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Everything posted by smac97
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Ouch!?! Eww!?! -Smac
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The presence of sexual content on television, streaming, and in movies is a real issue, and parental control over it is often imperfect. That does not resolve the narrower question raised by the Florida statute. The law does not attempt to regulate every form of sexual imagery minors might encounter. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets a specific three-part test: it predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive to prevailing standards regarding what is suitable for the child’s age, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for that age. That is the longstanding obscenity-as-to-minors standard. I keep saying this because it seems to not be getting much attention: Live, in-person commercial performances differ from mediated content in important ways. Parents can more readily limit or supervise what comes into the home through ratings, parental controls, and device settings. A commercial venue that knowingly admits children to a qualifying adult live performance is a different setting—one the law has long treated as subject to age-based restrictions. It may be that, historically, existing rules were largely effective at keeping children out of traditional adult venues such as strip clubs. In recent years, however, some venues have sought to present sexually explicit live performances in settings that are specifically intended to include children. The newer statute responds to that development by applying a clear, neutral standard to all qualifying adult live performances, regardless of the identity or orientation of the performers. It is not limited to any one type of event. Pointing to the broader problem of media exposure does not make a targeted limit on certain live performances incoherent. We already accept many age-based rules without first requiring that every other avenue of similar content be eliminated. The question is whether this particular restriction is justified on its own terms. The distinction is not simply “live versus filmed.” The statute targets a specific conduct: knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets the obscenity-as-to-minors test. That is different from the separate (and imperfect) systems that already exist for broadcast, streaming, and theatrical films—ratings, parental controls, time-slot restrictions, and the practical ability of parents to limit what enters the home. Whether a particular drag show or Pride-related performance is more or less explicit than a given movie or television scene is a factual question that varies case by case, and in the end is immaterial. The statute does not depend on a blanket ranking of entire categories. It asks whether the specific live performance, taken as a whole, meets the three-part standard for material that is unsuitable for the child’s age. Some will; many will not. Broadcasting raises different issues under different legal frameworks. The statute at issue does not regulate broadcasting, and hypothetical questions about what would be permitted if the same content were only televised do not determine whether a state may set age limits on admitting children to qualifying live commercial performances. Those are separate regulatory domains, just as age limits on entering an adult club are separate from rules governing what may air on television. In short, the law draws a line around a particular commercial setting and a particular act (knowingly admitting a child). It does not require proving that every other form of sexual content is more restrained, nor does it turn on whether the same material would be treated identically if it appeared only on a screen. Thanks, -Smac
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I'd be happy to evaluate whatever analysis it was that led you to this conclusion. If so, doesn't that cut against the "Hey, this new statute is unnecessary because we already had one that covers this stuff" argument? I think there are plenty of heterosexual people who are prosecuted under obscenity laws, child-endangerment laws, and so on. Plenty of white people too. Plenty of Christians as well. Criminal statutes with differentiated application based on sexual orientation or race or religion would be unconstitutional. The Florida statute does not do any of that. The relevant decision is from the en banc Eleventh Circuit (not the Eighth), which vacated the preliminary injunction against Florida’s statute. The majority held that the law tracks the longstanding “obscenity-as-to-minors” standard recognized by the Supreme Court: material that, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of minors, is patently offensive under contemporary community standards regarding what is suitable for minors, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. The court rejected the claims that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad or vague and concluded the challenger was unlikely to succeed on the merits. Obscenity—including material that is obscene as to minors—is not protected speech under the First Amendment. That is settled doctrine, not an “imagined” exception invented for this case. The statute does not ban every drag performance or every Pride-related event, nor are "straight" performances/events exempted from it. Instead, the statute restricts knowingly admitting a child to any live performance that meets the statutory criteria above. On parental rights, again, they are fundamental, but they have never been treated as an absolute trump card that disables every age-based restriction on commercial exposure of minors to sexual content. Neither Supreme Court nor circuit precedent in Florida requires a parental-consent exception for regulations of material that is obscene as to minors. States already limit minors’ access to certain live entertainment, alcohol, tobacco, and other categories without first proving that every parent would make the same choice. The “persecution of groups who aren’t straight-white Christians” framing converts a content-based restriction (tied to sexual explicitness relative to the child’s age) into a claim of viewpoint or identity-based targeting. The statutory text applies to any qualifying adult live performance regardless of the performers’ identities. Whether particular shows meet the criteria is a factual question; the constitutional validity of the underlying standard is what the en banc court addressed. In sum, the appellate ruling does not treat the speech as categorically protected, does not treat parental preference as automatically controlling, and does not rest on the identity-based persecution narrative. It rests on the obscenity-as-to-minors doctrine. Thanks, -Smac
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What "other reasons" do you have in mind? Again, parental rights are important and broad, but they are not unlimited. The rights and interests of the child, and of society, may also play a role in justifying state intervention. I don't think "take over parental control" is accurate. Parental rights exist, but they have always had some constraints. I have previously provided extensive examples of sexually explicit behavior at drag shows, Pride parades, etc. which I find to be problematic, particularly in relation to children. Florida and other states have long allowed non-sexual social nudity in designated private settings such as AANR-affiliated resorts and certain clothing-optional venues. Those places operate under an explicit legal exception for nudity “in any place provided or set apart for that purpose,” and AANR clubs emphasize a family-friendly, non-sexual code of conduct. Simple nudity in that context is not treated as indecent exposure. The Florida statute at issue is narrower. It does not ban all nudity around minors, nor does it ban every Pride parade or every drag performance. It prohibits knowingly admitting a child to an “adult live performance” that depicts or simulates nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, specific sexual activities, lewd conduct, or lewd exposure of prosthetic/imitation genitals or breasts when the performance, taken as a whole: Predominantly appeals to a prurient, shameful, or morbid interest; Is patently offensive to prevailing adult community standards regarding what is suitable for the age of the child present; and Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for the age of the child present. That is the longstanding “obscenity-as-to-minors” standard. It targets sexualized performances aimed at adult audiences, not ordinary social nudity or non-sexual public events. A family nudist resort where people of all ages are, it is argued, simply unclothed in a non-sexual recreational setting is not the same thing as a commercial show that includes simulated sexual acts, exaggerated sexualized dancing, or other content designed to appeal to adult sexual interests. I have some personal reservations about these things, but we live in a pluralistic society. In any event, the law already draws that kind of distinction in many areas (public indecency, age-restricted entertainment, material harmful to minors). Treating every instance of nudity as equivalent to every sexually explicit live performance collapses a distinction the law has maintained for a long time. I’m not “railing against” all LGBT events. The question is whether the state