Techné as the ship in Mormonism's Bottle? Rorty and Alma 32

[MosiahFree]

15 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said:

When he is describing Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, or the works by Calvin, and Barth, he is correct. Otherwise his definition is far too loose and unsystematic.  Few Mormons are even qualified to undertake such a task, and those who are qualified see no point to it -- instead they nibble around he edges of the subject as if it were a dangerous singularity waiting to swallow them and all their presuppositions into its abyss.

and

16 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

I can't speak for Robert but I'd say it's hard to reconcile to the Mormon approach. I think McGrath is much more focused on theology as done in the 19th and 20th century. I think Mormons have attempted systematic works but typically don't systemize very much. Orson Pratt comes closest I'd say. I'm not sure I'd count Richards although there's certainly elements of a systematizing tendency. McConkie might be the figure most would point to yet there's a strong nominalistic aspect to McConkie. He tends to shy from discussing the foundational elements which are so characteristic of modern systematic theology. Even Pratt, while he at least tries, is pretty weak stuff in that regard.

Everything quoted by McGrath is echoed elsewhere, take this essay by Robert H. King: 

Quote

Another positive feature of the present time is the increased recognition that theology, for all its reliance upon tradition, is a constructive undertaking. What has previously been set down cannot simply be taken for granted. The tradition we have received has evolved over time, and we ourselves contribute to its further development by the way in which we appropriate and apply it. We had therefore best take responsibility for what we say and for the way in which we say it. That is especially true if what we seek is a “systematic theology,” for whatever else that term may mean mean, it surely connotes a deliberate ordering of ideas, the self-conscious articulation of a theological position. 

Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, edited by Hodgson, Peter C. & King, Robert H. Fortress Press, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 1985 (2nd edition). p.2

I just don't see what it is about systematic theology is totally at odds with Mormonism. Consider this comparison:

On 11/17/2017 at 11:12 AM, Robert F. Smith said:

It is nice to have an internally consistent and fully systematic theology (such as that of Thomas Aquinas), because it answers nearly all questions and allays doubt. 

Quote

One unacquainted with the history of theology might suppose that a major systematic work of this sort would close off further discussion, since it would answer all the important questions. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Origen’s comprehensive treatment of Christian doctrine, particularly his views on the relationship of God the Father to God the son, contained ambiguities which, when clarified, opened up further issues for debate and thus prepared the way for the great ecumenical councils of the fourth and fifth centuries.  It is as though first an attempt had to be made to provide a unified, coherent account of Christian belief before the difficulties, the apparent inconsistencies, and mistaken understandings could be identified and dealt with.

Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, edited by Hodgson, Peter C. & King, Robert H. Fortress Press, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 1985 (2nd edition). p.4

Nor do systematics need to rely on any certain form of philosophical dialectics:

Quote

It is certainly not insignificant that Calvin chose to organize his theology around the articles of the creed or that one of Luther’s most successful ventures in the direction of systematics should have been his shorter catechism, for the Reformers were characteristically confessional in their approach to theology. Their primary interest was not in system building but in witnessing to their faith. To this end they made far less use of philosophical argument than their predecessors and relied to a much greater extent upon scriptures--and on creeds, as the key to the interpretation of scripture. 

Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, edited by Hodgson, Peter C. & King, Robert H. Fortress Press, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 1985 (2nd edition). p.9-10

It can also become a fluid mix of multiple (and seemingly contradictory) philosophical views:

Quote

Much of the Thomistic literature is, as one would expect, very traditional, yet there were some fairly significant modifications in response to the challenges of the modern period. Thus, instead of “proofs” for the existence of God, we hear of intimations of the unconditioned. Deductive argument has for the most part given way to analogical description, and first principles have been replaced nu rational postulates. Even the philosophical turn to the subject has had an effect, as witness Joseph Maréchal’s reinterpretation of Aquinas along lines congenial with Kant’s critical epistemology.

Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks, edited by Hodgson, Peter C. & King, Robert H. Fortress Press, Philadelphia Pennsylvania, 1985 (2nd edition). p.20

To switch sources, I don't see how what Wolfhart Pannenberg says is incompatible with our Mormon faith or our practice of theology:

Quote

In the history of Christianity, there was always a fundamental question to be faced and to be answered, the question of why an individual person should commit herself or himself to be a member of the Christian church.

An Introduction to Systematic Theology Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid Michigan, 1991. p.3

These are attitudes expressed by Richard.

Quote

To a Jew it may be natural to honor the God of his or her forebears, though even that is not a condition for being a Jew. In the case of the Christian, however, whose background is Gentile and who only becomes a member of the Christian community by confessing to the God of Israel, why should such a person do so?  Here we are at the core of our subject, the need for systematic theology, because it all depends on the question of truth: If we suppose that the God of Israel and of Jesus is the one and only true God, then and only then is there sufficient reason for believing in that God, even if one is not a Jew. 

An Introduction to Systematic Theology Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid Michigan, 1991. p.4-5

Completely applicable to our Missionaries:

Quote

The question of truth in religion is not only a theological question. It is not even theological in the first place. Before it comes to theology, there is a feeling of reliability or an awareness, but vaguely perceived, of the mysterious reality that encompasses and pervades our lives...All momentary certainty stands in need of further confirmation and interpretation, and it is only by reference to the unity of all our experiences and of all our knowledge that we can determine what is true.

An Introduction to Systematic Theology Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid Michigan, 1991. p.4-5

I can't imagine what Mormonism would look like if it wasn't compatible with systematics:

Quote

If theology does not properly face its particular task regarding the truth claims of the Christian tradition, then it easily happens that the clergy of the church are the first to become insecure and evasive about the message they are supposed to preach. When they become doubtful about the truth of the gospel, they will tend to replace it by other “causes,” and the believers will be disturbed, because they no longer get to hear in church what they rightfully expect to be taught there.

The task of theology is not only to investigate the origin and the original content of the Christian faith and of the doctrine of the church, or the changes they underwent in the course of history, but also to determine the truth which is contained in that tradition. All theological disciplines share in this task, but undoubtedly it is the special task of systematic theology, and to the degree that the question of the truth content in the documents of the Christian tradition is dealt with in biblical exegesis and in church history, those disciplines share in the special task of systematic theology.

