Robert Ritner And Joseph Smith

[mfbukowski]

Software is a property of hardware, and mind is a property of the brain.

That is not really a view of most pragmatists- and I would question it highly. I would like to see more about what theory of "properties" could justify that view- I am not saying flat-out that you are wrong- but that is not how I have seen the term used. For me, the simple definition of a "property" would be an adjective used to modify a noun- like a "red" house, or a "beautiful" symphony. Clearly software is not that kind of word, or concept in relation to hardware.

Clearly, hardware can run different software which seems to me to make it clear that any given software is not a "property" of hardware at all. I think you would have a tough time making that case in a pragmatist context because pragmatists usually would regard such kinds of "things" as properties as not "things" at all but as a linguistic convenience, any more than "blue" is a thing itself. "Blue" has no ontological reality, unless you are a Platonist and believe that "Blueness" somehow exists as a Form or something.

Again- I could be wrong, but it would be interesting if you could show that view as compatible with Pragmatism- but I don't think that's possible.

Software engineers merely work at a higher level of organization. It's a bit like driving a car. The driver of a car technically only manipulates only a few parts. But because the parts are integrated into a system, manipulation of those parts has predictable effects on all the other parts in the system. The driver can therefore be said to be driving the entire car-- manipulating the entire system. It's not necessary for him to know how the system is organized in order to manipulate it. But that doesn't negate the fact that the system is, in principle, reducible. What the driver is really doing is causing a cascade of interactions between various hardware components within the system. It's exactly the same with a computer. A software engineer does his "thinking" at a systems-level, but his activities are still reducible to a cascade of hardware interactions started by his manipulation of his input devices. One could theoretically program a computer solely by manipulating its hardware (though this would too complex to really be practical).

Yeah, but you wouldn't say that the driver is a "property" of the car- which is the analogy you are making if I understand you correctly. Furthermore, that analogy seemingly could be used by "my side" to say that consciousness is what is "driving" the body.

And, I would argue, it's the same with the brain. You can change the software by changing the hadware. There's no reason to believe consciousness is anything but a property of the physical brain.

Heck yeah! Put a bullet through the computer or the brain and the software or consciousness is not going to work too well. But I don't know if that proves your point.

Christianity Today recently had an interesting issue on the debate over Adam and Eve. According to the CT articles-- and I'm working from memory here-- geneticists have found that humans descended from an ancestral population that was never smaller than a few thousand individuals. This problematizes the notion that humanity originated from one man and one woman.

Straight up? I think that doesn't bother the story at all if you want to believe it. Yes, I said "want" because I believe that we all construct our stories the way we want to. I think that right now you don't WANT to see it my way, and that is fine- I don't WANT to see it your way either. I do not see the story as literal unless we want to insert something supernatural or symbolic into it. But so what if we do? It is not a falsifiable story to start out with and it is not meant to be.

But wanting to create a story that works is what it comes down to. I take that story about Nagel as a perfect example. I am using his arguments as a theist, even though he is an atheist because he has clearly stated that he doesn't want to be a theist. Here he is, one of the most important philosophers of our time, whose arguments can be and are used by theists all the time, but he doesn't WANT to be a theist.

But of course for me, that is evidence for my side of it. We all have an internal drive to make up our own world as we see it. Some of these worlds make sense and others don't- so here we are, each discussing if our world makes sense to the other one or not.

And this is just one small objection to the historicity of the story; others could be adduced from history and logic. Of course, this doesn't mean that the story isn't true in some metaphorical sense, as I argued here. But once you start interpreting it that way, IMO you're doing something much more than relegating religion to a subjective sphere of activity. You're also substantially modifying your religious system of thought. And that modification has compromising reverberations throughout the entire system. Make enough such modifications and it starts to fall apart.

Not the way I see it.

And this, I think, highlights an ambiguity in the "pragmatic" program you've described in this thread.

We still haven't talked about William James. I don't think you can call yourself a "Pragmatist" and disagree with James about this. But I would like to see your arguments on that.

On one level, you seem to be calling for the simultaneous affirmation of both the "Mormon" system and the "scientific" system, albeit in different contexts. I've called this "doublethink," because I'm assuming that you're going to maintain both systems intact, and therefore you're going to be affirming contradictory propositions and basically just sublimating different systems in different contexts

.

OK- show me some. I would love to have you show me that if you can- quite honestly.