may set age limits on commercial live performances that meet the statutory criteria for being unsuitable for children. Florida’s statute attempts to do exactly that. Whether particular shows cross the line is a fact-specific question; the principle that some adult-oriented sexual performances can be restricted for minors is not novel. You are pointing to a legitimate issue: a great deal of sexual content is available to minors through television, streaming, movies, and advertising, and parental oversight of that material is often inconsistent. That is a fair observation. I'm less persuaded that it is a moral one. That we have allowed children to be exposed to sexually explicit context is not, in my view, a justification to throw off any and all constraints intended to protect children. It also does not answer the narrower question raised by the Florida statute. The law does not claim that live adult performances are the only source of sexualized material minors encounter, nor does it require that every other form of exposure be eliminated before any limit can be placed on commercial live shows. Most regulations work that way: We restrict minors from buying alcohol even though they may see adults drinking on television. We restrict minors from certain rated films in theaters even though similar content exists online. We set age limits on casinos, tobacco, and adult businesses even though the underlying themes appear elsewhere in media. And on and on. The existence of other, sometimes more pervasive problems does not make a targeted restriction incoherent or hypocritical. There are also differences in kind that matter. A live performance in front of an audience is an immediate, in-person experience, often commercial and specifically marketed. Streaming or cinematic content is mediated, usually subject to ratings systems, parental controls, and the practical reality that parents can (and frequently do) limit access in the home. Those distinctions are imperfect, but they are not imaginary. The statute targets knowingly admitting a child to a live show that meets the statutory criteria for being unsuitable for minors; it does not attempt to solve the entire landscape of media exposure. If the broader concern is that sexual content reaches children too easily across many platforms, that is a legitimate subject for separate discussion about things like ratings enforcement, parental tools, platform responsibility, and so on. It does not follow, though, that therefore no age-based limits should exist on commercial live adult performances. Pointing to worse or more widespread examples elsewhere is a classic “not as bad as” move; it shifts the focus rather than addressing whether the specific restriction is justified on its own terms. Again, parental authority over children is fundamental, but it has never been absolute. The state already draws lines around what adults may expose minors to commercially: material harmful to minors statutes, age-restricted theaters and clubs, restrictions on selling certain sexual content to children, and limits on public indecency. Those rules exist alongside parental rights; they do not wait for every other form of exposure (TV, streaming, billboards) to be eliminated first. The Florida statute does not outlaw all sexual content or strip parents of guidance over their own living rooms. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial live performance that meets the statutory test for being unsuitable for minors—appealing to prurient interest, patently offensive for the child’s age, and lacking serious value for that age. That is a narrower rule than the “state controls every sex act a child might see” claim suggests. Whether a particular depiction is pornographic does not depend on the medium alone. The law has long treated live, commercial, in-person performances differently from mediated content that parents can more readily control at home. Demanding that every other source of sexual imagery be banned before any limit can be placed on adult live shows is an all-or-nothing standard the law has never required. The statute we’ve been discussing does not single out LGBT events. It restricts knowingly admitting a child to a commercial adult live performance that meets a specific three-part test: it predominantly appeals to a prurient interest, is patently offensive for the child’s age, and lacks serious value for that age. That standard applies regardless of the sexual orientation or identity of the performers. A heterosexual burlesque show meeting the same criteria would fall under it just as readily. Do you agree or disagree with the foregoing paragraph? If not, I would like to hear about your disagreement. I’m not arguing that parents should have no role, or that every form of sexual content in media should be treated identically. I’m arguing that the state may set age limits on certain commercial live performances without first solving every other avenue through which sexual imagery reaches children. Pointing to television, streaming, or advertising does not make a targeted restriction on live adult shows incoherent. As for you speculating about motives: I have no animus toward LGBT people. Disagreement about where to draw age and content lines for minors applies to both the "gay" and "straight" segments of society (to the extent we want to divvy ourselves up that way), and is not the same as hostility toward a community. It seems an ongoing challenge for some folks to cope with disagreement about their worldview. I think some Latter-day Saints construe any and all critiques of their faith as "attacks," as "anti-Mormonism" (candidly, I have done this in some instances). Similarly, some in the LGBT community seem to construe too many things to be hatred or "hostility" (your word) rather than what they really are: instances of disagreement in a pluralistic society. Reasoned and principled and civilly-expressed disagreement is not hate or hostility. It's just disagreement. So when, as here, the response shifts from the content of the rule to speculation about my personal reasons for discussing it, the underlying policy question tends to get lost. I’m willing to keep discussing the merits of the restriction itself—what the statute actually covers, whether the line is drawn in the right place, and how it compares to other age-based limits we already accept. Thank you for sharing your thoughts and perspective. We seldom agree, but sometimes we do. And in any event, I find value in listing to perspectives which vary from my own. Thanks, -Smac
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Plenty of ways to test whether their interpretation of the law is an anomaly or congruent with general principles of constitutional jurisprudence. Broadly, I think the majority opinion is more in line with those general principles. No, it means that legal analysis reliant or or derived mostly/entire from AI is fairly suspect. Thanks, but I'm not interested in exploring this in this thread. Thanks, -Smac
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An update: House Judiciary Approves Bill Establishing Right to Sue for Damages on Trans Surgery Another lawsuit: ‘I thought gender surgery would make me feel better. I was misled’ A Grok summary: Informed consent. Irreversibility. Sterilization. Cutting off healthy body parts. Lifelong medical regimens. Comorbidities. Compromised assessments of the best interests of the child. Informed consent. Massive ideological/sociopolitical influences/pressures on medical care. Article about Soren Aldaco: Woman claims gender-affirming doctors ‘gaslit’ her into transitioning: ‘Disguising harm as compassion’ Back to the first article: I am curious how many "detransitioner" lawsuits we will see. Thanks, -Smac
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The Plaza Live case is an ideal case study about whether the new law was necessary: 1. The state's own investigators said the show was raunchy and suggestive, but that there was no genital exposure, no physical sexual interaction with audience members, and no lewd acts. In other words, this was a marginal case. 2. It wasn't marketed as being family friendly, and only three minors were there. 3. They successfully prosecuted this under the old laws--the venue had to pay a $5,000 administrative penalty, and promise that it would forbid people under the age of 18 from attending in the future, even with parental approval. From your source: "Although the complaint asserted that the Plaza Live broke decency laws, prosecutors have not filed criminal charges. The state is handling the case as a license-compliance matter." It appears that whether the charges in Plaza Live would have stood up in a criminal context (rather than an administrative one) was never determined. Would you agree with that? I could not immediately find any published cases where the older statute - Fla. Stat. § 847.013 - was applied to adult live performances. I previously noted that there are some substantial differences between the two statutes. As for whether their overlap or non-overlap defines whether the new statute is "necessary," I think that's really hard to assess. Whether a statute that is more narrowly crafted towards adult live performances (and which has different parameters and applications) is "necessary" seems to have a good amount of "value judgment" aromas coming off it. In any event, both are misdemeanors. Thanks, -Smac
