Elder Packer's Parable Of The Mediator

[cksalmon]

Virtually every systematic Christian theology acknowledges that any rational notion of God subjects him to "external" laws and structure which he arguably did not create.

Hi groove--

You've stated that "virtually every systematic theology" argues thusly. I would challenge to show just one "systematic Christian theology" that does this.

Best.

cks

[groove]

Can you give me some examples of this, that show that God is subject to external laws that he did not create?

(and for cks)

Actually, I did in my post. This is concept is nothing new, although we LDS sometimes have a little different take on such things. Typically, these sorts of limits are posited to answer paradoxes which arise when trying to define God. The examples I provided apply to paradoxes of omnipotence (i.e. can an omnipotent being make another being who is more powerful). Historically people like Augustine argued that God could not do certain things simply because he is God. See here for example. Others have extended these arguments to include limitations based on intersections of God's nature and perfections. In other words, for example, God cannot be evil if he is good -- and by extension will not perform any intrinsically evil act if he is good. Typically, what I have observed is that at some point you see a trade-off between goodness and power, and in order to maintain God having the power of a metaphysical absolute, one must necessarily trade goodness and love. IMO, we LDS simply maintain that when it comes down to that dichotomy where it is either one or the other that it is love that wins the day. It has nothing to do with God being "kept down" by some extrinsic force. It just has to to with the way things are and the way he is defined.

[cksalmon]

(and for cks)

Actually, I did in my post. This is concept is nothing new, although we LDS sometimes have a little different take on such things. Typically, these sorts of limits are posited to answer paradoxes which arise when trying to define God. The examples I provided apply to paradoxes of omnipotence (i.e. can an omnipotent being make another being who is more powerful). Historically people like Augustine argued that God could not do certain things simply because he is God. See here for example. Others have extended these arguments to include limitations based on intersections of God's nature and perfections. In other words, for example, God cannot be evil if he is good. Typically, what I have observed is that at some point you see a trade-off between goodness and power, and in order to maintain God having the power of a metaphysical absolute, one must necessarily trade goodness and love. IMO, we LDS simply maintain that when it comes down to that dichotomy where it is either one or the other that it is love that wins the day. It has nothing to do with God being "kept down" by some extrinsic force. It just has to to with the way things are and the way he is defined.

If you think the fact that God acts inevitably in comformity with his own nature indicates that he is subject to "external" laws, you have just completely misunderstand Augustine. And logic, for that matter.

Best.

cks

PS. And there's nothing here that even remotely validates your claim, frankly, groove. If you believe otherwise, I'd like to see your argument specified.

[groove]

If you think the fact that God acts inevitably in comformity with his own nature indicates that he is subject to "external" laws, you have just completely misunderstand Augustine. And logic, for that matter.

The problem here is a couplefold. First, is that this is as much an issue of semantics as logic. There's no compelling reason to believe that a truly all powerful God cannot be illogical, but it makes no practical sense and doesn't help us understand God. You can debate whether semantical limits are "external" but again, it doesn't help the discussion, and I think you already know what I meant. Secondly, I think you are missing the context of my post addressing Billy who continues to insist that ANY limitation on God represents some external hedging on God's turf. Maybe I was just being too subltle placing "external" in quotes, but I belive I have been pretty clear that we are talking about developing an internally consistent concept of God. And in order to create this concept, virtually all religions posit "limitations" on God in order to describe a rational being.

PS. And there's nothing here that even remotely validates your claim, frankly, groove. If you believe otherwise, I'd like to see your argument specified.

I think you are misunderstanding my claim. Let's get the claim straight first, and then we can discuss whether Augustine here is an example. I think I have been pretty clear, but maybe I am not making sense. So toss me a bone and tell me where you think I am going wrong -- preferably after reading what I have already written.

[cksalmon]

There's no compelling reason to believe that a truly all powerful God cannot be illogical...

I categorically reject and deny your stated premise. You have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of logic and the relationship of logic and God if you truly believe what you've written.

I have read what you've written, groove; and I just find it fundamentally incorrect. And not even controversially so.

Again, you've stated that "virtually every systematic theology" argues thusly. I would challenge to show just one "systematic Christian theology" that does this.

