LDS Epistemology - What Can We Know? How Can We Know It?

[Brade]

Bat-man, I understand the distinction you're making between "false knowledge" and "true knowledge." All I'm pointing out is that in philosophy we don't speak about it that way. In philosophy the concept of "knowledge" is taken to mean, at least, something that somebody believes, for good reasons, that is true. What you call "false knowledge" and "true knowledge" is the same thing philosophers just call true and false propositions. Part of the reason it's not spoken of in the way you are speaking of it is because it leads to the very confusion we've been mulling over.

I'm aware that when somebody says "I know" that doesn't mean what they claim to know is true. If you read through every post I've ever made on this subject you'll find that I've never asserted that. In fact, the point of this thread is, in part, to undermine that thesis.

But it is possible to think you know the truth when what you know is false. Do you see that?

Yes I see that. I've seen that. I've never asserted anything contrary to that. In epistemology the effort is not trying to show that whenever somebody says "I know" that what they claim to know is true. That's absurd. Epistemology is interested in the conditions that would need to be met in cases where a person does in fact know in the sense that the proposition being known is true.

Perhaps what you think is false is actually true, though.

Have you ever through about that, ba81?

Yes. I have thought about it and I'm finding questions like this insulting and I have this sense that you're intending them to be taken that way.

Good, because that's not what I believe.

I'm just saying a person can have false knowledge, or knowledge which is not true.

I'm confident we're in perfect agreement on the conceptual issue here. You're just speaking in terms that no philosopher has ever used with respect to this issue. And there's a reason they don't use the terms you're using.

Please go back and review everything I have already said now that you are getting a little closer to understanding what I have been talking about. You missed a lot from me because you didn't correctly understand me up to this point, but now it seem that you are headed in the right direction.

I believe I do understand you. I'm just resisting speaking about "propositions" in terms of "true knowledge" and "false knowledge" for the simple fact that the audience I'm writing to, philosophers, don't speak in those terms. They speak in terms of statements or propositions having a truth value and either being right about the truth value, in which case we might say the person knows, or being wrong about the truth value, in which case we would say the person doesn't know. I'm happy that I understand your understanding of propositions but I'm not about to adopt your understanding in an epistemology paper addressed to an audience of formally trained philosophers.

Some people believe what is false while believing it is true, even going so far to state that they know it is true... when it is actually false... and that is what I call false knowledge.

That's right. Some people do believe what is false while believing it is true and even state that they know it is true when it is actually false. You call this "false knowledge." In epistemology this is just called being wrong, or having a false belief about a statement or proposition.

Epistemology is just not at all interested in the rather trivial and ordinary fact that people sometimes claim to know things when what they claim to know is false. As I've already said, epistemology is interested in, among other things, what it would take to justify a claim to knowledge in the right way.

Edit: I have to add one thing. I feel like I've made quite an effort to make sure I have your view right. I believe I've avoided being insulting. I'm not sure I've recieved the same respect from you on both counts. Meaning, I don't feel like you've made any effort at all to try to understand what it is I'm asserting and I've had this sense that some of your comments were intended in some sort of demeaning way (as if you feel like you're talking down to a little child). I may be wrong about the last claim but I feel pretty confident about the first.

[Bat-Man]

Bat-man, I understand the distinction you're making between "false knowledge" and "true knowledge." All I'm pointing out is that in philosophy we don't speak about it that way.

Heh, so it was semantics, all along, huh.

I thought so, at first, but when I had so much trouble conveying my understanding to you, after trying over and over and over again with you telling me that I was wrong, I then became convinced that you just didn't get it.

Words shouldn't get in our way that much when we understand what someone really means.

In philosophy the concept of "knowledge" is taken to mean, at least, something that somebody believes, for good reasons, that is true.

Okay, so with that "knowledge" you should at least be able to grasp the concept of there being "true knowledge" and "false knowledge"... even if you don't agree with the words I am using.

What you call "false knowledge" and "true knowledge" is the same thing philosophers just call true and false propositions. Part of the reason it's not spoken of in the way you are speaking of it is because it leads to the very confusion we've been mulling over.

So, to you, the concepts I was describing would have been crystal clear to you if I had simply used the word "proposition" instead of "knowledge" ?

Heh, I think that's funny, but now that you understand what I mean when I use the term "false knowledge" I hope we won't have any more trouble on this point.

