Religion and the Domains of Truth

[wenglund]

I don't know much about this Dewey fellow, but getting back to the topic of the thread, and regarding domains of truth, I think there is good reason why at universities the College of Fine Arts are separate from the College of Life Science.

Maybe it is just me, but in various ways, particularly in terms of affect, I see descernable differences in "truths" found in and conveyed by a Braham's Concerto as contrasted with a petri dish.

Granted, there is considerable beauty to be found in nature, including the elegant structure of a mold spore. And, I believe there is truth in beauty. But, it seems to me that the life sciences aren't concerned with the beauty, but certain "truths" underneath the beauty; whereas the Fine Arts (and to some extent religion) are focused on the beauty and the "truths' found and conveyed therein. This, to me, is an important difference in domains of "truth".

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[Facsimile 3]

Okeh, I call for reference.

Dewey wanted to force children into schools where irreligious people would teach them.

CFR

He is (although it may have been one of his atheistic friends) the one who said, "What good is their one hour a week in Sunday School compared to six hours a day in our schools?"

I really hope this isn't your CFR for the above statement.

The literature of the day (written by the same people who were doing that forcing) tells us it was to divorce children from their parents. Dewey was of the same mind as Mann who wanted to tear the child from his father's religious beliefs, to "free him from pope, papa and priest," in the words of another of their supporters.

CFR

As Dewey was a strong supporter of grtf-welfare schools, he must accept the label as traitor to freedom. None other fits him or any of the rest of the "schoolmen" of the mid-to-late XIX and early XX.

Your use of language here is over the top. I find it funny that you are so quick to illegitimately pin Dewey as having some ready made mold for all the children of America to fit into (which in essence contradicts progressive education) and yet you make such a bold declaration of Dewey as an enemy of freedom based on GRTF-Welfare schools. Hmmm, who appears to be the bully here?

I have often said that no one here has shown that the counsel of the Brethren to keep our children out of grtf-welfare schools has been rescinded. They were adamant that LDS children be taught by the faithful, not the faithless. Dewey was among those whose work has seduced Saints around the world, not just in Utah, to ignore these warnings. We are seeing the harvest of that rebellion. I hold Dewey and his ilk responsible for the failure of so many Saints to remains faithful.

Wow!

Even the devil tells us truths from time to time, as it suits his purposes. Karl Marx and Mao Tsedung said things that were correct. That does not make them wise or good men. The things Dewey said that were correct do not overcome the horrific effect his schools have had on the training and morality of children and the adults they grew up to become.

This conclusion really ties it all together quite well (Sarcasm). This conclusion feels a lot like an Evangelical Christian conclusion to a weak argument against the Church. Compare Joseph Smith to a bunch of false prophets and explain how the devil makes it all happen.

Remember how I said CFR on a few items here. Honestly, I really don't want you to CFR because this is getting way too political as it is and I really don't want to further water down this great thread.

I'll just leave it at, I agree to disagree.

http://teachnet.edb.utexas.edu/~lynda_abbott/Deweysum.html

SHORT-FORM SYNOPSIS (Click here to see the full, detailed synopsis)

John Dewey, Experience and Education (1938)

Context: As explained in the "Editorial Foreword," the Executive Council of Kappa Delta Pi asked Dewey to discuss questions "that divide American education into two camps and thereby weaken it at a time when its full strength is needed in guiding a bewildered nation through the hazards of social change." Dewey

[Montgomery Price]

Well, I am finally settling back into my own room. There is already so much to talk about, and I haven't even completed my response to your original post. But it is nearly finished. Since this thread has been filled with separate discussions, I'll be giving a single response here, and a much more detailed response later tonight. I'd like to use your comments to clarify what I want to discuss. Glad to be back up to speed, Don.

>>>>>>>>>>>

I'd like to make a distinction before I post my new thread. I want to outline the differing religious domains, that collected comprising a set of domains. "Religion as a domain of inquiry", as you describe it, is the set of religious domains. The Mormon domain, the Catholic domain, and the Buddhist domain are all domains within the set of religious domains. I am questioning Mormon epistemological tools, such as Moroni's Promise, within a specific religious domain, Mormonism. There are other religious domains that disagree with Moroni's Promise, yet they are all within the set of religious domains. There are overlapping domains within the set of religious domains, and I want to focus on these overlapping areas.