Best.

cks

[groove]

I categorically reject and deny your stated premise. You have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of logic and the relationship of logic and God if you truly believe what you've written.

I'm sorry, but now you are just playing games. The "nature of logic and God" you have described (I am taking this from the other thread) appears to be a semantical contrivance you have paradoxically developed as both derivative of God and yet able to circumscibe the God from whom it is derived. In doing so, you are attempting to masquerade what is ultimately a self-referential logical conundrum -- and thus semantical issue -- for a rational argument. Now, granted, I am in agreement that the application of logical constraints on God makes sense and helps us to understand God better. I do not think an incoherent God is a better God. However, as I am sure you well know, historically, the syntheses have run the gamut (including the idea that God is above logic - a la Descartes) and none have been uncontroversial.

I have read what you've written, groove; and I just find it fundamentally incorrect. And not even controversially so.

I don't believe you have. Because I seem to write one thing and you make comments which appear to be addressing something completely divergent. So either I am being very muddled (which is very possible), or you need to go back and re-read what I wrote. I may very well be incorrect or at least misunderstanding some of the foundational premises at work here. But you have done bupkis to explain why or how this would be the case. I am interested in dialogue, and have asked for clarification. If you don't want to get involved in discussion, then fine, but spare us the empty pronouncements and move along citizen.

Again, you've stated that "virtually every systematic theology" argues thusly. I would challenge to show just one "systematic Christian theology" that does this.

Here is what I have argued thusly: 1. Virtually every systematic Christian theology has placed limitations on God in order to: a)describe a coherent nature of God which is internally consistent b)produce a rational understanding of the nature of God c)describe God consistent with scriptural writ. 2. These limitations (please read carefully here) do not imply extrinsic influences upon God, but simply flesh out an internally consistent picture of God. However, to a certain degree, they reflect external semantic and logical presuppositions which exist simply because of their necessity for communication. 3. The theology of the LDS faith has expanded upon some of these limitations in order to describe a being which is both maximally powerful and maximally good.

Therefore, in order to help a certain poster who is having trouble comprehending that we could possibly suggest that there are some limits on Gods power -- a realization he is coming to be aware of quite quickly after a foray into the other thread -- I am simply saying that other people put some limits on what God can and cannot do. We just add some more.

[cksalmon]

Here is what I have argued thusly: 1. Virtually every systematic Christian theology has placed limitations on God in order to: a)describe a coherent nature of God which is internally consistent b)produce a rational understanding of the nature of God c)describe God consistent with scriptural writ. 2. These limitations (please read carefully here) do not imply extrinsic influences upon God, but simply flesh out an internally consistent picture of God. However, to a certain degree, they reflect external semantic and logical presuppositions which exist simply because of their necessity for communication.

What I'd like to see is some evidential basis for your claim that "Virtually every systematic Christian theology acknowledges that any rational notion of God subjects him to 'external' laws and structure which he arguably did not create."

That is just your claim, directly quoted. I'm just asking you to demonstrate it.

If you'd like to retract your assertion, then we can deal with what I take to be your further misunderstandings.

Otherwise, will you demonstrate your assertion? Let's not pass this by. I'd like to see some sort of verifiable source(s) for your claim. CFR.

Best.

cks

[groove]

That is just your claim, directly quoted. I'm just asking you to demonstrate it.

Let's look at Augustine's statement from the cited passage: "For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent"

According to Augustine, God cannot do something which would make him, in effect, not God. This is more than simply God choosing not to do something contrary to his nature and desires, rather it is referencing God not performing actions contrary to the condition of being God. Along the same lines, Aquinas writes here: "Some things also God cannot make, because they would be inconsistent with the notion of a creature, as such: thus He cannot create a God, or make anything equal to Himself..." Again, we see the same theme of some concept of Deity to which that Deity is required to conform, and a laundry list of limitations which are inconsistent with that concept. Over in 2.22 of Summa Contra Gentiles we see Aquinas going on about God's adherence to laws of noncontradiction. So there are apparently bounds and limits on what is entailed by the condition of being God, such that if these conditions were violated, we would not recognize said being as God.