An Introduction to Systematic Theology Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid Michigan, 1991. p.6-7

And what of apologetics?

Quote

So far, I have argued that systematic theology is necessary in order to substantiate the truth claims of Christian language about God. This task is met by attempting a comprehensive and coherent account of the world as God’s creation, including the economy of God’s action in history. To provide such a comprehensive interpretation on the basis of a Christian doctrine of God is more or less what has actually been done in systematic theology since the days of the early church, when in a context of Hellenistic culture Christians, especially Gentile Christians, had to justify their faith in the Jewish God and in Jesus as his final word. Explicitly, such a defense of the Christian faith in God by way of a systematic exposition of Christian doctrine as well as of the world of creation and history has been attempted since Origen’s work on principles. 

An Introduction to Systematic Theology Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid Michigan, 1991. p.13

Here Pannenberg echoes Robert King:

Quote

The modern criticism of authoritarian argument on the one hand, and the criticism of the retreat to subjective commitment on the other, have caused many theologians to surrender Christian apologetics and dogmatics, to surrender even the Christian truth claims themselves, and to turn to what are considered “relevant issues” of the time. But there is no reason to lose heart and to sell out just because there is no a priori guarantee of truth. The effort at systematic reconstruction of Christian doctrine is even more needed than in earlier periods of the church, because now it should be clear that one has to deal with the truth claims of the tradition in this framework .

An Introduction to Systematic Theology Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid Michigan, 1991. p.17-18

And perhaps, one of the most important tasks of systematics:
 

Quote

In explicating the systematic coherence of this divine economy as manifesting the eternal life and truth and glory of God, systematic theology in its own way contributes to the commonly human task of glorifying God--a task that was never more urgent than in a world of secularist culture.

An Introduction to Systematic Theology Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid Michigan, 1991. p.68-69

 

[mfbukowski]

3 hours ago, MosiahFree said:

Well I’d have to disagree with this assessment. I think the place to begin is with the term “scholasticism” and what encompasses that term:

Knowles goes on to tell us:

Much later in his comments on the life of Aquinas and notes that it is an error to believe that the work of Aquinas is the most characteristic of medieval philosophy:

Make note of the name “Gilson” (referencing Etienne Gilson) because we’ll get to him shortly. Now earlier in the thread I quoted the Italian scholar Romanus Cessario (who also is a Dominican Brother) to the effect that “Thomism” was a broad term that cast its shadow over a variety of thinkers who hold mutually exclusive beliefs about a variety of topics. I feel that it is a categorical error talk about “Thomism” as a single system; to ask if “Thomism” is a “systematic theology” is akin to asking, “Is Phenomenology a systematic theology?” I had thought that citing a former editor of The Thomist would be sufficient, but I can make use of other sources. Here is an entry under Thomism:

Notice Etienne Gilson mentioned again. For those readers curious about the 19th century resurgence of Thomism here is a little snippet of historical context:

With that little digression out of the way, I can address this:

Well The Elements does plod along in a deductive manner (it is geometry after all) and that sort of deduction doesn’t really crop up often systematic theologies or in Thomism for that matter. In regards to Thomism here is a small passage from Etienne Gilson in a section of a book on Thomas Aquinas called ‘The Spirit of Thomism’:

So in summation, I think your characterizing of Thomism is simply wrong and doesn't do our common faith any credit to do so. I can't imagine our Roman Catholic friends here appreciate it.

Well thank you!

I'll have more to say Re: Systematic Theology when time permits, but I felt I should do Thomism the justice is deserves when being spoken of by Non-Thomists.

On the other hand, the metaphysics of Thomism is undeniably based on the substance / accident distinction made by Aristotle, which many hold today to be untenable philosophically, and based on linguistic confusions. The unity of the Trinity, and the basis for the transubstantiation of the Eucharist, are both doctrinally based on the validity of substance theology.  This is the problem with basing religious beliefs on systematic philosophy. No one outside of Catholic Universities works on Thomism. http://www.aquinasonline.com/Topics/substacc.html

We're I still Catholic, I would, and did, have to re-think the whole basis for the faith, which is why I am Mormon. This doesn't mean Catholicism is untenable philosophically, just that its systematic foundation must now be re-thought. 

Rorty's "Future of Religion" is co-authored by a Catholic, and I think their views are beneficial to both faiths. 

Edited November 22, 2017 by mfbukowski

[MosiahFree]

On 11/17/2017 at 11:31 AM, mfbukowski said:

I hope it helps.  Gonna be pretty busy from now out but I will pick up the thread when I can.

I haven't been ignoring your post friend, I've just been rereading Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity to get reacquainted with it before I give my thoughts.

[MosiahFree]

5 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

No one outside of Catholic Universities works on Thomism. 

There are Non-Catholics who publish on Thomism.

[clarkgoble]

5 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Well I disagree with your analysis of many if these philosophers, but a lot if it is nuances because in the big picture our positions are so close, the only thing we have to differ on is the nuances.But the big difference is that I see language as not "representing" anything in the "real world" except perceptions which are all results of mental states. So we have mental states by cultural convention symbolizing other mental states so that even thinking of them as "representing " something other than mental states is, sorry but I will use the word " naive".

That's a good point and I should have anticipated that with my use of "representation." When I'm using the term here I'm using it more loosely rather than in the Cartesian sense. I think one can talk about representation (as Peirce does) without acys cepting it in a Kantian sense. From a purely linguistic sense even strong idealists are fine using the term representation. I don't think we should let Descartes and to a lesser extent Kant control the word.

More or less what I'm saying is just that "representations" or whatever word you'd prefer to replace it with aren't all there is. 

But as you note our views are pretty similar and tend just to differ over Peirce's realism and perhaps his logic.

A different criticism is just to note that when you talk about mental states if we choose that language rather than representations the same problems remain. It ignores the background practices that give sense to mental states. Likewise it tends (IMO) to downplay process in preference to state in a fashion akin to how representations tend to have problems in the same way.

But I'll wait to see what MosiahFree says on this as I'm not quite sure where he's coming from or what he's critiquing exactly relative to Mormon theology. After all the notion of absolute truth can just be understood as what structures persist through societal change or inquiry. With regards to Aquinas I'll remain silent as I know just enough to be dangerous. Plus I was always more a Duns Scotus kind of guy. Relative to systematic theology I certainly don't have a problem with the drive. My only qualm is the hermeneutic principle that typically there are multiple different and incompatible systematic theories for any set of data. Since there's usually no determinate reason to pick one over the others beyond preference I think we should always be suspicious.

