Pious Fraud

[Calm]

I wish you could read Vogel's book. I think you're a little off here in your focus, (in terms of this discussion) and not having read it is likely part of the reason why.

I'll be keeping my eye out for it at the local library. Alas, my book funds are way too meager these days.

It seems that you think knowledge of the misconception likely to occur is enough for intent to deceive. I do not. I believe one of the primary motives needs to be for the misconception to occur for it to qualify for intent (which is what I see lacking in D&C 19). I am trying to figure out what your 'line in the sand' is on this issue.

Do you see teachers as deceiving their students if they don't tell them everything at once in order to avoid misconceptions (and trust me, they do automatically occur, I've tutored enough kids from beginning math to calculas to know this; history--you should see the difference between how it's conceived by students in Canada and Russia as compared to the US; spelling rules are another fun misconception the kids have)? Do you think doctors not telling their patients about all the possible sideeffects of drugs as deception even knowing that in some cases if they inform them there is a higher probability that they will produce these symptoms?

[Dan Vogel]

Cal,

Thanks for being brief. I

[Dan Vogel]

Cal,

I am not arguing against the existence of other evidence. I am only arguing against using D&C in this manner. If you don't think we should fixate on D&C 19 this way, then all that needs to be done is to remove it from the 'evidence list' and use something else to support the pious fraud argument.

And this is your goal? Remove it because Cal doesn

[USU78]

RA: "When Mormons in the late nineteenth century told public officials (sometimes in court) that they were not living

[Calm]

Cal,

I am not arguing against the existence of other evidence. I am only arguing against using D&C in this manner. If you don't think we should fixate on D&C 19 this way, then all that needs to be done is to remove it from the 'evidence list' and use something else to support the pious fraud argument.

And this is your goal? Remove it because Cal doesn

[Calm]

add-on: This post was written at the same time as the following post, so his was not in response to this one to avoid misunderstanding by other readers.

Any objections to my use of this statement to show JS

[Dan Vogel]

Cal,

Again, let me state that I see some evidence for in the scriptures of God promoting deception when it comes to human relationships. I am unaware of evidence where God promotes the pushing of false doctrine for whatever reason. That is not to say that I wouldn't accept it if I saw it in a passage that clearly indicates it. I believe that using D&C 19 to do so is too weak. If this argument for pious fraud when it comes to doctrine is so strong, there should be other stronger evidence out there to be examined.

Who said God was teaching false doctrine in D&C 19? It wasn

[Calm]

D&C promotes the idea that God participates in deception, why do we need another reference?

But that assumption is yours and I don't see it as a valid assumption ('D&C promotes', not that 'God participates'), so another reference would be helpful in convincing me that this is a possibility (at least in the connection of false doctrine being promoted).

As to false doctrine, I am now confused.

Are you stating that D&C 19 does not promote the learning of false doctrine, whether or not God teaches it directly? Because that is the issue as far as I'm concerned. I'm not talking about technical truth in regard to doctrine for this.

QUOTE

[Dan Vogel]

Cal,

Psychology of what "might work upon the hearts":

[Calm]

I hope so too.

[Calm]

[Dan Vogel]

Cal,

But that assumption is yours and I don't see it as a valid assumption, so another reference would be helpful in convincing me that this is so (at least in the connection of false doctrine being promoted).

Cal, needs another source. I don

[Beowulf]

After all this time, yes, I still do not see how D&C 19 is a prooftext for Joseph being able to engage in pious deception.

I have learned a lot about D&C 19 along the way, making it all a useful exercise.

But no, I do not see the relevance to pious deception

Beowulf

[beastie]

It seems that you think knowledge of the misconception likely to occur is enough for intent to deceive. I do not. I believe one of the primary motives needs to be for the misconception to occur for it to qualify for intent (which is what I see lacking in D&C 19). I am trying to figure out what your 'line in the sand' is on this issue.

Absolutely I think knowledge that misconception is likely, or inevitable (in the scenarios I presented, as well as, IMO, D&C), and going ahead with the omission is intent to deceive. What else could it be?

Do you see teachers as deceiving their students if they don't tell them everything at once in order to avoid misconceptions (and trust me, they do automatically occur, I've tutored enough kids from beginning math to calculas to know this; history--you should see the difference between how it's conceived by students in Canada and Russia as compared to the US; spelling rules are another fun misconception the kids have)? Do you think doctors not telling their patients about all the possible sideeffects of drugs as deception even knowing that in some cases if they inform them there is a higher probability that they will produce these symptoms?