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The LDS Church continues to teach in its seminary manuals that a dark skin color was the sign of the curse. 1) "Some people have mistakenly thought that the dark skin placed upon the Lamanites was the curse. President Joseph Fielding Smith (1876–1972) explained that the dark skin was not the curse: "The dark skin was placed upon the Lamanites so that they could be distinguished from the Nephites and to keep the two peoples from mixing. The dark skin was the sign of the curse [not the curse itself]. The curse was the withdrawal of the Spirit of the Lord" (Religion 121–122 - Book of Mormon Student Manual, 2018, chapter 8). This is interesting. Your quote here is from Chapter 8 of the Church's 2018 Student Manual, which quotes an excerpt from Pres. Joseph Fielding Smith's "Answers to Gospel Questions." This same passage was quoted two years later in the Come Follow Me manual: Significantly, the Church publicly apologized for this, calling it an error (Deseret News) : See also LDS Living and KSL News. And also here (Millennial Star Blog). Ben Spackman quite helpfully weighed in as well: Inerrancy among Church Employees about Church Materials I even called them out on avoiding the central issues, which received no response. One of them said (quoting from a screenshot), Let’s set aside the traditional misunderstanding of the “steadying the ark” story. Let’s set aside the fact that Elder Stevenson demonstrates below that in this case, the ark did need steadying, as Curriculum, Correlation, and review failed to do its job— or more likely, simply saw nothing wrong with what had been written. Let’s set aside that manuals themselves invite feedback and constructive criticism via an email address. (Seriously, open any printed manual and look. I myself was one of those back in fall who was made aware of the problems with the printed manual, and privately raised my voice.) No, the problem is that while S&I may venerate these manuals because of their mythic view of the review process, it does not appear that such intensive Apostolic review actually corresponds to reality. (Even if it were, it would not guarantee the correctness of the material.) From the Deseret News on January 20, here is an Apostle speaking about this issue, my italics. A search of the Church's website indicates that the quote still appears in two places (neither which is the Come Follow Me manual) : The URLs for these two: https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/manual/book-of-mormon-student-manual-2018/chapter-8-2-nephi-4-8?lang=eng https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/manual/book-of-mormon-seminary-teacher-manual-2013/2-nephi/lesson-27?lang=eng Note that these manuals were published in 2018 and 2013, respectively, so both came out prior to the 2020 retraction/apology by Elder Stevenson as noted above. So, in Elder Stevenson’s words, this was a mistake in the manual, which escaped the attention of Church leaders. His words do not lend support to the view of these two S&I employees that the printed published manuals must be treated as the infallible word of God because they have been closely reviewed by Apostles. Nor does the printed history support it. Example 1, manuals change, sometimes 180 degrees. Ben's comments about expectations of infallible church manuals are, in my view, very worthwhile. I encourage you to read his entire post. I surmise - but cannot confirm - that the Church's historical retention of manuals (such as those published prior to 2020) may well include quotes which have since been set aside. Either that or the Church has only been made aware of the quote existing in the 2020 manual, and so has simply overlooked these other sources (from 2013 and 2018). In any event, let's go back to your critique that the Church "continues to teach in its seminary manuals" the very quote for which an apostle in the Church very publicly apologized, and which he explicitly said had been "mistakenly included in the printed version of the manual," and which quote he said - again, publicly - the Church had asked members to "disregard." Given what I have now presented to you, do you think your statement is accurate? Or would you consider re-visiting it? Okay. Could you then explain why you are claiming that the Church "continues to teach in its seminary manuals" items which were addressed in 2020 by Elder Stevenson in 2020 and removed from the current (2024) version? There's more to it than that. See the FAIR article titled, "What Does the Book of Mormon Mean by "Skin of Blackness"? "2 Skousen, Analysis of Textual Variants, 4–2:897, appears to follow the suggestion that there was a physical change in skin color. Discussing the change of white to pure in 2 Nephi 6:30 for the 1840 edition, he notes: "Of course, the 1840 change of white to pure avoids . . . the need to interpret the remnant of the Nephites as being dark skinned. In other words, the editing change to pure may represent a conscious attempt at avoiding what was perceived as a difficult reading (the Nephites as being dark skinned), which therefore explains why the change from white to pure was made here—and only here—in 2 Nephi 30:6. There has never been any attempt to emend any of the passages that directly comment on the dark skin of the Lamanites." Skousen's argument for the reason for the editorial change is persuasive. It persuades, however, that the reader's understanding of the text related to a change in pigmentation. It does not discuss the point made in this commentary of the text's use of skin as a metaphor rather than as a literal description". Despite the esthetic reword in later Book of Mormon versions, Alma 3:6-8 remains to lend support to the real intent of 2 Nephi 30:6. What do you feel is "the real intent of 2 Nephi 30:6"? The FAIR article you cite was written by Brant Gardner. An eminently erudite and sharp scholar, one of our best. But they were not taught as theories in the past. Perhaps not. But the issue has been corrected for some years now. Not sure about that. See above. Could you elaborate? Is the Church allowed, in your view, to correct past errors? Are all past errors instances of the Church "leading people astray"? What are your thoughts about Ben Spackman's comments about "infallible" manuals (or, errors leading some to consider manuals to be infallible)? For obvious reasons. Fortunately his and teachings by others are still available. Yes. That availability is a fulfillment of Mormon 9:32: The leaders of the Church are not perfect, nor are those responsible for overseeing the contents of its manuals. Mistakes happen. Those comments constitute false teaching. Well, perhaps, and perhaps not. Could you elaborate on the significance of this issue for you? Thanks, -Smac
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Analytics just ran into the same issue when responding to a post of mine in this thread. Looks like the board is glitchy today. Take your time. Thanks, -Smac
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I don’t understand. Analytics’ example showed a drag show being investigated under the earlier statue, Yes. That other statute was a less-than-ideal fit, but it's what was on the books at the time. Because an investigation is at the front end of a legal process, and may or may not culminate in a conviction, and I think the new statute was not in place at the time (I'm open to correction on that point). Thanks, -Smac
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Okay. "The evidence that a minor suffers serious, lasting harm from a single or occasional vodka tonic is weak." And yet we still have a categorical prohibition against minors imbibing. Ah. How would this play out in the real world? Would you agree with the following statement? In the absence of legal constraints, children and/or their parents are at liberty to attend sexually explicit adult live performances, and so run the risk of "chronic exposure, exposure combined with abuse, or exposure to pornographic material." Claude apparently did not tell you that the "judges" referenced here are those who dissented. The actual decision held: "The Supreme Court of Florida’s definition of 'lewd' eliminates any overbreadth, and the use of the phrase 'age of the child present' does not render the Act unconstitutionally vague." That's the bummer thing about AI. It's not ready for primetime when it comes to substantive legal analysis. Two thoughts: First, the new statute seems to have harder definitional edges in many respects. Second, yes, the legislature can chill or prohibit a "disfavored expressive category" as long as it does so within the confines of the Constitution. And the 8th Circuit held that this is what Florida has done. I'm not persuaded that the statute was preemptive. I've previously provided ample citations to situations in which children have been exposed to explicitly sexual adult live performances. I'm reasonably confident there were instances of this in Florida. The statute, then, could be seen as remedial rather than preemptive. Either way, though, it is a legitimate legislative exercise. There is no principle of law that says that a legislature must sit on its hands and wait for a substantial number of harmful events to occur before it can take steps to mitigate or prohibit those events from happening. I agree with this. Sure. But the constitutional question was asked and answered by the 8th Circuit. Yes, parental rights are not absolute. Florida, like every state, has long imposed significant limits on parental authority. A few ordinary examples: Parents cannot