preferred approach to this issue is that the Walter Caleros-types of persons living in America have no need to "{sneak} into the girls restroom," since by your reckoning they can do so under the color of law. Respectfully, no, it isn't. Walter and "trans women" would, in your approach, fall into the same category, namely, men who can enter into women's bathrooms under color of law. I have spent many pages talking about "limiting principles," and Walter is a good example of why such principles are needed. in my view, the only coherent and workable limiting principle is biological sex (with, perhaps, some narrowly-drawn exceptions for persons with DSDs). From a previous post: Your comment above ("It seems Smac's fear is that a pervert could play the I'm-really-a-woman-and-I-have-the-right-to-be-here card, but there have been zero examples of that happening. Anywhere. Ever.") appears to put you at Step 1 ("It's not really happening"). I think this is not correct. First, under your approach, there is no need to "play the I'm-really-a-woman-and-I-have-the-right-to-be-here card," since everyone would have access to women's bathrooms. You reject any and all "limiting principles," correct? Second, I think there have been instances of bad actors taking steps to appear as women so as to enter into women's bathrooms for unlawful purposes (and under your "No Limiting Principles" approach, there would be no way for a jurisdiction to keep them out of women's spaces). Judge Rules Loudoun County Teen Sexually Assaulted Female Student in Girls' Bathroom (2021) "{T}he male student forcibly sodomized his ninth-grade daughter in a school bathroom while wearing a skirt." And he was in the girls' bathroom under color of law (the "gender-inclusivity policy"). 6 Men Who Disguised Themselves as Women to Access Bathrooms (from 2016) "{W]earing fake breasts and a wig while loitering in a women’s restroom..." "Hernandez had disguised himself as a woman on two separate occasions to get inside a UC Berkeley locker room." "Both instances involved a man in women’s clothing who used a mirror and camera to take pictures of a mother and her 5-year-old daughter..." "a man used a women’s locker room at a public swimming pool in Washington state to undress in front of young girls who were changing for swim practice. When Seattle Parks and Recreation staff asked him to leave, the man claimed that 'the law has changed and I have a right to be here.'" Transgender woman arrested for voyeurism at Ammon Target (2016) "{A} man, dressed in women’s clothing, had entered a fitting room in the women’s clothing section of the store. Deputies say the suspect was seen taking photos of a woman in a stall next to him while she was changing." Man Dressed as Woman Arrested for Spying Into Mall Bathroom Stall, Police Say (2015) "A man dressed as a woman was arrested in Virginia on Monday after police say he was caught peeping into restroom stalls three times in the past year." Cross-Dressing Man Secretly Taped Women at Macy’s (2013) "{T}he man was wearing a wig and was dressed as a woman." Sex offender posed as woman, went into women's locker room "A registered sex offender dressed up like a woman, went into a women's locker room at a pool and talked with several children before being chased down." Man Undresses In Front Of Children In Walmart Restroom (2010) "Burnes was wearing a dark woman's suit, black high heals, red nail polish, green eye shadow and women's jewelry. ... a witness also watched Burnes 'show off his white girdle and dark thong underwear' in the women's section of the store." Purdue police investigate report of man taking photographs in women's restroom (2008) "{A} man dressed as a woman was seen taking photographs under the wall of a women's bathroom stall..." Sexual predator jailed after claiming to be ‘transgender’ to assault women in shelter (2014 in Canada) "Under the name 'Jessica,' he was able to get into the women’s shelters, where he sexually assaulted several women in 2012..." ‘Transgender’ man may continue using girls’ locker room, says college (2012) "The 45-year-old man, who calls himself Colleen Francis, presents himself as a transgender 'female.' ... On September 26, teenage girls on a high school swim team were using the facilities when they saw 'Colleen' Francis exposing male genitalia through the glass window in a sauna." "Joe Wheeler of the Thurston County Prosecutor’s Office said he will not prosecute the matter as indecent exposure." Seems like the above items moves us to Step 2 ("Yeah, it's happening, but it's not a big deal"). These items were not hard to find, BTW. I don't think this matters, as under your regime there are no limiting principles, ergo no such thing as a "legitimate" or "illegitimate" right for males to enter into women's bathrooms. All of them have that right, under color of law. No need to even bother with claiming to be trans or dressing like a woman or entering covertly. You've said this twice now. What is this "category" thing? Under your preferred "no limiting principles / laissez faire" approach, what "categories" of men exist, such that some can enter into women's bathrooms and some cannot? By repeatedly alluding to "categorical" differences, you implicitly acknowledge reliance on some sort of limiting principle. Could you explain what the principle is? So everyone can enter into women's bathrooms under color of law. That is what you propose? Thanks, -Smac

But not to bathrooms. Yes. It seems like it would not be too difficult to go in and get a replacement that provides the individual's biological sex. Government documents such as DLs are not, I think, supposed to be a mode of self-expression of the individual. Rather, it serves some specific and important purposes: Identification accuracy: Sex is a stable, observable biometric characteristic that helps law enforcement, border officials, and others confirm that the person presenting the DL is the person to whom it was issued. Public safety and investigation: Accurate sex data assists in locating missing persons, identifying suspects or victims, and conducting criminal investigations where physical description matters. Sex-specific legal and medical contexts: DLs are sometimes used in settings where sex is relevant—medical emergencies, single-sex facilities, correctional placement, and certain statutory requirements. Administrative consistency: DLs serve as foundational identity documents. Recording sex the same way across records (birth certificate, license, etc.) reduces mismatches and fraud opportunities. Statistical and planning uses: Aggregated, sex-based data from licensing records can support transportation planning, public-health analysis, and other government functions that rely on demographic accuracy. I suspect you care less about the foregoing utilitarian-minded functions of DLs, and would prefer to have DLs reflect the individual's subjective "gender identity" that differs from his/her biological sex and the sexual binary. Some jurisdictions are on board with this approach, and some are not. Thanks, -Smac