Over in the other thread, I see you as stating that these conditions exist because God is logical as a matter of his nature. In other words, he is the ground of logic and therefore acts in a logical fashion and therefore is simply doing what is in his nature to do rather than being subject to anything. However, this seems to be simply a self-referencing circularism -- God is the ground of logic therefore he is logical, and how do we know that God is logical? Because he is God and God is logical. Thus the argument is not based on logic (because it is circular) rather it is a semantical construct intended to provide a measure of coherence to the idea of God.

So the basic point here is that we human people have constructed a notion of God which concept subjects God to a certain framework which makes God both somewhat comprehensible and consistent. Now granted, my initial statement was probably not worded well, which is why I have tried to clarify (and even that may require some re-working). My apologies if my exuberance got the better of my reasoning.

[cksalmon]

<br />Let's look at Augustine's statement from the cited passage: "For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent"<br /><br />According to Augustine, God cannot do something which would make him, in effect, not God. This is more than simply God choosing not to do something contrary to his nature and desires, rather it is referencing God not performing actions contrary to the condition of being God. Along the same lines, Aquinas writes <a href="http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc2_25.htm" target="_blank">here</a>: "Some things also God cannot make, because they would be <i>inconsistent with the notion of a creature, as such</i>: thus He cannot create a God, or make anything equal to Himself..." Again, we see the same theme of some concept of Deity to which that Deity is required to conform, and a laundry list of limitations which are inconsistent with that concept. Over in 2.22 of <i>Summa Contra Gentiles</i> we see Aquinas going on about God's adherence to laws of noncontradiction. <br /><br />Over in the other thread, I see you as stating that these conditions exist because God is logical as a matter of his nature. In other words, he is the ground of logic and therefore acts in a logical fashion and therefore is simply doing what is in his nature to do rather than being subject to anything. However, this seems to be simply a self-referencing circularism -- God is the ground of logic therefore he is logical, and how do we know that God is logical? Because he is God and God is logical. Thus the argument is not based on logic (because it is circular) rather it is a semantical. <br /><br />So the basic point here is that we human people have constructed a notion of God which <i>concept</i> subjects God to a certain framework which makes God both somewhat comprehensible and consistent. Now granted, my initial statement was probably not worded well, which is why I have tried to clarify (and even that may require some re-working). My apologies if my exuberance got the better of my reasoning.<br />

What I'd like to see is some evidential basis for your claim that "Virtually every systematic Christian theology acknowledges that any rational notion of God subjects him to 'external' laws and structure which he arguably did not create."

That is just your claim, directly quoted. I'm just asking you to demonstrate it.

If you'd like to retract your assertion, then we can deal with what I take to be your further misunderstandings.

Do you wish to now retract your claim?

If not, then let's deal with what I can only surmise to be the easily-supplied, and numerous, examples demonstrative of your assertion.

Again, your claim is as follows: "Virtually every systematic Christian theology acknowledges that any rational notion of God subjects him to 'external' laws and structure which he arguably did not create."

I want to see evidence for your claim, groove. Since virtually every systematic Christian theology acknowledges your assertion, then, I assume, it must be a very easy claim to demonstrate. Yes? One wouldn't need to search high and low for it. Your claim is built into virtually every systematic Christian theology, after all. Here's your claim, again: "Virtually every systematic Christian theology acknowledges that any rational notion of God subjects him to 'external' laws and structure which he arguably did not create." Demonstrate it.

Or, you can retract it. And we can start again fresh. I have no interest in countenancing the idea that you can assert as fact an insupportable claim and then later claim that I have misunderstood you.

Again, let's deal with your virtual certainty here. And, then, we can move on. Again: CFR.

Best.

cks

[groove]

Or, you can retract it. And we can start again fresh. I have no interest in countenancing the idea that you can assert as fact an insupportable claim and then later claim that I have misunderstood you.

Please. This is getting ridiculous. I have spent the better portion of several posts in a good faith effort to clarify my position. I have stated that my original wording was probably not the best, and have felt bad for it. Thus I have spent more effort than I ought to have to clarify in the apparently vain hope that you would just accept that I didn't elucidate clearly, accept those clarifications and move on from there. You now have more than enough material to understand my position.