You'd have to give me a hard example of the teacher example.

Re the doctors - I think doctors have the ethical responsibility to inform their patients of all possible side effects. I think a doctor neglecting to do so out of a patronizing belief hearing the side effects will cause hypochondria opens the doctor to medical liability if the side effects do occur and the patient can demonstrate he/she was never informed of the risk.

You also said to Vogel:

And my position is that you haven't demonstrate that there aren't limitations on this pious deception, as in doctrinal issues.

How would he demonstrate that there aren't limitations on this pious deception?

Whoops, forgot another point:

You seem to be using the standard "a good psychologist wouldn't do this, so God wouldn't." Yet, if scriptures are to believed, God hardly follows our contemporary ideas of good parenting or healthy psychological practices. Normally when pointing this out, believers tell me we can't expect to understand God and his actions, but we know that whatever God does is good (paraphrasing) even if it appears evil on the surface. So your standard of expecting God to follow the standards of good modern psychology seems doomed.

[wenglund]

Wade,

As I said, you are not making a significant point.

I suppose that my noting instances of where people are obviously talking past each other, while also suggesting why that is and how that may be corrected, can, in the minds of some, be considered insignificant.

Obviously, I don

[Tchild2]

Wade wrote:

What you are failing to grasp is that while a number of interdependent premises, sub-arguments, and conclusions to your argument, may be viewed as sound and valid according to your paradigm (this is still an open question, and I am granting it here only for the sake of argument), they may not be accepted as valid, (though possibly sound), by those of other paradigms. To illustrate further, here is a continuation of my syllogism above::

a. Given that P = X + Y + Z

b. If and only if P, then R.

c. And, if according to P2 (P2 being an opposing paradigm), ~X, and/or ~Y, and/or ~Z,,

d. Then ~P, and hence, ~R.

Now, let

[Benjamin McGuire]

Well, I am not sure Dan saw my earlier comments, and I had some questions I would really like to ask him, so I am going to try again:

A great deal has been said by Dan and others here in this forum (earlier) on the nature of prophets. I wanted to run another definition by Dan - which appears to be used in the Book of Mormon - for his consideration.

In the Old Testament, Moses marries an Ethiopian woman which prompts a cry of outrage from his sister (Merriam) and his brother (Aaron). In response to this outrage, we get this passage (Number 12:4-6 ff.)

And the LORD spake suddenly unto Moses, and unto Aaron, and unto Miriam, Come out ye three unto the tabernacle of the congregation. And they three came out. And the LORD came down in the pillar of the cloud, and stood in the door of the tabernacle, and called Aaron and Miriam: and they both came forth. And he said,

Hear now my words: If there be a prophet among you, I the LORD will make myself known unto him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a dream.

So, we have the identification of a prophet coming from God Himself. In the early parts of the Book of Mormon, Lehi is intentionally portrayed as a prophet like Moses. And this passage seems to be referred to in 1 Nephi 1:8 and 1 Nephi 2:1

And being thus overcome with the Spirit, he [Lehi] was carried away in a vision, even that he saw the heavens open, and he thought he saw God sitting upon his throne, ... FOR behold, it came to pass that the Lord spake unto my father, yea, even in a dream, and said unto him ...

This isn't so much a prophet "talking to God" as it is "God talking to" the prophet. And, it would seem, that Joseph Smith himself invokes this notion of a prophet when he describes his First "Vision".

Finally, as far as this topic goes, at the beginning of this thread you wrote:

Again, personally, I do not believe prophets REALLY talk to God, but I realize that even my paradigm does not make it impossible for the believer to maintain belief if they are willing to make modifications in their background beliefs, such as the definitions of prophet and revelation.

This, however, is actually not as simple as you make it. I believe that I REALLY talk to God. I believe that God wants all his people to be "prophets". To suggest that prophets don

[beastie]

So, we have the identification of a prophet coming from God Himself. In the early parts of the Book of Mormon, Lehi is intentionally portrayed as a prophet like Moses. And this passage seems to be referred to in 1 Nephi 1:8 and 1 Nephi 2:1

No, what we have is the identification of a prophet coming from someone who believed he was speaking for God himself.

