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Hugo Grotius's On the Law of War and Peace in comparison with the Book of Mormon


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Posted

In this thread, the text I will generally be quoting and referencing is Stephen C. Neff's Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace. The translation is not new, it uses the 1925 Francis W. Kelsey translation of the 5th edition (published posthumously in 1646) which contained only typographic corrections from the fourth and final edition published by Grotius in 1642. For those wishing to follow along, there is a online version of the Kelsey translation here.

I would personally like to focus on a few points that interest me:

1: The extensive development in Grotius's text of the idea of natural law, and the morality of 'natural law'. I believe that this comes into sharp contrast with the Book of Mormon's criticism of the 'natural man'

2: I am interested in discussing the issues raised by Moroni in Alma 43. I think that this discussion of using strategy as a part of warfare, and its appropriateness (this is a highly dialogic part of the text) is fascinating, and probably most closely represents some of Grotius's thought in his volume.

3: I would like to discuss the differences between the two over using property as a justification for just war (the Book of Mormon seems in favor of this, Grotius is generally opposed to it).

4: Lastly, I am interested in the contrast between Grotius and the Book of Mormon on the topic of violent revolution - when it is allowed, and when it isn't.

@JarMan - pick one of these or offer one of your own, and we can start the discussion there. Also, as the discussion develops, I would like to welcome our resident scholar of historical warfare and its justifications - @morgan.deane to chime in. I am curious to know what he thinks about my short list here.

Posted (edited)
18 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

In this thread, the text I will generally be quoting and referencing is Stephen C. Neff's Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace. The translation is not new, it uses the 1925 Francis W. Kelsey translation of the 5th edition (published posthumously in 1646) which contained only typographic corrections from the fourth and final edition published by Grotius in 1642. For those wishing to follow along, there is a online version of the Kelsey translation here.

.............................

@JarMan - pick one of these or offer one of your own, and we can start the discussion there. Also, as the discussion develops, I would like to welcome our resident scholar of historical warfare and its justifications - @morgan.deane to chime in. I am curious to know what he thinks about my short list here.

Excellent idea, Ben, and we should also see what @Zosimus has to say as well, since he and JarMan both argue for someone in Early Modern English times to have authored or translated the Book of Mormon.  We may also want to examine the life and writings of Dr John Dee, since so much of what Joseph Smith did fits so tightly with the ideas of the Renaissance magi, of which Dee was one of the most prominent.

 

Edited by Robert F. Smith
Posted
5 hours ago, Robert F. Smith said:

@Rajah Manchou has to say as well, since he and JarMan both argue for someone in Early Modern English times to have authored or translated the Book of Mormon

Rajah Manchou is my old account I can no longer access. I’d posted a comment on Dee and Postel in the Caesar thread, will let Ben and Jarman focus on the OP in this thread

Posted
6 hours ago, Zosimus said:

Rajah Manchou is my old account I can no longer access. I’d posted a comment on Dee and Postel in the Caesar thread, will let Ben and Jarman focus on the OP in this thread

John Dee (1527-1508) was used as the model for the magus Prospero by Shakespeare in "The Tempest."  Cf. John Dee’s “Book of Enoch” (1583 Sloane MS 3189, British Library), and Ludovico Lazzarelli’s Epistola Enoch.

Posted
18 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

In this thread, the text I will generally be quoting and referencing is Stephen C. Neff's Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace. The translation is not new, it uses the 1925 Francis W. Kelsey translation of the 5th edition (published posthumously in 1646) which contained only typographic corrections from the fourth and final edition published by Grotius in 1642. For those wishing to follow along, there is a online version of the Kelsey translation here.

I would personally like to focus on a few points that interest me:

1: The extensive development in Grotius's text of the idea of natural law, and the morality of 'natural law'. I believe that this comes into sharp contrast with the Book of Mormon's criticism of the 'natural man'

2: I am interested in discussing the issues raised by Moroni in Alma 43. I think that this discussion of using strategy as a part of warfare, and its appropriateness (this is a highly dialogic part of the text) is fascinating, and probably most closely represents some of Grotius's thought in his volume.