As for why I think it's hard in a Mormon context to do systematic theology it's more that we don't tend to approach things from basic principles. People starting a more systematic theology tend to quickly run into the problem of ambiguous texts and the obvious hermeneutic problems. At one time I thought Roberts had done systematic theology but when I reread his works they tend to be much more cautious. Blake Ostler in some ways is doing a systematic approach to some issues like his arguments for Open Theology. But I think some caution is in order there.

Edited November 22, 2017 by clarkgoble

[Robert F. Smith]

4 hours ago, MosiahFree said:

........................

I just don't see what it is about systematic theology is totally at odds with Mormonism. ..............

To switch sources, I don't see how what Wolfhart Pannenberg says is incompatible with our Mormon faith or our practice of theology:

...................................

I can't imagine what Mormonism would look like if it wasn't compatible with systematics:

...........................................

I did not say, and do not believe that "systematic theology is totally at odds with Mormonism."  Only that most Mormon intellectuals feel that way, or are at least very dubious about the possibility.  A systematic theology can be written about nearly any religion.  The only question which remains is whether that system accurately portrays that religion, and whether that system corresponds in some meaningful way with that religion.  In the case of the OT, that means dealing with multiple religions.*  In the case of Mormonism, that means dealing effectively with the naturalistic and humanistic basis of LDS theology -- aside from correct exegesis of the various parts of the Mormon Canon.  A canon lawyer like the late Bruce McConkie certainly could not do it.  I'd like to see you give it a shot, or at least give us a prospectus of what that would mean.  Meanwhile, you are apparently in competition with Spencer Macdonald to see who can create the longest post.  

*  Cf. Ziony Zevit, The Religions of Ancient Israel: A Synthesis of Parallactic Approaches (N.Y./London: Continuum, 2001).

[mfbukowski]

2 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

That's a good point and I should have anticipated that with my use of "representation." ....

A different criticism is just to note that when you talk about mental states if we choose that language rather than representations the same problems remain. It ignores the background practices that give sense to mental states. 

....Which are themselves mental states if you can think of them. That concept is a mental state. 

Anything else is unspeakable!

"Background practices"? 

What could that possibly mean. ?Anything you THINK is if course a mental state!

That is why I think from you, I always see some kind "external" cause of mental states which cannot be justified in my view.

It is an inescapable tautology that knowledge is a mental state.

Whatever you think,  say, conceive, visualize, see, perceive, want, like, hate, theorize, it is a mental state. Every word is a cultural relic of the cultures collective mental states.

This is what I feel I can never get across to you.

 

[Robert F. Smith]

6 hours ago, MosiahFree said:

......................................... “Thomism” was a broad term that cast its shadow over a variety of thinkers who hold mutually exclusive beliefs about a variety of topics. I feel that it is a categorical error talk about “Thomism” as a single system; to ask if “Thomism” is a “systematic theology” is akin to asking, “Is Phenomenology a systematic theology?” ................................

Quote

Successive generations have taken his philosophy as the starting point for their own speculations and have developed his ideas in many directions.

 

Perhaps even the thought of Teilhard de Chardin was ultimately a development from Thomism, or perhaps sui generis.  What is your opinion, Brother?

6 hours ago, MosiahFree said:

Well The Elements does plod along in a deductive manner (it is geometry after all) and that sort of deduction doesn’t really crop up often systematic theologies or in Thomism for that matter. ..........................

Systematic theologies are perforce syllogistic at base, even when the syllogisms (enthymemes) are unstated.

6 hours ago, MosiahFree said:

So in summation, I think your characterizing of Thomism is simply wrong and doesn't do our common faith any credit to do so. I can't imagine our Roman Catholic friends here appreciate it..............................

Well, I guess I will have to see what they in fact say on this matter.  As to having a "common faith," I am not sure that they will share that notion with the Mormon heretics.

[clarkgoble]

17 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

....Which are themselves mental states if you can think of them. That concept is a mental state. 

Anything else is unspeakable!

"Background practices"? 

What could that possibly mean. ?Anything you THINK is if course a mental state!

That is why I think from you, I always see some kind "external" cause of mental states which cannot be justified in my view.

It is an inescapable tautology that knowledge is a mental state.

Whatever you think,  say, conceive, visualize, see, perceive, want, like, hate, theorize, it is a mental state. Every word is a cultural relic of the cultures collective mental states.

This is what I feel I can never get across to you.

I suspect we're just returning to the debate we first had. More or less the question is the makeup and constitution of mental states and language. As I recall I floored you a bit in our earlier discussion by accusing you of being too Cartesian when you thought you were completely the opposite. Yet it's precisely on this "there's only mental states" that I think your position (and perhaps Rorty's) are so Cartesian - only with the "real world" removed. I'm not sure how to describe this but "mental state" language to me ends up being representational even if nothing is represented/referenced but other representations.

The critique I have with this is that the tautological aspect of it arises only because you from the start say this is all there is. That is there's a certain "when you're a hammer everything is a nail" aspect to it.

A common counterexample to show the paucity of this position is something common like running. Now is running exhausted by mental states? No of course not. That would be silly. Now the move I suspect someone from Rorty's camp would make would be to say all we can say about running arises out of descriptions that are ultimately just mental states. But that kind of begs the question of what a mental state is. And that's where I think things get messy. A Heideggarian would say that representations, propositions or whatever you want to call them come second and not first. That is they become sensical only against a background of practices which can't be reduced to mental states. The reason running is a good example of this is that a description of running isn't the same as running. Further when we run we're really not making use of representations. There's certainly a mental state component. Especially if you're willing to expand mental state to nervous state rather than conscious state. But running can't be understood merely in terms of that internal state. It's a practice.

Ironically Wittgenstein moves very far in that direction with language, which is why I want to be careful since Rorty/Wittgenstein's treatment of language ends up being a bit more sophisticated here than a mere reduction to a Cartesian conception of the mental. 