consent to their child having sex with an adult. Age-of-consent and child-sex-offense laws categorically disable both the minor’s agreement and any parental attempt to authorize it. Parents cannot authorize female genital mutilation or most non-therapeutic sterilizations of minors. Parents can lose custody or have their rights terminated for abuse, neglect, or abandonment under Chapter 39; the state may intervene even over parental objection when a child’s safety is at stake. Compulsory education laws and certain vaccination/school-entry requirements constrain parental choice. Child labor laws limit the hours and types of work parents may permit. Parents cannot refuse life-saving medical treatment in many circumstances without the state being able to intervene. The Florida Parents’ Bill of Rights itself (Chapter 1014) explicitly states that it does not authorize a parent to engage in unlawful conduct or to abuse or neglect a child, and it does not apply to parental decisions that would end life. In short, parental rights in Florida have never been "near-absolute." They are fundamental but bounded by the child’s welfare and by specific statutory prohibitions. Pointing to limits on taking children to sexually explicit adult performances, or to restrictions on certain medical pathways for minors, does not uniquely contradict a previously “near-absolute” regime—because no such regime existed. The real debate is which limits are justified and whether they are applied consistently, not whether the state suddenly invented constraints on parental authority. I agree with this. I think it's a given. The "not as bad as" fallacy again. And I would like to see that literature. "That asymmetry is defensible only if one thinks religion is constitutionally special." Is there any question about religion being "constitutionally special"? Also, just because an action is taken under the rubric of "religion" does not protect it from state intervention. I am not aware that "Hooters, beauty pageants, and cheerleading routines" involve Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts I think this presupposes, rather than demonstrates, ulterior motives. Thanks, -Smac
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The Economist (June 2024) : Research into trans medicine has been manipulated A Grok summary: Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy (January 2023) : The Myth of “Reliable Research” in Pediatric Gender Medicine: A critical evaluation of the Dutch Studies—and research that has followed A Grok summary: Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (June 2025) : The Façade of Medical Consensus: How Medical Associations Prioritize Politics Over Science A Grok summary: Thanks, -Smac
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Your acting as if public screening R rated movies doesn't exist. Not quite. I am saying the comparison to R-rate movies does not really work here. Florida Statute § 847.013: Prohibits knowingly exhibiting, selling, renting, or-providing paid admission for minors to view motion pictures, shows, or representations depicting nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or abuse that is "harmful to minors". Violations are generally first-degree misdemeanors punishable by up to one year in jail. Florida Statute § 847.012: Criminalizes selling, renting, loaning, or distributing materials defined as harmful to minors to a child under 18. I think this is an example of the "not as bad as" fallacy, or the "fallacy of relative privation" or "appeal to worse problems" or the "starving children in Africa" argument. It happens when someone tries to dismiss a problem or complaint just because a worse problem exists somewhere else. You seem to be suggesting that until and unless I first express concern about this or that other social ill, it is not legitimate for me to speak about the one under discussion here. I respectfully do not agree with that proposition. Thanks, -Smac
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My original post was based on a news item, for which I provided a link. That news item quoted Gov. DeSantis, but it also stated: "Critics have argued the measure could be used to crack down on certain drag performances and chill free expression." Overall, I thought the article did a good job of clinically describing the news item at hand. This misconstrues both the legal background of this case and what this particular law actually changes in Florida. Could you elaborate? What am I misconstruing? I was not parroting Gov. DeSantis. I was expressing my own viewpoint, which happens to be similar to his. Existing laws in Florida include: Fla. Stat. § 847.013 — Exposing minors to harmful shows and exhibitions Fla. Stat. § 800.04(7) — Lewd or lascivious exhibition before a person under sixteen Fla. Stat. § 847.011(4) — Obscene live performances Fla. Stat. § 847.0133 — Showing obscene material to a minor Fla. Stat. § 800.03 — Exposure of sexual organs Fla. Stat. § 847.012 — Harmful material distributed to minors Fla. Stat. § 827.071 — Sexual performances by children and child pornography Fla. Stat. § 796.07 — Places operated for “lewdness” Fla. Stat. § 823.05 — Public nuisances involving lewdness or illegal conduct Fla. Stat. § 877.03 — Disorderly conduct and breach of the peace ... I would say the closest real-world parallel to Fla. Stat. § 827.11 — Exposing children to an adult live performance is Fla. Stat. § 847.013 — Exposing minors to harmful shows and exhibitions. Okay. Thank you for this list, and for the comparison between 827.11 and 847.013. I asked Grok to compare the two: What are your thoughts about this? Do you think the earlier statute was sufficient to cover drag shows? Way back in the day I clerked for a judge in Tacoma who heard an interesting criminal case about a guy manufacturing meth. He had been pulled over in his truck, the bed of which was full of boxes containing jars filled with alcohol and a white sludge at the bottom, which turned out to be powdered Sudafed tablets. My recollection is that everyone, including the criminal defense attorney, agreed that the only possible purpose for having jars full of alcohol with powdered Sudafed was to make meth, which is a controlled substance. However, the criminal statute in place at the time only criminalized the production of a controlled substance, which had not yet happened (since there was no meth or other controlled substances in the truck, just a bunch of pseudoephedrine, which is not a controlled substance). The criminal defense attorney argued that the statute - as worded - only criminalized the completion of "production," not interim steps are are incrementally headed that way. He also contrasted Washington's statute with Idaho's, which did criminalize both "production" and "taking a substantial step towards the production" of controlled substances. The judge agreed with the criminal defense attorney and dismissed the case. The prosecutor was not happy, but the judge noted that criminal statutes are often refined by these sorts of developments, which eventually filter up to the legislature so that they can fill in the gaps. Another example: Years ago I worked with a criminal defense attorney in Utah. He came back from a hearing and said that he had succeeded in getting serious criminal charges against my client dismissed. The criminal statute in question was sort of complex, but basically criminalized physical contact between an adult's mouth, genitals or hands with any part of a minor's genitals or anus. However, there was one combination that the legislature had left out, namely, an adults mouth to a minor's anus. This was precisely what the police had charged the defendant, and the statute did not criminalize it, so the defendant effectively got away with it. It is my understanding that in both instances the state legislatures have either amended existing statutes or enacted new ones to address the foregoing "gaps" in what the criminal statutes cover. I think something similar happened in Florida. I think what is illegitimate and imaginary is Ron DeSantis's claim, which you parrotted, that this particular law shouldn't even be controversial, and the implication that his political oponents are against "limiting minors access to sxualized events." I'm not sure I understand your position. Do you think the statute is controversial or not? I don’t have an absolute rule. I can imagine sufficiently extreme sexual conduct where the state would be justified in overriding parental consent. Fair enough. Can you allow for principled departure from your position on this? Is it possible and reasonable that citizens and their legislative representatives might prefer to not limited constraints to only "sufficiently extreme sexual conduct"? I would be interested in hearing what you feel these "real questions" are. But isn't this what the legislative process is for? To make judgment calls about "whether Florida's existing laws" were sufficient to address whether children should be allowed to view highly sexualized live adult performances? As for "whether § 827.11 makes Florida a better place to live and raise a family," I think it does. You (apparently?) do not. Again, isn't that what the legislative process does all the time? Just as I don't think Florida needs redundant laws, I don't think other states need them, either. Okay. I think we just disagree about redundancy, as I think the statutes overlap but still have some material differences. Criminal statutes are regularly created or refined