The (strong) free will theorem

[Brade]

Does the mind/body problem really address the free-will issue? If our choices are seated in our consciousness/intelligence/spirit, which (for the sake of argument) we may even assume is independent of the physical universe (in some sense), wouldn't we still have to deal with the issue or whether or not our choices were determined by the previous aspects/states of said consciousness along with the inputs the universe presents?

I'm not sure that it does. All the same problems pop up whether you're a libertarian that believes in an immaterial agent or rather that the mind and the body are identical. And, likewise for the compatibilist and the determinist.

[AmorLibertas]

Then the gods really should look into the infinite improbability drive, makes whale creation much easier and even adds in a free bowl of petunias.

Oh no, not again!

[johndoe]

I'm not sure that it does. All the same problems pop up whether you're a libertarian that believes in an immaterial agent or rather that the mind and the body are identical. And, likewise for the compatibilist and the determinist.

Now that I have more time, Iâ??ll address this in more detail.

There are two separate issues here.

A. Does a focus on the origin of our choices resolve the free will debate?

No, it doesnâ??t, unless we are content to conclude that free will is an impossibility. This is what I get from Strawsonâ??s Basic Argument. That being said, I donâ??t think itâ??s logically consistent to assume on one hand that decisions in our mind can have a completely internal origin while on the other hand considering that those same decisions still could be completely defined and inevitable from prior states. If we keep going back in the past, either we reach the point where the individual in question did not exist as an individual entity (and so all prior states must necessarily be external to said individual), or we have an eternally existent individual (in which case it is difficult to truly consider an initial state, if such a thing can be spoken of intelligently, internal). I admit that, if determinism obtains, our choices have an ultimately external origin (per the Basic Argument). The point I was making was to support Tarskiâ??s assertion that indeterminism doesnâ??t resolve this problem. How can quantum indeterminacy in the brain of an individual be considered an internal origin for a choice? Just because it happened inside the physical cavity where his brain resides? Is that particle really a fundamental part of the individualâ??s mind/consciousness just because of its location inside the brain?

B. How does the assertion that the free will debate is a subset of the Mind-Body Problem provide a resolution the debate?

It doesnâ??t, and I never stated that it would. The assertion that free will is a subset of the Mind-Body Problem doesnâ??t attempt to solve the problem of determinism, it attempts to more precisely define it. I think it provides additional insight into the issue that could ultimately lead to more satisfying formulations indirectly. Or not. But it is an interesting route to explore.

I asked: Why is it relevant to the free will issue whether or not our choices are determined?

An analysis of the typical objection to determinism from folks who accept libertarian free will is instructive. Since heâ??s not here (so to speak), Iâ??ll pick on Log. In the past, Log has stated that if determinism were true, then we would be no different from rocks. The objection certainly isnâ??t always stated this way, but a similar idea is often expressed, i.e. that we would be just robots, or just automatons, etc. For the moment, weâ??ll stick with rocks since it gives a good, stark contrast in order to make the point.

The objection implies several things:

1. We are, in fact, different from rocks in a basic sense that affects free will.

2. If determinism were true, then at worst the seat of our consciousness (our mind) is simply a complex physical system that is the sum of its parts. At best, our mind is only an emergent property of a complex physical system.

3. For an individual to be truly free, the mind of that individual must be more than that implied in #2.

I think that everyone would agree to #1, but #2 (and maybe even #3) is far from obviously true. Maybe #2 obtains, but I donâ??t believe it has been demonstrated (and I currently donâ??t accept it). #3 places the free will debate directly within the overall category of the Mind-Body Problem. It seems to me that all three points stem more from intuition than anything else.

In order for us to move beyond the constant back and forth between the libertarians and compatibilists (where dialogue ultimately breaks down at the points where intuitions clash, IMO), it may be a good idea to focus on how free will should be defined within the context of who we are, and what it means to be a self-aware individual.