On Categories, Definitions, And Divinity In The Hebrew Bible

[maklelan]

I'm hard at work writing my thesis right now, but I've come across some interesting methodological discussions that I'm incorporating into my argument, and I thought I would take the time to discuss some of them here. I think these are interesting insights that might be valuable to people who discussion religion and religious definitions/classifications, and this thread gives me an opportunity to crystallize some thoughts in a publica forum.

The insights I'm talking about are from the field of cognitive psychology, by way of cognitive linguistics. To move from general to specific, two broad observations are made, the first theoretical, and the second based on empirical data: (1) language is not an independent and disembodied faculty, but a function of cognition, and (2) natural categories are not binary conceptualizations with well-defined borders.

Regarding observation (1), scholars have long thought of language as an independent and discrete set of structures that people utilize when they want to communicate. This means the general principles of language are universal, minimally influenced by human experience, and can be reconstructed at any time and in any place. Much of biblical lexicography is based on this assumption. Since the 60s, though, research with cognition has shown that language is much more intimately tied to the human experience, so much so that it is considered a function of our cognition. In other words, language is a product of how our brains experience and perceive the world. Language itself is universal, but only as a faculty subordinate to our cognition. This means all the different aspects of our culture, upbringing, and personal background are responsible for our ability to communicate and the exact ways in which we communicate.

Here is a simple illustration. I am willing to bet you understand the phrase "alligator shoes" to mean shoes made from the skin of alligators, while you likely understand the phrase "horse shoes" to mean shoes worn by horses. There is nothing in the syntactical relationship of these two phrases that makes this distinction evident. Rather, you have probably never heard of shoes worn by alligators, or of shoes made from horse skins, but you are likely to have heard of shoes made of alligator skin, and shoes worn by horses. You determined the meaning of the phrases subconsciously because your brain finds it more likely that they related to your experience than that they did not. You probably also had images of each in your mind, memories of experiences with one or both, or felt a visceral reaction to the morality of shoes made from the skins of alligators. Perhaps you find "alligator shoes" a bit unusual because you're more used to the idea of alligator boots. Perhaps you pictured the process of cleaning, removing, or installing horse shoes. All of these conceptualizations, or semantic domains, are brought to bear on our understanding of the meaning of a word, phrase, or clause, with the context determining and prioritizing the more relevant ones ("activating" them). The combination of semantic domains is called a frame, and meaning is produced by the hierarchization of domains within that frame. As an extension of the above illustration, if you added the word "played" to the phrase "horse shoes," it changes the hierarchy of semantic domains. The object's domain is still the same, but the domain relative to the utility of the object has changed.

On to consideration (2). Basically, the human mind does not conceive of categories in terms of necessary and sufficient attributes and clear boundaries, but in terms of central cognitive figures, or prototypes. Boundaries may or may not exist for natural categories, but there is graded membership in the category relative to the proximity of an item to the central attributes of the prototype(s). An example of a category with natural boundaries is "bird." Sparrows or robins are prototypical birds, while penguins and ostriches are not. They are all 100% birds, but the latter are the ones that are likely to be qualified as "technically a bird," or "flightless birds." Bats are not birds, but it's not difficult to conceive of a context where they might be referred to as birds or bird-like. A natural category without firm boundaries is "furniture." According to the dictionary definition (Merriam-Webster), "furniture" are "movable articles used for readying an area for occupancy or use." Such a vague description hardly establishes firm boundaries. This means pictures, blankets, lamps, clocks, drapes, and even clothing and dental floss are "furniture," but few people conceive of them as such. Chairs, sofas, tables, etc., are the prototypical examples of furniture.

This phenomenon, known as "prototype effect," is found throughout human cognition. We do it with natural categories, with artificial categories, with grammar and linguistics, with genre and rhetoric, and the list goes on. Prototype effect itself is recursive, meaning it also experiences prototype effects (some prototype phenomena is more prototypical than other). To utilize this phenomenon to help us understand religions religious lexica, however, we have to incorporate it into a model of some kind. Cognitive linguistics has taken greatest advantage of this insight. There are a bunch of ways to integrate prototype theory into that field, and apply it to religious studies, but they're complicated and I don't want to take the time. Instead, I'd like to share an example of how I synthesize these two observations in my research.