Hi Montgomery,

So religious methods constitute an alternative epistemology and conflict with other established domains.... Huh? This frames religion as on the outside from the get-go, the struggling newcomer trying to establish a place in the epistemic world. My point was that precisely the opposite is the case. Religion is an established domain of inquiry, a very, very long and broadly established one and one that has led to a number of conclusions shared by groups widely separated in time and space and also one that has shown tremendous value.

What I mean by "alternative" is that there are several tools, conclusions, and interpretations to choose from when exploring the set of religious domains. There are many that are similar, and there are many that are dissimilar. I am questioning a very specific type of epistemological tool, Moroni's Promise. This does not involve the overall health of the set of all religious domains. Moroni's promise involves only the health of a single epistemological tool. We can evaluate this tool within the context of all other domains, including philosophy, science, mathematics, and differing religious domains. We can view the very tiny portion of the set, within the context of all the overlapping domains within the set, and outside it.

The idea would not be to try to shoehorn religion into an already cramped epistemological establishment, but, rather, to acknowledge that religion already is established: it is the domain in which human beings inquire after questions of larger meaning and seek to actualize such meaning and that it has always, or verrry long, had methods for inquiring after these things.

To correct my statement, I could say that, "If I hadn't accepted that many people believe alternative epistemology exists, and is an established domain of inquiry, then I wouldn't be here."

Yes, Religion is one of the domains. But because one domain is more prevalent throughout history, or of greater age than another domain has no bearing on its reliability. The reliability of a specific tool within a certain domain is what is in question. Not the existence of the set of domains, or the frequency of their employ. It would be a mistake to reason that Religion becomes more likely to be true the older it is, or because many people practice it. These are complicated caricatures of an argument from antiquity, and argument from popularity, and are not related to my argument. You could just as well argue that the belief in a flat earth was a reliable proposition, if you fallaciously appealed to popularity and antiquity, but it was certainly a false belief. It had no reliability within the domain of science, and does not reflect reality.

To me, to mildly mix my metaphors, what you're asking is equivalent to requiring someone to justify a place for moral inquiry at the epistemic table, as though morality were this strange new fashion that some offbeat folks wanted to set aside a reservation for within a world that belongs to philosophy, math, and science.

Morality is an existing domain of inquiry, inquiry after moral truth. Religion also is an existing, established domain, one which inquires after a kind of truth all normal human beings seem predisposed (if to varying degrees) to contemplate--most obviously questions of transcendence, spirituality, and meaning--how we connect to the universe and whatever is ultimate and primordial in it, where we fit in the grand "scheme of things," and what ultimately matters.

But does this religious inquiry produce reliable results? Are there many differing opinions, and irreparable contradictions between certain religious domains? Or is there a common reliable core of beliefs found in all religious domains?

Are the existence of these contradictions or common beliefs better explained or resolved by the theories of non-Religious domains, or by the Mormon domain? Do the verification tools provided by the Mormon domain in fact reliably verify the claims of Mormonism?

I was going to write that such religious inquiry is at least as universal as mathematical inquiry, but of course it is far more so. We are homo religiosis much more than homo mathematicus or homo philosophicus.

I no more think religion and the religious method need "justification" as a domain and an epistemology than do morality, science, math, and philosophy.

Now...in fairness to you, I would have not long ago asked the same or similar questions to yours; so I "get" that you think religious epistemology does need special justification. But, for me, deeper probing into the basic nature of religion and its questions, and the universality or near-universality of some of its methods and even findings, has turned such a worldview on its head. It's like thinking we need to argue for the validity of philosophy, not that it's as circular as that, but that we cause ourselves similar trouble in both cases by feeling we need to justify as a special adjunct what is already established and intrinsic. The philosopher may have trouble justifying something as basic as the systematic application of logic, but this doesn't stop him from being able to use it, finding things through it, and benefiting from its application. It is the same for the religionist.