In (not too) recent arguments I have had with individuals over on ZLMB, the notion of evidence was raised. And, I was told that because of the claims of the "supernatural", any argument which did not involve the "supernatural" would trump any argument which did, no matter how unlikely the naturalistic argument was.

This is a misleading and oversimplified summary of those conversations. "No matter how unlikely" seems to imply a wildly improbable situation defying logic. The naturalistic explanations which must, logically, trump supernatural explanations are those which are logical and not wildly improbable, even if definitive proof does not exist. Some natural explanations are so improbable that they may as well be supernatural, and your summary seems to imply that was the argument on ZLMB. It wasn't.

For example, it is not wildly improbably that JS had access to Ethan Smith's ideas. Do we have definitive proof of that? A diary record, a written admission? No, but the book was in his area, Ethan was a known preacher, etc.

I would like you to give an example of an "no matter how unlikely" naturalistic argument versus the implied more likely supernatural one to clarify your statements.

[Beowulf]

I would like you to give an example of an "no matter how unlikely" naturalistic argument versus the implied more likely supernatural one to clarify your statements.

For an example of a "no matter how unlikely" naturalistic theory:

How about that idiotic Golden Pot idea, presented by the now-notorious Grant Palmer, to account for JS' description of the Golden Plates?

Beowulf

[Benjamin McGuire]

beastie writes:

No, what we have is the identification of a prophet coming from someone who believed he was speaking for God himself.

Ah. Someone else with a reading comprehension problem.

Can you point out to us, exactly where in the Book of Mormon Lehi suggested that God didn't make himself known unto him (Lehi) and that God didn't speak to him in a dream?

Whether or not you are skeptical of whether or not the events happened, the text itself is clear. The author of the text portrays the characters as really believing that these things happened. So, regardless of whether you think that it is realistic or not, when discussing how the Book of Mormon uses the notion of "prophet", your skepticism has no place.

This is a misleading and oversimplified summary of those conversations. "No matter how unlikely" seems to imply a wildly improbable situation defying logic. The naturalistic explanations which must, logically, trump supernatural explanations are those which are logical and not wildly improbable, even if definitive proof does not exist. Some natural explanations are so improbable that they may as well be supernatural, and your summary seems to imply that was the argument on ZLMB. It wasn't.

This isn't an oversimplification.

The person in question was E Allusion. The following is part of a lengthy discussion which I was engaged in:

I didn't use the term "simpler", but attempted to bring up the notion of prior probability as another angle to explain why if both models equally account of the data the 19 c hypothesis is to be preferred. This is the set of ideas Seven is attempting to get at when she says "simpler". Simply for the fact that an antiquity hypothesis requires you to posit J. Smith translated a language he did not speak using unknown supernatural means to give us a book that first appears in the 19th century is reason alone the antiquity hypothesis is naturally much less likely. And that's only one of many issues. So the antiquity hypothesis has to have a comparatively stronger case to over come that. "19th century" is the preferred hypothesis before other data is considered. By a large margin.

When the "19th century is the preferred hypothesis before other data is considered" suggests that unless one accepts - or has absolute proof of - the supernatural, the only reasonable starting place apparently is with the theory which does not involve the supernatural. Later, he followed this up with this remark:

The 19 Century hypothesis doesn't require us to posit nearly as many elements both in amount and strength that are yet unverified. There's less "explanatory risk" associated with it. It's much more likely.

and this comment:

First of all, there are many other peripheral issues to the prior probability of the translated document from antiquity hypothesis, such as comparing the odds of falsity compared to supernatural story of finding the plates. However, I am not saying the 19 c hypothesis is to be preferred over antiquity no matter how strong the case for antiquity. I am saying that there is a natural gap in prior probability that needs to be made up. Unless you have sound, independent evidence that spirit beings help people translate heretofore-unknown languages through accessing unknown cognitive processes, then that is a giant unverified element in the antiquity hypothesis that makes it naturally less likely. The problem with my "talking dog" hypothesis is that, given what we currently know, we should not think talking dogs exist. Accepting the very idea of talking dogs would cause us to significantly rearrange our framework of knowledge on language production and who has access to it. So, in order to accept the "talking dog" hypothesis, the case would have to be strong enough for us overcome that unnatural likelihood of talking dogs existing. The very act of accepting the hypothesis of talking dog translation means we have now expanded our ontology to include the existence of talking dogs.