I'm aware that when somebody says "I know" that doesn't mean what they claim to know is true. If you read through every post I've ever made on this subject you'll find that I've never asserted that. In fact, the point of this thread is, in part, to undermine that thesis.

Yes I see that. I've seen that. I've never asserted anything contrary to that.

That's good, ba81. I'm glad we were actually in agreement on this point, all along, even though it seemed to at least one of us that the other one of us just wasn't getting it.

In epistemology the effort is not trying to show that whenever somebody says "I know" that what they claim to know is true. That's absurd. Epistemology is interested in the conditions that would need to be met in cases where a person does in fact know in the sense that the proposition being known is true.

I went into that in depth too, ba81... before we got off track thinking the other one of us was wasn't getting it when we both actually did.

Yes. I have thought about it and I'm finding questions like this insulting and I have this sense that you're intending them to be taken that way.

No, I'm not trying to insult you, and if you really believe I am that is false knowledge on your part.

I'm just trying to check with you to see if you agree on a specific point because it appeared to me that you did not see what I was saying, even though I tried over and over again to make my point clear to you.

I'm confident we're in perfect agreement on the conceptual issue here.

I am too... now... finally. Sheesh.

Can we now please continue our discussion where we left off before we got bogged down with semantics?

You're just speaking in terms that no philosopher has ever used with respect to this issue. And there's a reason they don't use the terms you're using.

As long as we both understand the concepts, and we both know that we both understand the concepts, we can now proceed to go into some more detail.

Personally, I prefer to use the word "knowledge" while labeling that "knowledge" as either false or true knowledge, because to the person who is expressing what you call a "proposition" it is something they "know" and are claiming to "know" rather than merely "proposing".

I believe I do understand you. I'm just resisting speaking about "propositions" in terms of "true knowledge" and "false knowledge" for the simple fact that the audience I'm writing to, philosophers, don't speak in those terms.

It seems to me that those philosophers you are speaking to should open themselves up to more figures of speech. It's the concept that is important, in my perspective.

They speak in terms of statements or propositions having a truth value and either being right about the truth value, in which case we might say the person knows the truth, or being wrong about the truth value, in which case we would say the person doesn't know the truth.

You stopped two words short, in my perspective.

Try adding "the truth" to the end of your statement, as I added in blue highlight.

False knowledge is... of course... not true knowledge.

False knowledge is the opposite of true knowledge.

I'm happy that I understand your understanding of propositions but I'm not about to adopt your understanding in an epistemology paper addressed to an audience of formally trained philosophers.

Heh, my "understanding" is true.

What you don't agree with... if I understand you correctly... is only my choice of words.

Try getting over that hurdle, as I will when you and others use the word "proposition".

That's right. Some people do believe what is false while believing it is true and even state that they know it is true when it is actually false. You call this "false knowledge." In epistemology this is just called being wrong, or having a false belief about a statement or proposition.

My "understanding" of what I mean when I use the term "false knowledge" is pretty much the same thing you are talking about.

I'm not saying that someone knows the truth when they have false knowledge.

You do understand me now... don't you ???

Epistemology is just not at all interested in the rather trivial and ordinary fact that people sometimes claim to know things when what they claim to know is false. As I've already said, epistemology is interested in, among other things, what it would take to justify a claim to knowledge in the right way.

It takes truth to arrive at true knowledge, and it takes what is false to arrive at false knowledge.

There. That settles that point.

What else do they want to know about?

Edit: I have to add one thing. I feel like I've made quite an effort to make sure I have your view right. I believe I've avoided being insulting. I'm not sure I've recieved the same respect from you on both counts. Meaning, I don't feel like you've made any effort at all to try to understand what it is I'm asserting and I've had this sense that some of your comments were intended in some sort of demeaning way (as if you feel like you're talking down to a little child). I may be wrong about the last claim but I feel pretty confident about the first.

Yes, you are wrong in thinking that I was trying to insult you. I did run out of patience with you a few times after I kept having to explain things to you over and over and over again when it seemed to me that you just didn't get what I was talking about, and I did express my impatience with you on those occasions, but I wasn't trying to insult you. If anything, it was my problem for running out of patience with you, and I did ask you to bear with me as I tried to explain things to you.

Don't worry, though. I won't hold the fact that I ran out of patience with you against me.

... because I know that I am not perfect... yet.