Did God Want Adam And Eve To Follow Satan In The Garden?

[Facsimile 3]

Yes- I totally agree. The mere fact that we have choice as independent spirits makes sin a possibility and it is that agency itself which allows it. For me, I think a "propensity" to sin is really no more or less that the ability to choose it, which agency itself implies.

Yep, you nailed it.

This is all great stuff MFB! I thought I would be able to respond quicker, but I want to spend a bit more time ironing out what I want to say.

[Facsimile 3]

I think this nails it, because that Rorty discussion I have mentioned hinges on the fact that his view of an "ironist" is wrong- and in fact, his view is flawed not because it is only an "irony" but at its base I think it is contradictory. One cannot have a contingent self AND yet see oneself as what he calls a "strong poet". One is either a strong poet, without a contingent self, or one who has a contingent self and gives up on being a "strong poet", because after all, one is contingent and cannot BE a "strong poet".

So I think where Rorty goes wrong is precisely here, that after you strip away everything and take away all the narratives and vocabularies, there is still a self which experiences oneself as oneself. There is always a "speaker" of the narrative- of the vocabulary. There is one who "finds the words" to construct one's vocabulary.

So if we are not contingent at the core, there is also a chooser - the experience of choice I think is "properly basic" and subjectively impossible to doubt. I hope that ultimately doesn't make me Cartesian in a new way, but I think it is true regardless.

There is always an organism in the environment- the self vs the other- the "out there" which must be modified which in turn sets up the dialectic on one hand with the passive environment (the need to provide shelter etc) and on the other hand with other beings with whom we as the "speaker" interact to create our narratives together.

I think that is where Rorty goes wrong ultimately in collectivizing everything- and ultimately why he ends up as a "liberal" in a modern political sense- it is ultimately the denial of the individual who gets lost in the affirmation of the collective narrative.

Your objections make sense to me as a Pragmatist. This is precisely why Rorty is a “Neo-Pragmatist” and not a Pragmatist. Pragmatism did not start out with a particular interest in language; Dewey tried his hand in it and kind of fell on his face. Rorty imported Wittgenstein into Pragmatism, which is incredibly useful, but unfortunately he seems to have run with the tendency in the Wittgenstein tradition of hating metaphysics and he incorporated Continental Philosophy’s pessimistic take on humans creating truth while he wore the Pragmatist hat. Pragmatism needs metaphysics and the metaphysics needs to be driven by an insatiable tendency towards inquiry. The search for truth and the need to form a definition of truth that is usable in Pragmatism is not optional. So reading Rorty, the literature department head, you can actually feel the tension between his pragmatist style (which oft times feels neutered without the science) and his Wittgenstein philosophical therapy. Sometimes I read Rorty and I feel like I’m there in the promised land, free at last and other times I find myself lost in the wilderness. He puts a lot of cockroaches in his brownies. But I still love him.

Pragmatism needs Peirce’s semiotics as metaphysics or it has no mojo. And Peirce’s semiotics is a refutation of British Empiricism’s claims that we store memories of sensations as images and that those images copy themselves over time and fade. Peirce asserted that the image theory was one of the many a priori hold overs that the British were too lazy to look into and uproot. You can skip the text below if you want; it's the argument that he makes against sensations being stored in our memories as pictures and it pretty well sets the stage for his semiotics. If you read it, read it as proto Whitehead Process Philosophy.

From Pierce’s article Some Consequences of Four Incapacities:

Thus the formation of a habit is an induction, and is therefore necessarily connected with attention or abstraction. Voluntary actions result from the sensations produced by habits, as instinctive actions result from our original nature.

We have thus seen that every sort of modification of consciousness -- Attention, Sensation, and Understanding -- is an inference. But the objection may be made that inference deals only with general terms, and that an image, or absolutely singular representation, cannot therefore be inferred.