As you say this gets into nuance - perhaps more nuance than is relevant for this thread. The question is whether practices are merely what I think about them. I take you to be saying yes whereas key to my position is that they are more than I think about them - especially if we take thinking in terms of conscious awareness.

[mfbukowski]

31 minutes ago, clarkgoble said:

I suspect we're just returning to the debate we first had. More or less the question is the makeup and constitution of mental states and language. As I recall I floored you a bit in our earlier discussion by accusing you of being too Cartesian when you thought you were completely the opposite. Yet it's precisely on this "there's only mental states" that I think your position (and perhaps Rorty's) are so Cartesian - only with the "real world" removed. I'm not sure how to describe this but "mental state" language to me ends up being representational even if nothing is represented/referenced but other representations.

The critique I have with this is that the tautological aspect of it arises only because you from the start say this is all there is. That is there's a certain "when you're a hammer everything is a nail" aspect to it.

A common counterexample to show the paucity of this position is something common like running. Now is running exhausted by mental states? No of course not. That would be silly. Now the move I suspect someone from Rorty's camp would make would be to say all we can say about running arises out of descriptions that are ultimately just mental states. But that kind of begs the question of what a mental state is. And that's where I think things get messy. A Heideggarian would say that representations, propositions or whatever you want to call them come second and not first. That is they become sensical only against a background of practices which can't be reduced to mental states. The reason running is a good example of this is that a description of running isn't the same as running. Further when we run we're really not making use of representations. There's certainly a mental state component. Especially if you're willing to expand mental state to nervous state rather than conscious state. But running can't be understood merely in terms of that internal state. It's a practice.

Ironically Wittgenstein moves very far in that direction with language, which is why I want to be careful since Rorty/Wittgenstein's treatment of language ends up being a bit more sophisticated here than a mere reduction to a Cartesian conception of the mental. 

As you say this gets into nuance - perhaps more nuance than is relevant for this thread. The question is whether practices are merely what I think about them. I take you to be saying yes whereas key to my position is that they are more than I think about them - especially if we take thinking in terms of conscious awareness.

Notice my list did not include actions, for a reason. The discussion is about epistemology. Running is not epistemology.

That would be a category error. 

Obviously talking about running is not running, don't know why you mentioned it.

I do not understand how my position is "Cartesian" in any way. There is no dualism here, 

I really don't understand your point at all, I'm afraid. I think your assertion surprised me, as it still does.

[clarkgoble]

33 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Notice my list did not include actions, for a reason. The discussion is about epistemology. Running is not epistemology.

That would be a category error. 

Obviously talking about running is not running, don't know why you mentioned it.

I do not understand how my position is "Cartesian" in any way. There is no dualism here, 

I really don't understand your point at all, I'm afraid. I think your assertion surprised me, as it still does.

The reason I raise it is because of the question of what a mental state is. But more to the point, the question is whether if knowing is like running. A strong strain of pragmatism says it is. That is it's an act that is in terms of background practices with representations being one production of this practice but not reducible to it. This is pretty much Heidegger's position which is why I raised it.

The dualism is where things broke down last time we talked about this. Again though note I said Cartesian without the external world. So there is no dualism. The question is whether the internals is still caught up in those Cartesian assumptions about what mind is like inside. There was more to Descartes than just his dualism - as later German idealism showed I think.

This is a pretty huge ontological difference between us. Although again, I think it might be getting at nuances not relevant to this thread. So I'll not push it too far. 

[mfbukowski]

13 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

The reason I raise it is because of the question of what a mental state is. But more to the point, the question is whether if knowing is like running. A strong strain of pragmatism says it is. That is it's an act that is in terms of background practices with representations being one production of this practice but not reducible to it. This is pretty much Heidegger's position which is why I raised it.

The dualism is where things broke down last time we talked about this. Again though note I said Cartesian without the external world. So there is no dualism. The question is whether the internals is still caught up in those Cartesian assumptions about what mind is like inside. There was more to Descartes than just his dualism - as later German idealism showed I think.

This is a pretty huge ontological difference between us. Although again, I think it might be getting at nuances not relevant to this thread. So I'll not push it too far. 

Cartesianism without dualism is not Cartesianism.  Yes it is like running.

Cartesianism without the external world is not Cartesianism either.

Not following at all.

How is running dualism?

[mfbukowski]

15 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

The reason I raise it is because of the question of what a mental state is. But more to the point, the question is whether if knowing is like running. A strong strain of pragmatism says it is. That is it's an act that is in terms of background practices with representations being one production of this practice but not reducible to it. This is pretty much Heidegger's position which is why I raised it.

The dualism is where things broke down last time we talked about this. Again though note I said Cartesian without the external world. So there is no dualism. The question is whether the internals is still caught up in those Cartesian assumptions about what mind is like inside. There was more to Descartes than just his dualism - as later German idealism showed I think.

This is a pretty huge ontological difference between us. Although again, I think it might be getting at nuances not relevant to this thread. So I'll not push it too far. 

The very use of the word " like" makes everything that follows a simile, and therefore an imperfect representation.

It is seeing through a glass Darkly and not face to face. Whatever follows that magic word is suddenly automatically a distortion and not even a true attempt at a representation of reality.

[clarkgoble]

On 11/23/2017 at 8:24 AM, mfbukowski said:

The very use of the word " like" makes everything that follows a simile, and therefore an imperfect representation.

It is seeing through a glass Darkly and not face to face. Whatever follows that magic word is suddenly automatically a distortion and not even a true attempt at a representation of reality.

There is no ideal "Cartesianism" and not even Descartes followed what often gets criticized as Cartesianism by 20th century philosophers. But yes, what I presented was an imperfect representation - a model designed to get at the core dispute. (Cartesianism minus the dualism)

On 11/23/2017 at 7:07 AM, mfbukowski said:

Cartesianism without dualism is not Cartesianism.  Yes it is like running.

Cartesianism without the external world is not Cartesianism either.

Not following at all.

How is running dualism?

Probably not worth pushing. The point is just that there are background practices that aren't cognitive representations, language or anything like that. When you only allow for one kind of entity and then deny other 'things' by that presupposition it's completely circular. That's really all I was getting at. Running is just am example something that seems essentially extra-linguistic. But the Cartesian metaphor clearly isn't helping so I'll just drop it.