to address more particularized behaviors. I don't think anyone has made "the suggestion that, before § 827.11, Florida was helpless to protect children from sexually inappropriate live entertainment." Again, criminal statutes are amended or created all the time to more specifically address particularized behaviors. As noted above, § 827.11 seems to cover ground that other statutes did not, or did not cover with clarity and concision. I believe the importance of a topic like this should depend, at least in part, on how much actual harm it causes individuals and society. Okay. Is it possible that exposing children to highly sexualized live adult performances causes "actual harm" to individuals and/or society? Do you think legislatures and societies are obligated to wait until "actual harm" accrues and becomes a very serious problem before taking steps to legislative mitigate it? Can it be reasonable and appropriate for legislatures to take reasonable preemptive steps to avoid the "actual harm" before it actually harms society and individuals? I have previously posted a number of news items about children being exposed to highly sexualized behaviors at drag shows, "Pride" parades, and so on. A sampling: SF Cop Says Nudity Around Kids is OK at Pride Parade Graphic “Pride” Parades Attacking the Innocence of Children San Francisco Pride Parade features public nudity around kids, 'Fetish Zone' with urine Why drag queen performances are not appropriate for children Yes, kink belongs at Pride. And I want my kids to see it. Don't Look Away: These Are the 'Family-Friendly' Pride Events the Left Is Pushing On Kids Prepping Kids for a Pride Parade Journalist Witnesses Naked Men Playing with Kids at Pride Children as Sex Objects: Why NYC Gay Pride Parade Is Being Called a 'Celebration of Pedophilia' DC Pride parade marked by depravity, grooming of children despite ‘family friendly’ billing Pride Parade Clips Show Shocking and Bizarre Moments — with Children in Attendance Pride Month Jumps the Shark Yale Professor Wants Your Kids To See Sex At Pride Parades So They’re Not ‘Homophobes’ Dallas Club Investigated After Drag Show for Kids Why Drag Events for Kids Are Inappropriate—And Actually Work Against the LGBT Community Children to experience sexual content at "Drag the kids to pride" (video included) Not for children! A lot of the events in the foregoing links involve quite a bit more than “a hip thrust or two” or “bare-chested men who wouldn’t have been out of place at a Madonna concert.” What "made-up" incidents are you referring to here? We have had all sorts of discussions about bishops who have abused children while acting in that capacity. Given the size of the Church, the number of actual incidents is statistically tiny, but does that mean that the Church can therefore safely disregard the issue, take not remedial efforts to mitigate risks, etc.? Also, is it ever appropriate for a legislature to anticipate, and preemptively take steps to curb or avoid, "widespread threats to children" before they actually materialize? Also, is it possible that the legislature in Florida decided that the exposure of children to highly sexualized adult live performances was sufficiently "widespread" as to warrant a statutory response? I think this is an example of the "not as bad as" fallacy, or the "fallacy of relative privation" or "appeal to worse problems" or the "starving children in Africa" argument. It happens when someone tries to dismiss a problem or complaint just because a worse problem exists somewhere else. Well, yes. Legislators may well be incentivized to pass laws that they think will please their constituencies. We live in a pluralistic society, so there are differences of opinions. Some people may indeed have "beliefs and cultures" in which it is acceptable to expose children to highly sexualized live adult performances (if you would like to identify these, feel free). Other people, meanwhile, have "beliefs and cultures" which find that unacceptable. We generally let the democratic process govern such differences. That said, the result is that legislatures pass laws to be enforced by the State and by law enforcement. Previously you said that the new statute was unnecessary/redundant because preexisting statutes were already sufficient to address the issue. Do you characterize those statutes as "tak{ing} away parents rights"? Here you seem to be saying that the statute amounts to "new exercises of state power," which would seem to suggest that the new statute is not "redundant" after all (since its effect is "new"). Could you clarify? What is it that you think is "really going on here"? I appreciate your input. Thanks, -Smac
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I understand the skepticism about legislative motives. Politicians of every stripe mix principle, politics, and constituency pressure, and it is fair to question whether a particular bill is primarily about child protection or about "signaling." That said, the comparison to R-rated movies watched with parents does not seem to work. An R-rated film is a recorded work that parents can preview, control, and contextualize in private. A live performance in a commercial or public venue is different in setting, immediacy, and the degree of parental control once the child is present. Existing law already treats live adult entertainment, obscenity, and age-restricted venues differently from private viewing of movies for related reasons. A person can criticize the Florida statute as poorly drafted, politically timed, or broader than necessary, but I think he could do that without treating every age-based limit on sexualized live performances as illegitimate religious lawfare. However, the reverse is also true: existing gaps or inconsistencies in how other forms of content are regulated do not automatically prove that any restriction in this area is pretextual. I would be interested in your responses to the questions I posed above: Do you believe there should be any age-based legal limits on the sexual content of live performances that minors can attend, or is your position that parental consent should be the sole and final authority in every case? If Florida’s prior obscenity and harmful-to-minors statutes already fully solved the problem, why do similar age restrictions exist in many other states and localities for adult entertainment venues, strip clubs, and certain performances? Are those also unnecessary? CB compared this law to forcing children to read the Bible. What is the closest real-world parallel you see: is restricting minors from a sexualized stage performance more like compelled religious exercise, or more like existing limits on minors’ access to pornography, alcohol, or adult businesses? Thank you for your participation. -Smac
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I can't tell whether you want to have a serious conversation about this. I do want to have a serious conversation. Could you explain what part(s) of my comments are causing confusion on this point? Existing laws against obscenity and harmful material to minors are relevant, and it’s fair to ask whether a new statute is necessary or carefully drawn. Legislatures sometimes pass overlapping or politically timed measures; that criticism is not unique to this issue. That said, equating a law that restricts minors’ access to performances meeting a statutory definition of sexual or lewd content with a proposal about litter boxes in schools is a category error. One involves regulating adult-oriented sexualized performances in the presence of children. The other addresses a largely anecdotal or satirical claim that never reflected widespread policy. Treating them as the same kind of “made-up problem” collapses distinct questions into a single partisan narrative. I am willing to examine whether this particular statute is vague, overbroad, or redundant with prior law. I am less persuaded by the claim that any effort to set age-based limits on sexualized live performances must be dismissed as pure identity politics. Consequently, please identify which preexisting Florida statutes which you think already cover the same ground as the above-referenced statute covers. The underlying interest—limiting children’s exposure to certain sexual content in public or commercial settings—is not new, and it is a legitimate governmental objective. Children really are being exposed to highly sexualized content. While reasonable disagreement exists about the means and the drafting of the statute, that is different from saying the entire subject is imaginary. That’s a fair description of the procedural history. The district court and a majority of the original panel found a substantial likelihood of success on the vagueness and overbreadth claims and issued a broad injunction. Five judges on the en banc court agreed with that view in dissent. The en banc majority of eight, however, disagreed. It held that the statute’s use of “lewd,” as construed under existing Florida law, and its age-variable standard did not render the Act facially unconstitutional, and it vacated the injunction. Close divisions among judges are common on difficult First Amendment questions; they do not themselves establish that the losing side’s position is the correct one. The controlling decision at this stage is the en banc majority’s. That is a legitimate policy question, and it is distinct from the constitutional one the en banc court decided. I don't think I have claimed that the statute was the only possible