But on another level, you seem to be calling for the modification of the Mormon system in order to remove the contradictions. This is no different from what religious liberals have been doing throughout history-- conceding and metaphorizing in order to eliminate problems in their religious views. I have no particular objection to this second approach, but it doesn't seem to have any particular relation to pragmatism or the subjective/objective distinction you outlined earlier in this thread. So now I'm curious how you would position your project in relation to these two approaches, and how, if at all, you think they fit together.

Not quite sure what you mean here. How does taking a pragmatic view of "I know this church is true" NOT have a "relation" to pragmatism?

But I think your point about "metaphorizing" and its relationship to the subjective and objective might be important to discuss- but I don't have time at the moment- but will find it in the next day or two.

All I'll say about this is that we as a species aren't very good at discerning the mechanisms behind our experiences on the basis of the phenomenological quality of the experiences alone.

Which is why I am drawn to pragmatism. Since I think such "mechanisms" are constructed, as is every other theory or view of reality, they are subject to the vagaries of further collective definition and further data- in other words, collective experience in the human pool of experiences. Such "mechanisms" are as good as what they explain for a given purpose and nothing more or less.

Later, dude!

[mfbukowski]

Flawed in what respect? A "literally true" statement, for me, just means one which is predictively valid. It is a statement whose entailments are consistent with all observed constraints.

Well I would like to get into that- but frankly it sounds kind of "correspondencie" to me. It seems you are saying that all statements it entails are consistent with all observations, and has "predictive value". But I think that this is a bit different and more restrictive than a typically pragmatic view. Of course, to some extent, there IS no "typically Pragmatic view"- since Peirce was quite different than say, Rorty, But generally speaking, pragmatists rarely use the word at all, quite honestly.

I did a couple of searches for the word "predict" or similar words in a few articles about Pragmatism and found a surprisingly few hits. Here is one of them, highly relevant to the question at hand here, about the philosophy of James:

(Underlining added)

3.2 James on truth

Claims about truth had a much more central role in James's work and he was even prepared to claim that pragmatism was a theory of truth. And his writings on this topic rapidly became notorious. They are characteristically lively, offering contrasting formulations, engaging slogans, and intriguing claims which often seem to fly in the face of common sense. We can best summarize his view through his own words:

The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons. (1907: 42)

‘The true’, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole, of course. (1907: 106)

Other formulations fill this out by giving a central role to experience:

Ideas … become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience. (1907: 34)

Any idea upon which we can ride …; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally. (1907: 34)

This might be taken to suggest that beliefs are made true by the fact that they enable us to make accurate predictions of the future run of experience, but other passages suggest that the ‘goodness of belief’ can take other forms. James assures us that it can contribute to the truth of a theological proposition that it has ‘a value for concrete life’ (1907: 40); and this can occur because the idea of God possesses a majesty which can ‘yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of minds’ (1907: 40). This suggests that a belief can be made true by the fact that holding it contributes to our happiness and fulfilment.

The kind of passages just noted may lend support to Bertrand Russell's famous objection that James is committed to the truth of ‘Santa Claus exists’ (Russell 1949: 772). This is unfair; at best, James is committed to the claim that the happiness that belief in Santa Claus provides is truth-relevant. James could say that the belief was ‘good for so much’ but it would only be ‘wholly true’ if it did not ‘clash with other vital benefits’. It is easy to see that, unless it is somehow insulated from the broader effects of acting upon it, belief in Santa Claus could lead to a host of experiential surprises and disappointments.

I included that last objection specifically for MortalMan- because I just knew he would love it. But in fact, it helps clarify Jame's position overall. Acting on a belief in Santa Claus is a far cry from acknowledging the value of having a meaning in one's life squarely built upon subjective experiences which convince one that those experiences are "real".

I was under the impression that we shared basically the same notion of truth in this respect. I don't adhere to a correspondence theory of truth, either.

Well we can explore that further if you like. At this point I see the value of what you are saying, and understand what you mean by "predictive value, I think, but I would say that predictive value is only one part of the whole picture of a "value for a concrete life", or for building one's world view. The ability to predict what will happen is relevant in science, in objective measurement, but not so much so in other areas of life like morality.

Morality is the key here- certainly living morally does not necessarily "predict" happiness, riches, or "success", or necessarily even fulfillment. I wish it did, but we all know it doesn't!