In other words, unless we can overcome (or demonstrate) the existence of the supernatural, any explanation which doesn't involve invoking the supernatural should be preferred before we even begin to look at the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis.

For example, it is not wildly improbably that JS had access to Ethan Smith's ideas. Do we have definitive proof of that? A diary record, a written admission? No, but the book was in his area, Ethan was a known preacher, etc.

However, access (whatever the possibility) isn't evidence. Since there is a large body of established scholarship devoted to demonstrating literary and textual reliance, it should be possible to prove reliance in cases like this beyond reasonable doubt (where it exists) following established methods and criteria. In other words, it should be possible, if you are claiming that Joseph Smith used Ethan Smith's ideas, to demonstrate it using appropriate and accepted methods. Without doing so, to simply claim that because it was there, and Joseph had access to it, is not an argument which demonstrates anything.

I would like you to give an example of an "no matter how unlikely" naturalistic argument versus the implied more likely supernatural one to clarify your statements.

This mis-states my position. My position is that there are those who claim that any naturalistic explanation trumps any supernaturalistic explanation independant of whether or not the naturalistic explanation is any good. Since the value of a supernatural explanation is variable (depending on whether you think the supernatural happens), the relative values of the two would only mean something to a person who accepts the supernatural, and the example which you ask me for is meaningless. There was no implied better supernatural explanation. Simply because in this case, alternatives that are supernatural are never given any consideration.

This is the reason why I ask what the evidentiary bar is for the supernatural so that Dan can demonstrate to us, at what point he would become willing to entertain the possibility of a supernatural explanation. His discussion here in this forum seems to me to suggest that he is claiming a willingness largely because he believes that it will never happen. If he really isn't being duplicitous (like he claimed at the beginning of this thread), then he should be able to provide for us a description of the evidentiary bar which would need to be reached to convince him of the existence of the supernatural.

Ben

[beastie]

Ah. Someone else with a reading comprehension problem.

Ah. Someone else who can't resist the impulse to insult.

Can you point out to us, exactly where in the Book of Mormon Lehi suggested that God didn't make himself known unto him (Lehi) and that God didn't speak to him in a dream?

Whether or not you are skeptical of whether or not the events happened, the text itself is clear. The author of the text portrays the characters as really believing that these things happened. So, regardless of whether you think that it is realistic or not, when discussing how the Book of Mormon uses the notion of "prophet", your skepticism has no place.

The highlighted portion of your statement is what is pertinent to Vogel's comments.

When the "19th century is the preferred hypothesis before other data is considered" suggests that unless one accepts - or has absolute proof of - the supernatural, the only reasonable starting place apparently is with the theory which does not involve the supernatural. Later, he followed this up with this remark:

This was a reasonable, rational, and logical comment. Note in particular he said "starting place". Of course the first starting place with any hypothesis should be the natural. Not even believers normally suggest that the supernatural should be the first consideration for events in this world. They usually view supernatural events as somewhat unusual.

The 19 Century hypothesis doesn't require us to posit nearly as many elements both in amount and strength that are yet unverified. There's less "explanatory risk" associated with it. It's much more likely.

Again, reasonable, rational, and logical. You can't refute it. Nothing supernatural, including religion, has been verified. That's why it's called faith.

In other words, unless we can overcome (or demonstrate) the existence of the supernatural, any explanation which doesn't involve invoking the supernatural should be preferred before we even begin to look at the likelihood of the alternative hypothesis.

yes, and he explained why quite well.

However, access (whatever the possibility) isn't evidence. Since there is a large body of established scholarship devoted to demonstrating literary and textual reliance, it should be possible to prove reliance in cases like this beyond reasonable doubt (where it exists) following established methods and criteria. In other words, it should be possible, if you are claiming that Joseph Smith used Ethan Smith's ideas, to demonstrate it using appropriate and accepted methods. Without doing so, to simply claim that because it was there, and Joseph had access to it, is not an argument which demonstrates anything.

You are verifying what I suspected. EA was not making the argument for a natural explanation that was wildly improbable, and you implied he was. You are simply demanding exact proof, which is not always possible in historical cases. Your stance seems to be that lacking exact proof, the supernatural should be viewed as just as likely.

