There is no free will if God is omniscient

[elguanteloko]

What do you mean by "a fact not yet done." When I posted my comment a few minutes ago, it was already a fact about the past that you typed "yes." on the MADB forums on January 5th 2010 at 9:26pm (your time). I don't see how that fact is not yet done.

I meant a fact not yet done at the time of God having such knowledge.

I agree that the fact that God knows everything, if that is in fact true, does not determine anything in itself. Nothing I've said entails that, and if you think something I've said does entail that, then I'm afraid you don't understand what I've said.

Just look at what you're saying here. You're saying that God knows today what you will do tomorrow. If God can never be wrong, then that means that what he knows to be true must necessarily be true. If God can't be wrong about what you'll do tomorrow, how can you do something other than what God knows you will do?

I mean, really, think about what you're saying here. You're saying that God knew you would type "yes." but you could have typed "Crumpa!". If you had typed "Crumpa!", and God knew you would type "yes.", then what does that mean about what God knew other than the God would have to have been mistaken. Certainly you don't believe God can be mistaken in what he knows.

Again, I've never advocated that view. If you re-read several of my posts from the very beginning of this thread, you'll see that on several occasions I've been explicit about the fact that I don't think God's knowledge determines anything.

Again, I'm not arguing that God's knowledge affects anyone's free will. I am arguing that if God knows the future in the way we're discussing, then that entails that people aren't free in the way we're discussing. That simply does not entail that I think God's knowledge is causing people to loose their freedom.

but I think you are contradicting yourself, then. in one hand you say God's knowledge does not determine anything (no matter what that knowledge may be) and on the other hand you say that since He knows something (we don't know what it is) we do not have free will since we can't do otherwise. again, the knowledge of the future that He has depends on your actions and decisions, not on Him. to say that you cannot do otherwise that from what He already knows because He is always one step ahead really makes no sense. the determining factor in a decision is you; He just knows what you will do. you can do whatever you want but He just knows what you will do. His knowledge is dependent on your choices.

the argument I see you are presenting goes something like this (please correct me if I am wrong):

1) God knows everything always. (we agree this was not really the case but it does not really matter)

2) You break a window.

3) God knew you would break a window before you did it.

-----------------------------------------------------------

therefore, you could not have done otherwise except to break such window.

even if I accept this argument I don't see how that does anything against free will. let's say that 'it was written already' that you were going to break such window, that does nothing against free will at all. the foreknowledge, even though it exists before your action, is not dependent on itself but on your action (even though it will be future).

[Brade]

I meant a fact not yet done at the time of God having such knowledge.

Ah, I see. Thanks for the clarification.

in one hand you say God's knowledge does not determine anything (no matter what that knowledge may be) and on the other hand you say that since He knows something (we don't know what it is) we do not have free will since we can't do otherwise.

Ok, let's start with the bolded bit. Another way of putting the bit in bold is to say, as I have said elsewhere, that If God knows what somebody will do in the future, then that person doesn't have free will. You seem to think that by saying that, I'm committing myself to the view that if God knows what somebody will do in the future, then God's knowledge causes (determines) them to do what God's knowledge says they will do. That just doesn't follow. Not all conditionals express a causal deterministic relationship. For example, consider the following conditional:

If the earth doesn't explode tonight, then I will go to the hardware store tomorrow.

Now, does it follow from that conditional that the earth not exploding is the cause of my hardware store going? No. In the same way, it doesn't follow from my claim that God's knowledge determines or causes anything, let alone anyone's actions.

the argument I see you are presenting goes something like this (please correct me if I am wrong):

1) God knows everything always. (we agree this was not really the case but it does not really matter)

2) You break a window.

3) God knew you would break a window before you did it.

-----------------------------------------------------------

therefore, you could not have done otherwise except to break such window.

Something like that, sure.

this argument is a perfect non-sequitur. you could, in fact, have broken a plate instead and God just would have known it the same.