One chapter of my thesis is aimed at describing the different meanings of the Hebrew words for deity/divinity. My approach is to group the various occurrences of the relevant words and concepts according to apparent domain activation. I try to identify material and textual remains that might contextualize that activation, but because cultural experience is so fundamental to the way language is used, comparative studies are of limited utility. From there I look for prototype effects, which will help in illuminating central divine cognitive figures associated with the different domains. This will help us to better understand the words used, and to avoid trying to draw artificial boundaries over synchronic and diachronic usage variants and corpus limitations.

As an example, a common domain activated in contexts containing references to divinity is the notion of a divine patron having authority over one or another nation. The clearest example of this is Deut 32:8-9, where Elyon divides up the nations of the earth to the "sons of Elohim." Yhwh receives Israel as his portion. In Ps 82, a text that likely dates to a few centuries later, Yhwh condemns the gods of the other nations and takes over their portions, making him political ruler over all the nations. Before this happens, though, there is a long history of other gods ruling other nations. "Gods of the nations" reflects this domain, as do the individual titles of national deities, as found in 1 Kgs 11:33. The same domain is activated in 1 Sam 26:19, where David insists his being chased out of Israel is in effect a command to worship other gods. The implication is that Yhwh cannot be worshipped outside of Israel. The story of Naaman in 2 Kgs 5 also illustrates this. Naaman arrives at the conclusion that there is no god anywhere in the world except within the boundaries of Israel (in other words, the other gods are irrelevant). To properly worship Yhwh, he requests cartloads of earth. The obvious implication is that Yhwh can only be worshipped on his own soil.

This is not just a mistaken foreign assumption in light of David's identical claim. Elsewhere the Israelites contemplate the problem of worshipping Yhwh in Babylon, which is related. Throughout the Deuteronomistic history we have frequent reference made to the gods of the nations surrounding Israel, and specifically to proscription of their worship. There are a couple of examples of military-like excursions made by Yhwh against the deities of these other nations, and in 2 Kgs 3:26 we actually have an example of a human sacrifice performed by Moabites catalyzing a response by the Moabite national deity which drives off Israelite forces who were guaranteed victory by Yhwh's prophet. We might call this domain [POLITICALLY LIMITED DIVINE PATRONAGE]. While Yhwh was originally a prototypical divine patron for Israel, his continued worship outside of Israel necessitated outgrowing the category. He then became the authority over the other divine patrons (Deut 4:19), and finally dismissed them altogether (Ps 82:6-. In doing so, the authors merged the domain with the conceptual domain of a celestial king over the gods ([DIVINE COUNCIL HIERARCHY]). This combined features of political authority with features of heavenly authority. The desired features of the former were transferred to the latter. The [POLITICALLY LIMITED DIVINE PATRONAGE] domain remained in Israel's scriptural heritage, though. It could not simply be jettisoned, so it became inhabited in the Greco-Roman period by angels.

A more specific domain might be [sECONDARY DIVINE AGENT], which is a broad way to refer to those contexts that describe a handmade or otherwise inanimate object that is seen as having been imbued somehow with divine agency. The most common context in which this domain is activated is in reference to idols, and it is usually pejorative. In later texts, like Deutero-Isaiah and some psalms, the use of divine terminology in reference to idols is ironic and satirical. That is, the author doesn't really think the objects are at all divine, but is calling them "gods" to belittle such beliefs about them.

In earlier texts, and in some material evidence, however, there does seem to be actual divine agency attributed to them. Jacob, for instance, sets up an altar (which may just mean a standing stone) and gives it the name "El, the God of Israel." In other words, he identifies the altar as God. Rebecca also steals her fathers "gods," which Jacob refers to as "gods" when Rebecca's father comes looking for them. They are also called "teraphim." These were likely objects associated with ancestors who had become divinized. It is likely their images were thought in some way to bless or protect the family. These secondary divine agents were more often associated in some way with a divine patron, like El or Yhwh, or some other deity. Here comparative material is useful. Mesopotamian literature is replete with divine determinatives attached to inanimate objects, as well as discussion of their vivification and worship. They are usually referred to as the gods they represented.