All of this is starting to get a bit afield of the original topic of systematic theology and Rorty though. To the degree it is relevant is perhaps the old praxis vs. theory distinction that seems key to both Mormonism and Judaism. So you have people like Jim Faulconer arguing against not just systematic theology but a lot of theology in general due to the emphasis on practice. While I think Jim pushes this a bit too far, I am sympathetic to the divide between theory/representation and practice/comportment. If I understand "MosiahFree" he's making a similar charge but focusing it on Rorty. Not that Rorty neglects practice of course. In a certain way public praxis is his main focus, as I recall him. The question is how he deals with this theory/praxis relationship. That's what I'd hope "MosiahFree" would bring out a bit more and explain how it relates to this question of "system."

Edited November 24, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

3 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

There is no ideal "Cartesianism" and not even Descartes followed what often gets criticized as Cartesianism by 20th century philosophers. But yes, what I presented was an imperfect representation - a model designed to get at the core dispute. (Cartesianism minus the dualism)

Probably not worth pushing. The point is just that there are background practices that aren't cognitive representations, language or anything like that. When you only allow for one kind of entity and then deny other 'things' by that presupposition it's completely circular. That's really all I was getting at. Running is just am example something that seems essentially extra-linguistic. But the Cartesian metaphor clearly isn't helping so I'll just drop it.

All of this is starting to get a bit afield of the original topic of systematic theology and Rorty though. To the degree it is relevant is perhaps the old praxis vs. theory distinction that seems key to both Mormonism and Judaism. So you have people like Jim Faulconer arguing against not just systematic theology but a lot of theology in general due to the emphasis on practice. While I think Jim pushes this a bit too far, I am sympathetic to the divide between theory/representation and practice/comportment. If I understand "MosiahFree" he's making a similar charge but focusing it on Rorty. Not that Rorty neglects practice of course. In a certain way public praxis is his main focus, as I recall him. The question is how he deals with this theory/praxis relationship. That's what I'd hope "MosiahFree" would bring out a bit more and explain how it relates to this question of "system."

Well the simplest way to explain it is that Rorty and many other pragmatists deny the distinction between reality and appearance, or as the Thomists might say, the substance / accident distinction. Cartesianism perpetuates the distinction.

That is the difference between Thomas and Alma in a nutshell. Alma says essentially, if it feels good, it is true.  If it bears good fruit it is good. Yesterday it is circular as you point out, and That is Rorty's circularism as well because truth is part of a circular language game that is self referential by nature in its DC 93 "sphere". All natural languages are self referential in the same way, each is a universe unto itself.

We know that when Alma speaks of ,"good fruit" he is not including murder as good, but he doesn't have to define it because his readers in their sphere already know that.

It is a circular argument to assume that one need not define why murder is wrong, because it is a known assumption within the community of Alma readers.

And if you are looking for how Rorty handles what is extra linguistic, just look at my siggy where he speaks of "causes" which are not mental states, but of course to speak more of them would is outside his context for writing in the first place.

So I would see running as experiencing reality "as it is" and talking about running as it's linguistic distortion.  Talking about running is not  a  "representation" of running any more than talking about a chair is a chair. 

Words can never describe either in the fullness of the experience.

I do not get tired talking about running or experience the comfort or color or texture of the chair. A picture may be a thousand times better, but even that is not close to being the full reality.

Surely neither is a "representation" of either.

William James makes the analogy between the experience of sights sounds and smells of strolling through a city vs the word, say fo example, "Paris".

Or suppose a map of Paris. In a paltry way a map "represents" Paris without any of the richness of the experience. James also speaks of the word "steak" on a menu vs all the sizzling splendor when it is served up before you, with all your senses immersed in the experience.

Edited November 24, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

Well the simplest way to explain it is that Rorty and many other pragmatists deny the distinction between reality and appearance, or as the Thomists might say, the substance / accident distinction. Cartesianism perpetuates the distinction.

That is the difference between Thomas and Alma in a nutshell. Alma says essentially, if it feels good, it is true.  If it bears good fruit it is good. Yesterday it is circular as you point out, and That is Rorty's circularism as well because truth is part of a circular language game that is self referential by nature in its DC 93 "sphere". All natural languages are self referential in the same way, each is a universe unto itself.

Yes, that's not really the point I was getting at. That part I somewhat agree with - given all the important qualifications a Pericean would give against the neo-pragmatists. The question is more are there things that aren't appearances. In other words in our taxonomy in what ways does the unspeakable matter. I take you following Rorty to say they don't matter at all. All that matters is speech of a sort. (Appearances if you prefer to get at the broader sense of this)

1 hour ago, mfbukowski said:

And if you are looking for how Rorty handles what is extra linguistic, just look at my siggy where he speaks of "causes" which are not mental states, but of course to speak more of them would is outside his context for writing in the first place.

So I would see running as experiencing reality "as it is" and talking about running as it's linguistic distortion.  Talking about running is not  a  "representation" of running any more than talking about a chair is a chair. 

Words can never describe either in the fullness of the experience.

I do not get tired talking about running or experience the comfort or color or texture of the chair. A picture may be a thousand times better, but even that is not close to being the full reality.

Surely neither is a "representation" of either.

I don't think I'd say one is a representation of the other. (Certainly when Heidegger discusses what is primordial before 'representational' truth he isn't either) I think with regards to truth we're close, although the Peircean in me would be a bit more expansive about what can act semiotically as a proposition. But as a practical matter for human affairs in the short term I think that there we largely agree.

So to me the interesting question is how appearances or more importantly propositions become able to be true. It's here that I think Rorty and I part ways since he puts the emphasis on the people in conversation whereas I put the emphasis on the world itself outside of my language. I certainly agree that once we start to talk about this we're trapped in language with all the associated distortions and errors. However I think that it's much more a combination of people and world acting together. Now people can ignore what's going on for various reasons. (This would be not conducting the test in Alma's language or "receive not the light" to use D&C 93's more platonic like language) But I think that giving from outside ourselves and our openness to it is important. Now again even if Rorty doesn't make openness of this sort a focus I tend to think he actually embraces it in various ways. First it's where I think James and Dewey influence him. (I might be critical of James' psychologizing what to me is external reality but at least there's still that openness) Second because as you note in your sig there's an openness to something like causality.