Beowolf,

Although I'm aquainted with the Golden Pot argument, I'm not schooled enough in it to judge. But personally, I think wildly improbable would include claims that would be difficult for most human beings to enact in the given time period, although technically possible.

[Benjamin McGuire]

beastie writes:

Ah. Someone else who can't resist the impulse to insult.

The pot calls the kettle black. Actually, I get tired of having to repeat myself over and over again. Lets parse what you wrote:

No, what we have is the identification of a prophet coming from someone who believed he was speaking for God himself.

Who is it, that is "speaking for God himself"? Was it the author of the text? Was it the character in the text (assuming that they are not the same)? What is your evidence that the author believed that "he was speaking for God himself"? This is not a statement which the author makes. There is no indication in the text that the character believed that he was "speaking for God himself". So either you misread the text, or are going outside the text in an appeal to your personal assumptions, from which to draw your statement. But the claim which you made had nothing to do with what I wrote. And by extension, your observation that this is pertinent to what Dan has written is right on - but not in the way that you think it is.

This was a reasonable, rational, and logical comment. Note in particular he said "starting place". Of course the first starting place with any hypothesis should be the natural. Not even believers normally suggest that the supernatural should be the first consideration for events in this world. They usually view supernatural events as somewhat unusual.

Of course. In fact, believers don't normally suggest that the supernatural is the evidence or the proof when trying to build an evidentiary case. But this doesn't describe the conversation on ZLMB. The specific argument that was being dealt with at the time was over the question of whether a specific piece of text in the Book of Mormon was derived from environmental issues within the Book of Mormon, or that it could describe a historically plausible setting. The argument being raised by those favoring a naturalistic case was that they could demonstate the existence of a hypothetical parallel within the environment, and thus, because it is existed, and was potentially a possible source, that it trumped any argument which involved the historicity of the text in explaining this particular feature of the text (sepcifically because anything which supported historicity supported a supernatural explanation involving angels, miraculous translation, etc.). When the text is analyzed without concern for its historicity (that is, even if we assume modern authorship - a point which I conceded for the purposes of that argument), it remained that those arguing for the modern authorship could not adequately defend their claim that there was any kind of demonstratable literary relationship. Essentially then, instead of using the notion of the supernatural as a way of "raising the bar" so to speak for those favoring the authenticity of the book, they were using it to lower the evidentiary bar for arguments favoring modern authorship.

When dealing with literary arguments dealing with the Book of Mormon, these arguments should be able to be made without playing the "angel card". That is, the text should be able to speak for itself. If there are references which refer to real histrorical events, (and I am not saying here that there are), then these should be the source for evidentiary arguments. If there are references to modern events, then these should be the evidentiary argument. There shouldn't be a need to disqualify prematurely any argument which supports the historicity of the text simply because their is implied in such an argument a reference to the supernatural involved in the alleged translation of the text. Does this make sense to you?

It isn't a case of arguing for or against the supernatural events - since, as even Dan pointed out, such claims cannot be proven or disproven. However, the question of whether or not the text has ancient or exclusively modern sources is one which should be answerable without discussing whether or not there was an angel, and whether or not God was involved somehow in the translation. The appeal to the supernatural as a way of dealing with arguments for a historic setting is nothing short of crying "Angel".

In the case of the argument on ZLMB, instead of looking at the evidentiary arguments, the evidence for the position which supported the historicty of the Book of Mormon was immediately disqualified because any approach which supports that historicity was presumed to endorse the supernatural. There was no discussion of the evidence. Just as when a competing theory was introduced (without significant evidence), that theory was given preferential treatment on the grounds that without proving the supernatural, it was the simpler, better argument (when in fact that argument wasn't coherent using recognized standards of literary analysis).

You are verifying what I suspected. EA was not making the argument for a natural explanation that was wildly improbable, and you implied he was. You are simply demanding exact proof, which is not always possible in historical cases. Your stance seems to be that lacking exact proof, the supernatural should be viewed as just as likely.

EA never provided evidence. Essentially his position was that no real evidence was necessary until any theory which invoked the supernatural first demonstrated the existence of the supernatural. It had no bearing on the other argument.

Now, if this is the way that Dan works, I want to know what the bar is for the admission of evidence which supports the supernatural. After all, I can shoot down naturalistic arguments any time (literary theory is one of my favorite topics). But how do you argue for a theory which suggests that the text is ancient - if I have to argue that the supernatural exists before the evidence is ever even examined?