No rule stops every possible bad actor or every urgent biological need. That is not a serious standard for whether a boundary is justified. Sex-separated bathrooms have never been claimed to be perfect filters. They reduce opportunity, express a clear norm, and give women a default expectation of privacy from the opposite sex. Determined predators, people in medical distress, or someone who simply ignores the sign can still cause problems under any regime. The same is true of locks, age limits, and “Employees Only” doors. We do not abandon those measures because they are imperfect. The relevant comparison is not “sex-based rule vs. zero incidents," but is instead “sex-based rule vs. identity-based (or no) rule.” Under a sex-based rule, a male who enters is already in violation; staff, other users, and (where applicable) the law have a clear basis to challenge or remove him. Under an identity-based rule, a male who asserts a female identity has a claimed entitlement to be there. That changes the default and removes the clean limiting principle. Urgent need or poor impulse control does not require us to dissolve the category. They can be an argument for single-occupancy options where feasible, and for ordinary enforcement of existing criminal laws when someone abuses a space. It is not an argument that sex is irrelevant to the purpose of the facility. Thanks, -Smac

WNBA Strongly Denounces “Bad-Faith Efforts” of Cis Men Claiming to Be Trans to Join I think White and Freedom are making a legitimate point. If anyone can "register for the WNBA draft by simply saying they identify as women," and if "simply saying" is not to be questioned, then White and Freedom are on their way to the WNBA. Alternatively, the WNBA would resolve the matter by explaining who does, and does not, count as "women." But they can't and won't do that. If the league endorses and accepts the expansive, incoherent, "a woman is anyone who identifies as one" approach, then the point White and Freedom are making will be validated. Alternatively, if the league puts any coherent constraints on the definition of "woman," then they'll run afoul of folks who object to those constraints. To the extent White and Freedom are making a point about the definition of "woman," I don't see that as "bad faith." I see it as a deployment of Saul Alinsky's "Rule 4": "Make the enemy live up to its own book of rules." It's not just the policy. It's the recent public statements welcoming "trans" athletes into the WNBA. And he appears to be entirely correct. I am curious about this. Ironically, the WNBA would seemingly need to rely on the reality of biological sex to defeat legal claims. "{N}o legitimate trans athlete." If these principles are in play, then there is no mechanism whereby the WNBA can dispute a claimed "identity." I think they want this controversy to blow over. It may well do that. Thanks, -Smac

I think you are conflating two separate - but interrelated - issues. Government documents should correctly recite the person's biological sex, for a variety of reasons. But IDs are not really relevant to, for example, the Kansas law. Thanks, -Smac

Yes, the vast majority of the time, those who passed or were close enough to be ambiguous were the only ones attempting to use them…or we would have had this discussion long before it became a political rallying cry. I think stories like Lia Thomas and Lily Tino have given rise to these discussions. Again: The issue did not originate with politicians inventing a controversy. It arose when institutions and advocacy groups began treating self-identification as sufficient to redefine sex-based categories in sports, prisons, shelters, and intimate facilities, and when those changes produced concrete conflicts over fairness, privacy, and safety. That some politicians thereafter paid attention to it does not mean they created the topic, or that the underlying concerns are fabricated or "insane." Thanks, -Smac

So tell me what males want to use the women’s bathrooms who could pass for women, but aren’t transgendered women? It seems that you are A) assuming that only fully-transitioned "trans women" and bad actors "want to use the women's bathroom," and B) laws restricting males from accessing women's bathrooms are worthless. Am I correct on that? Okay. Not sure how this would play out at scale. Access is lawful based on the status of the individual: Males who are "fully transitioned" trans women can go in, but all other males cannot. Is that correct? Or would you prefer to statute or legal mechanism at all? Just leave the decision to the individual? So by "fully transitioned" you are referring to biological males who have had their penises removed? Would all other men be barred from women's locker rooms? Not really seeing it, but I'll look again. Thanks, -Smac

The same way that happened a decade or two ago and was functioning relatively well (in the sense of with transgendered individuals and worked like tissue paper in stopping actual predators who weren’t bothered by social pressures to avoid such areas). What "way" are you referencing here? Trans women going into women's bathrooms? Also, in your view are there any other legitimate concerns of women and girls - beyond physical safety - that might be relevant to allowing biological males into women's bathrooms? From a public policy perspective, I think you are describing an informal, appearance-and-social-pressure regime and treating it as if it were a stable rule. Am I correct? That regime only functioned while the background expectation remained that the spaces were separated by sex. Within that expectation, people made practical judgments about edge cases. Once subjective "self-identity" is formally elevated over sex, the background expectation itself changes: a male who asserts a female identity now has a claimed right of access, not merely a hope of avoiding challenge. That is the difference. Social awkwardness and the risk of being challenged can deter some opportunistic behavior when the formal rule is still sex-based. They are much weaker once the formal rule (or institutional policy) says "self-identity" controls. At that point the person who is challenged can invoke the policy or the law in his favor. You are also setting what looks to be an impossible standard. If a rule cannot stop every determined predator, it is supposedly worthless ("and worked like tissue paper in stopping actual predators")? Almost no boundary works that way. Locks, age restrictions, and sex-separated prisons do not eliminate all misconduct; they still exist, reduce opportunity and express a clear norm. The same is true here. The claim is not that a sex-based rule will catch every predator. It is that the rule keeps the category coherent and avoids creating a ready-made entitlement for any male willing to claim a female identity. If the alternative is “let appearance and informal judgment decide, and rely on ordinary criminal law after the fact,” then there is still no principled way to admit males who identify as women while reliably excluding other males. Appearance is a spectrum, identity is unverifiable, and predators are not limited to those who look stereotypically male. That is why I think the "limiting principle" question keeps returning. A sex-based rule has one. An identity- or appearance-based rule does not. Also, I wonder if some of this discussion has been hampered by our having differing perspectives and presuppositions. My participation here is based mostly on "public policy"-related issues, whereas you and @Analytics are evaluating the Kansas law and other legalities from the perspective of one or few individuals. Both inquiries are legitimate, but I hope that, having now pointed out the "public policy" angle, you can weigh in on it. I value and appreciate your perspective. Thank you for sharing it. -Smac