Ah ha! You're simply saying that if I had broken a plate instead of a window, then God just would never have believed I would break a window, rather, he would have always believed I was to break a plate. That, unfortunately, is entirely unhelpful and just reiterates the point that you always do what God knows you will do. And, if God knows everything you will do, you simply cannot do anything else but what God knows you will do. And, again, that doesn't mean that God causes your behavior. It just means that, independent of God, there are already facts about what you will do at every moment. Pick any moment in time and there is only one way the world can be at that moment; the way God knows it will be.

Finally, the argument, properly construed, is not a non-sequiter, because the conclusion follows from the premises. Just to check, consider the same set of propositions:

1) God knows everything always. (you agree with this in some sense, as in "some God-like being somewhere")

2) You break a window. (assumed)

3) God knew you would break a window before you did it. (follows from 1)

Given that set of propositions two things could be true. Here they are:

A. You could not have done otherwise except to break the window.

B. You could have done other than break the window.

Given propositions 1-3, which do you think is true, A or B?

Edit: I edited this post when I realized I misunderstood something you said after reading the rest of your post.

[elguanteloko]

Ah, I see. Thanks for the clarification.

Ok, let's start with the bolded bit. Another way of putting the bit in bold is to say, as I have said elsewhere, that If God knows what somebody will do in the future, then that person doesn't have free will. You seem to think that by saying that, I'm committing myself to the view that if God knows what somebody will do in the future, then God's knowledge causes (determines) them to do what God's knowledge says they will do. That just doesn't follow. Not all conditionals express a causal deterministic relationship. For example, consider the following conditional:

If the earth doesn't explode tonight, then I will go to the hardware store tomorrow.

Now, does it follow from that conditional that the earth not exploding is the cause of my hardware store going? No. In the same way, it doesn't follow from my claim that God's knowledge determines or causes anything, let alone anyone's actions.

Something like that, sure.

Ah ha! You're simply saying that if I had broken a plate instead of a window, then God just would never have believed I would break a window, rather, he would have always believed I was to break a plate. That, unfortunately, is entirely unhelpful and just reiterates the point that you always do what God knows you will do. And, if God knows everything you will do, you simply cannot do anything else but what God knows you will do. And, again, that doesn't mean that God causes your behavior. It just means that, independent of God, there are already facts about what you will do at every moment. Pick any moment in time and there is only one way the world can be at that moment; the way God knows it will be.

man, I just edited the last portion of the post... I apologize.

[elguanteloko]

Ah, I see. Thanks for the clarification.

Ok, let's start with the bolded bit. Another way of putting the bit in bold is to say, as I have said elsewhere, that If God knows what somebody will do in the future, then that person doesn't have free will. You seem to think that by saying that, I'm committing myself to the view that if God knows what somebody will do in the future, then God's knowledge causes (determines) them to do what God's knowledge says they will do. That just doesn't follow. Not all conditionals express a causal deterministic relationship. For example, consider the following conditional:

If the earth doesn't explode tonight, then I will go to the hardware store tomorrow.

Now, does it follow from that conditional that the earth not exploding is the cause of my hardware store going? No. In the same way, it doesn't follow from my claim that God's knowledge determines or causes anything, let alone anyone's actions.

Something like that, sure.

Ah ha! You're simply saying that if I had broken a plate instead of a window, then God just would never have believed I would break a window, rather, he would have always believed I was to break a plate. That, unfortunately, is entirely unhelpful and just reiterates the point that you always do what God knows you will do. And, if God knows everything you will do, you simply cannot do anything else but what God knows you will do. And, again, that doesn't mean that God causes your behavior. It just means that, independent of God, there are already facts about what you will do at every moment. Pick any moment in time and there is only one way the world can be at that moment; the way God knows it will be.

even if I accept this argument I don't see how that does anything against free will. let's say that 'it was written already' that you were going to break such window, that does nothing against free will at all. the foreknowledge, even though it exists before your action, is not dependent on itself but on your action (even though it will be future).

[nicolasconnault]

God could not know the wisdom of any of my choices if He didn't also know the choices of others ahead of time. Therefore, according to this version of God's knowledge, He is not able to guide my choices and it is fruitless to ask Him to do so.

This is only one of the many consequences of believing that God doesn't know our choices before we make them. It transforms God into a being which is no longer available for counsel, guidance or (heaven forbid), prophecy.