Best,

Don

I will not assume that the Mormon tools are reliable until they are established to be so. The religious domain is a set of diverse beliefs. Some are corroborating, and others are contradicting. It is not established which epistemological tools are reliable, because many contradict in methodology, and results. Within the set of religious domains, not one religious domain is established as reliable. Neither the Baha'i faith or Scientology is the established domain of inquiry, there are many competing domains with in the set of religious domains.

While great debates fill the religious domain, the inquiry as a whole may be an established method of inquiry, but the results of such an inquiry are not so clearly established. We can't agree on the results of a religious inquiry. We don't know exactly what is established. We're still developing our thoughts. Does a inquiry into the after life entail resurrection or reincarnation? At this very moment, these theories are being discussed and debated. They are by no means "established" within the set of religious domains.

These differing domains cannot all be "established" like you may wish to describe. The fact that the set of religious domains exists does not magically rid of the contradictions between those domains. The set of religious domains is perceived, as a whole and single domain, to be ancient and popular. Yet, you would be reasoning fallaciously if you believed that arguments from antiquity and popularity supported the reliability of the results produced by domains within the set. For as long as this domain has existed, religious domains have contradicted each other. You can only support the proposition that many people believe the religious domain has value or potential value as a method of inquiry, not that its fruits are reliable and verified. People have for long believed the fruits to be great, but there are many different fruits to choose from. There is no established fruit to eat off the grand tree of religious domains. Mormonism is one of those fruits.

I am open to the possibility that this domain may have potential value, but am thus far convinced that it's value has not been shown by reliable results. Specifically Mormonism's epistemological tools.

Further thoughts in that vein...

It is not the acceptance of a universal and long-standing domain of truth, inquiry, and life that requires justification but its entire rejection--which, in such a case, ought to require hefty justification indeed, if not also the full and adequate replacement of any functions of the rejected domain that meet demonstrable human needs.

Absolutely not. We can well recognize that a specific domain of inquiry that uses a certain epistemological tool produces unreliable results without having to toss out the entire set of religious domains. It is also a wild suggestion to assert that the function of a such an inquiry must be replaced.

I can assert that there are birds in flight somewhere on Earth. Can I assert that the total number of birds on the planet is 10 pigeons? Can I be confident in rejecting the idea that only penguins can fly? Yes and yes, I can. But can I know the exact number of birds in flight at this very moment? No, such an inquiry will never provide us a concrete and reliable answer. We may reject the 10 pigeon theory, but we need not replace it with another unsubstantiated guess. We can reserve judgment, and as I will argue, be content with not knowing how to replace the theory, but recognizing that the previous theory was wrong. We are perfectly capable of recognizing flaws, without providing their solutions.

While science sometimes seeks to explain religion, it is a far cry from refuting the validity of its methods within its domain proper and farther still from subsuming it and replacing its functions in human life. Science doesn't, and by its nature isn't going to, address the human needs for and culturally universal concepts of the transcendent and the sacred, meaning (much less ultimate meaning), how we are to connect to what is larger than ourselves, and what, ultimately, we are to live for. These are simply beyond its scope or what its methods are good for.

Science was never conceived to provide sacred, transcendent meaning for the ultimate purpose of life. Of course this surpasses the scope of the scientific domain! Science was conceived to address different human needs. To ask of science these things is only to attack a ridiculous straw man caricature of Science as a domain attempting to provide spiritual needs for humanity. It never was, and never will be. It may eventually explain why we perceive spiritual needs, but it is not flawed in the least bit for failing to provide the spiritual solutions to these needs. This is analogous to criticizing an Ice Cream Truck Man for not selling you oil for your car. This is not a legitimate criticism of Science.

Even further, the spiritual solutions to spiritual needs may be beyond the scope of Science, but other things are not. Science has much to say about the religious domain, and it need not have anything to do with spiritual needs or solutions.