Now, I have provided statements from the easily located works of two of the founders of systematic Christian thought underpinning the theology upon which most major Christian denominations operate which appear to support the notion that 1) God has limits and 2) those limits exist due to a descriptive framework and logical conditions which enable us to apply the concept of God. So far you have given me little evidence that further effort on my part would be useful or productive. First you wanted "just one" systematic theological example of my case, now you want "numerous examples." If you feel these samples from the roots of Christian Orthodoxy do not support my now amply fleshed out position or their that their provenance somehow does not permeate systematized Christian thought, then you need to explain why and support your refutation. I have been more than charitable in accomodating you here.

Now it is time for you to either deal with it or move on to greener pastures. I have satisfied your CFR by 1) spending considerable time clarifying my position, and 2) offering what I see as documentary support for that position. Until I see something from you which is going to move the discussion forward, I am done with this exchange.

[consiglieri]

Here's a question I've also thought about:

We believe that our post-mortal spirits will have the same personalities, tendencies and desires that we do on this Earth. It is well established that no matter how good we are, everyone continues to sin, even after they find the gospel and receive the Holy Ghost. Some may sin less than others, and few may live a pretty-darn-close to perfect life (I would imagine President Monson has had most his rough edges worn off him), but all of us will be imperfect until the day we die as a matter of course.

So then our imperfect spirits continue on, and get reunited with our bodies in the resurrection. Then we get judged, and receive our reward.

At what point do our spirits stop wanting to steal the candy bar, or get rich quick, or eat meat unsparingly etc.? When do we become perfect, and what is the actual change that makes our spirits stop wanting to sin? Does God reach into my heart and just remove the desire I have to type on message boards instead of spending time with my kids?

Hi, Cinepro!

Yours is a good question, and stems from a common piece of what I consider to be Mormon folklore; i.e., the idea that we rise in the resurrection with the same appetites and desires we had when we passed on from mortality. This idea is usually based on a misunderstanding of Alma 34:34, which says that the spirit that possesses our bodies at the time we die will have power to possess our bodies in that eternal world. The usual understanding is that the spirit referred to is our own spirit, but there is nothing in the passage to indicate that is what Amulek meant. Rather, everything before and after this particular verse indicates that Amulek did not mean the spirit of our own body; but rather the Spirit of God or the spirit of the devil.

Whichever of those two spirits possesses our bodies when we die will be the one with power to possess our bodies in that eternal world.

I think that when the Spirit of God possesses our body, we no more have any desire to sin. Instances of this happening even in mortality are recorded in the Book of Mormon with relation to the people of king Benjamin, as you no doubt have heard.

I hope you are having a pleasant day!

All the Best!

--Consiglieri

[Billy]

Therefore, in order to help a certain poster who is having trouble comprehending that we could possibly suggest that there are some limits on Gods power -- a realization he is coming to be aware of quite quickly after a foray into the other thread -- I am simply saying that other people put some limits on what God can and cannot do. We just add some more.

Who is the poster that you are trying to help?

[consiglieri]

I already answered your question, but I will answer it again for the third time. YES I think that God could just forgive us when we say we are sorry IF he chose to do so.

Thank you for finally answering my question, Billy, for what I count as the first time.

Do you see any problem with your position? You don't like my characterization of your God as a "bloody tyrant"?

I can understand that.

What words would you use to characterize a God who sacrifices his own Son in the most painful way imaginable when he didn't have to?

All the Best!

--Consiglieri

P.S. Oh, yes, the matter of the question you posed to me. Revelation is scant on the subject as to how the laws by which God is bound came into existence, or whether they came into existence at all.

In the absence of direct revelation, I tend to suspect that the laws by which God is governed have always existed, and that there is no "creation" about them.

We are familiar with the laws of physics, like the law of gravity, by which we are bound (literally). There appears to be no creation about the law of gravity; it simply is, and exists whenever and wherever a body of any particular mass exists. And yet we are bound by them.

In the same way, I suspect that the laws of eternal progression; and the laws of atonement and sin-forgiveness; are similarly eternal. God is bound by them just as we are; and likely God progressed to become God by following the very same laws.