[Brade]

Actually, let me revise things a bit.

1. God knows everything always. (you agree with this in some sense, as in "some God-like being somewhere")

2. God knows you will break a window at time T and place P.

Given that set of propositions two things could be true. Here they are:

A. You could not have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

B. You could have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

Given propositions 1 and 2, which do you think is true, A or B?

[Brade]

God could not know the wisdom of any of my choices if He didn't also know the choices of others ahead of time. Therefore, according to this version of God's knowledge, He is not able to guide my choices and it is fruitless to ask Him to do so.

This is only one of the many consequences of believing that God doesn't know our choices before we make them. It transforms God into a being which is no longer available for counsel, guidance or (heaven forbid), prophecy.

That doesn't follow. To say that God doesn't know the future is not to say that he doesn't know the past and present. So, even if he doesn't know the future (in the way we're discussing) he can still know the past and present. By knowing the past he can know perfectly well the context of any choice I am currently trying to make. Additionally, God has the wisdom of having lived as God for a really long time. He seems perfectly capable of guiding me when I need his guidance.

[Brade]

Oops, double post.

[nicolasconnault]

Actually, let me revise things a bit.

1. God knows everything always. (you agree with this in some sense, as in "some God-like being somewhere")

2. God knows you will break a window at time T and place P.

Given that set of propositions two things could be true. Here they are:

A. You could not have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

B. You could have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

Given propositions 1 and 2, which do you think is true, A or B?

My version:

C. You could have done other than break a window at time T and place P, but it is impossible that you would have ended up doing it.

This is the same as the "God cannot lie" conundrum: when we say he cannot lie, it is not because he does not have the power or the freedom to do so, but because he will never do it.

This is why I put the emphasis on "It is not possible that I would do X" in opposition to "I cannot do X". The word "cannot" implies a lack of inherent power to act.

Likewise, there are billions (even an infinity) of things I will never do, but that doesn't mean I cannot do them.

[Brade]

even if I accept this argument I don't see how that does anything against free will. let's say that 'it was written already' that you were going to break such window, that does nothing against free will at all. the foreknowledge, even though it exists before your action, is not dependent on itself but on your action (even though it will be future).

Look, if free will is the ability to do either A or B, and "it was written already" that I will do A, then I simply don't have the ability to do B. If I do B, then it can't have already been written that I would do A, unless what was written was false.

[elguanteloko]

Actually, let me revise things a bit.

1. God knows everything always. (you agree with this in some sense, as in "some God-like being somewhere")

2. God knows you will break a window at time T and place P.

Given that set of propositions two things could be true. Here they are:

A. You could not have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

B. You could have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

Given propositions 1 and 2, which do you think is true, A or B?

both are right. the first one is right from God's perspective since He knows that will happen for sure(not that you did not have the capacity to do otherwise but in the sense that He has the knowledge of it). the other one is right from our own perspective since we have free will and do not know what will come . whatever that other time and place might be, God would have already know it. even if I entered in the mind of God to see what will happen to you tomorrow that would not mean you could not do otherwise. it is because you have several options and you decide to take one that that is written in the mind of God.

[nicolasconnault]

That doesn't follow. To say that God doesn't know the future is not to say that he doesn't know the past and present. So, even if he doesn't know the future (in the way we're discussing) he can still know the past and present. By knowing the past he can know perfectly well the context of any choice I am currently trying to make. Additionally, God has the wisdom of having lived as God for a really long time. He seems perfectly capable of guiding me when I need his guidance.

Do you mean that, each time I ask God to guide me for a particular choice, He considers every possible choice every human being will ever make that could possibly be even slightly remotely connected with my choice, then decides which of my choices is wisest in consideration of that? Wouldn't such "chess-like" analysis resemble very much an omniscient foreknowledge?

[Brade]

My version:

C. You could have done other than break a window at time T and place P, but it is impossible that you would have ended up doing it.

Saying that it's impossible that I would break a window at time T and place P is just saying that I could not have done other than break a window at time T and place P. Imagine if things were as you seem to suggest. Saying that it's impossible for something to be another way is semantically identical to saying that something could not be otherwise.