I think I was pretty clear on what I meant with “fully transitioned”. Okay. But I am not sure you were clear on what you think about other-than-'fully-transitioned'-'trans-women' biological males. Hence my inquiry. Again, my inquiry was about "males other than {fully-transitioned} 'trans women.'" You said: "I find the law that requires apparently fully transitioned individuals to use the restrooms of their biological sex insane." Got it. Understood. But what about a law pertaining to all males? If I understand you, you are taking the position that "fully transitioned" biological males ought to be able to go into women's bathrooms, but you would exclude all other males. Am I correctly stating your position? Putting aside your perspective on "fully transitioned individuals" using "the restrooms of their biological sex," what is your perspective on all other males going into women's bathrooms? Are you for it or against it? If so, how would you propose to differentiate between the authorized males (fully transitioned trans women) and unauthorized males (everyone except fully transitioned trans women)? Understood. To clarify, I am asking for both your personal perspective and also your public policy proposals. I hope you can elaborate on the latter. Okay. What does "no thanks to seeing penises {in women's bathrooms}" mean from the public policy perspective? In your view, should "a transwoman who hasn’t had bottom surgery" be allowed into women's bathrooms? Apparently only a small percentage of trans women (5-13%) have undergone "bottom surgery." So your stated position pertains to a small fraction ("fully transitioned") of a small fraction ("trans women") of biological males. Perhaps I have overlooked where you have laid out your perspective on the vast majority of males - "trans" or otherwise - going into women's bathrooms. You did say this: How does this work from a public policy perspective? Whom would you exclude from women's bathrooms? What criteria would you use? What "limiting principles" would you propose? Any? None? What sort of "accommodations"? The small-fraction-of-a-small-fraction of males who meet your "fully transitioned" criterion? Also, what sort of enforcement mechanism do you have in mind. Assuming you are excluding all males except "fully transitioned" ones, would the law just be an "on your honor" sort of thing? Also, what do you mean when you say "fully transitioned"? "Bottom surgery" seems to cover quite a few distinct procedures. From Grok: Which of these procedures counts for the purposes of a "fully transitioned" male to be allowed to go into women's bathrooms? What criteria are you using to include and exclude items from the "fully transitioned" meaning (from a public policy / statutory perspective)? Thanks, -Smac

The way I see things, for the purposes of using the restroom, the following individuals should use the men's restroom: They are men not based on my perspective and not because of me. But because of biology and reality. I have repeatedly invited you to present some alternative to sex-bases segregation. I'll do it again: If there is/are "limiting principle(s)" by which laws could differentiate between A) "transgender" men and B) other men with nefarious reasons for entering into women's bathrooms, and also which could preserve women's and girls' interest in privacy and safety, I would really like to hear about it. The “bounty” characterization is overstated, but the private right of action is real and worth addressing directly. SB 244 creates a civil cause of action for a person who, while using a multi-occupancy facility designated for their sex, is aggrieved by the presence of someone of the opposite sex in violation of the statute. The liquidated amount is $1,000 (plus the possibility of fees). It is not a free-floating reward for anyone who merely “suspects” a mismatch and files a lawsuit; it is framed as a remedy for invasion of privacy or related harm in a sex-designated space. Private rights of action are common in many areas of law (civil rights statutes, consumer protection, some privacy and trespass contexts). Their purpose is to give affected individuals a way to enforce a boundary when public authorities cannot or do not act in every instance. Whether this particular design is well-calibrated—amount, standing requirements, safeguards against abuse—is a fair subject for debate. Over-broad or poorly drafted private enforcement can encourage frivolous claims or harassment; that is a legitimate design concern. It does not follow, however, that the underlying sex-based rule is unjustified simply because the statute includes a civil remedy. The policy question remains whether access to sex-separated intimate facilities should turn on sex or on identity. A private right of action is one enforcement tool; it is not the justification for the rule itself. One can support sex-based boundaries while still arguing about the wisest way to enforce them, including whether a $1,000 liquidated-damages provision is proportionate or prone to misuse. If the objection is to the specific enforcement mechanism, that is a narrower and more productive discussion than treating any private remedy as proof that the sex-based standard is illegitimate. Our substantive conversation appears to be coming to a close. Sarcasm doesn’t answer the underlying question. If privacy, dignity, and safety are the purposes of sex-separated facilities, then the relevant test is whether a sex-based rule or an identity-based rule better serves those purposes. A sex-based rule keeps the boundary tied to the characteristic the spaces were created around. An identity-based rule severs that connection and leaves no coherent way to exclude males who claim a female identity. You can criticize the drafting or enforcement mechanisms of a particular statute. That is fair. What is not persuasive is treating any attempt to maintain a sex-based boundary as inherently absurd or authoritarian, while treating the dissolution of that boundary as the default of “common sense.” The disagreement is about which rule actually protects the interests the facilities exist to serve. Thanks, -Smac