When Hezekiah has the temple emptied out of inappropriate cult paraphernalia we have mention of objects called asherim, which were probably wooden poles of some kind. A good indication that these were thought of as manifestations of Yhwh's divine agency is found in the inscriptions from Kuntillet Ajrud and Khirbet el-Qôm, which mention blessings coming from "Yhwh and his Asherah." Although there is debate, I think it unlikely that the text refers to a goddess, but rather to a cultic object thought to be imbued with Yhwh's agency. This is similar to the idea of Yhwh's name being "on" the angel of Yhwh or "in" the temple. Think also of Jesus, who has God's name, acts on his behalf and with his authority, and becomes a medium for worshipping God. A further indication that the asherim from Hezekiah's reform were associated with Yhwh is that Jehu earlier purged Baal worship from Israel (2 Kgs 10), but didn't touch the golden calves in Dan or Bethel or the asherim. This was a sin for the Deuteronomistic author, but not for Jehu. The object of his purge was Baalistic worship. He explicitly sought to protect Yahwistic worship.

There is, again, a shift in domains here, and thus a shift in prototype. In earlier literature, the "gods" are objects thought to be imbued with divine agency. A prototypical "god" in that sense would be one that protected or blessed the owner. It might be a standing stone or a group of standing stones (both have been uncovered in Israelite cities), or it might be a figurine of some kind (several of which have been uncovered in Israelite cities). In the late pre-exile and into the exile that kind of worship became taboo, and so the domain and prototype conceptualized in the word "god(s)" shifted to an inanimate object that was polemicized. Ironically, the exact same object might be referred to by both domains, but in one the object is viewed favorably, and in the other it is viewed unfavorably. Think again of the alligator shoes. One person might look at them as a desirable accessory, while another might look at them as a horrible abuse. There are two different domains, one associated with social/cultural capital, and the other with moral abuses.

Finally, I'd like to explain a couple examples of how non-prototypical views of deity are unwanted or marginalized. The human mind likes prototypes, but it often doesn't much care for those entities or items that inhabit the periphery, or that overlap with other categories. These things conflict with our assumptions about how things should be, especially when we're talking about fundamental natural categories like divinity and humanity. Three examples can be found in the first quarter of Genesis of peripheral members of categories being unwanted. The first is the Adam and Eve pericope. By disobeying God and eating the fruit, Adam and Eve become "as the gods, knowing good and evil." Here we have the domain of gods as possessor's of special knowledge. In the ancient Near East, technical, agricultural, and military skills and abilities, were thought to be given to humanity by the gods. Here Adam and Eve appropriate knowledge not intended for them. God prohibits them from eating of the tree of life, which would have imbued them with the most central of divine features: immortality. They are thus stuck between the human and divine categories, and they get ejected from Eden.

In Genesis 6 we have fully divine beings, the Sons of Elohim, descending to impregnate human women. Not only does this indicate genetic compatibility, but it produces offspring who are hybrid species. They are called ancient heroes and warriors, but God is obviously not happy with the situation, so he sends the flood to destroy all living. There is a literary disconnect between the story of the gods and the story of the flood, but this may be a result of the way the stories were redacted rather than their fundamental origins. The final crossing of the fuzzy boundaries of humanity and divinity occurs in the Babel pericope. The humans are building a tower to the heavens, which is where the gods dwell. If the humans make it, the author seems to suggest, they will be capable of anything. God cannot have this, so the humans are scattered and their language confounded. They remain human, and divinity is somehow protected. An example of marginalization in the other direction is Ps 82, where the gods are condemned to death. Their nature as gods is contrasted with the declaration of their mortality, which seems to invalidate their claim to stewardship over the nations. As mortal deities, they are marginalized and rendered irrelevant.

Something these domains illustrate is the multiplicity of viewpoints about the nature and function of divinity. A single definition of deity as a supernatural being, a spiritual being, or a being of the heavenly realms does not account for these differing positions (it relies on Aristotelian theories of classification, which have been shown to be incompatible with the mind's own method). Immortality seems to be a central feature of divinity, but not a necessary one. Knowledge is another feature that is indicated in some contexts. Inhabitation of the heavens is another. Fecundity and power to protect life are activated in other contexts. No context activates all these features.

One can also point to categories like "storm deity" or "high god" as distinct divine categories that comprise distinct features. They are conflated in the Hebrew Bible in Yhwh, though. In their quest to exalt Yhwh over the gods of the nations who continually dominate them, the Israelite literati appropriated for Yhwh salient divine categories until he becomes a super-prototype, effectively crowding out the other deities, who remain confined to individual roles. These roles are then recast as subordinate and contingent roles, and assigned to subordinate and contingent beings: the angels. Yhwh delegates the responsibilities to them. Those responsibilities are beneath him now. (For instance, in the Hebrew Bible, God visits people in dreams; in the New Testament, angels visit people in dreams.) This whole process renders Yhwh the divine prototype, and monotheism is the product. The other gods are not gods in the same sense that God is God, and mainly because he has appropriated all the divine attributes, rendering possessors of this or that attribute derivative and redundant. How do you account for those divine beings? Oh, they're created and contingent being; they're participating in Yhwh's divinity; they're angels; they're "gods" in name only.