I agree that this statement has to be read as an idiom rather than a literal statement. However, while there may well be people who use it as you describe-- as a statement about their subjective feelings-- I don't think that's the statement's conventional meaning.

I am unaware of a commandment which says "thou shalt be conventional"

Orthopraxis! I also think most Mormons are unacquainted with the nuances of string theory- or various theories of how consciousness relates to space/time, but should we abandon those inquiries because most people do not understand them? Frankly I think even most General Authorities have no need for the kind of conversation we are having here- good for them! I kind of wish I was not so obsessively-compulsively drawn to asking every possible question and coming up and weighing every possible answer as I have been in my life- on a very real level, who needs all this inquiry to get through the day?? I know I need it- and I see that others do, but I also see that others don't. And surely there's nothing "wrong" with that either!

I think in the Mormon context the statement conventionally means much more, such as that the LDS theology and scriptures are literally true, and the LDS Church possesses an exclusive, objective priesthood power to perform ordinances necessary for exaltation.

I have no problem with that- I have directly experienced the power in these ordinances in both giving them and receiving them. I have a firm testimony that this power is real.

I suspect some people might even feel betrayed or lied to if they found out you were using the phrase to mean anything less. That's one reason I gave up on the mythologizing approach. By making the same affirmations as my coreligionists but placing a different meaning on them, I felt like I was lying to them (and, frankly, to myself).

Now for me, THAT is "doublethink"! You are holding onto the idea that "metaphors" are "something less" than "real"- when in fact they are "true reality" and the best we can come up with linguistically!

"Anything less"? To me, I see it as considerably "more" - to have the confidence I have, quite frankly to fully understand these things and to be able to explain them in my own way? Are you kidding? There is no way that that is a "lesser" understanding than I might have had 30 years ago. I feel that there is no one anywhere who can shake my belief, because I have already shaken it and shaken it myself to the point of being nothing- and rebuilt it from nothing- I believe with the help of the Holy Spirit. I have critics, surely, but I have thought this through to the point where I feel I can answer anything to my own satisifaction- and that is the sole measure of what is important to me, obviously. THAT is what pragmatism is all about- building a world view and being happy in that world view, and having it consistent with all the observations one can make in ever field and see how it all works together! Lying to myself? No, the total opposite!

Perhaps at that time in your life you had an insufficient understanding of the theoretical underpinnings philosophically necessary to carry your journey forward.

As for the rest of your post, I think you place far too much emphasis on the emotional utility of beliefs, and not enough on their predictive utility. I recognize at least three different types of utility: predictive utility, emotional utility, and evolutionary utility. The three are not identical. It may be emotionally useful to believe that I am the best looking person in the world, but that belief has no predictive utility. It may be evolutionarily useful to believe that having dozens of babies will make me happy, but that belief has no predictive utility. It may be predictively useful to believe that our country is in decline, but that belief has neither emotional nor, probably, evolutionary utility. If we're going to claim that truth is defined by utility, ultimately I think we have to decide which kind of utility we're talking about. Pragmatism, as I understand it, generally defines it in terms of predictive utility. And that would seem to be consistent with the conventional meaning of the term "truth".

I like your different types of utility and see the balance there, but I think there are many other possible categories to be included as well, but still I think your sense of "predictive utility" is not enough. How do you know that if one truly believes that he is the best looking person in the world, his radiated confidence will not get him the job he wants despite his ugliness? Are you saying that there are no families with a dozen children who are happy? And suppose the belief that our country is in decline spurs people into pushing forward to turn the tide around? I am not sure it is sufficient as you have stated it. But of course that is a problem in any short description of a theory- when I explain to people that Pragmatic truth is "what works" they quite understandably have the same kind of reaction perhaps I am projecting on your short statement here.

But as far as the emotionality question, how much emotion is there in "rationality"? Where does one draw the line between what is "rational" and "emotional"? What about in the area of ethics? Can one be "too emotional" in pursuing what is right?

From the Humanist Manifesto of 1933

8. Religious Humanism considers the complete realization of human personality to be the end of man's life and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and now. This is the explanation of the humanist's social passion.

12. Believing that religion must work increasingly for joy in living, religious humanists aim to foster the creative in man and to encourage achievements that add to the satisfactions of life.