One of the major issues I have with key players in the current naturalistic theories (or environmental issues theories) like Metcalfe and Vogel is that they do not clearly discuss methodology or evidentiary criteria. This of course is a problem which runs through all of literary studies. At the end of 2003, Dennis R. MacDonald released his second book arguing that the New Testament (and in particular the Gospel of Mark) was influenced directly by the Homeric epics. (This of course is similar to many of the naturalistic arguments - and thus is relevant). His 2003 book, Does the New Testament Imitate Homer? Four Cases from the Acts of the Apostles, followed his 2000 book: The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark. Neither work has been exceptionally well received within the scholarly community. The criticism of the theory falls into two broad categories. First, it has been noted that there are problems with the methodology that MacDonald forwards. Sharyn Dowd, in her review of the earlier book published in Catholic Biblical Quarterly comments:

The two questions necessary for the evaluation of a claim about any mode of inter-textuality are: What is the evidence? and By what criteria is the evidence to be evaluated? MacD. lays out the criteria in the first chapter, introducing the evidence in later chapters.

[beastie]

The pot calls the kettle black. Actually, I get tired of having to repeat myself over and over again. Lets parse what you wrote:

Where did I engage in personal insults? Please quote me directly, with a link if it's from another thread. I also tire of repeating myself. Sometimes people simply have to agree to disagree. The fact that I may not agree with your interpretation or statements does not mean I have a "reading comprehension" problem.

Who is it, that is "speaking for God himself"? Was it the author of the text? Was it the character in the text (assuming that they are not the same)? What is your evidence that the author believed that "he was speaking for God himself"? This is not a statement which the author makes. There is no indication in the text that the character believed that he was "speaking for God himself". So either you misread the text, or are going outside the text in an appeal to your personal assumptions, from which to draw your statement. But the claim which you made had nothing to do with what I wrote. And by extension, your observation that this is pertinent to what Dan has written is right on - but not in the way that you think it is.

I'm going to answer this with your own words.

The author of the text portrays the characters as really believing that these things happened.

The difference between your approach and Dan's is that he is trying to understand JS in terms of how JS understood himself, and his role as prophet. You are trying to force the conversation into one of personal belief and dogma.

Unless, of course, you are claiming that the hand of God himself, without human intervention wrote these words. No? I didn't think so.

Nothing you have said in the remainder of your post convinces me that it is not actually you who has raised the standard of evidence for the naturalistic argument by demanding exact proof. I recall this conversation taking place in connection with a dialogue concerning whether or not the BoM had masonic echoes. IIRC, you insisted that the skeptics provide proof that JS intended the book to have Masonic echoes. The evidence, which was abundant, was not sufficient for you. You wanted proof of intent. Intent is irrelevant in determining whether or not a text that claims to be ancient may have modern fingerprints. Intent may be relevant in literary anaylsis, but not in determining the dating of potentially fraudulent document, (wherein the author would certainly not INTEND for the modern fingerprints to show).

Let's look at an example outside the current discussion.

Madame Zora does a pyschic reading on Joe Schmoe. Joe Schmoe is incredibly impressed by her psychic abilities since Madame was correct on several details of his life. Madame Zora happens to have a relative who lives in Joe Schmoe's neighborhood and knows personal information about Joe Schmoe, a detail Joe Schmoe does not know. The relative died the day of the psychic reading so is unavailable for further questioning.

We cannot prove that Medame Zora had conversations with her relative that enabled her to obtain information from Joe Schmoe. She certainly didn't intend for her reading to be connected in any way with the information the relative provided, and may have been deliberately a bit more ambigious on certain details so it didn't sound TOO exact.

So should the possibility that she has true psychic abilities in this scenario be viewed as likely as the possibility that she obtained information about Joe from her relative?

[Benjamin McGuire]

beastie writes:

Where did I engage in personal insults? Please quote me directly, with a link if it's from another thread. I also tire of repeating myself. Sometimes people simply have to agree to disagree. The fact that I may not agree with your interpretation or statements does not mean I have a "reading comprehension" problem.

However, the fact that completely misunderstood my point does. Although, I concede, I may not have communicated well. Similarly, you noted to Brant - "The problem with you Brant ..." But this is a diversionary topic. Should I really try and be grating, you will know it.