I think there are a lot of women and girls who do not want males in women spaces. I also don't think we can ignore these folks, or tell them that their desire for sex-segregated spaces is unreasonable or "insane." Again: Sex-separated bathrooms, locker rooms, shelters, and prison units exist because of persistent differences in strength, patterns of sexual offense, and the reasonable expectation of privacy from the opposite sex. These are not arbitrary preferences. They are responses to material realities that affect safety, fairness, and dignity at scale. Assuming, arguendo, that there exists in Kansas women and girls (and others) who want sex-segregated bathrooms, do you think these are legitimate concerns, or not? Also, I will again note that we apparently differ in how we approach matters of public policy. As I noted previously: Please note that my statement above reflects this approach: "They are responses to material realities that affect safety, fairness, and dignity {for women and girls} at scale." This is how the law plays out as to the persons for whom sex-segregated spaces were created. In contrast, your perspective is based on how the the law plays out as to persons for whom sex-segregated spaces were created to exclude, namely, biological males ("trans women" in particular, but all males in practice). Again: A consistent sex-based rule means that males (however they identify or present) do not use women’s facilities, and females (however they identify or present) do not use men’s facilities. I acknowledge that rule will sometimes produce awkward situations for people whose appearance does not match their sex. That is a real cost. But then, the alternative rule (access according to self-identification) also produces costs: loss of privacy, safety concerns, and competitive unfairness for the group the spaces were created to protect. Again: If there is/are "limiting principle(s)" by which laws could differentiate between A) "transgender" men and B) other men with nefarious reasons for entering into women's bathrooms, and also which could preserve women's and girls' interest in privacy and safety, I would really like to hear about it. Thanks, -Smac

I understand that is your perspective. I think that the Kansas law affects a lot of people, including women and girls who do not want males to be present in bathrooms. Could you elaborate on how the law does not affect these people? Thanks, -Smac

The only people affected by the new law are the "awkward edge cases." I don't think we can say that. Women and girls who do not want males in women's spaces have also been affected by the new law. Thanks, -Smac

Does this preference apply to males other than "trans women"? I assume, then, that you are on board with an alternative approach. Could you elaborate on that that alternative is, and how it would differentiate "trans women" (who would seemingly be allowed into women's bathrooms) and other biological males (who would not be allowed)? Thanks, -Smac

Thank you for sharing this perspective. I would like to better understand it. I assume you would not say that you "have very little sympathy for people {situated} like {Marquise Vilsón}" who are "insisting they have some sort of Constitutional right to {use women's bathrooms}." "Constitutional" hyperbole aside, you seem to disregard sex-based restrictions on biological males competing in women's sports, yet you seem quite exercised about sex-based restrictions on biological males entering into women's bathrooms. Could you elaborate on how you differentiate between these issues? Are there any other grounds to find what Lia Thomas did problematic? There have been a few arguments in favor of differentiating biological men - including "trans women" - in different contexts: Privacy and dignity: Intimate spaces (bathrooms, locker rooms, changing areas) involve undressing and bodily functions. Many people reasonably expect not to share those spaces with the opposite sex. This interest is grounded in modesty and personal boundaries, not merely fear of crime. Physical safety / risk patterns: Males, as a group, commit the large majority of sexual assaults, voyeurism, and exhibitionism. Sex separation is a prophylactic measure that reduces opportunities for male-pattern offenses in spaces where women and girls are vulnerable. The argument does not require every male to be dangerous; it relies on base rates and the difficulty of screening intent. Fairness in sports: Male physiology (testosterone-driven muscle mass, bone density, lung capacity, strength, speed) confers large average performance advantages that are not eliminated by testosterone suppression. Sex-separated sport exists to give females a fair chance to compete and win. Medical and data integrity: Sex is a binary biological variable relevant to diagnosis, drug dosing, disease risk, and research. Recording or treating people according to identity rather than sex can distort clinical care and population data. Single-sex institutions and associational rights: Women’s shelters, prisons, sports teams, and certain schools or organizations were created to serve females as a class. Allowing males to enter on the basis of identity undermines the purpose of those institutions and the ability of women to associate on the basis of sex. Child safeguarding: In schools and youth settings, sex separation reduces risks related to exposure, boundary violations, and the introduction of secondary-sex characteristics or adult male patterns into female spaces. Limiting-principle / coherence argument: Once self-identification overrides sex, there is no non-arbitrary way to exclude any male who claims a female identity. Appearance-based or “common-sense” standards are unstable and easily contested. Sex remains the only clear, objective criterion that preserves the category. Social and psychological effects on women and girls: Loss of sex-separated spaces can increase anxiety, reduce participation (especially in sport and school activities), and signal that female boundaries are secondary to male identity claims. You seem to agree with #3 ("Fairness in sport"), but disagree with or reject most or all of the others. Is this a fair characterization of your perspective? Thanks, -Smac