To attempt to press it into those areas isn't science but scientism. Scientism, as you doubtless know, is a worldview that exalts science as the central, if not ultimately sole, normative mode. It begins from the (accurate) observation that science has been so fantastically successful these past few centuries and has consequently transformed our lives, and then makes the leap that we should therefore place the other domains under it, if not just replace them with it. Thus, for instance, E. O. Wilson wants to subsume the humanities, religion, and even morality into science. Fundamental problems, like the is-ought distinction, the nature of the domains themselves, and the nature and therefore limitations of the tools of science preempt such goals. But they do not preempt the potentially disastrous consequences of avidly pursuing them.

Devotees of scientism and of fundamentalist religion are each seeking the same thing--to steal turf that properly belongs, and can only belong, to the other. Here we need, as in government, a wall of separation to demarcate them, if hopefully a porous one so that they can propose ideas to inform and enrich, but not issue mandates, for one another.

Cheers,

Don

I advocate in no way the assimilation of other domains under Science. I also do not advocate the unjustified replacing of religious domains with Science. I only assert that the domain of science and logic are valuable in the evaluation of other domains of inquiry, such as specific religious domains. You have explained yourself that Science is defined in such a way that it could not replace spiritual solutions provided by religious domains of inquiry, and I agree.

But, this does not invalidate the use of Science for separate purposes. Purposes of evaluation, and the inspection of alternative religious domains. We can use Science to evaluate truth claims and the experiences of spirituality, without placing demands on Science to provide spiritual meaning that it was never conceived to provide. It is perfectly capable of inspecting religious domains, yet it does not provide what religious domains do.

I'll be posting my new thread soon. Thanks for your patience.

[wenglund]

I agree that the discussion of truth domains can benefit somewhat from an examination of respective epistemic tools.

It is my understanding that there are two main epistemic tools applicable to most any truth domain: ostenisive and experiencial

Ostensive learning is where a student learns things from and has things confirmed to them by others--often authority figures like parents, teachers, opinion leaders, leaders in various fields, established institutions, etc. This epistemic tool is instructional in nature (both formal and informal), and is conveyed through a variety of mediums: personal conversations, classroom instructions, lectures, books, news reports, witness testimonies, etc.

Experiencial learning is where a student learns thing from and has things confirmed personally by and to themselves. This epistemic tool is often experimental in nature (both formal and informal), and can take the form of lab work and simply or proactively living life.

These two epistemic tools are both of value in learning "truths", but I believe the sum of their individual values is greater when the two are combined--which is why most truth domains employ both.

This holism (the whole is greater than the sum of the parts) exist because there are some things that can be learned ostensively that can't be learned experiencially, and vice versa. Resource constraints limit the capacity of individual humans to practically experience all external stimuli available to humans collectively, and ontological constraints limit the capacity of individual humans to experience internal stimuli experienced by other humans, and as such, we may best, and perhaps only learn certain things ostensively. On the other hand, instructional constraints limit the capacity of humans to ostesively learn thing like the taste of salt, or what it is fully like to be a parent, or a leader, or a God; and trust and reliability constraints may limit the effectualness of ostensive learning, and as such we may only fully learn certain things experiencially. And, when the two are combined, it expands the potential scope of understanding and level of confidence one may have in that understanding.

With this general framework in mind, if Montgomery wishes to examine the epistemic tools of the restored gospel of Christ, as compared and contrasted with science, it may prove useful to exanine apples to apples and oranges to oranges, ostensive tools of Mormonism to ostensive tools of science, and experiencial tools of Mormonism to experiencial tools of science.

As for the ostensive epistemic tool of the restored gospel I submit that we consider Moroni 10, among others. And, as an experiential epistemic tool of the restored gospel I submit that we consider Alma 32, among others. I will leave the scientists to submit their favored examples of ostensive and experiencial epistemic tools of science.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[mfbukowski]

I advocate in no way the assimilation of other domains under Science. I also do not advocate the unjustified replacing of religious domains with Science. I only assert that the domain of science and logic are valuable in the evaluation of other domains of inquiry, such as specific religious domains. You have explained yourself that Science is defined in such a way that it could not replace spiritual solutions provided by religious domains of inquiry, and I agree.