So stand the theses of religious humanism. Though we consider the religious forms and ideas of our fathers no longer adequate, the quest for the good life is still the central task for mankind. Man is at last becoming aware that he alone is responsible for the realization of the world of his dreams, that he has within himself the power for its achievement. He must set intelligence and will to the task.

These value statements are to be judged as much emotionally as rationally- they are one and the same in my opinion. As you know I think they are "true" probably for about the same reasons you think they are true- defining that though can become problematic, as we see in this discussion.

Incidentally for one of the most important and best discussions I have seen of these issues, in a fairly short, 20 page read, I would recommend a piece by Rorty which discusses pragmatic truth, which was written as an introduction for a book- it can be found here. (Page down in the left window, find "Rorty", and then "Pragmatism")

The essence of what he says is that the whole concept of "truth" is not that important to Pragmatists, and I think he is right. It is more about "warranted assertibility" than truth.

Say what you like about Rorty, I think that no one doubts that the man was one of the best-read people of our time, and absolutely brilliant in his ability to categorize thought systems and see the big picture of how all these different thought systems relate to each other. If I was teaching philosophy now, this essay would definitely be required reading just for the history of it all.

Edit: I had problems posting this and so had to cut and paste, and all the links were lost- I am putting them back now, but if I missed some just ask.

Edited September 6, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Chris Smith]

Hi mfb, I haven't forgotten about this discussion, but it may be a couple days before I get back to you. As luck would have it, I'm reading through James's Varieties of Religious Experience again right now as part of my prep for my qualifying exams. Since you asked about my view on James, I think it's best that I finish the book before I formulate my reply.

[mfbukowski]

Hi mfb, I haven't forgotten about this discussion, but it may be a couple days before I get back to you. As luck would have it, I'm reading through James's Varieties of Religious Experience again right now as part of my prep for my qualifying exams. Since you asked about my view on James, I think it's best that I finish the book before I formulate my reply.

Sounds sensible to me!

On the other hand, it has been a long time since I read all of it myself- so I will make you a deal- this is a quote from the preface:

In Lecture XX I have suggested rather than stated

my own philosophic conclusions, and the reader who desires immediately to

know them should turn to the ‘Conclusions,’ and to the ‘Postscript’ of the book. I

hope to be able at some later day to express them in more explicit form.

In my belief that a large acquaintance with particulars often makes us wiser

than the possession of abstract formulas, however deep, I have loaded the lectures

with concrete examples, and I have chosen these among the extremer expressions

of the religious temperament. To some readers I may consequently seem, before

they get beyond the middle of the book, to offer a caricature of the subject. Such

convulsions of piety, they will say, are not sane. If, however, they will have the patience

to read to the end, I believe that this unfavorable impression will disappear;

for I there combine the religious impulses with other principles of common sense

I promise to review at least Lecture XX and the conclusions to refresh my memory!

Edited September 6, 2011 by mfbukowski

[Pahoran]

Well, I'm inclined to agree with you, but only because the processes involved are too complex to be described, rather than because it's impossible in principle.

Software is a property of hardware, and mind is a property of the brain.

I'm presuming that this is supposed to represent some kind of analogy. If so, you might want to find another one. Software is not a "property" of hardware; the ability to run software is a property of hardware, but the actual content of the software is (within certain constraints) hardware-independent.

Futhermore, the entire content of a computer's permanent storage can be backed up and restored to another computer, so that the next time the second computer is booted, it will function exactly as if it were the first one.

Computers (hardware) are relatively simple machines; computer programs (software) are the most complex of human artifacts.

But the most significant area where the analogy breaks down is that computers are in no sense "sentient." A computer doing a mathematical calculation doesn't "know" the answer any more than a pop-up toaster "knows" when the bread is toasted. All the vast and complex code that is written in AI programs is there precisely because a computer has no "intelligence" of its own. All a computer can actually do is perform simple arithmetic, compare two numbers and determine if they are equal, and transfer control to a given location in memory. A computer can't even learn that 2+2=4; it has to work out the answer every time, following exactly the same steps as if it were calculating pi squared.

Years ago when I was at university I saw a notice for a debate. The topic was: "Are computers conscious?" Can you guess who was running the debate?

It was the Philosophy department. Not the Computer Science department. All the Comp. Sci. students thought it was a huge joke.

Which it was.

Regards,

Pahoran

[Chris Smith]

The actual content of the software is (within certain constraints) hardware-independent.

Actually, it's not. For all intents and purposes, the content of the software is stored on the physical disk.

