Newcomb's Paradox and the morality of God

[Nofear]

This video is about Newcomb's Paradox. In this problem there is a predictor and an agent (you) and two boxes.
 

One box always has $1000 and is open and visible. The second box is determined by the predictor before you even enter the room. The predictor has past data on others and is really good at predicting.

If the predictor predicted you would take two boxes it puts $0 in the second box.
If the predictor predicted you would take only the second box, it puts $1,000,000 in the second box.

Which option should you choose?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ol18JoeXlVI

You should watch the video to see how the rational actor changes his mind. However, why it is posted here is because one of the conclusions that is drawn but one of the philosophers is that the moral of the paradox is that "being rational isn't deciding what is right in the moment but deciding what rules you are going to live by". Theologically, we have the idea that God doesn't just decide what is right/best/good from moment to moment but as stated in D&C 130 20-21: There is a law, irrevocably decreed in heaven before the foundations of this world, upon which all blessings are predicated—and when we obtain any blessing from God, it is by obedience to that law upon which it is predicated.

There are many who can object to the notion of God because of the reality of evil in the world. This paradox shows rationally why God has set up the situation He has set up.

 

 

 

[The Nehor]

Newcomb’s paradox is not actually a paradox.

Also the whole problem hinges on how the predictor is able to predict the actions of the participant. It is such a poorly defined problem that it lines people up yelling about how the other side is wrong because the premises are so vague.

[Nofear]

For this problem rational means getting the most expected money.

Let's let box B's reward be only $10. The rational coice will be selecting both boxes. You will always get more.

Let box B's reward be $1000. The rational choice is still choosing both boxes.

Let box B's reward be $1010. Is tho rational choice still picking both? How about if box be is $1,000,000? Where does it change from the rational best choice to irrational? Logic holds there isn't any threshold. Picking both always gives you the more rational outcome (more money).

But, as argued in the discussion, the most “rational“ choice is to make the irrational choice. To be rational you must be irrational. Hence the term “paradox”.

[The Nehor]

20 hours ago, Nofear said:

For this problem rational means getting the most expected money.

Let's let box B's reward be only $10. The rational coice will be selecting both boxes. You will always get more.

Let box B's reward be $1000. The rational choice is still choosing both boxes.

Let box B's reward be $1010. Is tho rational choice still picking both? How about if box be is $1,000,000? Where does it change from the rational best choice to irrational? Logic holds there isn't any threshold. Picking both always gives you the more rational outcome (more money).

But, as argued in the discussion, the most “rational“ choice is to make the irrational choice. To be rational you must be irrational. Hence the term “paradox”.

But if the predictor knows what you will do then doing the opposite is the better choice as your choice somehow semi-retroactively changes the predictor’s decision. That is why the problem is so vague. Unless you define how this predictor is operating and how it is reaching conclusions the problem is too vague to be answered.

[Nofear]

2 hours ago, The Nehor said:

But if the predictor knows what you will do then doing the opposite is the better choice as your choice somehow semi-retroactively changes the predictor’s decision. That is why the problem is so vague. Unless you define how this predictor is operating and how it is reaching conclusions the problem is too vague to be answered.

That is messiness irrelevant to the nature of the problem that is trying to be illuminated. So, philosophers don't bother trying to explain how it might* be. It is sufficient to posit that the predictor has 100% accuracy. A reader who gets hung up on that is missing the point.

* Or just put in some hand-wavy explanation that isn't intended to be serious or rigorous.

Edited March 12 by Nofear

[The Nehor]

On 3/12/2026 at 8:55 AM, Nofear said:

That is messiness irrelevant to the nature of the problem that is trying to be illuminated. So, philosophers don't bother trying to explain how it might* be. It is sufficient to posit that the predictor has 100% accuracy. A reader who gets hung up on that is missing the point.

* Or just put in some hand-wavy explanation that isn't intended to be serious or rigorous.

The standard position of Newcomb’s problem is the predictor has nearly perfect accuracy, not 100% accuracy. If the predictor is 100% accurate the situation changes.

[Nofear]

I almost wrote near 100% accuracy and that woud indeed have been better. Though the limit case is also considered by some. The point remains that how the predictor has that near perfect skill isn't relevant and thus can remain vague and poorly defined.

You view it from it from a different perspective. Okie dokie.