So non-stakeholders can nevertheless opine about such matters. Seems like we agree about that. You comment on the Church all the time. Thousands of posts. Over many years. And you are quite at liberty to do so. I encourage you to keep doing so. I was responding to what I thought was a gatekeeping comment by you: "Should leages be legally required to exclude trans athletes, even if they aren't breaking the curve? I don't know, but if you aren't a stakeholder, it really isn't something to worry about." To clarify: Are you saying that the only times you have commented about the Church are when you are "a stakeholder" in the topics/issues under discussion? Thanks, -Smac

That description reframes the historical practice. Sex-separated bathrooms were understood to be separated by sex, not by self-identified gender or preferred presentation. Informal tolerance for occasional edge cases is not the same thing as a rule that identity or appearance governs access. Ordinary criminal laws against assault, voyeurism, and indecent exposure remain necessary under any regime. They are not a substitute for the boundary itself. Those laws address misconduct after it occurs; the sex-based rule is a prophylactic measure that keeps males out of female intimate spaces in the first place. Demanding a single, perfectly documented Kansas case in which police said “we are powerless without SB 244” sets an artificially high bar. We do not require a headline incident in one state before recognizing why women’s prisons, shelters, and locker rooms are separated by sex. Also, the absence of a specific law prohibiting males from entering into women's bathrooms means it may not have been a chargeable offense. And if it was, it was likely a misdemeanor (SB 244 designates violation of the new law a Class B misdemeanor). There is, I think, going to be little publicly-available information about incidents along these lines. A rule that admits any male who identifies or presents as female has no coherent stopping point. That is the limiting-principle problem. Maintaining sex as the criterion preserves the purpose of the spaces; replacing it with identity or presentation does not. You seem to be treating the presence or absence of a single, perfectly documented Kansas “creep exploits self-ID” case as decisive, while treating any post-enactment inconvenience to transgender-identified people as proof the law fails. That is not a balanced standard of evidence. Sex-separated bathrooms were not originally created in response to a statistical crisis unique to Kansas. They exist because of enduring differences between the sexes: strength, patterns of sexual offense and voyeurism, and the ordinary expectation of privacy when undressing or using the toilet. Those reasons are not refuted by the lack of a headline incident in one state that meets an extremely narrow search criterion. We do not require a recent, well-publicized assault in Topeka before recognizing why women’s prisons, shelters, and locker rooms are separated by sex. The “laissez-faire / use whatever makes sense” approach only functions while the shared understanding remains that these spaces are separated by sex. Once identity or presentation is treated as the governing criterion, that shared understanding is replaced. At that point any male who claims a female identity has a right of access, and ordinary criminal laws become after-the-fact remedies rather than a substitute for the boundary itself. The relevant comparison is not “zero qualifying Kansas crimes under the old informal norm” versus “some enforcement friction under the new statute.” It is whether a clear sex-based rule better preserves the privacy and safety purposes of the spaces than a rule that severs access from sex. The first has a limiting principle, the second does not. Demanding a single idealized case study before allowing the first rule to exist sets a bar we do not apply to other sex-separated facilities. Thanks to the law you support, the issue in Kansas is whether every person whose appearance is ambiguous or atypical must be aggressively policed at the bathroom door. Read the NYT article. I guess we'll need to agree to disagree about this. Perhaps the "boundary" worked previously because there were very few males trying to enter into women's bathrooms. The social taboo/stigma was sufficient. And perhaps in recent years there have been increasing incidents of males entering into women's bathrooms. Put another way, “it worked” (which you assert, but do not demonstrate) only describes the period in which the operative social and legal understanding was still that these spaces were separated by sex. Informal tolerance for occasional edge cases is not the same thing as a formal rule that identity or presentation governs access. Once the rule becomes self-identification (and as the likelihood of males who "identify" as women, but also any other males as well) see the boundary breaking down, the boundary is no longer the one that previously “worked.” Any male who asserts a female identity - and any other male, for that matter - then has a claim to enter, and the prior informal norm no longer constrains him. That is a change in the rule, not a continuation of the old arrangement. The absence of a large, well-documented set of Kansas incidents under the old understanding does not prove that dissolving the sex-based boundary will preserve the same outcomes. It only shows that a sex-based expectation, backed by ordinary social enforcement and criminal law, was largely adequate. Replacing that expectation with an identity-based entitlement is a different regime. The burden is not solely to prove the old system was in crisis; it is to justify why the category should be redefined so that sex no longer controls access to a space created on the basis of sex. I adamantly disagree with your framing here. One standard is based on common sense and allows for the good-faith judgment of the individuals it affects. You are labeling your preferred "standard" as "common sense." I am framing it as "replac{ing} that {sex-differentiating} boundary with a subjective or appearance-based claim." Of the two, I think my framing is more accurate and clinical. The historical practice was not an open-ended “use whatever matches your identity or presentation” rule. It rested on the shared understanding that the facilities were separated by sex. Within that understanding, people exercised ordinary judgment about awkward edge cases. That is not the same thing as a formal standard that makes identity or appearance the criterion of access. Once identity is treated as decisive and discretionary (left to the individual), the old informal norm no longer governs. Any male who asserts a female identity then has a claim to enter (as does any other male, as you have yet to articulate any legally coherent mechanism to differentiate the two categories), and “common sense” becomes optional for anyone who chooses not to follow it. That is a redefinition of the boundary, not a continuation of the prior arrangement. A sex-based rule will sometimes create discomfort for people whose presentation diverges from their sex. That cost is real. I think I have acknowledged this a few times now. The cost of the alternative is also real: the loss of a coherent sex-based boundary for everyone else who uses the space. I think you have yet to acknowledge this. I think women's bathrooms and other sex-segregated spaces have always been intended to be fore the use and benefit of women and girls. I think the law should support that intended purpose, even if doing so comes at the expense of some males who - for any reason or no reason at all - may want to enter into those spaces. Calling the first cost “real-world” and the second “hypothetical” simply privileges one set of interests. Both are concrete. The question is which set of costs is more consistent with the purpose of sex-separated facilities. IMO, keeping the boundary tied to sex remains the more coherent answer. I think our disagreement is ultimately rooted in conflicting philosophical presuppositions. You appear to hold that at least some biological males who "identify" as women thereby become women in the relevant sense, or that “woman” should be defined in a way that is no longer anchored to sex and instead means, in effect, “anyone who identifies as a woman.” On that premise, excluding such a person from women’s facilities is treating a woman as if she were a man, which understandably looks unjust to you. I do not share that premise. I take “woman” to mean adult human female. On that understanding, a male who identifies as a woman remains male. Admitting him to women’s facilities is not an act of recognition, but instead is the abandonment of the sex-based boundary that justifies the facilities in the first place. The discomfort this creates for some individuals who present or identify differently is real, but it does not require us to redefine the category or surrender the boundary. And the alternative is to create problems and impositions on women and girls, for whom bathrooms and other sex-segregated spaces are intended. So the practical dispute about restrooms is downstream of a prior disagreement about what the words mean and whether sex remains a legitimate basis for the distinction. If sex is real and relevant, a sex-based rule is coherent. If "identity" overrides sex, then the sex-based rule will always look like injustice. That is the deeper conflict. The restroom arguments are mostly a working-out of those incompatible starting points. Thanks, -Smac