way to address the issue, or that Florida’s prior obscenity and harmful-to-minors laws were a complete nullity. Legislatures often add overlapping or more specific tools when they conclude existing provisions are hard to apply to live performances, slow to enforce, or uncertain in scope when the event is marketed as entertainment rather than explicit adult material. Whether this particular law was necessary is a judgment call about legislative priorities and drafting. Reasonable people can conclude it was redundant, poorly tailored, or politically motivated. My point has been narrower: the underlying interest in setting some age-based limits on sexualized live performances is not inherently illegitimate, and the en banc court found the statute survived the facial constitutional challenge that was brought. Necessity and constitutionality are related but not identical questions. I am open to arguments that better-drafted or more targeted tools would have been preferable. Those are reasonable criteria for evaluating any statute. I'm not sure the statute in question scores perfectly on all of them. Clearer definitions and tighter tailoring are almost always preferable. Age-variable standards can create practical uncertainty for venues. Parental autonomy deserves due weight and deference (due, but not unlimited). Any law that touches expressive conduct needs safeguards against selective or viewpoint-driven enforcement. The dissent emphasized these concerns, and they are worth taking seriously in application. My position is not that the statute is a model of legislative craftsmanship. Rather, I think the state has a legitimate interest in placing some outer limits on sexualized live performances involving minors. I also think that existing - and constitutionally valid - categories of regulation (obscenity, harmful-to-minors material, age restrictions on adult entertainment) already reflect that interest, and that the en banc court found the facial constitutional challenge unlikely to succeed. One can accept those points while still preferring narrower drafting, stronger definitional clarity, or greater deference to parental decision-making in close cases. So while criticizing the law's language or design is fair, but I think that treating the entire subject as illegitimate or imaginary is a different claim. A few questions for you: Do you believe there should be any age-based legal limits on the sexual content of live performances that minors can attend, or is your position that parental consent should be the sole and final authority in every case? If Florida’s prior obscenity and harmful-to-minors statutes already fully solved the problem, why do similar age restrictions exist in many other states and localities for adult entertainment venues, strip clubs, and certain performances? Are those also unnecessary? CB compared this law to forcing children to read the Bible. What is the closest real-world parallel you see: is restricting minors from a sexualized stage performance more like compelled religious exercise, or more like existing limits on minors’ access to pornography, alcohol, or adult businesses? This is an important and difficult topic. I appreciate your efforts to treat it seriously. Thanks, -Smac
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Do you find it troubling at all when the state starts to take over and decide what is appropriate or not appropriate rather than let the parents of their own children decide how they raise their children? I do think parental authority should be the default, and state intervention in family decisions deserves close scrutiny. Neither of these considerations is absolute. We as a society already accept a number of limits that apply even when parents might consent: Minimum age for alcohol Restrictions on tattoos and certain body modifications Child labor laws Prohibitions on exposing minors to obscenity or pornography Do you agree or disagree with these other instances of the state "tak{ing} over and decid{ing} what is appropriate or not appropriate" for children "rather than let the parents ... decide"? I would assume you agree with them, but I am open to correction. In any event, the debate seems to really be about where the line belongs, not whether any line can exist. I am open to arguments that this particular statute is drawn too broadly or too vaguely. I just do not accept the premise that the state must stay entirely out of the question of what sexualized content is appropriate for children in public or commercial settings. I would be interested in hearing more from you about this topic. That’s a useful test of the principle, so let’s take it seriously. Forcing children to read the Bible (or any religious text), or "anti-Mormon literature," either of which being against their parents’ beliefs, would be a clear establishment of religion and a direct violation of both parental rights and the Free Exercise Clause. The state would be affirmatively compelling a particular religious practice or viewpoint. Restricting minors’ access to sexualized live performances is a different category. It does not compel anyone to adopt a belief, practice a religion, or consume any particular content. It sets a boundary on what commercial or public adult-oriented sexual material may be presented to children. That kind of age-based restriction already exists in many areas (obscenity laws, pornography, alcohol, tobacco, certain performances) without being treated as equivalent to compelled religious instruction. One can consistently support parental primacy on matters of religious upbringing while also supporting some outer limits on the sexual content to which children can be exposed in public or commercial settings. The two are not the same exercise of state power. Respectfully, no, I am not advocating for that. I am not advocating a “takeover” of parenting. I am defending the idea that the state may set some outer limits on the sexual content to which children can be exposed in public or commercial settings—just as it already does with obscenity, pornography, alcohol, and certain performances. Parental judgment remains primary in most areas, but that does not mean it is the only consideration when the question is what adults may present to other people’s children in shared spaces. The law in question is not limited to “drag shows.” It targets all live performances (not just drag shows) that meet a statutory definition involving nudity, sexual conduct, lewdness, etc., when those performances are deemed unsuitable for the age of the child present. Some events marketed as family-friendly have included highly sexualized elements; others have not. Treating every drag performance as identical is no more accurate than treating every restriction as a ban on two moms in a picture book. Could you clarify your perspective? If a drag show does not violate the statute, then the statute would not apply. Do you therefore endorse drag shows which do violate the statute? Drag shows depicting or simulating: Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts? Or putting aside specific endorsement, do you think children should be exposed to these behaviors? Or is your perspective more about leaving such matters to parents? If so, what are the parameters you envision? Are parental rights inviolate in your view? If not, what limitations do you think can or should exist? As for quantified “proven harm” from every possible exposure: that is a high bar that we do not require in most other areas of child-protection law. We do not demand a precise body count of damaged children before restricting minors’ access to pornography, strip clubs, or other adult sexual material. The question is whether the state may draw any age-based line around sexualized live performances at all. I think it may. Reasonable minds can disagree about where exactly that line should sit and how clearly a statute must define it. Thank you for sharing your perspective. Thanks, -Smac
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That’s a fair question about definitions. Vague or elastic terms in any criminal or regulatory statute are worth scrutinizing, because the people enforcing them will not always share our priorities or judgment. Nevertheless, the existence of hard cases or bad-faith actors does not mean we abandon the underlying category. That a concept cannot be defined with exacting precision does not mean it cannot be defined at all. We already have legal concepts like “obscenity,” “harmful to minors,” “indecent exposure,” and age-based restrictions on alcohol, tobacco, and certain performances. Those terms are also contested at the margins, yet most people still accept that some line exists between material appropriate for adults and material that should not be presented to children in public or commercial settings. The examples you raise (books depicting same-sex parents, or a same-sex kiss in Lightyear) are not the same as sexually explicit or lewd live adult performances. Conflating ordinary representation of gay people with adult sexual content is, I think, a category error that makes productive disagreement harder. One can support age restrictions on sexualized entertainment without supporting the removal of books that simply show two moms or two dads. Here is a copy of the en banc decision from the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Here is a Grok summary of its treatment of the two phrases you referenced: I am happy discuss where the line should be drawn and how clearly the statute defines it. I am less persuaded that the risk of overreach by “the wrong people” means there should be no enforceable line at all when it comes to minors and sexual content. Thank you for sharing your perspective. -Smac