In short, God did the most horrific thing he possibly could to forgive our sins simply because there was no other way.

This is the key, I think.

If God were not bound by such a law, and if there had been another way, then I am not sure that particular God is worthy of worship.

[Billy]

Thank you for finally answering my question, Billy, for what I count as the first time.

Do you see any problem with your position? You don't like my characterization of your God as a "bloody tyrant"?

I can understand that.

What words would you use to characterize a God who sacrifices his own Son in the most painful way imaginable when he didn't have to?

A God who loves us so much that he gave his only begotten Son to die for us.

We are familiar with the laws of physics, like the law of gravity, by which we are bound (literally). There appears to be no creation about the law of gravity; it simply is, and exists whenever and wherever a body of any particular mass exists. And yet we are bound by them.

"Extrapolation of the expansion of the universe backwards in time using general relativity yields an infinite density and temperature at a finite time in the past.[20] This singularity signals the breakdown of general relativity." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_bang

"General relativity or the general theory of relativity is the geometric theory of gravitation published by Albert Einstein in 1916." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity

[consiglieri]

A God who loves us so much that he gave his only begotten Son to die for us.

I'm glad he doesn't love us as much as his only begotten Son!

With friends like these . . .

[Billy]

I'm glad he doesn't love us as much as his only begotten Son!

With friends like these . . .

So you do not believe the verses below because Christ's sacrifice was strictly done based on some pre-existing laws that required the death of Christ which was outside of God the Fathers control?

John 3:16 "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

John 15:13 "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends."

In the absence of direct revelation, I tend to suspect that the laws by which God is governed have always existed, and that there is no "creation" about them.

So these imaginary EXISTING laws that you believe in, that God is 100% bound to obey, have just floated around in space, and one of these laws required the death of Jesus? Do you really believe this?

[Jason]

We believe that our post-mortal spirits will have the same personalities, tendencies and desires that we do on this Earth. It is well established that no matter how good we are, everyone continues to sin, even after they find the gospel and receive the Holy Ghost. Some may sin less than others, and few may live a pretty-darn-close to perfect life (I would imagine President Monson has had most his rough edges worn off him), but all of us will be imperfect until the day we die as a matter of course.

I think you've answered your own question. If some can live "a pretty-darn-close to perfect life" during mortality, then your original premise that "everyone continues to sin no matter how good they are" isn't necessarily true.

At what point do our spirits stop wanting to steal the candy bar, or get rich quick, or eat meat unsparingly etc.? When do we become perfect, and what is the actual change that makes our spirits stop wanting to sin? Does God reach into my heart and just remove the desire I have to type on message boards instead of spending time with my kids?

No, God does not remove unrightous desires. You remove unreighteous desires, often with God's assistance.

Eternal progression implies that we never reach a finish line and that there is always room for improvement. Perfection is therefore not a set state, but a continual goal thorughout eternity.

We might reach the mountain top of what we viewed as perfection from below, but then we see other mountains higher than where we are.

[JDave]

Eternal progression implies that we never reach a finish line and that there is always room for improvement. Perfection is therefore not a set state, but a continual goal thorughout eternity.

We might reach the mountain top of what we viewed as perfection from below, but then we see other mountains higher than where we are.

So God still has some unrighteous desires that He is working out? He is still working toward perfection?

[Jason]

So God still has some unrighteous desires that He is working out? He is still working toward perfection?

I don't know. If he does I would say they are completely insignificant and unnoticeable at our spiritual level, and perhaps not correctly labled as "unrighteous desires".

[thesometimesaint]

JDave:

Perfection is not necessarily limited to absence of some unrighteous desires.

[jwhitlock]

Thank you for finally answering my question, Billy, for what I count as the first time.

Do you see any problem with your position? You don't like my characterization of your God as a "bloody tyrant"?

I can understand that.

What words would you use to characterize a God who sacrifices his own Son in the most painful way imaginable when he didn't have to?

All the Best!

--Consiglieri

P.S. Oh, yes, the matter of the question you posed to me. Revelation is scant on the subject as to how the laws by which God is bound came into existence, or whether they came into existence at all.