To say software is a property of hardware may be an oversimplification, but it's adequate for the purposes of this discussion. It might be more technically correct to say software supervenes on hardware.

But the most significant area where the analogy breaks down is that computers are in no sense "sentient."

Irrelevant.

Peace,

-Chris

[Pahoran]

Actually, it's not. For all intents and purposes, the content of the software is stored on the physical disk.

In which case "software is a property of hardware" in the same way as honey is a property of jars.

Regards,

Pahoran

[Chris Smith]

In which case "software is a property of hardware" in the same way as honey is a property of jars.

Not really. When you put honey into a jar, you don't physically change the jar itself. But when you write data to a hard drive, you do so by altering the physical architecture of the disk. Also, the honey is honey regardless of whether it's in the jar or not. But the physical configuration of the hard disk is not, itself, software. It only gets manifested as software in the context of a computer system designed to read it as such.

In other words, software, unlike honey, is not an independent "thing" that's "contained" within a computer system. Rather, it's an expression of the physical configuration of the computer system itself.

[Zeta-Flux]

Not really. When you put honey into a jar, you don't physically change the jar itself. But when you write data to a hard drive, you do so by altering the physical architecture of the disk. Also, the honey is honey regardless of whether it's in the jar or not. But the physical configuration of the hard disk is not, itself, software. It only gets manifested as software in the context of a computer system designed to read it as such.

In other words, software, unlike honey, is not an independent "thing" that's "contained" within a computer system. Rather, it's an expression of the physical configuration of the computer system itself.

Chris, you seem to be using nonstandard definitions of software and hardware. Colloquially, software is thought of as the data which provides instructions to the hardware. Hardware is thought of as the machine which *can* implement those instructions. The data comprising a piece of software can exist outside the context of instructions which can be run on the machine. (Think of a Window's disk I simply have not installed yet. Or a piece of a program I wrote on a napkin.) The data is software before (if ever) its presence becomes physically manifested in the hardware of any specific machine. (Unless you want to include "the entire universe" as part of your hardware--in which case you are still using nonstandard definitions.)

Besides which, I don't agree with your analogy. Putting honey in a jar changes its configuration just as much as installing software on a computer changes its configuration. And just as honey is honey, data is data regardless whether it is installed and stored as a bunch of magnetic states or scribbled on a napkin.

So, software IS an independent "thing" that's "contained" within a computer system. At the same time, that "thing" can be expressed via physical configurations in the computer system or it may not be.

[Pahoran]

Not really. When you put honey into a jar, you don't physically change the jar itself. But when you write data to a hard drive, you do so by altering the physical architecture of the disk. Also, the honey is honey regardless of whether it's in the jar or not. But the physical configuration of the hard disk is not, itself, software. It only gets manifested as software in the context of a computer system designed to read it as such.

In other words, software, unlike honey, is not an independent "thing" that's "contained" within a computer system. Rather, it's an expression of the physical configuration of the computer system itself.

Software and data are stored on a hard drive by altering magnetic values on the disk surface, not "the physical architecture of the disk." That architecture remains unchanged regardless of what is or is not stored there.

Incidentally, when you put honey in a jar, there are analogous changes to the surface of the glass, as small local static charges are built up, which is (in part) what makes it so hard to get the last bit of honey out.

Software doesn't even have to be stored on the hard drive; it can be stored, inter alia, on a DVD, a CD or a flash card. When it is running, it is loaded into RAM, i.e. Random Access Memory, which is nothing more than an array of silicon chips.

The real relationship between hardware and software is that hardware is the physical apparatus or "toolkit" that software uses to do what it does; perhaps this is analogous to the way the mind uses the brain as its toolkit.

Chris, you really ought to confine yourself to pontificating about subjects you actually understand. Alternatively, if you really want to show off, you could try teaching your grandmother how to peel potatoes. I'm sure your knowledge of such subjects exceeds hers by about the same margin as your knowledge of computer systems exceeds mine.

Regards,

Pahoran (Software engineer.)

Edited September 7, 2011 by Pahoran

[Chris Smith]

Zeta Flux,

Colloquially, software is thought of as the data which provides instructions to the hardware.

"Data" exists only as a magnetic pattern on a physical disk. A disk is considered hardware. And the only thing that makes the physical pattern on the disk "data" is that we have computer hardware designed to read it as such. So while it's true that the software provides instructions to the hardware, it's also true that the software is a property of the hardware (or, more technically, supervenes on the hardware).