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I find it more troubling that you trust the government to make these decisions for families rather than trusting parents to decide what is appropriate for their own children. Thank you for sharing your perspective. I think most of us have a healthy dose of skepticism in terms of relying on the State to intervene in family matters. We should be cautious about state intervention in areas that traditionally fall under parental judgment. Parents generally know their own children best, and government overreach in family life is something worth watching carefully. That said, the principle of parental authority has never been absolute when it comes to protecting minors from certain harms. We already accept a number of limits even when parents might consent: Minors generally cannot get tattoos or certain body modifications without restrictions, regardless of parental approval. Parents cannot lawfully provide alcohol to their underage children in most settings. Child labor laws restrict the hours and types of work minors can perform, even with parental permission. Mandatory schooling and certain medical reporting requirements exist precisely because society has decided some baseline protections apply to children as a class. In each of these cases, the law draws a line based on the view that children lack full capacity to consent to certain risks, and that parental judgment, while primary, is not the only consideration. The debate over whether sexually explicit performances fall into that same category is a legitimate policy disagreement. But the existence of some outer limits on what adults (including parents) can expose children to is not a novel or radical idea. This is already already embedded in many areas of law. I am open to arguments about where exactly that line should be drawn in this specific context. I just don’t think the principle itself, that the State may set some protective boundaries for minors irrespective of parental oversight, is inherently illegitimate. So what are your thoughts. Per the article, children cannot attend adult live performances depicting or simulating: Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts Do you think parents should be allowed to have their children attend adult live performances which feature these sorts of things? Or is your position more of a "I just think parental rights should supersede governmental oversight" sort of thing? Thanks, -Smac
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A news item about a federal appellate court decision: Florida’s old ‘drag show’ law can be enforced once again. Here’s what that means I find it troubling that limiting minors' access to sexualized events is controversial, and that a federal judge stopped it, and that the decision by the federal appellate court to reverse it was sort of close (8-5). I think encouraging minors to attend events such as this amounts to sexualization and grooming. It seems, though, that only venues with drag shows are trying to attract children to their "adult live performance{s}." The statute does not single out any sexual/gender orientation or identity of the performers, and yet the only lawsuit challenging it is about drag shows. It will be interesting to see how the case turns out. Frankly, I would not be surprised if it dies on the vine. Sexualization and grooming. The statute "crack{s} down" on venues which invite children to attend sexually explicit live performances. The only "certain drag performances" which will be affected are those which violate the statute. Performances which violate the statute live performances depicting or simulating: Nudity Sexual conduct Sexual excitement Specific sexual activities (as defined under Florida law) Lewd conduct Lewd exposure of prosthetic or imitation genitals or breasts This is a reasonable statute, IMO. A good result here. Thanks, -Smac
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I wonder if she was "willing to alter stuff on plural marriage" because she was personally so troubled by it. She wanted to create a narrative that conformed to her preferences on that subject. Perhaps notably, her sons stated that they "apologized to our mother for putting the questions respecting polygamy and plural wives, as we felt we ought to do." Even decades later, the topic was very painful to her. I don't know that she had a motive to substantively depart from the truth as to other matters in her life. See here: See here: Thanks, -Smac
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Yes. Likely for a variety of reasons. Pretty much. See here: The RLDS/COC folks believe theirs is the legitimate successor to the Church organized by Joseph Smith in 1830. The Latter-day Saints believe that the Church instituted in 1830 has no "successor," and instead has continued to exist from 1830 to today. Reasonable minds can disagree about such things. I wonder if Emma's beliefs would align with those of the CoC, particularly as pertaining to the Book of Mormon. Well, she rejected plural marriage. And she had substantial disagreements with Brigham Young. And she was geographically isolated from the Church led by Brigham Young. As much as we can trust any historical figure. We work with the evidence at hand, and make reasoned conclusions based thereon. I think Emma's utter repudiation/denial of plural marriage originating with Joseph taints her credibility as a historical source on that specific issue, since the evidence of Joseph's involvement in polygamy is pretty much beyond dispute. However, pretty much everything else about which she spoke are matters of opinion or belief or both, or matters about which she was a percipient witness. For example, her statements about the Plates are corroborated by other witnesses. Do you "trust Emma" on that point? If not, why not? Looking at the totality of her life, would you characterize Emma as a good person? An honest one? For the same reason we trust, or do not trust, everyone who has ever lived since Jesus Christ: Because she was human, and hence had foibles and weaknesses and errors, just like all of us, but she also had strengths and virtues and was a percipient witness to many things. Again, I am curious as to your perspective on the Plates. Do you "trust her" insofar as her statements about the Plates are corroborated by the other witnesses? I appreciate your input. Thanks, -Smac
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So what do they conclude she saw these teachings as since it seems at times she rejected them as revelation? I'm not sure they reach a conclusion one way or another (BTW, what you are quoting is not me, but the Grok summary). The "at times" seems to be an important part of your question. I think Emma went through terrible trials throughout much of her life. I surmise that by 1879, her hostility against polygamy had come to affect her perspective on it. Her 1879 statement about Joseph's polygamy ("At one time my husband came to me and asked me if I had heard certain rumors about spiritual marriages, or anything of the kind; and assured me that if I had, that they were without foundation; that there was no such doctrine, and never should be with his knowledge, or consent."), must be construed in light of the clear and extensive evidence we now have that Joseph did introduce the concept and practice of plural marriage. Emma's 1879 statement is dated, but not the statement within it which she attributes to Joseph ("At one time..."). Per the Hales: Assuming there is some accuracy to Emma's statement, we don't know when in the above timeline it happened. The reference to John C. Bennett is interesting. The Hales wrote a good article, "John C. Bennett's Spiritual Wifery." A summary: I have wondered, but not really investigated, whether by 1879 Emma, who despised even the religious practice of plural marriage introduced by Joseph Smith, had come to conflate it with the illicit "spiritual wifery" depredations arising from John C. Bennett's behaviors. A few thoughts along these lines: Strong negative association with the term: “Spiritual wifery” / “spiritual wife system” was publicly and scandalously tied to Bennett’s conduct in 1842. Joseph, Hyrum, Emma (in Relief Society), and other leaders repeatedly denounced it. The phrase carried a strong connotation of unauthorized, illicit sexual behavior. Emma’s deep and longstanding opposition: Emma opposed plural marriage during Joseph’s lifetime (with only brief, reluctant periods of acquiescence) and rejected it completely afterward. She taught her children that Joseph never practiced or taught it and blamed its introduction on Brigham Young and others. Over 35 years, her rejection hardened into a clear, consistent public position. Time and memory: The 1879 interview occurred 35+ years after the events. Memory can be reconstructive. It is not uncommon for people to simplify or merge related but distinct painful experiences over decades, especially when they already view both negatively. Rhetorical and religious incentives: Emma was aligned with the Reorganized Church tradition, which rejected polygamy and taught that it originated after Joseph’s death. Framing any form of “spiritual” or plural marriage as something Joseph himself rejected (and associating it with the disreputable Bennett episode) fit the narrative she and her sons maintained. Language in the 1879 statement itself: Emma does not carefully distinguish categories. She groups “polygamy,” “spiritual wives,” and “spiritual marriages/wifery” together and issues a blanket denial that Joseph taught or practiced any of it. This is consistent with conflation. Thanks, -Smac