The difference between your approach and Dan's is that he is trying to understand JS in terms of how JS understood himself, and his role as prophet. You are trying to force the conversation into one of personal belief and dogma.

Once more. This is going outside the text. The text does not indicate that Joseph Smith was its author. Nor did I make this statement. So, to read my comments with the added assumptions that I was refering to Joseph Smith (as the author) is to misinterpret my intent. While I would expect Dan to address the topic given the fact that he believes that Joseph Smith is the author is one thing. Your comments however did not reflect anything that I wrote. Although, I suppose that since meaning is a construct of the reader (you) that feasably any meaning could be derived from my comments.

I am not attempting to force the conversation. What I am trying to do is introduce the fact that the text is far more complex than Vogel presents itself. Vogel largely ignores the specific model of a prophet presented in the early parts of the Book of Mormon - a model which seems to be based on a particular biblical paradigm. This, of course, is relatively meaningless in the question of authenticity since the biblical material was available to a 19th century author. But what it does do is call into question Dan's picture of how Joseph Smith saw himself as a prophet. And this is highly significant to the discussion. The Book of Mormon model is based on Moses. It quotes the Old Testament in reference to Moses. It alludes to passages about Moses. It contains several very lengthy literary allusions to Old Testament texts. Yet, Joseph, outside of the Book of Mormon does not appeal to Mosaic tradition in anywhere near the same fashion. In many ways, Joseph sees himself as a prophet and seer in much the same way as other contemporary individuals who also claimed such a distinction (and there were many - I have gathered several late 18th century and early 19th century accounts).

The discussion is not about dogma or belief - but rather about how we evaluate evidence. And my question I think is important. Is Vogel willing to abandon issues over the supernatural to allow discussion of evidentiary claims in the same fashion as he presents his own evidentiary arguments for 19th century sources? And if not, what evidence would he be willing to accept (if any at all) for the existence of the supernatural so that we can at least level the playing field.

Is this unreasonable?

Unless, of course, you are claiming that the hand of God himself, without human intervention wrote these words. No? I didn't think so.

No - but as I pointed out, the author nowhere claims that he speaks for God. That is your creation. How you derive such from my comments is a mystery to me.

Nothing you have said in the remainder of your post convinces me that it is not actually you who has raised the standard of evidence for the naturalistic argument by demanding exact proof. I recall this conversation taking place in connection with a dialogue concerning whether or not the BoM had masonic echoes. IIRC, you insisted that the skeptics provide proof that JS intended the book to have Masonic echoes. The evidence, which was abundant, was not sufficient for you. You wanted proof of intent. Intent is irrelevant in determining whether or not a text that claims to be ancient may have modern fingerprints. Intent may be relevant in literary anaylsis, but not in determining the dating of potentially fraudulent document, (wherein the author would certainly not INTEND for the modern fingerprints to show).

I am not (and wasn't then) demanding exact proof. This is the same dodge that other critics have presented. There isn't any such thing as "exact proof" in literary studies - particularly when dealing with the notion of intent. However, there is in fact a large body of scholarly literature and research which is devoted to making similar arguments and studies. And it is far more specific and demanding than most critics (such as yourself) are willing to present in your arguments. In order to justify their lack of evidence (exact or otherwise), the response was on ZLMB to cry "angel" - that is to suggest that real evidence was not necessary - that only to argue that it was plausible was sufficient because, after all, the alternative was not simple because it invoked the supernatural and thus should be ignored.

I don't, of course, expect you to agree with me. However, I am pointing out that the use of parallelomania is not recognized as legitimate evidence within the scholarly community and is repeatedly criticized.

I wasn't asking that they prove that Joseph Smith intended to have the text be read as Masonic. In that case, I presented clear evidence (against Vogel) beyond what had currently been published against Vogel (which was substantial) pointing out that none of the things which were being used to substantiate a Masonic reading in the Book of Mormon were uniquely Masonic. I demonstrated that contra Vogel, other specific contemporary organizations with no Masonic affiliations had been referred to as "secret combinations". I offered a number of additional contemporary uses of the term which did not match Voge's claim of "secret combination" as a technical (and thus association through uniqueness) term specifically referencing the Masons (as used in anti-Masonic rhetoric). I pointed out contemporary romantic literature - which did not discuss freemasonry, in which literal bands of robbers (not masons) had secret oaths, and secret socities living within the larger community whom they robbed, kidnapped, etc. The entire point I was making was that there was nothing compelling about claiming anti-masonry as the source of the Gadianton robbers when there were other at least equally compelling options. On that ground, I find the argument to be unpersuasive. In any case, the arguments are still there. Despite my willingness to concede the modern authorship of the Book of Mormon, the position of the unsupportable nature of the supernatural continued to be raised against me.