"Singular" and "individual" are equivocal terms. A singular may mean that which can be but in one place at one time. In this sense it is not opposed to general. The sun is a singular in this sense, but, as is explained in every good treatise on logic, it is a general term. I may have a very general conception of Hermolaus Barbarus, but still I conceive him only as able to be in one place at one time. When an image is said to be singular, it is meant that it is absolutely determinate in all respects. Every possible character, or the negative thereof, must be true of such an image. In the words of the most eminent expounder of the doctrine, the image of a man "must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny; a straight or a crooked; a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man." It must be of a man with his mouth open or his mouth shut, whose hair is precisely of such and such a shade, and whose figure has precisely such and such proportions. No statement of Locke has been so scouted by all friends of images as his denial that the "idea" of a triangle must be either of an obtuse-angled, right-angled, or acute-angled triangle. In fact, the image of a triangle must be of one, each of whose angles is of a certain number of degrees, minutes, and seconds.

This being so, it is apparent that no man has a true image of the road to his office, or of any other real thing. Indeed he has no image of it at all unless he can not only recognize it, but imagines it (truly or falsely) in all its infinite details. This being the case, it becomes very doubtful whether we ever have any such thing as an image in our imagination. Please, reader, to look at a bright red book, or other brightly colored object, and then to shut your eyes and say whether you see that color, whether brightly or faintly -- whether, indeed, there is anything like sight there. Hume and the other followers of Berkeley maintain that there is no difference between the sight and the memory of the red book except in "their different degrees of force and vivacity." "The colors which the memory employs," says Hume, "are faint and dull compared with those in which our original perceptions are clothed." If this were a correct statement of the difference, we should remember the book as being less red than it is; whereas, in fact, we remember the color with very great precision for a few moments (please to test this point, reader), although we do not see anything like it. We carry away absolutely nothing of the color except the consciousness that we could recognize it. As a further proof of this, I will request the reader to try a little experiment. Let him call up, if he can, the image of a horse -- not of one which he has ever seen, but of an imaginary one -- and before reading further let him by contemplation fix the image in his memory . . . . Has the reader done as requested? for I protest that it is not fair play to read further without doing so. -- Now, the reader can say in general of what color that horse was, whether grey, bay, or black. But he probably cannot say precisely of what shade it was. He cannot state this as exactly as he could just after having seen such a horse. But why, if he had an image in his mind which no more had the general color than it had the particular shade, has the latter vanished so instantaneously from his memory while the former still remains? It may be replied, that we always forget the details before we do the more general characters; but that this answer is insufficient is, I think, shown by the extreme disproportion between the length of time that the exact shade of something looked at is remembered as compared with that instantaneous oblivion to the exact shade of the thing imagined, and the but slightly superior vividness of the memory of the thing seen as compared with the memory of the thing imagined.

The nominalists, I suspect, confound together thinking a triangle without thinking that it is either equilateral, isosceles, or scalene, and thinking a triangle without thinking whether it is equilateral, isosceles, or scalene.

It is important to remember that we have no intuitive power of distinguishing between one subjective mode of cognition and another; and hence often think that something is presented to us as a picture, while it is really constructed from slight data by the understanding. This is the case with dreams, as is shown by the frequent impossibility of giving an intelligible account of one without adding something which we feel was not in the dream itself. Many dreams, of which the waking memory makes elaborate and consistent stories, must probably have been in fact mere jumbles of these feelings of the ability to recognize this and that which I have just alluded to.