"Data" is a lot like language. Colloquially, both language and data are forms of information. But the term "information" is just a shorthand for a pattern in a physical substrate that is acted on by a physical system capable of "interpreting" it. Thus there's a real sense in which the concepts of "data," "language," and "information" make no sense except as properties of the physical systems that produce and interpret them, and the physical substrates in which they are stored.

(Think of a Window's disk I simply have not installed yet. Or a piece of a program I wrote on a napkin.) The data is software before (if ever) its presence becomes physically manifested in the hardware of any specific machine.

Your Windows disk is hardware.

Besides which, I don't agree with your analogy. Putting honey in a jar changes its configuration just as much as installing software on a computer changes its configuration.

The jar itself is unchanged.

And just as honey is honey, data is data regardless whether it is installed and stored as a bunch of magnetic states or scribbled on a napkin.

I would say that the "data" represented by your napkin scribblings is a property of the substrate and the system that interprets it.

Pahoran,

Software and data are stored on a hard drive by altering magnetic values on the disk surface, not "the physical architecture of the disk."

Strange as it may sound, the magnetic pattern of the disk's surface is part of its physical architecture.

Incidentally, when you put honey in a jar, there are analogous changes to the surface of the glass, as small local static charges are built up, which is (in part) what makes it so hard to get the last bit of honey out.

This sort of irrelevant hair-splitting is just what I've come to expect from you. Thanks for your contributions to the discussion, such as they were.

Peace,

-Chris

Edited September 7, 2011 by Chris Smith

[Pahoran]

"Data" exists only as a magnetic pattern on a physical disk.

I'm sorry, but that is nonsense. The existence of data is logically prior to its storage on any medium.

A disk is considered hardware. And the only thing that makes the physical pattern on the disk "data" is that we have computer hardware designed to read it as such. So while it's true that the software provides instructions to the hardware, it's also true that the software is a property of the hardware (or, more technically, supervenes on the hardware).

So, to extend your analogy, writing is a property of paper?

Pahoran,

Strange as it may sound, the magnetic pattern of the disk's surface is part of its physical architecture.

This sort of irrelevant hair-splitting is just what I've come to expect from you. Thanks for your contributions to the discussion, such as they were.

And this sort of arrogant insistence that you are right and everyone else -- including specialists in the subject area upon which you are pontificating -- are wrong, is just what I've come to expect from you.

So I suppose neither of us is really surprised.

Regards,

Pahoran

[Chris Smith]

I'm sorry, but that is nonsense. The existence of data is logically prior to its storage on any medium.

Would that be as a Platonic form or an Aristotelian universal?

Edited September 7, 2011 by Chris Smith

[Zeta-Flux]

Zeta Flux,

"Data" exists only as a magnetic pattern on a physical disk.

This is false. It can also exist as graphite on a napkin, or thoughts in the mind.

Or more particularly, representations of the data exists in those patterns. I'll remain agnostic on the question of whether the data exists outside any particular physical representation of it until you answer a question I ask far below.

A disk is considered hardware.

You are conflating hardware that comprises your machine and hardware outside the machine. Do you consider a programmer to be a piece of hardware for your computer? Is a piece of paper with the program written in pencil considered hardware? The purpose of the disk is to convey the data, not understand/use it.

And the only thing that makes the physical pattern on the disk "data" is that we have computer hardware designed to read it as such. So while it's true that the software provides instructions to the hardware, it's also true that the software is a property of the hardware (or, more technically, supervenes on the hardware).

Are you saying that data exists as such only when interpreters exist to interpret it? Or are you saying that data exists only as physical expressions in matter? These seem to be incompatible.

Does a Windows disk cease to be data if all humans and all computers stopped existing?

"Data" is a lot like language. Colloquially, both language and data are forms of information. But the term "information" is just a shorthand for a pattern in a physical substrate that is acted on by a physical system capable of "interpreting" it.

I don't disagree, if we understand "interpretation" similarly.

Thus there's a real sense in which the concepts of "data," "language," and "information" make no sense except as properties of the physical systems that produce and interpret them, and the physical substrates in which they are stored.

This doesn't seem to follow.

Your Windows disk is hardware.

True, but not part of the hardware comprising your machine. So the data stored on the disk is not physically manifested in the computer itself (unless, as I said earlier, you want to expand your "computer" to mean "the entire universe").