You are no longer a member of the Church, yet you have spent years racking up thousands of posts commentating about the Church. I assume that you feel you are a "stakeholder," and thus entitled to publicly speak about these matters because of your former affiliation, your acquaintance with Latter-day Saints, because the Church is part of society and has an impact on it, because we live in America and enjoy Free Speech and Association, and so on. Could you therefore elaborate on your "if you aren't a stakeholder, it really isn't something to worry about" reasoning? You have frequently weighed in on, and endorsed, governmental oversight on the Church's actions. So how does this "They aren't stakeholders" rationale apply to that? Thanks, -Smac

Yes. Sex-segregated bathrooms have been around for a long time, as have their intended purposes, which purposes are reasonable and legitimate. However, I am open to hearing alternative approaches, hence my various inquiries, over the space of years, about "limiting principles." I think we differ in our perspectives and approaches in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons, one of which is that you seem to approach public policy questions from the (extreme?) margins, hence your gallery of pictures featuring biological women who "identify" as men. I tend to conceptualize public policy questions from a "how does this play out when deployed over a large area/population" kind of way. A laissez faire, let-everyone-do-whatever-they-want approach is, in my view, untenable because it has no limiting principles. There are, no doubt, plenty of transgender folks who want to use the bathroom congruent with their "gender identity" for normal, benign reasons. I acknowledge that. But there are safety and privacy issues that need to be addressed, and I don't think you are doing that. See, e.g., here (a comment from Nehor responding to me) : And most of them were done by cishet men who never claimed to be transgender so what would change to make them stop. "What would change" would be . . . laws that prohibit men from entering into women's spaces. If there is/are "limiting principle(s)" by which laws could differentiate between A) "transgender" men and B) other men with nefarious reasons for entering into women's bathrooms, and also which could preserve women's and girls' interest in privacy and safety, I would really like to hear about it. Your comments here presuppose a lot of things that I think need to be demonstrated rather than asserted. "Common sense," in my view, states that women's bathrooms should only be patronized by women, and that our society was working fine with that provision in place. Same goes for "civilized." I think the "civilized" thing to do is preserve women's spaces for women and girls. Sex-separated bathrooms, locker rooms, shelters, and prison units exist because of persistent differences in strength, patterns of sexual offense, and the reasonable expectation of privacy from the opposite sex. These are not arbitrary preferences. They are responses to material realities that affect safety, fairness, and dignity at scale. I think that you are shifting the question. The issue is not whether every person whose appearance is ambiguous or atypical must be aggressively policed at the bathroom door. Most people already navigate ordinary social situations with a degree of practical judgment. The issue is what the rule is when someone asserts a right of access. Hence my various inquiries re: limiting principles. If the rule is biological sex, then a male does not have a right to enter a women’s facility, regardless of clothing, hormones, or surgery. That rule is clear, predictable, and matches the reason the spaces were separated in the first place: physical sex and the privacy/safety expectations that track it. Alternatively, if the rule is self-identification (or “whatever makes the most sense” based on appearance), then any male who claims to be a woman, or who presents sufficiently feminine, or who can feign these things (which, effectively, means all males) gains a legal claim to enter. There is no coherent way to admit the well-intentioned or highly “passable” cases while reliably excluding the opportunistic or predatory ones, because the criterion is no longer objective. That is the limiting-principle problem, and I do not think you are addressing it. Indeed, it seems you are not even acknowledging a need for such principles, or are even denying that there is a need for them. Am I correct here? You say society used to handle this with common sense. I agree. Where we may disagree is whether this "common sense" rested on the shared understanding that these spaces were separated by sex. Once that understanding is formally replaced by identity or appearance, the informal norm loses its foundation. “Just be civilized and use the one that makes sense” works only while everyone roughly agrees on what the categories mean. When the categories themselves are redefined, the informal approach no longer resolves the conflict, and instead simply privileges the identity claim. Requiring accurate sex on identification documents, or maintaining sex-based rules for intimate facilities, does not mean society must interrogate every person who walks through a door. It means the underlying standard remains sex, not self-declaration. That standard is what makes the spaces coherent. Replacing it with an unbounded subjective criterion is what creates the need for new rules and the conflicts that follow. The discomfort that can arise in edge cases under a sex-based rule is real. I acknowledge that. The loss of a workable boundary under a self-ID rule is also real, and it affects the entire category, not just the edge cases. I don't think you are acknowledging or addressing that. No. The question isn't about what people "are". The question is when an individual needs to use the restroom, which one should they use, and who gets to make that decision. Not only to you want the government to make that decision, you support laws that require people like Buck Angel (picture below) to use the women's restroom! You seem to be trying to separate the practical question from the definitional one, but they are connected. Which restroom someone should use depends on what the restrooms are for. Women’s restrooms exist as a sex-separated space. If “woman” is defined by sex, then a female person uses the women’s room and a male person uses the men’s room. If “woman” is re-defined to be determined by "identity" or appearance, then access follows the claim or the presentation instead. Access becomes a de facto free-for-all. You say the