I will now go so far as to say that we have no images even in actual perception. It will be sufficient to prove this in the case of vision; for if no picture is seen when we look at an object, it will not be claimed that hearing, touch, and the other senses, are superior to sight in this respect. That the picture is not painted on the nerves of the retina is absolutely certain, if, as physiologists inform us, these nerves are needlepoints pointing to the light and at distances considerably greater than the minimum visibile. The same thing is shown by our not being able to perceive that there is a large blind spot near the middle of the retina. If, then, we have a picture before us when we see, it is one constructed by the mind at the suggestion of previous sensations. Supposing these sensations to be signs, the understanding by reasoning from them could attain all the knowledge of outward things which we derive from sight, while the sensations are quite inadequate to forming an image or representation absolutely determinate. If we have such an image or picture, we must have in our minds a representation of a surface which is only a part of every surface we see, and we must see that each part, however small, has such and such a color. If we look from some distance at a speckled surface, it seems as if we did not see whether it were speckled or not; but if we have an image before us, it must appear to us either as speckled, or as not speckled. Again, the eye by education comes to distinguish minute differences of color; but if we see only absolutely determinate images, we must, no less before our eyes are trained than afterwards, see each color as particularly such and such a shade. Thus to suppose that we have an image before us when we see, is not only a hypothesis which explains nothing whatever, but is one which actually creates difficulties which require new hypotheses in order to explain them away.

One of these difficulties arises from the fact that the details are less easily distinguished than, and forgotten before, the general circumstances. Upon this theory, the general features exist in the details: the details are, in fact, the whole picture. It seems, then, very strange that that which exists only secondarily in the picture should make more impression than the picture itself. It is true that in an old painting the details are not easily made out; but this is because we know that the blackness is the result of time, and is no part of the picture itself. There is no difficulty in making out the details of the picture as it looks at present; the only difficulty is in guessing what it used to be. But if we have a picture on the retina, the minutest details are there as much as, nay, more than, the general outline and significancy of it. Yet that which must actually be seen, it is extremely difficult to recognize; while that which is only abstracted from what is seen is very obvious.

But the conclusive argument against our having any images, or absolutely determinate representations in perception, is that in that case we have the materials in each such representation for an infinite amount of conscious cognition, which we yet never become aware of. Now there is no meaning in saying that we have something in our minds which never has the least effect on what we are conscious of knowing. The most that can be said is, that when we see we are put in a condition in which we are able to get a very large and perhaps indefinitely great amount of knowledge of the visible qualities of objects.

So here is what his semiotics looks like. Thoughts are signs (symbols) and we have a survival drive towards inquiry because the more signs we usefully interpret, the better we will be at surviving.

We encounter objects and we seek to fully understand them (think of a baby encountering objects). So we seek to understand objects by using signs (symbols) and we keep deriving signs from that object until the end of inquiry. So for instance, let's consider a situation where you want to understand an orange and after spending time with the object you come up with symbols for its smells, tastes, skin textures, colors, peelability, etc. Underlying all the signs that we derive from this object that we call an Orange is the dynamic object (a constant wellspring of new signs). What we immediately consider the object to be is the Immediate Object; it's the time when we arrive at an interpretation of the object. We are constantly driven by inquiry to pull new signs out of the Dynamic Object and then reform our facsimile of it as an Immediate Object. The process never ends.

All thoughts are signs (symbols) and we are constantly pulling them out of the Dynamic Object and then we create new signs out of our interpretation (which is the Immediate Object).

The interpretation has 3 divisions (from Stanford Encyclopedia):

The Immediate Interpretant: The general definitional understanding of the relationship between the sign and dynamic object. The immediate interpretant, then, is something like recognition of the syntax of the sign and the more general features of its meaning.

The Dynamic Interpretant: The actual interpretation or understanding we make at some point in the semiotic process, and also constitutes, along with previous dynamic interpretants, the immediate object, or partial understanding we have of the dynamic object at any particular point in the semiotic process.

The Final Interpretant: this is what our understanding of the dynamic object would be at the end of inquiry.

So your world of things and thoughts would look like this:

You decide to go outside and signs (thoughts) you associate with going outside help to you direct your body there (standing up, going through the door, etc). Even your decision to go outside was an interplay of signs being interpreted into a facsimile of going outside. So then you move through (sign) the front door (sign(s)). You look to your roof and see a weather vane move. The weather vane is an interpretant of metal rooster, wind, clouds, sun, etc.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics/

It's subtle, but Peirce's semiotics pops up quite often in the work of Dewey and James.

John Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy:

Man differs from the lower animals because he preserves his past experiences. What happened in the past is lived again in memory. About what goes on today hangs a cloud of thoughts concerning similar things undergone in bygone days. With the animals, an experience perishes as it happens, and each new doing or suffering stands alone. But man lives in a world where each occurrence is charged with echoes and reminiscences of what has gone before, where each event is a reminder of other things. Hence he lives not, like the beasts of the field, in a world of merely physical things but in a world of signs and symbols. A stone is not merely hard, a thing into which one bumps; but it is a monument of a deceased ancestor. A flame is is not merely something which warms and burns, but a symbol of the enduring life of the household, of the abiding source of cheer, nourishment and shelter to which man returns from his casual wanderings. Instead of being a quick fork of fire which may sting or hurt, it is the hearth at which one worships and for which one fights. And all this which marks the difference between bestiality and humanity, between culture and merely physical nature, is because man remembers, preserving and recording his experiences (Chapter One pg. 1)

But I think as you say, seeing this theologically, this is the essence of "intelligences becoming spirits" narrative- we come as individuals who have choice in choosing our particular narratives.

I remember my mom before she passed- with severe dementia- she became stripped of all her narratives, but she was still an individual who invented narratives, I was not her son, she thought, because she never married nor had any children. She believed herself to be 25 years old when in fact she was 87. But yet she fought death until her final surrender; she was always a person, and individual, who invented narratives, the last thing to go was the desire to survive itself.

THAT to me is ultimately what defines us- we have an innate desire to survive and fight death- and that is which is under all the narratives, vocabularies, metaphors- everything.

And ultimately, of course I think that survival mechanism is what gives us "The Way of Life" when we acknowledge it in others.

I felt it important to cram this all in because I think it shows very sharply where Rorty doesn't fit and why you are right. We are born with instincts to survive and we start understanding concepts of the world around us with symbols which we associate with other symbols. This all happens before the language or the narrative. This all ties into Whitehead and the idea of God showing us higher possibilities for ourselves, "signs" of what we can become. I imagine a scene with intelligences where God reveals to them signs that they can move toward with their desires and will which then allows Him to organize them into Spirits capable of learning a language and forming narratives.

Just for fun:

Whitehead's categories organized in Peircean triads

http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.htm

Edited September 14, 2011 by Facsimile 3

[mfbukowski]

Yep, you nailed it.

I love your new avatar.

You know of course that it is the emblem of St. Mark......

[mfbukowski]

Whitehead's categories organized in Peircean triads

http://www.jfsowa.co...bs/signproc.htm

Holy cra......cker barrel that was an incredible post!

I have never really gotten into Peirce because I always conceived him as a "proto-Dewey" and not worth the effort- my usual dismissive attitude- and I think I got much of his semiotics unconsciously as you say, in Dewey- that was all perfectly clear to me on almost an unconscious level in my "channeling Dewey" but it was great to see it explicitly stated- and I had no idea about Peirce and the survival stuff- holy cow- that one post has enough to keep me busy for a year of background research.

But we really have to do that other thing we started- like right away. I wish I wasn't so computer illiterate- you will probably have to walk me through it again. And the Sowa stuff??? Amazing!!

Pragmatism needs Peirce’s semiotics as metaphysics or it has no mojo.

Edited September 14, 2011 by mfbukowski

[thesometimesaint]

HeatherAnn:

Yes; God does allow us to be tempted, but not beyond that which we are able to resist, if we want to.

Edited September 14, 2011 by thesometimesaint

[orion88]

HeatherAnn:

Yes; God does allow us to be tempted, but not beyond that which we are able to resist, if we want to.

Was Adam and Eve succumbing to the devil's temptation God's permissive will

or His desired will for them?

[Facsimile 3]

double post

Edited September 14, 2011 by Facsimile 3

[Facsimile 3]

double post

Edited September 14, 2011 by Facsimile 3

[Facsimile 3]

I love your new avatar.

