Mormonism And Classic Protestantism:

[Drewm777]

As I read through this thread, a reoccurring question that has bothered me over the years keeps popping up again. I understand why, in the Mormon POV, God created man, but I have never understood why, in the Mainstream Christian POV, God created man.

If God is all powerful and totally self-contained, needing no external stimulation, why would He create man? In fact, why would He do anything?

I have been told that God created us to love Him, but why would He need us to love Him, is He lacking something that only we could give Him or something external to Him could give Him? Well, He created us to give Him glory, but what glory is He lacking and why does He need anything to give Him glory that He couldn't give Himself?

These are some excellent questions that I would also like to see addressed.

[LifeOnaPlate]

These are some excellent questions that I would also like to see addressed.

Second the motion.

[johndoe]

Hi Chris--

Yeah, I'm familiar with the distinction. My problems with panentheism are underlined in your post above. If one merely means that God indwells all things, no problem. And obviously I agree that the universe has no existence with God's providential maintenance. But, I'd be leery of tying that providential maintenance to anything remotely suggesting a necessary material overlap. (Even if that necessity only flows in one direction: Godwards down.) To my mind, the "ontological gulf" between Creator and creation must be maintained and is not sufficiently maintained (in fact, is contraindicated) by the notion that the universe derives from God's "substance" and is "a part of him."

If I might interject, it also seems to me that this idea that the universe is a part of God leads to some logical difficulties. Chris has argued that God exalts (glorifies) Himself by exalting (glorifying) the universe, which is a part of Him. This resonates with LDS doctrine in a way, but what of those who are not saved? I suppose it's possible that Chris embraces some form of universalism, but assuming that isn't the case, does the lack of glorification of the condemned result in a lessening of the glory of God? I can't imagine that classical Protestantism would ever produce an answer in the affirmative (recognizing that this is not a difficulty that classical Protestantism actually shares with panentheism). Is there something I'm missing here?

To echo urroner's question in a different way, if the immortality and eternal life of man is not God's work and glory, then what is His work and glory? CKSalmon, I would love to see how you answer this, though I suspect that you may have to say that a complete exposition of divine purpose simply isn't found in the Bible. I believe that at least a partial purpose for our creation (in the Reformed view) is to have an avenue through which to express His nature. I would like to get a clarification though, and could certainly be mistaken.

On a more general note, what does it mean to glorify God per a classical Protestant understanding? Doesn't God already possess all glory? One would think that His glory is eternally complete, and could not be added to or diminished in the least by any external being or force.

[Chris Smith]

Hi Chris--

Yeah, I'm familiar with the distinction. My problems with panentheism are underlined in your post above. If one merely means that God indwells all things, no problem. And obviously I agree that the universe has no existence with God's providential maintenance. But, I'd be leery of tying that providential maintenance to anything remotely suggesting a necessary material overlap. (Even if that necessity only flows in one direction: Godwards down.) To my mind, the "ontological gulf" between Creator and creation must be maintained and is not sufficiently maintained (in fact, is contraindicated) by the notion that the universe derives from God's "substance" and is "a part of him."

Hi CKS,

You're right to suggest that the panentheist view appeals especially to God's role as sustainer and to his omnipresence in order to make its case. And you're also right to point to the classical theist habit of expressing God's relationship to the world in terms of opposition as the obvious counterpoint to panentheism. But I don't think the two views are incompatible. Much of the opposition-language derives from Platonic thought, where it existed in an even more extreme form: matter was actually evil for the Platonists. But despite this, they maintained a thoroughgoing philosophical monism: the entire world was an emanation from God. It was therefore a part of him, if an extremely degenerate and base part. The purpose of gnostic redeemer cults was to restore the "divine sparks" in this world to unity with their source.

Now, I don't buy into the Platonic or gnostic schemes, and neither I think does any Christian panentheist. But I think it's important that for these ancient monists, the idea of monism and of a dramatic creator/emanation distinction were not incompatible.

Classical theism does not provide a metaphysical explanation for God's relationship to the world. Panentheism fills this conceptual gap. I understand not wanting to debase God by having the fallen world exist inside of him, but I also suggest that to have something exist independently of God outside of him does still more to diminish his greatness. It nullifies his claim to absoluteness.