question is not about what people “are.” But every access rule rests on some definition of the category. A sex-based rule uses biological sex. A self-identification rule uses the person’s declared identity. An appearance-based rule uses how they look that day. There is no neutral, definition-free option. On the specific example: a sex-based rule does mean that a female person who has taken steps to appear male still uses the women’s facility (or a single-occupancy option where available). That can be awkward for the individual. The alternative rule of letting identity or appearance control means male people who identify or present as female, and anyone else as well, gain access to women’s facilities. That creates a different set of costs, borne by the women the space was created to serve, and it removes any stable way to exclude males who might exploit the rule. The choice is not between “government coercion” and pure individual freedom. It is between two different standards for a shared, sex-separated facility. One standard keeps the boundary tied to sex. The other replaces that boundary with a subjective or appearance-based claim. Preferring the first does not require obsessing over every person’s body; it requires declining to redefine the category itself. The issue isn't about whether somebody "is" a "man". That is semantics. The question I am talking about is when somebody needs to use the restroom, which should they use, and who gets to decide? I think individuals should decide, and I think common sense should be the guide. In contrast, you don't think individuals can be trusted to choose the correct public restroom and want laws that dictate which they use. And you support laws that say people like Laith Ashley (photograph below) must use the women's restroom and if they dare step into the men's room, they should be subject to penalties up to a $1,000 fine and six months in jail. Calling biological sex “just semantics” does not make the underlying question go away. Every rule about who may enter a sex-separated space rests on some definition of the category. You can prefer a standard based on individual choice and “common sense,” but that still requires an answer to what the space is for and what criterion governs access when people disagree. If the criterion is biological sex, then a female person uses the women’s room and a male person uses the men’s room. That rule is clear and matches the reason the facilities were separated. It will sometimes feel awkward for people whose appearance diverges from their sex. That is a real cost. Alternatively, if the criterion is self-identification or individual preference, then any male who identifies as a woman (or decides the women’s room “makes more sense,” or decides to enter for any other reason or no reason at all) gains a claim to enter. At that point there is no stable basis for excluding males who might exploit the rule. “Common sense” and personal discretion only work reliably while the shared understanding of the categories remains intact. Once identity is treated as decisive, the informal norm no longer constrains anyone who chooses not to follow it. You frame sex-based rules as the government refusing to trust individuals and threatening fines or jail, and that this is a new and alarming and unreasonable thing. In reality, sex-separated facilities have long been maintained by a mix of social expectation, facility policy, and, where necessary, law. The current dispute exists because some now demand that the sex-based standard be replaced by an identity-based one. Preferring to keep the sex-based standard is not an obsession with forcing people into the “wrong” room; it is a refusal to dissolve the boundary that makes the rooms coherent in the first place. The choice is between two different rules for shared intimate spaces. One keeps the boundary tied to sex. The other replaces it with a subjective claim. The first has a limiting principle. The second does not. How is thinking individuals should be free to choose the restroom that makes the most sense in their particular situation "denying reality"? By "denial of reality" I was referring to the people in the photos you keep posting being women. The “choose the restroom that makes the most sense” framing still depends on an unspoken definition of the categories. If “makes the most sense” is guided by biological sex, then we are largely back to a sex-based rule. If “makes the most sense” is guided by the individual’s identity or preferred presentation, then the practical rule becomes self-identification. In that case, a male who decides the women’s room makes more sense for him is treated as entitled to use it. That only works if we accept that sex is no longer the operative criterion, that is, that a male can, for these purposes, be treated as a woman on the basis of identity or appearance. That is the redefinition. It is not required by ordinary politeness or case-by-case judgment. It is required once identity is allowed to override sex as the basis for access to sex-separated spaces. At that point we are no longer simply letting individuals exercise discretion within stable categories; we are changing what the categories mean. The "denial of reality" is not the impulse to be flexible or kind in awkward situations, in instead is the claim - implicit or explicit - that a woman can "become" a man by "identifying" as one, or vice versa, and that sex itself is irrelevant to the purpose of the space once someone asserts a different identity. That claim does require treating a male as a woman for purposes of access, which is a redefinition of the ordinary meaning of the words. If the objective is really things like safety and fairness, then common-sense exceptions to the rules should be permissible when making those exceptions promotes safety and fairness. But you are against common-sense exceptions that support safety and fairness. You think that since people like Schuyler Bailar (picture below) "are" "women", they should be legally required to use the women's locker room at the pool. “Common-sense exceptions” still require a standard that tells us when an exception is warranted and when it is not. If the underlying rule is biological sex, then limited, practical accommodations (single-occupancy options, case-by-case discretion in low-stakes settings, etc.) can be discussed without abandoning the category. The boundary itself remains intact. However, if the underlying rule is self-identification or appearance, then the “exception” ceases to be one, it becomes the new rule. At that point any male who identifies as a woman, or who presents sufficiently