You know of course that it is the emblem of St. Mark......

Yeah, lions are way cool. There were tons of lion symbols all over Jerusalem with it being the symbol of Judah and all.

My avatar is a zoomed in picture of an 1860 gold coin minted by the Deseret Territory for trading with people outside of the territory. Because the coins held no value other than their weight in gold, most were melted down almost immediately after they were received.

The lettering, in Deseret Alphabet, reads "Holiness to the LORD."

Holy cra......cker barrel that was an incredible post!

I have never really gotten into Peirce because I always conceived him as a "proto-Dewey" and not worth the effort- my usual dismissive attitude- and I think I got much of his semiotics unconsciously as you say, in Dewey- that was all perfectly clear to me on almost an unconscious level in my "channeling Dewey" but it was great to see it explicitly stated- and I had no idea about Peirce and the survival stuff- holy cow- that one post has enough to keep me busy for a year of background research.

But we really have to do that other thing we started- like right away. I wish I wasn't so computer illiterate- you will probably have to walk me through it again. And the Sowa stuff??? Amazing!!

I'm glad you liked it!

I have time to mess around with the blog on Friday afternoon. PM me and let me know if that works for you.

[jadams_4242]

I was looking at http://mormon.org/plan-of-happiness/. The section Adam and

Eve Gave Us the Gift of Choice says, "Lasting happiness and progression come

from choosing to do what God wants us to do."

Did God want Adam and Eve to choose to follow Satan in order to progress?

Did the spirits in the pre-earth life also follow Satan in their limited progression

there before coming to earth?

He did not "want" them too; although he knew they would..

[volgadon]

Yeah, lions are way cool. There were tons of lion symbols all over Jerusalem with it being the symbol of Judah and all.

My avatar is a zoomed in picture of an 1860 gold coin minted by the Deseret Territory for trading with people outside of the territory. Because the coins held no value other than their weight in gold, most were melted down almost immediately after they were received.

The lettering, in Deseret Alphabet, reads "Holiness to the LORD."

Awesome coin!

Back home in Israel I have a brass chanukkiah in the form of a lion by the walls of Jerusalem. Maybe I'll have my folks take a picture of it. Pretty cool stuff.

[HeatherAnn]

HeatherAnn:

Yes; God does allow us to be tempted, but not beyond that which we are able to resist, if we want to.

Thanks for that ever-needed reminder, Thesometimessaint... because I too am only part-time saint.

God does not just allow it - but God planned it.

God saw that we must pass through sorrow to know the good from the evil... Upon taking the fruit, already Eve's eyes were open & she recognized Satan (that which enticed her).

Yet, without that enticing, we might not get very far. Jesus explained - (or it's written that he explained )... Don't be luke warm or else you'll be spit out.

In other words... Don't be too afraid to screw up & miss out on learning opportunities...

Maxwell explained (yes he really did! lol) it's like guided missiles... Throughout their journey to their target, they regularly get off target & must be corrected... but a nonmoving missile will never reach its target... only a moving one will.

The biggest lesson I take from the story of Adam & Eve is one of NEW AWARENESS... line upon line... being born again (& dying again to old perspectives) & born again to new perspectives... eternal progress= eternal life...

Gospel=Good News (after the grieving process of the death of the old news - new wine into new wine bottles)

The only way we can get good new perspectives, is if we keep striving - living passionately - with all of our hearts, minds & souls & correcting, as we go.

Edited September 15, 2011 by HeatherAnn

[Facsimile 3]

Awesome coin!

Back home in Israel I have a brass chanukkiah in the form of a lion by the walls of Jerusalem. Maybe I'll have my folks take a picture of it. Pretty cool stuff.

I would like to see this chanukkiah!

[mfbukowski]

My avatar is a zoomed in picture of an 1860 gold coin minted by the Deseret Territory for trading with people outside of the territory. Because the coins held no value other than their weight in gold, most were melted down almost immediately after they were received.

Incredibly cool coin! I'll PM you.