In the absence of direct revelation, I tend to suspect that the laws by which God is governed have always existed, and that there is no "creation" about them.

We are familiar with the laws of physics, like the law of gravity, by which we are bound (literally). There appears to be no creation about the law of gravity; it simply is, and exists whenever and wherever a body of any particular mass exists. And yet we are bound by them.

In the same way, I suspect that the laws of eternal progression; and the laws of atonement and sin-forgiveness; are similarly eternal. God is bound by them just as we are; and likely God progressed to become God by following the very same laws.

In short, God did the most horrific thing he possibly could to forgive our sins simply because there was no other way.

This is the key, I think.

If God were not bound by such a law, and if there had been another way, then I am not sure that particular God is worthy of worship.

Seems to me like a very simple, rational extrapolation to me.

Billy's apparent response - that God sacrificed his Son out of love, even though He could have done it another way - appears to be an irrational attempt to reconcile the contradiction in the scriptures with his doctrinal concept of a God who is above law.

To be clear, for Billy's sake, I do not see any rational reason that "love" would be the driver for God sacrificing His Son, when God didn't have to in order to accomplish the exact same thing - according to Billy's doctrine.

Of course, Billy should feel free to clarify his position, including the reason why "love" is the most rational reason for God acting the way He did as outlined above.

[Billy]

Seems to me like a very simple, rational extrapolation to me.

Billy's apparent response - that God sacrificed his Son out of love, even though He could have done it another way - appears to be an irrational attempt to reconcile the contradiction in the scriptures with his doctrinal concept of a God who is above law.

To be clear, for Billy's sake, I do not see any rational reason that "love" would be the driver for God sacrificing His Son, when God didn't have to in order to accomplish the exact same thing - according to Billy's doctrine.

Of course, Billy should feel free to clarify his position, including the reason why "love" is the most rational reason for God acting the way He did as outlined above.

If Christ's sacrifice was absolutely required by some set of pre-existing laws that God the Father has no control over, how can you say that it was out of love that he offered his son as noted in John 3:16? If what you are saying is true it was not out of love, but out of obligation for Christ's sacrifice. And again who made up these LAWS that God the Father is obligated to follow?

[Jason]

If Christ's sacrifice was absolutely required by some set of pre-existing laws that God the Father has no control over, how can you say that it was out of love that he offered his son as noted in John 3:16?

Simple. Christ's sacrifice was only absolutely required if God the Father wished to obtain the end of redeeming mankind. The Father's wish to redeem mankind was motivated by love. Therefore the Son's sacrifice was made out of love.

If what you are saying is true it was not out of love, but out of obligation for Christ's sacrifice.

But God could presumably have chosen not to redeem mankind, and not to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man. He choses to do so out of love.

And again who made up these LAWS that God the Father is obligated to follow?

They may be uncreated, even as spirit and matter are uncreated.

[Billy]

Simple. Christ's sacrifice was only absolutely required if God the Father wished to obtain the end of redeeming mankind. The Father's wish to redeem mankind was motivated by love. Therefore the Son's sacrifice was made out of love.

So you are saying that God the Father had a choice?

[jwhitlock]

If Christ's sacrifice was absolutely required by some set of pre-existing laws that God the Father has no control over, how can you say that it was out of love that he offered his son as noted in John 3:16? If what you are saying is true it was not out of love, but out of obligation for Christ's sacrifice. And again who made up these LAWS that God the Father is obligated to follow?

I don't really want to get in the way of Consig's train of thought with you, Billy. But since you seem to keep wanting to dodge the question - which I'll ask again, as being "How can you reconcile God being a loving God in sacrificing His Son, when there was another way to do it?" - I'll just note the following:

It's obvious that God acted out of love.

Acting out of obligation does not eliminate the possibility of acting out of love, just as my obligation towards my children does not eliminate my love for them. Really, Billy, that should be obvious.

Claiming that God acts out of love in sacrificing His Son, when He could have accomplished His designs in another manner, appears to be a self contradiction. Your mission, Billy, is to explain to us how it is not.

I'll turn the time back to Consig.