But, this does not invalidate the use of Science for separate purposes. Purposes of evaluation, and the inspection of alternative religious domains. We can use Science to evaluate truth claims and the experiences of spirituality, without placing demands on Science to provide spiritual meaning that it was never conceived to provide. It is perfectly capable of inspecting religious domains, yet it does not provide what religious domains do.

I'll be posting my new thread soon. Thanks for your patience.

This seems to represent a major departure from your previous positions on this forum- congratulations!

[Montgomery Price]

This holism (the whole is greater than the sum of the parts) exist because there are some things that can be learned ostensively that can't be learned experiencially, and vice versa.

True, but it is not clear which sorts of knowledge are restricted to each tool, and what knowledge can be shared. There is considerable debate as to what we are experiencing, and what we can know about the sorts of experiences we may call spiritual.

esource constraints limit the capacity of individual humans to practically experience all external stimuli available to humans collectively, and ontological constraints limit the capacity of individual humans to experience internal stimuli experienced by other humans, and as such, we may best, and perhaps only learn certain things ostensively.

It could be that certain qualia we experience are actually results of cognitive dysfunctions, or incorrect interpretations. It could also be that certain experiences contradict what we already know using experiential or ostensive tools. In the realm of spiritual experience, there may be some overlap between the experiential and ostensive findings, and there may be much to learn. The possible validity of a certain experiential tool may, indeed, be unattainable with ostensive tools. But this has not been established. Many disagree as to what tools are shown to be unreliable, by other tools, experiential and ostensive alike.

On the other hand, instructional constraints limit the capacity of humans to ostesively learn thing like the taste of salt, or what it is fully like to be a parent, or a leader, or a God; and trust and reliability constraints may limit the effectualness of ostensive learning, and as such we may only fully learn certain things experiencially. And, when the two are combined, it expands the potential scope of understanding and level of confidence one may have in that understanding.

Again, this is possible. To use the salt example, we must recognize that the qualia we experience when tasting salt is ostensibly unreachable. But, we can recognize experientially and ostensibly that the salt exists, and possesses certain properties. Our qualia, or the result of our experiential tools, are representations of things that actually exist. While salt can only be experienced, it's existence can be supported and shown to be reliable. Can the same be said of God and religious tools?

With this general framework in mind, if Montgomery wishes to examine the epistemic tools of the restored gospel of Christ, as compared and contrasted with science, it may prove useful to exanine apples to apples and oranges to oranges, ostensive tools of Mormonism to ostensive tools of science, and experiencial tools of Mormonism to experiencial tools of science.

As for the ostensive epistemic tool of the restored gospel I submit that we consider Moroni 10, among others. And, as an experiential epistemic tool of the restored gospel I submit that we consider Alma 32, among others. I will leave the scientists to submit their favored examples of ostensive and experiencial epistemic tools of science.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

...And this I will do. Big Mormon 5th of July bash to get to. I'll be back to talk again.

This seems to represent a major departure from your previous positions on this forum- congratulations!

Thank you. Great to know that someone believes I am improving.

[mfbukowski]

Again, this is possible. To use the salt example, we must recognize that the qualia we experience when tasting salt is ostensibly unreachable. But, we can recognize experientially and ostensibly that the salt exists, and possesses certain properties. Our qualia, or the result of our experiential tools, are representations of things that actually exist. While salt can only be experienced, it's existence can be supported and shown to be reliable. Can the same be said of God and religious tools?

You gotta work on that idea that "qualia" "represent" anything. That is not a given by any means in epistemology. The whole idea that "qualia represent things which actually exist" is a dualistic notion which is highly debatable.

How could one know about what "actually exists" when all that we experience are qualia? That is the whole reason for inventing the word "qualia", otherwise we could just say we see what "actually exists". So on that view, the very use of "Qualia" representing anything introduces an element which is unnecessary. Either we experience things- which to me is clearly not so, or else there would not be optical illusions etc, or we experience qualia. You can't have it both ways.

Your theory still needs a bit of work imo. But you are getting there!

[wenglund]

Hi Montgomery,

I appreciate your thoughtful response.