My sense is that your  Dewey is coming out here whereas it often seems to me (perhaps mistakenly) that Rorty doesn't embrace the full sense of experience that Dewey does. Perhaps  you'd disagree with me there. But that's one way to put my critique is simply Dewey's unwillingness to reduce experience to what (at his time) the realists and idealists were wont to do. Whereas to me Rorty falls prey to those drives Dewey opposes. (Again you and I may read Dewey slightly differently as I read with more of a Peircean lens - but it's Dewey where I think the two of us are most in agreement)

Getting back to the original theme of systematic theology I think one way to put my own qualms with systematic theology is that systematic theology falls prey to dogma. In other words I have no problem with systematic theology so long as that sense of openness is there. (Or as Peirce put it, continue to question and continue to inquire) However the problem with systematic theology whether of Aquinas' type or late 19th century Protestants - particular German scholars - is that they tend to make presuppositions not allowed into question. To me good systematic theology is clear about suppositions and where they might fail.

 

Edited November 24, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

Yes, that's not really the point I was getting at. That part I somewhat agree with - given all the important qualifications a Pericean would give against the neo-pragmatists. The question is more are there things that aren't appearances. In other words in our taxonomy in what ways does the unspeakable matter. I take you following Rorty to say they don't matter at all. All that matters is speech of a sort. (Appearances if you prefer to get at the broader sense of this)

I don't think I'd say one is a representation of the other. (Certainly when Heidegger discusses what is primordial before 'representational' truth he isn't either) I think with regards to truth we're close, although the Peircean in me would be a bit more expansive about what can act semiotically as a proposition. But as a practical matter for human affairs in the short term I think that there we largely agree.

So to me the interesting question is how appearances or more importantly propositions become able to be true. It's here that I think Rorty and I part ways since he puts the emphasis on the people in conversation whereas I put the emphasis on the world itself outside of my language. I certainly agree that once we start to talk about this we're trapped in language with all the associated distortions and errors. However I think that it's much more a combination of people and world acting together. Now people can ignore what's going on for various reasons. (This would be not conducting the test in Alma's language or "receive not the light" to use D&C 93's more platonic like language) But I think that giving from outside ourselves and our openness to it is important. Now again even if Rorty doesn't make openness of this sort a focus I tend to think he actually embraces it in various ways. First it's where I think James and Dewey influence him. (I might be critical of James' psychologizing what to me is external reality but at least there's still that openness) Second because as you note in your sig there's an openness to something like causality.

My sense is that your  Dewey is coming out here whereas it often seems to me (perhaps mistakenly) that Rorty doesn't embrace the full sense of experience that Dewey does. Perhaps  you'd disagree with me there. But that's one way to put my critique is simply Dewey's unwillingness to reduce experience to what (at his time) the realists and idealists were wont to do. Whereas to me Rorty falls prey to those drives Dewey opposes. (Again you and I may read Dewey slightly differently as I read with more of a Peircean lens - but it's Dewey where I think the two of us are most in agreement)

Getting back to the original theme of systematic theology I think one way to put my own qualms with systematic theology is that systematic theology falls prey to dogma. In other words I have no problem with systematic theology so long as that sense of openness is there. (Or as Peirce put it, continue to question and continue to inquire) However the problem with systematic theology whether of Aquinas' type or late 19th century Protestants - particular German scholars - is that they tend to make presuppositions not allowed into question. To me good systematic theology is clear about suppositions and where they might fail.

 

Apologies, the post was not complete when you made these comments.

Read up on the deflationary theory of Truth. It is a useful word, not too much more

And I really don't care about mixing views, I am not concerned about the history of philosophy, as I have told you before, I am interested in a position which works.

We seem to be going in circles as usual.

Reality IS the unspeakable and it seems I cannot get that through to you while you keep on telling me about Peirce.   

Edited November 24, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

3 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Reality IS the unspeakable and it seems I cannot get that through to you while you keep on telling me about Peirce.   

It's a big reason why I think philosophy of language is ultimately pointless as it misses too much relative to a general theory of signs. Semiotics opens things up more than linguistics does. Had you spoke to me before I'd learned semiotics and Heidegger I'd have completely agreed with you.

There's not a slam dunk on why to prefer one over the other - as is so common in philosophy. I can but say it raises questions and gives a reasonable answer. Beyond that I can I guess point to books like Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism but that's ultimately about it. 

Edited November 25, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

15 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

It's a big reason why I think philosophy of language is ultimately pointless as it misses too much relative to a general theory of signs. Semiotics opens things up more than linguistics does. Had you spoke to me before I'd learned semiotics and Heidegger I'd have completely agreed with you.

There's not a slam dunk on why to prefer one over the other - as is so common in philosophy. I can but say it raises questions and gives a reasonable answer. Beyond that I can I guess point to books like Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism but that's ultimately about it. 

And so we return again to the same point we always reach and that is about the problem of whether or not religious belief is logically justifiable. Peirce is on the no-side and Rorty is on the yes-side, though both are atheists personally.

Tactically,  in apologetics, I am interested in why an atheist would think that religious belief is justifiable. For me, Rorty is clearly a friend of religion, at least to the extent of finding religious beliefs justifiable, while Peirce is not. 

https://www.firstthings.com/article/2004/05/how-richard-rorty-found-religion

Edited November 25, 2017 by mfbukowski

[clarkgoble]

2 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

And so we return again to the same point we always reach and that is about the problem of whether or not religious belief is logically justifiable. Peirce is on the no-side and Rorty is on the yes-side, though both are atheists personally.

Tactically,  in apologetics, I am interested in why an atheist would think that religious belief is justifiable. For me, Rorty is clearly a friend of religion, at least to the extent of finding religious beliefs justifiable, while Peirce is not. 

Peirce was a Christian albeit one with unusual beliefs. He even has a well regarded argument for God. It's one of the few that seem mildly persuasive.

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

Peirce was a Christian albeit one with unusual beliefs. He even has a well regarded argument for God. It's one of the few that seem mildly persuasive.

Well thanks for this that changes things considerably. In our previous discussions you had not brought this up and I wasn't in the mood to research it.