[Brade]

both are right. the first one is right from God's perspective since He knows that will happen for sure(not that you did not have the capacity to do otherwise but in the sense that He has the knowledge of it). the other one is right from our own perspective since we have free will and do not know what will come . whatever that other time and place might be, God would have already know it. even if I entered in the mind of God to see what will happen to you tomorrow that would not mean you could not do otherwise. it is because you have several options and you decide to take one that that is written in the mind of God.

Ok, so you just believe that there are true contradictions. Notice that A is just the negation of B. So really, the options are A and not-A. That's just the textbook definition of a contradiction. If you believe both are right, then you believe a contradiction.

[Brade]

Do you mean that, each time I ask God to guide me for a particular choice, He considers every possible choice every human being will ever make that could possibly be even slightly remotely connected with my choice, then decides which of my choices is wisest in consideration of that? Wouldn't such "chess-like" analysis resemble very much an omniscient foreknowledge?

Well, I wasn't really saying all that, but that's one view to take. Personally, I think God needs to know much much less than all that to give good advice, but let's set my particular view aside for a moment.

Wouldn't such "chess-like" analysis resemble very much an omniscient foreknowledge?

Yes. And that would be the point of advocating, as you put it, a "'chess-like' analysis". Such a view would give you basically the same results as omniscient foreknowledge without all the problematic baggage.

[Brade]

Ok, it's way past my bedtime. By the way, love the Marx and Chomsky quotes. Although, you better watch out, not the two most popular guys around here.

[nicolasconnault]

Saying that it's impossible that I would break a window at time T and place P is just saying that I could not have done other than break a window at time T and place P. Imagine if things were as you seem to suggest. Saying that it's impossible for something to be another way is semantically identical to saying that something could not be otherwise.

Yes, I was arguing against the misleading and ambiguous use of the word "can". In a philosophical argument I expect to use more precise words Saying that something "can happen" is not semantically identical to saying that "I can do something".

[elguanteloko]

Ok, so you just believe that there are true contradictions. Notice that A is just the negation of B. So really, the options are A and not-A. That's just the textbook definition of a contradiction. If you believe both are right, then you believe a contradiction.

no contradiction whatsoever. let me explain.

A. You could not have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

if by 'could not have done other than' means, not that you did not have the capacity to do otherwise (free will), but that it is known to be the case such as an event that already happened such as is in God's mind...we assume. therefore, it can not be otherwise (again, not because of a lack of ability to choose something else, free will).

B. You could have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

this is also true since we can choose among many things (free will). since we ignore what God knows we can do whatever we want or do otherwise but He just knows what we will choose. so, in both cases we can have free will acting at the same time and both events happening (God foreknowing and we choosing) and not be a contradiction.

[elguanteloko]

Ok, it's way past my bedtime. By the way, love the Marx and Chomsky quotes. Although, you better watch out, not the two most popular guys around here.

yeah... it's not hard to see why most around here would not like their ideas.

but please come back when you can; I would really like to continue with this good nigh!

[elguanteloko]

Look, if free will is the ability to do either A or B, and "it was written already" that I will do A, then I simply don't have the ability to do B. If I do B, then it can't have already been written that I would do A, unless what was written was false.

crap! I missed this post of yours.

I guess the problem may arise in thinking of time linearly, which would be a huge mistake. your actions ARE the knowledge that the Deity has. they have the knowledge of what you will do tomorrow because you will choose to do so tomorrow among the many options that you may have. the control has always been with you (free will). in other words, something in the future (your choice) is the cause of something that always existed (past, present, and future): God's knowledge. both ideas are not contradictory at all.

[Mordecai]

I assume you're arguing we 'choose' our thoughts but the choice of entertaining thoughts has the same logical precedent of all other decisions, ie the pull of predetermined emotions.

Our feelings come from our thoughts more than thoughts come from feelings... at least for emotionally healthy people.

[nicolasconnault]

Our feelings come from our thoughts more than thoughts come from feelings... at least for emotionally healthy people.