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Um, she did: "Sister Emma, in speaking of the condition of the Church after her husband’s death, said to me, “I was threatened by Brigham Young because I opposed and denounced his measures and would not go west with them. At that time, they did not know where they were going themselves, but he told me that he would yet bring me prostrate to his feet.” (Early History of the Reorganization, Apostle Edmund C. Briggs, pp. 88, 93-95) She says she opposed and denounced Brigham Young, Thank you for your response. She says she "opposed and denounced" Brigham Young about "his measures." To what do you think she was referring here? I can understand and appreciate that perspective, even if I do not fully share it. From later on in the interview: Her beef with Brigham Young may have influenced her perspective about whether "the Church (that went west)," the group led by the individual with whom she had substantial personal, financial and religious disagreements, amounted to the "Mormonism" of which she spoke in 1879. For herself, she separated the two. For myself, I think the Church as now constituted and led by Pres. Oaks is the same one that Joseph founded in 1830. My assessment is that the “measures” Emma most consistently opposed were plural marriage (polygamy) and, secondarily, Brigham Young’s leadership claims and the associated financial/property decisions after Joseph’s death. Her perspective on Brigham became strongly negative. From FAIR: Brigham and Emma did not agree on the disposition of Joseph's estate Furthermore, Brigham and Emma did not agree on the disposition of Joseph's estate. Illinois law at the time held that no church could hold more than ten acres of property, and so much of the church's properties were held in Joseph's name. At the same time, much of the Church's debt was held by Joseph as a private citizen—thus, Emma was liable for Joseph/the Church's debts, but had a less clear claim on the Church's lands that Joseph held as Trustee-in-Trust. Emma's repudiation/denial of Joseph's plural marriages contravene the great weight of historical evidence. Brigham Young's accusation of poisoning was, as Bro. Bushman put it, "unfounded." Both Emma and Brigham did tremendous things to advance the Lord's work. And both of them had substantial flaws in their behavior and temperament as well. Hence the value of the Atonement in their - and our - lives. Also, what are your thoughts about this statement attributed to Emma? The question, I suppose, is what she thought of to be "Mormonism" at this point in time. She was 74 when she was interviewed by her son, and had suffered challenges and tribulations far worse than anything most of us will encounter. Also, her inconsistent approach to polygamy was well-known. Her conflict about it was deep-seated. From FAIR: Emma did teach her children that Joseph had never taught the doctrine of plural marriage, and blamed its introduction on Brigham Young Emma never denied Joseph's prophetic calling; she did, however, teach her children that Joseph had never taught the doctrine of plural marriage, and blamed its introduction on Brigham Young. Torn between two certitudes—her conviction of Joseph's prophetic calling, and her hatred of plural marriage—Emma had difficult choices to make for which we ought not to judge her. But, the critics ought to let all of Emma speak for herself—she had a great trial, but also had great knowledge. That she continued to support Joseph's calling and remain with him, despite her feelings about plural marriage, speaks much of her convictions. As she told Parley P. Pratt years later: Allen J. Stout: "from moments of passionate denunciation [Emma] would subside into tearful repentance and acknowledge that her violent opposition to that principle was instigated by the power of darkness" Emma Smith: "The principle is right but I am jealous hearted. Now never tell anybody that you heard me find fault with that [principle;] we have got to humble ourselves and repent of it Emma's inner conflict was also dramatized in another report: Emma Smith: "I desire a fruitful, active mind, that I may be able to comprehend the designs of God, when revealed through his servants without doubting" Emma asked Joseph for a blessing not long before he went to Carthage. Joseph told her to write the best blessing she could, and he would sign it upon his return. Wrote Emma: When I consider Emma's statements about polygamy, Brigham Young, the "Church" (the one that went West), and the translation of the Book of Mormon, and so on, I consider it in the context of her life and circumstances, her perspective and knowledge and information, and her foibles and weaknesses, and also in light of Mormon 9:31 ("Condemn me not because of mine imperfection, neither my father, because of his imperfection, neither them who have written before him; but rather give thanks unto God that he hath made manifest unto you our imperfections, that ye may learn to be more wise than we have been."). I wonder if the "new-fangled notion" was plural marriage, and if plural marriage had become, for her, a dealbreaker in terms of the authority of the Church led west by Brigham Young. She did that too: "At one time my husband came to me and asked me if I had heard certain rumors about spiritual marriages, or anything of the kind; and assured me that if I had, that they were without foundation; that there was no such doctrine, and never should be with his knowledge, or consent. I know that he had no other wife or wives than myself, in any sense, either spiritual or otherwise." (1 October 1879 - "Last Testimony of Sister Emma," Saint's Herald, Vol. 26, No 19 p. 289.) Again, Emma's approach to polygamy was inconsistent, with her acknowledging and accepting it at times and denouncing and attempting to thwart it at others. From the above link: "Allen J. Stout, who served as a bodyguard for Joseph, recounted a conversation he overheard in the Mansion House between Joseph and his tormented wife. A summary of his account states that 'from moments of passionate denunciation [Emma] would subside into tearful repentance and acknowledge that her violent opposition to that principle was instigated by the power of darkness; that Satan was doing his utmost to destroy her, etc. And solemnly came the Prophet's inspired warning: "Yes, and he will accomplish your overthrow, if you do not heed my counsel."'" "Maria Jane Johnston, who lived with Emma as a servant girl, recalled the Prophet's wife looking very downcast one day and telling her that the principle of plural marriage was right and came from Heavenly Father. 'What I said I have got [to] repent of,' lamented Emma. 'The principle is right but I am jealous hearted. Now never tell anybody that you heard me find fault with that [principle;] we have got to humble ourselves and repent of it.'" "At one time my husband came to me and asked me if I had heard certain rumors about spiritual marriages, or anything of the kind; and assured me that if I had, that they were without foundation; that there was no such doctrine, and never should be with his knowledge, or consent. I know that he had no other wife or wives than myself, in any sense, either spiritual or otherwise." What are we to make of the inconsistency? For me, I think claiming that Emma "flatly denied plural marriage" is a half-truth that needs context and clarification. Well, yes. Her sons reported that statement in 1879. We have other historical sources indicating that she had at times accepted the principle of plural marriage ("The principle is right but I am jealous hearted. Now never tell anybody that you heard me find fault with that [principle;] we have got to humble ourselves and repent of it."). So did Emma accept the principle of plural marriage or not? A "flat" answer either way does not seem to work. No. But then, they also did not include the "super relevant quotes" above (e.g., "'The principle is right but I am jealous hearted. Now never tell anybody that you heard me find fault with that [principle;] we have got to humble ourselves and repent of it.'"). The YouTube video was not, I think, intended to be an exhaustive analysis of Emma's particularized statements about any given topic, but rather an assessment of her life overall. Indeed, I think Don Bradley was speaking against the idea of using Emma "a premise in arguments about polygamy, succession, or Church history," but rather treating her "as a full person." Thank you for taking time to share your thoughts. -Smac
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This came out two weeks ago: Very much worth a watch, though it's long (1 hr 45 min). For those not so inclined, here is a Grok summary: At about 1:21 Don addresses situations in which some critics have "tried to use Emma," or "co-opt{ing} her" as being on their "side." A Grok summary of that bit: I appreciate this effort to bring Emma into discussion, into being the topic of discussions. Not just in relation to Joseph, but in her own right. Any thoughts about Don's points? What is your overall assessment of Emma? What did she leave behind that has value to you? Thanks, -Smac