At first blush this appears to be a similar argument, actually to Alma 32, clad in the jargon of logic. To lead a good life one must be optimistic and desirous of experimenting on what seems aesthetically good and lead to a good life. I am not quite sure on how a psychology of optimism fits in to a discussion about logic however. Quite honestly I am not sure how much further study I will put into it but I appreciate you bringing up something about which I was totally unaware .  I can see how this germ of an idea was later developed by James and Dewey and finally Rorty, at least that would be my perspective on its development. Again thanks for bringing this to my attention!

[clarkgoble]

5 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

Well thanks for this that changes things considerably. In our previous discussions you had not brought this up and I wasn't in the mood to research it.

At first blush this appears to be a similar argument, actually to Alma 32, clad in the jargon of logic. To lead a good life one must be optimistic and desirous of experimenting on what seems aesthetically good and lead to a good life. I am not quite sure on how a psychology of optimism fits in to a discussion about logic however. Quite honestly I am not sure how much further study I will put into it but I appreciate you bringing up something about which I was totally unaware .  I can see how this germ of an idea was later developed by James and Dewey and finally Rorty, at least that would be my perspective on its development. Again thanks for bringing this to my attention!

It's a bit different from Alma in that it relies on abduction - although perhaps that's what you mean by the jargon of logic. However to me Alma 32 is much more the traditional Hebrew notion of things being true when they show themselves to be the things they appear to be. That is over time they act like they first appeared. I did a T&S post on that a while back tied "how the Church is true."  (I was originally set off on this years ago by a Mormon Matter podcast where people were annoyed with Mormons saying the Church is true. I was pretty surprised how many missed both the Hebrew context but even normal English rhetoric with similar usage.) So for Alma 32 truth is in things, not words (there's no clear word/thing distinction) and we know by watching how things show themselves to be. It's much more deductive/inductive.

For Peirce it's a bit different. He's using abduction which is third form of logic after deduction and induction. It's more or less the ability to make correct guesses when looking at evidence. The reason his argument for God is so interesting even to non-theists is that it really illustrates the use of abduction. 

Now I suppose there is one place of crossover between Peirce and Alma in that we have to be able to grasp what things show themselves to be. But that's not really relevant in that chapter as Alma and Amulek have made such things clear with their words. But in a more general case abduction is what lets us see things to be what they are. Of course given Peirce's thoroughgoing fallibilism he thought we could be wrong. So abduction is the starting not ending point. We then use deduction to work out implications and induction to test them. (And often more abduction along the way as well)

Edited November 26, 2017 by clarkgoble

[mfbukowski]

1 hour ago, clarkgoble said:

It's a bit different from Alma in that it relies on abduction - although perhaps that's what you mean by the jargon of logic. However to me Alma 32 is much more the traditional Hebrew notion of things being true when they show themselves to be the things they appear to be. That is over time they act like they first appeared. I did a T&S post on that a while back tied "how the Church is true."  (I was originally set off on this years ago by a Mormon Matter podcast where people were annoyed with Mormons saying the Church is true. I was pretty surprised how many missed both the Hebrew context but even normal English rhetoric with similar usage.) So for Alma 32 truth is in things, not words (there's no clear word/thing distinction) and we know by watching how things show themselves to be. It's much more deductive/inductive.

For Peirce it's a bit different. He's using abduction which is third form of logic after deduction and induction. It's more or less the ability to make correct guesses when looking at evidence. The reason his argument for God is so interesting even to non-theists is that it really illustrates the use of abduction. 

Now I suppose there is one place of crossover between Peirce and Alma in that we have to be able to grasp what things show themselves to be. But that's not really relevant in that chapter as Alma and Amulek have made such things clear with their words. But in a more general case abduction is what lets us see things to be what they are. Of course given Peirce's thoroughgoing fallibilism he thought we could be wrong. So abduction is the starting not ending point. We then use deduction to work out implications and induction to test them. (And often more abduction along the way as well)

Well as I said, I really was basing everything on that first article you referenced- and mentioned that I am still not likely to carry my study much further- BUT this passage stood out to me as being VERY much like Alma but as said, clothed in quasi-logical jargon.  Emphasis added:

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/chiasson/revisit.htm

Quote

 

So, both perspectives--that we need the Reality of a God to have a hopeful vision and that we do not need a God for this--can be 'true' at the same time if we follow out Peirce's Neglected Argument. It appears that confusion between these two perspectives can be--at least at the level of Peirce's argument-- language-based. What one calls a hopeful vision that must be connected to the belief in God, another might be willing to agree is one sort of (form of) long-term optimism. This latter form of optimism needn't be hooked to the survival of a 'time-based" self--but rather to 'the out of time" experience that is abduction. The optimistic application of abductive reasoning allows an individual to engage in an aesthetic exploration of options and to then filter these options through the lens of ethics (or right conduct) before establishing one or another hypothesis as worthy of development and testing out in the inquiry that is one's life. Peirce called this 'right reasoning'. John Dewey called this activity undergoing an 'aesthetic experience'.

[25]

Though God is a value-laden term for most people--the idea of God's Reality, in Peirce's sense, does not have to signify a specific being--nor need it have a religion connected up to it. It appears that Peirce's use of the term, God, may have signified an ongoing inquiry into the hypothesis that there is meaning resulting from the way in which an individual conducts his life. This meaning is a consequence of deliberate choices of conduct based upon having abductively developed the hypothesis that what he does matters to both the immediate and ultimate outcome of things that may be beyond his ken.

[26]

Because of this hypothesis--which through repeated testing is likely to become a belief--such an individual sees that there's an ongoing need to refine his conduct as various beliefs and propositions interact with experience. "All you have any dealings with", wrote Peirce in another essay, "are your doubts and beliefs, with the course of life that forces new beliefs on you and gives you the power to doubt old beliefs." In this way, based upon his abductively-derived hypothesis of an optimistic long-term vision of some sort, the individual has use of highly polished aesthetic and ethical lenses. By means of these lenses, he can bring his attention to those behaviors and attitudes that need to be changed in order to bring his conduct into ever better alignment with the ethical principles to which he must conform if he is to follow that vision.

[27]

And that's the short version of of Peirce's "Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" in action. But what does this essay mean in terms of Peirce's pragmatism--in terms of the meaning of abduction?