The jar itself is unchanged.

I disagree. Pahoran mentioned one specific change.

I would say that the "data" represented by your napkin scribblings is a property of the substrate and the system that interprets it.

The representation surely is a property of the substrate. The data itself may possibly exists outside the markings on the napkin.

[mfbukowski]

Uh, I forgot why this is an important question?

[Chris Smith]

This is false. It can also exist as graphite on a napkin, or thoughts in the mind.

I was speaking of the data in the analogy, not data in general.

Are you saying that data exists as such only when interpreters exist to interpret it? Or are you saying that data exists only as physical expressions in matter? These seem to be incompatible.

I'm saying both, and I don't see why they would be incompatible.

Does a Windows disk cease to be data if all humans and all computers stopped existing?

Yes.

True, but not part of the hardware comprising your machine. So the data stored on the disk is not physically manifested in the computer itself (unless, as I said earlier, you want to expand your "computer" to mean "the entire universe").

An external disk is to a computer as soundwaves are to the brain. It is imprinted with patterns ("data") to enable interoperability between compatible systems. However, the patterns on the disk only become intelligible as data when they are integrated into a system (i.e. by inserting the disk into a computer).

The representation surely is a property of the substrate. The data itself may possibly exists outside the markings on the napkin.

To suggest that the data has an existence independent of the medium is not only unwarranted speculation, but also pragmatically irrelevant.

Peace,

-Chris

Edited September 7, 2011 by Chris Smith

[Chris Smith]

FWIW, the discussion of terminology here is getting pretty far afield of the original analogy. The point of the analogy was that software is entirely dependent on its physical substrate, even though there's little superficial resemblance between the two. And the same appears to be true of the mind and the brain. Questions about external disks and the definitions of software and data carry a certain intrinsic interest, but ultimately have little bearing on the analogy.

[Zeta-Flux]

I was speaking of the data in the analogy, not data in general.

So was I.

An external disk is to a computer as soundwaves are to the brain. Its purpose is to enable interoperability between compatible systems. However, the patterns on the disk only become intelligible as data when they are integrated into a system (i.e. by inserting the disk into a computer).

I would agree with you that "intelligibility" would be a property gained by integration. But the existence of the data itself does not require intelligibility.

I'm saying both, and I don't see why they would be incompatible.

To suggest that the data has an existence independent of the medium is not only unwarranted speculation, but also pragmatically irrelevant.

I don't suggest such a thing. I'm just trying to understand your claim that it cannot exist independent of an interpreter and yet remain completely in the physical realm (i.e., be expressed in a medium). Let me give you a situation so you might understand my confusion.

Suppose I write piece of mathematics (being a math professor, this might just be plausible). Suppose further that every human dies. Thousands of years pass, apes evolve, and they stumble across my paper. They eventually even learn to interpret it as I meant it to be interpreted.

Please explain what the physical medium within which the data of my paper existed is? I would say it was the paper upon which it was written. But that won't suffice in your view, because data cannot exist apart from an interpreter.

[Chris Smith]

Zeta,

To understand my position you have to understand the nominalist philosophy of language, which says that names are just useful conventions. Marks on a piece of paper are not inherently data. They possess no inherent quality of data-ness. Data is merely what we have chosen to call them, to indicate the function we use them for. Something that is data to me might just be art to you. Or we might both take the same markings and interpret them differently, in which case are we really looking at the same data? The point is, data is constituted as such in the interaction between substrate (i.e. the physical marks on your paper) and an interpreting system. Apart from that context, the substrate is just another nameless physical thing.

Peace,

-Chris

[mfbukowski]

FWIW, the discussion of terminology here is getting pretty far afield of the original analogy. The point of the analogy was that software is entirely dependent on its physical substrate, even though there's little superficial resemblance between the two. And the same appears to be true of the mind and the brain. Questions about external disks and the definitions of software and data carry a certain intrinsic interest, but ultimately have little bearing on the analogy.

The problem of course is that we are not computers, and the question as I recall was about subjective experience. The entire discussion about how computers work is based on objective data- ie: observations about computers- since I know nothing about computers I don't have a clue if those observations are accurate but it is irrelevant anyway.

If the computer could describe its subjective experience it might be relevant, but as it is, I haven't seen a computer do that. I just think we got a little far afield but guess what- our whole discussion is a major derail from the OP anyway and I appreciate Pedro's patience.