Let's look at an example outside the current discussion.

Madame Zora does a pyschic reading on Joe Schmoe. Joe Schmoe is incredibly impressed by her psychic abilities since Madame was correct on several details of his life. Madame Zora happens to have a relative who lives in Joe Schmoe's neighborhood and knows personal information about Joe Schmoe, a detail Joe Schmoe does not know. The relative died the day of the psychic reading so is unavailable for further questioning.

We cannot prove that Medame Zora had conversations with her relative that enabled her to obtain information from Joe Schmoe. She certainly didn't intend for her reading to be connected in any way with the information the relative provided, and may have been deliberately a bit more ambigious on certain details so it didn't sound TOO exact.

So should the possibility that she has true psychic abilities in this scenario be viewed as likely as the possibility that she obtained information about Joe from her relative?

This isn't an analogous example.

What happens with the text of the Book of Mormon is the forcing of pre-determined conclusions on the text. In the case of the argument on ZLMB, Seven of Nine insisted that where there were similarities between the Book of Mormon text and 19th century sources, these should be considered to be a connection. And where there were differences, it should be attributed to the creative mind of Joseph Smith. Where is the possibility of falisification of the hypothesis?

It reminds me of an incident in a novel by Douglas Adams - Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency. In the beginning, Dirk pretends to be psychic for his friends. He lets drop that he could (for a fee) provide a glimpse of the upcoming exam questions. He then does a bunch of research. He follows patterns of questions in past years exams, and so on - attempting (so he claims in the book) to come close enough to get a pat on the back, but be far enough off to allow him to dismiss it. What gets him expelled is the fact that he manages to duplicate, exactly, the exams. Leaving open the question of his psychic ability.

The issue here (and you are doing exactly what I found so problematic on ZLMB, and what I am asking Dan about) is that you are reducing the question to "Was the psychic really psychic" instead of asking if what she said was accurate. In other words, if we apply this to the Book of Mormon, you are still asking whether or not the supernatural occured, not whether or not the relative really knew what he was talking about. You conveniently get rid of the relative - but the Book of Mormon (and in the case of anti-masonic rhetoric) still exists. We can quite easily compare the Book of Mormon to the anti-masonic rhetoric and make a determination of whether or not there is textual reliance by following widely accepted and practiced methodology and criteria. It is not that difficult an exercise to either determine that it was likely or that it wasn't. We don't have to argue that we have completely recovered authorial intent. We don't have to say that we are one hundred percent certain. We can however, make an argument that reflects with a high degree of certainty that such claims of borrowing are justified or not.

Why is it that neither Vogel nor Metcalfe nor any of the other persons favoring the naturalistic origins theory are willing to use accepted scholarship in their approach?

I got a real kick out of Grant Palmer's book (I figured I would throw him in here, since he appears so prominently in all of the internet forums of late). Here are some of the comments I forwarded to David Bitton (at Bitton's request) when he was preparing his review (I have ommitted the discussion on method, but would be happy to provide it):

Lazarus and Lamoni

Palmer compares a BoM text and a New Testament text to the effect, he suggests, that

[beastie]

However, the fact that completely misunderstood my point does. Although, I concede, I may not have communicated well. Similarly, you noted to Brant - "The problem with you Brant ..." But this is a diversionary topic. Should I really try and be grating, you will know it.

Actually, it could just as likely reflect that you have a problem conveying your meaning accurately in your writing, or that you have a reading comprehension problem yourself in understanding my answer. BTW, you conveniently omit the fact that I was replying to Brant exactly as he had just replied to me, "the problem with you, beastie". Yes, this is diversionary, but your rudeness is unnecessary, and the fact that you don't recognize it as rudeness even more grating than your whatever intentional future insults you intend to dish out.

I give up on the remainder of the conversation. It is absolutely pointless. Perhaps tomorrow I will have the energy to deal with it, but not tonight.