feminine, has a claim to enter, and there is no coherent basis for excluding others who make the same claim. That is not a narrow, safety-enhancing adjustment. It is the replacement of the sex-based boundary with a different criterion. On the specific example: a sex-based rule does mean that a female person, however she presents or identifies, is not male and therefore does not belong in the male category. Treating her as male for purposes of locker rooms or sports would itself be the redefinition. The awkwardness that can create for the individual woman who has chosen to present herself as being male (or vice versa) is real. So is the alternative of letting identity or presentation override sex, which creates a different and broader set of costs for the people the female (or male) category was created to protect, and it eliminates any stable limiting principle. Wanting the category to rest on sex is not a refusal of all practical judgment. It is a refusal to let the category be redefined so that sex no longer governs access. Safety and fairness are better served by keeping the boundary coherent than by dissolving it in the name of case-by-case common sense. The problems addressed by sex-based boundaries are not hypothetical. Sex-separated spaces exist because of persistent, well-documented differences in strength, patterns of sexual offense, and the reasonable expectation of privacy from the opposite sex. Those realities do not disappear because some individuals identify or present differently, or because some do not believe they constitute "harm" (mostly to women and girls). You characterize the costs of a sex-based rule as “real-world harm” and the costs of removing that rule as merely speculative. That framing is one-sided. The discomfort, loss of privacy, and safety concerns reported by women and girls when males are admitted to their intimate facilities are also real. So is the competitive unfairness in sports. Treating only one set of costs as legitimate does not make the other set vanish. A consistent sex-based rule will sometimes create awkward or painful situations for people whose appearance or identity diverges from their sex. That is a genuine cost, and practical accommodations (single-occupancy options, etc.) can reduce it without erasing the boundary. But the alternative rule, access by self-identification, imposes a different set of costs on the far larger group for whom the spaces were created, and it removes any stable limiting principle. Once sex is no longer the criterion, there is no coherent basis for excluding any male. The question is not whether any policy is cost-free. It is which policy better preserves the purpose of the spaces while remaining workable. Maintaining sex as the criterion does that. Replacing it with identity does not. Pointing to difficulties experienced by some under a sex-based rule does not prove that dissolving the rule produces a net gain in safety, privacy, or fairness. The two prompts are not parallel, which is perhaps why the answers look so different. The first prompt asks only for harm caused by transgender-identified people in Kansas under a self-ID regime, and only counts assault, voyeurism, groping, filming, or indecent exposure. That is an extremely narrow filter. It ignores: The actual purpose of sex-separated spaces, which is to exclude males (not merely people who identify as transgender); Privacy and dignity harms that do not rise to criminal victimization; Incidents that may be under-reported, handled quietly, or never framed in media as “transgender restroom cases.” A null result under that narrow search does not prove the underlying boundary is unnecessary. We do not require a recent, perfectly documented violent crime in one state before recognizing why women’s prisons, shelters, and locker rooms are separated by sex. The second prompt asks for any measurable negative consequence to transgender-identified people after a sex-based law took effect (job friction, disciplinary action, inconvenience, or decisions to relocate). Those are real costs to the individuals involved. But they are a different category of claim. Pointing to enforcement friction or social conflict under a sex-based rule does not establish that the rule fails on its own terms (privacy, safety, and the integrity of sex-separated spaces). It shows that some people are burdened by a clear sex-based boundary. That has always been true of sex-separated facilities. So the comparison is structured to find “no qualifying crimes by transgender people” on one side and “various burdens on transgender people” on the other, then treat that as proof that sex-based rules do more harm than good. That framing stacks the deck. A more fair and reasonable assessment, IMO, would be to ask whether admitting males into female intimate spaces on the basis of identity better or worse serves the reasons those spaces exist, and whether the costs of maintaining a sex-based rule are justified by the protection it provides. Here are my thoughts: Sex-separated intimate spaces exist to protect privacy, dignity, and safety in situations involving undressing, bodily functions, and vulnerability. Those interests track biological sex because of average physical differences and well-documented patterns of male-pattern sexual offense and voyeurism. A sex-based rule directly serves the foregoing purpose. It excludes males. It imposes real costs on a small number of people whose identity or appearance diverges from their sex (awkwardness, the need to seek single-occupancy options, social friction). Those costs are not trivial, but they are limited in scope. Meanwhile, the legitimate concerns of women and girls - pertaining to privacy, dignity and safety - are preserved. An identity-based rule severs access from sex. Any male who "identifies" as a woman gains a claim to enter. So can any other male, simply by claiming the identity, and/or because the sex-based rule has been eliminated. That undermines the privacy and safety rationale for the entire category, shifts the burden onto women and girls, and provides no coherent way to exclude opportunistic or predatory males who make the same claim. The costs are broader and fall on the group the spaces were created to protect. Based on the foregoing, and given the purpose these facilities are intended to actually serve, the sex-based rule is the better fit. The costs it imposes on edge cases do not justify replacing it with a standard that dissolves the boundary itself. That's how I see it, anyway. I appreciate your thoughts and am open to listening to whatever further you have to say about this matter. Thanks, -Smac