The concepts of "feeling" and "thought" are very complex and well beyond the scope of this thread. There is a huge (I mean HUGE!) amount of empirical research done and under way to help understand these concepts. There is not, however, much about them in the scriptures or in revealed religion. Personally I would be very cautious in using these terms in a theological debate.

[Brade]

no contradiction whatsoever. let me explain.

if by 'could not have done other than' means, not that you did not have the capacity to do otherwise (free will), but that it is known to be the case such as an event that already happened such as is in God's mind...we assume. therefore, it can not be otherwise (again, not because of a lack of ability to choose something else, free will).

this is also true since we can choose among many things (free will). since we ignore what God knows we can do whatever we want or do otherwise but He just knows what we will choose. so, in both cases we can have free will acting at the same time and both events happening (God foreknowing and we choosing) and not be a contradiction.

elguanteloko, this just doesn't work. In the context of window breaking story, I want you to, again, consider the following proposition:

You could have done other than break a window at time T and place P.

Every proposition is either true or false (principle of bivalence). Additionally, the law of non-contradiction tells us that a proposition cannot be true and false. Let's call the above proposition 'Q'. Q is either true or false. Additionally, it can't be the case that Q and not-Q. If Q is true, then you could have done other than break a window at time T and place P. If Q is false, then you could not have done other than break a window at time T and place P. It's just that simple. Which is it, is Q true or false. Unless you're prepared to defend a position against the principle of bivalence and the law of non-contradiction, you've got to choose one or the other

[Uncertain]

How can God ensure that everyone has a fair test and receives what they need in mortality if He cannot predict our choices?

Hi Jason,

Well personally I am not convinced the purpose of this life is some sort of test. But assuming it is a test. I would imagine God would handle this like he does other negative events that are not our fault. For example if someone is not taught the law of chastity God does not punish them for failing to live the law of chastity. We are only responsible for the light and knowledge we are given. Similarly if someone "fails" the test of life due entirely to circumstances beyond their control I imagine God will not punish them for "failing". It seems to me according to LDS theology there are already mechanisms in place to ensure we are not unfairly treated due to circumstances beyond our control.

Also simply because God does not know with a perfect foreknowledge what we will do does not mean God does not have a really good idea. I imagine God can predict with a pretty good accuracy what we will do in any given circumstance. He just doesn't know with 100% infallible accuracy but maybe he can predict with 99.9% accuracy what I or you will do in a given circumstance.

In addition I am not sure how absolute foreknowledge helps out in the case you have outlined. Absolute foreknowledge as has been made abundantly clear on this thread does not force a free agent to do that which is foreseen. Suppose God sees with perfect foreknowledge that Dave will have not have a fair test due to the freely chosen actions of free agents then what? Does God intervene in the free will of those who cause Dave to not have a fair test? Does he force them to make other decisions? God could conceivable alter the environmental influences to cause Dave to have a fair test. But he is still restricting the freely chosen actions of free agents. With Gods influence those who because of their freely chosen decisions would have caused Dave's unfair test chose differently because God intervened. Whether God acts firsthand or secondhand by manipulating the environment it is the same.

Besides absolute foreknowledge is incompatible with God changing the future. If God knows with 100% accuracy what will happen then it will happen. God is bound to act out what he knows with 100% accuracy he will do. If God sees with 100% accuracy that Dave will not have a fair test than Dave will not have a fair test. This is the definition of God having absolute foreknowledge what he sees to happen will without fail happen.

If God can change what he predicts will happen then God does not have absolute foreknowledge.

All the Best,

Uncertain

[Uncertain]

It matters a lot to me, because of two reasons:

1. It completely contradicts the scriptures
2. 
   

Hi Nicolasconnault,
I completely contradicts a particular interpretation of scripture. Whether that interpretation is the only reasonable one remains to be seen.

It completely alters one's confidence in God. What doesn't he know? Why doesn't he know it? How can I trust any prophecy, any personal amswers to my prayers?

God know all it is possible to know. It just so happens it is not possible to know with perfect accuracy the freely chosen actions of free agents. Also God has the power to fulfill any promise he makes to you. So if God answers your prays and promises you a new job God has the power to make sure with 100% confidence you will get a new job.

All the Best,

Uncertain