If I may, I'd like to offer an analogy for how this might work. This analogy relies especially on John's teaching that God created the world by his logos, which was a widely-used philosophical term meaning Word-- or more specifically in contexts like this one, Reason. The idea that God creates by his reason may perhaps permit us to make cognitive analogies for the act of creation. In that spirit, here goes:

Think of God as a dreamer. Not necessarily a sleeping-dream, which implies a lack of control. Think of him perhaps as a daydreamer. Note that when we daydream, the entire scene exists only in our head. And yet within the dream we conceive of ourselves as a center of consciousness separate from the dream's environs. We are capable of changing those environs at will-- they are within the dreamer's control-- but they can at the same time be dramatically opposed to the dreamer's self-consciousness. I might dream myself into the role of a hero, beset by a barbarian horde. Of course, the horde would let me win, because I'm in control, but within the context of the dream the distinction between them and me is stark. I am noble and cleanshaven; they are stinky, smelly, and ugly. And both of us want to slay each other. When this analogy is extended to God, we might say that the entire universe exists "in his head". He is in control, and yet he in some sense conceives of it as a separate entity (or grouping of entities) from himself. He relates to it. Though it is part of him, it is fallen, and he intends to redeem it. I think that this dreamer analogy expresses very well the implications of the panentheistic model (except that the dreamer would have three centers of consciousness instead of one).

If I might interject, it also seems to me that this idea that the universe is a part of God leads to some logical difficulties. Chris has argued that God exalts (glorifies) Himself by exalting (glorifying) the universe, which is a part of Him. This resonates with LDS doctrine in a way, but what of those who are not saved? I suppose it's possible that Chris embraces some form of universalism, but assuming that isn't the case, does the lack of glorification of the condemned result in a lessening of the glory of God?

This tension exists in classical theism as well; we are told in the Bible that God is not willing that any should perish, yet (at least for the Reformed tradition) God is absolutely sovereign. If he is not willing, then it shouldn't happen.

I wouldn't say that hell necessarily diminishes his glory, though. I don't think his glory is capable of either increasing or decreasing in either the classical or panentheistic models. I'd express it more in terms of the apparent disparity between his intent and the reality. And I agree that it's a problem. I suggest that the most obvious ways to resolve it would be either annihilation or divine perseverence (or some combination of the two). But of course that does not appear to harmonize with the Bible, in which some are envisioned as being tormented forever.

Anyway, I'm supposed to be working on a paper. Curse my compulsion.

-Chris

[johndoe]

This tension exists in classical theism as well; we are told in the Bible that God is not willing that any should perish, yet (at least for the Reformed tradition) God is absolutely sovereign. If he is not willing, then it shouldn't happen.

I wouldn't say that hell necessarily diminishes his glory, though. I don't think his glory is capable of either increasing or decreasing in either the classical or panentheistic models. I'd express it more in terms of the apparent disparity between his intent and the reality. And I agree that it's a problem. I suggest that the most obvious ways to resolve it would be either annihilation or divine perseverence (or some combination of the two). But of course that does not appear to harmonize with the Bible, in which some are envisioned as being tormented forever.

Anyway, I'm supposed to be working on a paper. Curse my compulsion.

-Chris

Thanks Chris. Regarding the Reformed tradition, I would guess that they simply interpret those Biblical passages differently rather than as an expression of God's will that none should perish. There have been discussions on this very board in the past that have gone that route.

I do however wonder how it is possible in any type of classical view that the reality could be different from God's will or intent. What force is capable of impeding God's will from shaping reality to conform to it? I could be mistaken, but I thought that reality did conform to God's will/intent, at least according to the Reformed view.

[cksalmon]

Thanks Chris. Regarding the Reformed tradition, I would guess that they simply interpret those Biblical passages differently rather than as an expression of God's will that none should perish. There have been discussions on this very board in the past that have gone that route.

Hi John and Chris--

I appreciate the good discussion, guys. I hope to write more tonight, John, in answer to your questions about God's glory. (As an aside, Chris, it seems your dreaming-God scenario is making the turn towards a process view. Am I reading you correctly?)

Just to answer very briefly these last few questions:

I do however wonder how it is possible in any type of classical view that the reality could be different from God's will or intent. What force is capable of impeding God's will from shaping reality to conform to it? I could be mistaken, but I thought that reality did conform to God's will/intent, at least according to the Reformed view.

Your putting a pointed finger on a central problem for Reformed theology. I mean "problem" in the sense of a situation in need of solution. Luther suggested that God functions with two wills: one that is sovereign, decretive, and often hidden, another that is revealed to us. I think a case can be made for this view, but I readily admit that it's not an obvious conclusion to reach and I wouldn't blame anyone for discounting it. That said, this distinction is a commonplace in Reformed thinking and is echoed throughout the literature.

I would guess that they simply interpret those Biblical passages differently rather than as an expression of God's will that none should perish.