I'm interested in your thoughts.

[Bill Hamblin]

This is very interesting. Let me know when I can read the final version!

[J Green]

Regarding observation (1), scholars have long thought of language as an independent and discrete set of structures that people utilize when they want to communicate. This means the general principles of language are universal, minimally influenced by human experience, and can be reconstructed at any time and in any place. Much of biblical lexicography is based on this assumption. Since the 60s, though, research with cognition has shown that language is much more intimately tied to the human experience, so much so that it is considered a function of our cognition. In other words, language is a product of how our brains experience and perceive the world. Language itself is universal, but only as a faculty subordinate to our cognition. This means all the different aspects of our culture, upbringing, and personal background are responsible for our ability to communicate and the exact ways in which we communicate.

I was reading Northrop Frye on my flight back from DC the other day and ran into something similar:

• In my Anatomy of Criticism I remarked that literary criticism was approaching the area of the social sciences. The statement was strongly resisted, as it cut across the conditioned reflexes of most humanists at the time, but language since then has been taken to be a model of investigation in so many fields, and the theory of language has revolutionized so many approaches in pyschology, anthropology, and political theory, to say nothing of literary criticism itself, that no one can any longer regard the humanistic concern with language as separable or even distinguishable from other concerns. (Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature [New York: Harvest/HBJ, 1982], xviii.)

Best of luck on your thesis, Mak.

[maklelan]

I was reading Northrop Frye on my flight back from DC the other day and ran into something similar:

• 
  In my Anatomy of Criticism I remarked that literary criticism was approaching the area of the social sciences. The statement was strongly resisted, as it cut across the conditioned reflexes of most humanists at the time, but language since then has been taken to be a model of investigation in so many fields, and the theory of language has revolutionized so many approaches in pyschology, anthropology, and political theory, to say nothing of literary criticism itself, that no one can any longer regard the humanistic concern with language as separable or even distinguishable from other concerns. (Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature [New York: Harvest/HBJ, 1982], xviii.)
  

Best of luck on your thesis, Mak.

Thanks Bill and J. That's an interesting quote. It's quite a lot of fun digging into the way cognitive linguistics can inform our reading of ancient texts. Unfortunately, because there's so little work in the field, it's taking quite a bit to develop my thoughts, and I need to get this thing done pretty soon.

[Matthew J. Tandy]

Dan,

That was an excellent read. Makes me miss studying it for school. Business isn't nearly as mentally stimulating!

Like Bill, I would be thrilled to read the final product.

[Benjamin McGuire]

Years ago (it must have been six years or so - my wife was expecting our third kid and he's six now), we were at Walmart running some errands, and as we were pulling into the parking lot, a car passed us going out. I didn't recognize it, and my wife asked me - "What kind of car was that?" (With the new kid on the way, we were considering some vehicle changes). I couldn't for the life of me figure out what the car was. It wasn't one I was familiar with. The icon on it was unfamiliar. After a few seconds, my four-year-old daughter piped up with that tone of voice that tells us all that she knows exactly what she is talking about.

"Mom, its a red one".

She was, after all quite right. It was a red car. And for her, at that point in time, I suppose that all cars were classified in the same manner. Red cars, yellow cars, blue cars. In not answering in this way, or even considering this as a real answer to the question, I suspect that I simply assumed (unlike my daughter) that my wife could see the car was red. That it wasn't the kind of answer that she wanted. My looking for an answer presupposed a cognitive type. I was trying to express the make and model. I could have gone with any number of other answers like "it's an SUV", but I suspect too that this would only have earned me a roll of the eyes as if to say, "I could see that". But there it was, and there it went: the red car.

You might really enjoy Umberto Eco's discussions on cognitive types in his book: Kant and the Platypus.

Ben M.

[maklelan]

This reflects Eleanor Rosch's conclusion that it is at the basic level (between the subordinate and supraordinate) that categories are most often communicated. In other word, you have the following:

supraordinate: vehicle

basic level: car

subordinate: Toyota

Your daughter misunderstood, because of her experience with car categories, what kind of subordinate category was meant. I'll check out Eco's book. Thanks!

Edited January 22, 2012 by maklelan