[Chris Smith]

The problem of course is that we are not computers

I beg to differ.

You're right about our straying from the thread topic. Maybe if we plan to continue, we should move to the focused discussions folder.

[mfbukowski]

But the existence of the data itself does not require intelligibility.

The problem is that you cannot know that, by definition. You can only know what you know- NOT what you do not know! The very act of your asserting such a thing defines it as "intelligible"

The proof that you are right would have been silence. Then we would know what you didn't say, and prove your case.

[Zeta-Flux]

To understand my position you have to understand the nominalist philosophy of language, which says that names are just useful conventions.

I don't think I disagree with this.

Marks on a piece of paper are not inherently data. They possess no inherent quality of data-ness. Data is merely what we have chosen to call them, to indicate the function we use them for. Something that is data to me might just be art to you. Or we might both take the same markings and interpret them differently, in which case are we really looking at the same data? The point is, data is constituted as such in the interaction between substrate (i.e. the physical marks on your paper) and an interpreting system. Apart from that context, the substrate is just another nameless physical thing.

You throw around the words "just" and "merely" a little too freely.

You previously said that software was manifested in the physical state of the computer; it was a property of the physical material comprising the computer. Now you seem to be saying the data is only such when it interacts with the interpreter. Are you saying that software is not software unless it is being run? I really am trying to understand your view, but you seem to keep changing things on me.

[Chris Smith]

Now you seem to be saying the data is only such when it interacts with the interpreter. Are you saying that software is not software unless it is being run?

Not quite. I'd say something more along the lines of, it's only instantiated as software when it's being run, but we still call it software the rest of the time because we're aware of its capacity to be instantiated as such. But if there were no computers, it would incapable of instantiation and we'd consider it just a magnetized piece of metal.

[Zeta-Flux]

Not quite. I'd say something more along the lines of, it's only instantiated as software when it's being run, but we still call it software the rest of the time because we're aware of its capacity to be instantiated as such. But if there were no computers, it would incapable of instantiation and we'd consider it just a magnetized piece of metal.

Okay, I think I see what you are saying. I would change your last sentence though to read "But if no computers are currently running it then some would consider it just a magnetized piece of metal, and others would consider it a piece of software not currently being run."

A little background might be useful. Being a mathematician who enjoys logic and fundamentals, I have occasionally delved into these issues from our standpoint. When constructing languages in which to express mathematics, there are two basic things one has to consider. Syntax (the rules for forming words and sentences, and how they interact) and semantics (giving a meaning to those sentences and rules). For example, in first order logic there is a unary operator called "negation" and it allows one to take a well-formed sentence A and form a new sentence ~A. This is interpreted as "not A", and given the opposite truth value. Here the truth semantic is fixed.

Giving a few more axioms it isn't too difficult to define arithmetic in this setting peano arithmetic. For simplicity, think of this as the natural numbers {0,1,2,...} with addition. One of the major breakthroughs in mathematical foundations was the discovery that these axioms do not determine the truth about all statements on the natural numbers. In other words, there are models of the natural numbers which look exactly like what you were taught to picture them as, and there are other models where there are "extra" natural numbers at the end. And at least inside the axiomatic framework of peano arithmetic, we cannot tell which model is "true".

If the axioms get more complicated then there are even more incompatible models of the systems.

Or to put it in other words, for sufficiently complicated finite systems, syntax does not determine semantics. For a more physical example, the rules of quantum mechanics do not force physicists into one, and only one, interpretive model of those rules.

So I can understand your point that two people can look at marks on a piece of paper and one of them might see art and another might see something else entirely. Further, if it is the case that the universe limits us to a finite set of ways to communicate, we may never be able to convey to each other (no matter how smart we are) how we are modeling what we experience.

On the other hand, syntax does rule out some semantics. A sufficiently intelligent being can determine from experiments that quantum mechanics is incompatible with certain interpretations of it.

So, trying to get to my point, your assertion that we are nothing more than computers may be consistent with what we know to the present, but I don't think that is the only model for the data, nor do I think that the syntax of the axioms you have presented (i.e., how you view all reality as interactions in matter) really established the necessity for your semantics, nor do I think that someday we won't be able to say for certain why we are not just computers (if that is the case).

Edited September 7, 2011 by Zeta-Flux