[28]

Peirce's argument here appears to be much the same as all the rest that he wrote about the role of abduction in pragmatism. He argued in this essay for the place of optimistic meandering by means of abduction to develop the hypothesis of God. (We could just as easily call this optimistic, aesthetic meandering) He argued for the place of ethical principles as the basis for developing the explication and demonstration of this hypothesis. He emphasized the place of action-reaction-interpretation as the ongoing process for setting out to prove the hypothesis of God-the same way as he would have us set about to prove anything else. The only apparent difference between this essay and Peirce's more 'scientific' ones is that the experiment in this case requires an individual to consciously engage himself in the experience of living his life. The proof--if it can be called that--resides in testing and adjusting as necessary to the conditions of the hypothesis throughout the conduct of one's life and not in any other objective measure.

[29]

In 'A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God", then, Peirce really argued for the Reality of the ways in which one's perspective (or vision) directs the aesthetic; the ethical and the reasonable (as practiced) to the living of a good life. With this in mind, perhaps it would not be too far a stretch to temporarily change the religiously (and even politically) loaded word God into a more neutral term when contemplating this essay. Perhaps words like Hope and Vision are good enough to use as we consider the effects of the attitudes of optimism and pessimism on the formation of hypotheses and the fixation of beliefs in general. After all, Peirce is not claiming that the proof of the Reality of God resides in an after life--but in the effects which this belief has on the way in which we conduct ourselves in this life.

[30]

From this criterion, perhaps we could say that we could redefine Peirce's use of the word God into: any hypothesis-formed by means of optimistically undergone abductive reasoning--that leads one into consciously choosing ethical conduct that results in the living of a good life--whether or not the concepts we know as God or an after-life enter into the matter at all.

 

One thing I do know well is what Dewey meant by an "aesthetic experience" and it matches well Alma's analogy of a practice bearing "sweet fruit" as tested in our lives.

And as I have pointed out elsewhere (I will give a quick reference for Mosiah Free in case he doesn't know Dworkin: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/nov/28/religion-without-god-ronald-dworkin-review) atheists clearly can have what we might call "religious experiences" or what Dewey would call an "aesthetic experience" without inferring from it that a personal God exists.

And actually Alma can be seen also as more about "aesthetic experiences" in this context than necessarily "religious" experiences.

Both Alma and Peirce -at least in this article - advocate "right reasoning" consisting of picking a belief and experimenting on whether or not it leads to "good" (left undefined) results in one's life.  For Dewey "aesthetic experience" is emotional feeling of satisfaction when things come together- or in Alma's terminology- "bear good fruit" or are "sweet"

Quote

 

Dewey holds that aesthetic quality is emotional. Emotions are not static entities with no element of growth. When significant, they are qualities of a complex changing experience, of a developing drama. There are no separate things called emotions. Emotions, rather, are aspects of events and objects. They are not, generally speaking, private. They belong to a self concerned with movement and change. Unlike automatic reflexes, they are parts of an on-going situation.

Emotion is a cementing force that gives diverse things their qualitative unity. This can give an experience aesthetic character. For example, an employee interview can either be mechanical and ordinary or can involve an interplay that turns it into an experience. In the latter case, the events are connected, each changing the underlying quality as they collectively move to consummation. This may involve the employer's imaginative projection of the character of the applicant onto the job, with resultant harmony or conflict.

The structure of “an experience” goes as follows. The subject undergoes something or some properties, these properties determine his or her doing something, and the process continues until the self and the object are mutually adapted, ending with felt harmony. This even holds for the thinker interacting with his or her ideas. When the doing and undergoing are joined in perception they gain meaning. Meaning, in turn, is given depth through incorporating past experience.

 

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dewey-aesthetics/#HavExp

Quite frankly from what I have read of "abduction" at least in this ethical context I can't see much more to it than what is found in Alma 32.

You find idea or behavior and try it out in your life and if the experience is "sweet" you know it is "true".

This idea is Wittgensteinian in that it places truth in the sphere of orthopraxis within a community- or language game.  It is what Rorty is talking about in that there is ultimately a subjective element, which cannot be tied to an "external reality" in determining what enriches our life and constitutes "truth".  Truth works in a practical way in our lives, no other abstract definition is necessary.  We know how to use the word "truth" even though it cannot be defined.  We can enter a courtroom and testify of the "truth" without defining the term further.  The idea fits perfectly with Dewey's notion of the "aesthetic" satisfaction when "it all comes together" in a number of situations, when the puzzle is solved and the disquietude generated by a problem is resolved.

In all these cases the truth is "sweet" and nothing more need to be said about it.

No quasi-logical jargon necessary.  It feels good and gives peace.

I am not sure the article you referenced represents abduction well but I think the qualification that one must have a psychological attitude of "optimism" to be a good logician in using abduction helps us to see the process in logical terms.

I have never heard of an optimistic attitude being necessary for a mathematician - so it seems to me that what is really being discussed here is about emotion more than logic.  But that is fine with me actually- I think they cannot be separated either, but that is what makes me a Mormon, and not many people think that way.  Virtually no one thinks one must be optimistic to be a scientist, for example.

But certainly I think one must have at least a somewhat optimistic attitude to believe in God.  But some might call optimism of that kind "confirmation bias" when it comes to religious matters.

So to make a long story shorter, YES "techne" IS the ship in Mormonism's bottle.  

Orthopraxis.

And that is also why systematic theology is not possible.  Not every intellectual proposition works for everyone, but a lifestyle of "family values" CAN work for everyone- I would argue.

Following the logic of the Didache, and throwing in some Darwin- the survival of the race requires following the "Way of Life" and not the Way of Death.

At least that is what I would argue. Orthopraxis not Orthodoxy.

 

Edited November 26, 2017 by mfbukowski

[mfbukowski]

I have decided that I am having way too much fun on this board. I really need to buckle down and get going on some requested articles and various other projects.

I am interested though in hearing from Mosiah Free especially though when he gets around to it.

So I will monitor the board and especially this thread and hopefully if I can keep my resolve strong I will be here a lot less.

But I must confess it has been a great deal of fun. I have broken many addictions before but there is still one more to crack.

[clarkgoble]

Mark I'll just go back to the old principle of pragmatism. For a difference to be a difference it must make a difference. The question really is whether there's a difference here. I think it's clear there's a difference in our views of experience which pretty well undergirds all the rest of the discussion.