However, in addition to what MfB astutely pointed out, when comparing the LDS religion to science, I think you may find that "reliability" (i.e. the level of unanimity and agreement in thought among humans) is less a function of the epistemic tools being employed, and more a product of the nature of the truth domain in which they are employed. The more externally observeable and objectifiable the phenomena of a given truth domain, the more "reliable" will be the learning that results from the epistemic tools, and vice versa.

For example, even within the medical area of science, there is more "reliability" regarding what has been learned about external cuts than there is with headaches, regardless of the epistemic tools employed. There is more "reliability" among the hard sciences than there is with the soft sciences, even though each tend to utilize the same epistemic tools.

So, if there is less "reliability" in religion, that may be because of the phenomena that occurs within the religion truth domain tends to be less externally observeable and objectifiable than the hard sciences, and this even though the respective epistemic tools are not that dissimilar.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[wenglund]

Also, as Don wisely proffered earlier in the thread, "reliability" may also be a function of the average maturity, or lack thereof, of the respect truth domains epistemologies.

For example, even though essentially the same epistemic tools have been employed throughout the ages, the "reliability" of the various sciences seems greater today than they were several hundred years ago.

This makes sense since, from what I have observed, the more we know and understand, the more "reliable" our understanding, and the more extensive the epistemic framework, the more stable the epistemology.

I would submit that in epistemic terms, the truth domain of science is far more mature and extensive than that of religion. And, again, that may be a function of the differing natures of the respective truth domains.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[mfbukowski]

I prefer to define "objectivity" in terms of how many people can make the same observation, and with how many senses one can make the observation.

If I see a pink elephant, it may be "true" that I have seen a pink elephant, but if no one else has seen the pink elephant, the experience is properly termed "subjective". Suppose I now start a religion based on my vision of a pink elephant.

If my buddy sees the elephant too, it is quite a bit more objective- we both saw it and know we saw it.

If a hundred or a thousand people see it, it becomes "phenomenon" and maybe gets written up in the papers- like perhaps UFO's occasionally do.

On the other hand, if I saw a pink elephant and weighed it, and felt it with my hands, and thousands of other people saw it, and smelled it, and agreed that it was "real" and then scientists came and examined it, and pronounced it to be a new species of elephant that was pink due to certain environmental conditions which selected for that, and then other pink elephants were discovered, it would become a scientific "fact" that pink elephants exist.

But before that, would pink elephants be "real"? Suppose right now there is an undiscovered species, (I am sure there are thousands)-- are they "real"?

If they are real, how are they real? Can you tell me about them? What they look like, how much they weigh, etc.? In what sense are they "real"?

I believe there are many principles we now see as "religious" which will later be seen to be "scientific".

Taking the same criteria to the religious realm, there are millions of people who say they have had the Moroni experience and it has be verified by the Alma experience.

To me that clearly makes that experience "real" and assertions about that experience can be just as "true" as assertions about anything.

But that is a description of what makes things "objective".

That is not to say that all religious principles can ever be proven or shown to be scientifically factual or "objective". Some might, like the historicity of the BOM might someday in principle be "proven", or it might never be- actually it isn't important for its religious significance; it is most significant for what it teaches us about living properly and our relation to God, not historic data.

Science and religion really have nothing to do with each other, since one deals with facts and the other deals with meaning. Nevertheless, that is the way I view what is "objective" or "subjective".

Edit- the social sciences are seen as "softer" imo because the results are more subject to interpretation, and even expert opinions in the social sciences may differ as to the interpretation of data.

So in the social sciences, fewer people can make the observations, and people may disagree about the interpretation.

But note that in the newest "hard" sciences- like quantum theory and particle physics for example, there is also often a similar problem.

[Montgomery Price]

Epistemic... forgot about this handy shortening. Thanks.

Hi Montgomery,

I appreciate your thoughtful response.

However, in addition to what MfB astutely pointed out, when comparing the LDS religion to science, I think you may find that "reliability" (i.e. the level of unanimity and agreement in thought among humans) is less a function of the epistemic tools being employed, and more a product of the nature of the truth domain in which they are employed. The more externally observeable and objectifiable the phenomena of a given truth domain, the more "reliable" will be the learning that results from the epistemic tools, and vice versa.