Indeed, and considered by someone outside the Reformed camp, I can only imagine that it seems quite a strained reading indeed. Here, goes the argument, God is expressing his desire, not that all individuals be saved, but that all types or classes of men--from slaves to kings--be saved. Convinced? Probably not.

This is just to point out that one's preconceptions color the way one reads verses that present difficulties to one's overarching theological system. If you're interested, I can track down the various arguments for what I've presented above.

Best.

CKS

[freakin a man]

Hi folks:

(2) The classical Protestant worldview, traditionally, seems to focus on declaring the utterly unique, unequivocal glory of the single God of all the entire universe.

This statement is a bit confusing to me at least. Are you suggesting that LDS don't also focus time on declaring the unique glory of of the single God of all the universe? God made the universe so God predates the universe. The fact that LDS do believe in the existence of other deity does not make those deities as God over this universe.

[Chris Smith]

(As an aside, Chris, it seems your dreaming-God scenario is making the turn towards a process view. Am I reading you correctly?)

No, at least not insofar as I understand process theology. They do tend to utilize a panentheistic view of God, but the centerpiece of process thought as I understand it is that Becoming rather than Being is the basic principle of the universe. They also, I think, hold that God is impotent with respect to the universe-- i.e. he is just a sort of divine memory repository into which our thoughts are deposited at death. But I think I've only read one process thinker (I think it was John Cobb; it's been a while), so I could be seriously off base here. What about my comments made you think of the process view?

If I had to pick a theologian most representative of my own theological predilections in this regard, it would probably be Jurgen Moltmann (though I am ambivalent about a few of his points).

-Chris

[urroner]

Okay Chris and CKS, the headache is coming back.

Process Theology

Major Concepts

* God is not omnipotent in the sense of being coercive. The divine has a power of persuasion rather than coercion. Process theologians interpret the classical doctrine of omnipotence as involving force, and suggest instead a forbearance in divine power. "Persuasion" in the causal sense means that God does not exert unilateral control.

* Reality is not made up of material substances that endure through time, but serially-ordered events, which are experiential in nature. These events have both a physical and mental aspect. All experience (male, female, atomic, and botanical) is important and contributes to the ongoing and interrelated process of reality.

* The universe is characterized by process and change carried out by the agents of free will. Self-determination characterizes everything in the universe, not just human beings. God cannot totally control any series of events or any individual, but God influences the creaturely exercise of this universal free will by offering possibilities. To say it another way, God has a will in everything, but not everything that occurs is God's will.

* God contains the universe but is not identical with it (panentheism, not pantheism or pandeism). Some also call this "theocosmocentrism" to emphasize that God has always been related to some world or another.

* Because God interacts with the changing universe, God is changeable (that is to say, God is affected by the actions that take place in the universe) over the course of time. However, the abstract elements of God (goodness, wisdom, etc.) remain eternally solid.

* Charles Hartshorne believes that people do not experience subjective (or personal) immortality, but they do have objective immortality because their experiences live on forever in God, who contains all that was. Others believe that people do have subjective experience after bodily death.

* Dipolar theism, is the idea that God has both a changing aspect (God's existence as a Living God) and an unchanging aspect (God's eternal essence).

[johndoe]

Your putting a pointed finger on a central problem for Reformed theology. I mean "problem" in the sense of a situation in need of solution. Luther suggested that God functions with two wills: one that is sovereign, decretive, and often hidden, another that is revealed to us. I think a case can be made for this view, but I readily admit that it's not an obvious conclusion to reach and I wouldn't blame anyone for discounting it. That said, this distinction is a commonplace in Reformed thinking and is echoed throughout the literature.

Indeed, and considered by someone outside the Reformed camp, I can only imagine that it seems quite a strained reading indeed. Here, goes the argument, God is expressing his desire, not that all individuals be saved, but that all types or classes of men--from slaves to kings--be saved. Convinced? Probably not.

I had come across this before - thanks for the reminder. You are correct that it isn't a very convincing position, but I am curious about it. I would like to take you up on your offer to present arguments for it if you don't mind. It doesn't need to be terribly detailed - or you could point me to some web resources if you prefer. I'm curious about 2 things - 1. what Biblical support is claimed for this idea (of the 2 divine wills); and 2. from a logical standpoint, can the two wills contradict each other, and if so, how can that be consistent with the revealed divine nature?

Regarding the strained reading of the scripture regarding God's desire that all men be saved, certainly this isn't the most natural reading. FWIW though, I think there's enough apparent contradiction in the Bible that everyone has to do this sort of thing to some extent. Certainly we LDS engage in our share of exegetical acrobatics in some areas of the Bible. (Of course, that's why it's nice to have additional scriptures and modern prophets! )

By the way, I appreciate your candor.