This may be true, but I'm not convinced this is the case for Mormonism. What is the difference between an unreliable tool, and a truth domain which seems to produce unreliable results? There is no difference, unless I am missing something specific to your claims.

You may excuse a lack of reliability, but this does not mean that a lack of reliability ceases to most often indicate a failed tool. It still does, and we have successfully followed this line of logic to countless improvements in our understanding. Whether or not what you say about reliability is true, this does not remove valid reason to doubt the claims of Mormonism.

For example, even within the medical area of science, there is more "reliability" regarding what has been learned about external cuts than there is with headaches, regardless of the epistemic tools employed. There is more "reliability" among the hard sciences than there is with the soft sciences, even though each tend to utilize the same epistemic tools.

There absolutely does exists a spectrum of epistemic tools at different levels of reliability. However, as there are many levels of reliability, there are many good and bad reasons to accept or reject certain epistemic tools. In the studies of mankind, we have utilized exceptionally reliable tools, and not so reliable tools, as well.

So, if there is less "reliability" in religion, that may be because of the phenomena that occurs within the religion truth domain tends to be less externally observeable and objectifiable than the hard sciences, and this even though the respective epistemic tools are not that dissimilar.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

And for my last question...

How do you know that Mormonism represents one of these less reliable domains of truth?

You've established that the domain of Mormonism is possibly a less reliable setting for our current epistemic tools. You have not shown it to be true. I have no reason to accept the epistemic tools of Mormonism until your alternate domain of truth is shown to be the case.

Also, as Don wisely proffered earlier in the thread, "reliability" may also be a function of the average maturity, or lack thereof, of the respect truth domains epistemologies.

For example, even though essentially the same epistemic tools have been employed throughout the ages, the "reliability" of the various sciences seems greater today than they were several hundred years ago.

This makes sense since, from what I have observed, the more we know and understand, the more "reliable" our understanding, and the more extensive the epistemic framework, the more stable the epistemology.

I would submit that in epistemic terms, the truth domain of science is far more mature and extensive than that of religion. And, again, that may be a function of the differing natures of the respective truth domains.

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Again, this is only a possibility. An immature domain of truth gives no justification for accepting the tools of the Mormon domain. If Mormonism has yet to mature as a domain of truth, then this must be shown. But how can you show that Mormonism will mature enough to provide sufficient justification for its acceptance? In doing so you would negate the epistemic need for Mormonism to mature. What is the difference between an immature (or seemingly unreliable) domain, and a actually unreliable domain? Until then, I am justified in rejecting the tools.

[DonBradley]

Montgomery,

I won't have time to go into this in depth until Thursday, if not until after a major deadline on the 15th. However, since your response suggests to me that my meaning was not clearly conveyed or received, here a few points of clarification:

1) A "domain" as the term has been used in the discussion prior to your response is a broad field, one in which comparable and commensurable claims are made and in which questions can, in principle at the very least, be adjudicated by a common set of methods. Thus philosophy, mathematics, and morality are independent domains, whereas Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy (or Mormonism, for that matter), are not independent domains any more than the standard model and string theory are.

2) The most basic question regarding religious epistemology is whether it produces agreed upon results across time and across faiths, i.e., whether there are valid epistemic methods for religion.

3) Religious methods do appear to produce a core body of knowledge, suggesting that there are valid methods for the religious domain. (See references above.)

4) The natural next question is that of the proper scope of religious epistemology. As has emerged in my discussion with Uncertain, there are legitimate questions regarding whether religious methods, as broadly understood and used at present, are sufficient to answer various questions religionists might want answered.

5) If religious methods applied to scientific questions are shown to produce answers at variance with those of science, this demonstrates nicely that religion can't answer questions of science proper any more than science can answer questions of religion proper. I would welcome exploration of the boundaries of the domain covered by religious methods of inquiry, per the discussion with Uncertain above.

6) Moroni's promise is the topic of your thread. The topic of this one is the existence and proper scope of the domain of religion and its epistemic methods.

I'll take my couple comments on that topic to your thread, and then I need to abstract myself from discussion for a while.

Cheers,

Don