3: I would like to discuss the differences between the two over using property as a justification for just war (the Book of Mormon seems in favor of this, Grotius is generally opposed to it).

4: Lastly, I am interested in the contrast between Grotius and the Book of Mormon on the topic of violent revolution - when it is allowed, and when it isn't.

@JarMan - pick one of these or offer one of your own, and we can start the discussion there. Also, as the discussion develops, I would like to welcome our resident scholar of historical warfare and its justifications - @morgan.deane to chime in. I am curious to know what he thinks about my short list here.

Another good translation can be found here: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/grotius-the-rights-of-war-and-peace-2005-ed-3-vols.

I think the most logical place to start is at the beginning of the Book of Mormon and then progress through it. The first place in the B of M we really encounter something contemplated in de jure is the story with Laban. There is some relevant material in Book 1, Chapter 3. The big question here is whether Nephi was justified in killing Laban. Nephi justified his actions, but what would Grotius think about them? I think this is a good place to start the discussion.

Posted (edited)
9 hours ago, JarMan said:

I think the most logical place to start is at the beginning of the Book of Mormon and then progress through it. The first place in the B of M we really encounter something contemplated in de jure is the story with Laban. There is some relevant material in Book 1, Chapter 3. The big question here is whether Nephi was justified in killing Laban. Nephi justified his actions, but what would Grotius think about them? I think this is a good place to start the discussion.

I don't think that this is the most logical approach - but it really doesn't matter. Nephi's encounter with Laban is a narrative that I am very familiar with. I am not sure what parts of Book 1 Chapter 3 you think are relevant in Grotius.

A large part of Nephi's argument revolves around property. I can summarize - Nephi wants the property in the hands of Laban. He offers to buy it, and has his own property stolen. He then kills Laban to take the property that he wants (and not the property that was stolen from him). All of these points are of interest because in various ways, Grotius comments on them. Nephi uses the fact that his property had been stolen as part of the justification for his killing Laban:

Quote

And the Spirit said unto me again: Behold the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands. Yea, and I also knew that he had sought to take away mine own life; yea, and he would not hearken unto the commandments of the Lord; and he also had taken away our property.

Grotius does hold that killing someone in self defense isn't merely a just cause for private war - he holds that it is a natural law (completely moral) for someone to kill someone in personal self defense. I will come back to this in a moment - because this is very narrow - and the narrowness in Grotius is important for the discussion of the Book of Mormon here.

But, on the issue of property, Grotius's point of view is very clear and not that narrow at all. This is from Book 2, Chapter 1, Section 13:

Quote

That the law of the Gospel demands more from us, I do not doubt. For if Christ bids that a tunic and a cloak be given up, and Paul, that an unjust loss be endured, rather than that recourse be had to a lawsuit – a contest without bloodshed – how much more do they wish that things also of greater value be relinquished rather than that a man, the image of God, sprung from the same blood with ourselves, should be killed!Wherefore, if a thing belonging to us can be saved in such a way that there seems to be no danger of causing death, it may rightly be defended; if not, then the thing should be given up, unless perchance it is of such a sort that our life and the life of our family is dependent on it and it cannot be recovered by process of law, since the thief is unknown, and also that there is some prospect that recovery will be made without slaughter. Although to-day almost all jurists and theologians teach that we have a right to kill a man in the defence of our property, even going beyond the limits within which such an act was permitted by the law of Moses and the Roman law – as, for instance, if the thief be making off with what he has stolen – nevertheless we do not doubt that the opinion which we have just set forth was held by the early Christians. In this matter, undoubtedly, as in many others, discipline has become relaxed with time, and little by little the interpretation of the law of the Gospel has begun to be adjusted to the customs of the age. Formerly among the clergy, conformity to the ancient practice was ordinarily kept up; but finally even the clergy have been released from censure in this matter.

1: We can say with some certainty I think that Nephi ticks all of these boxes which would not allow him to kill Laban under Grotius's principles here. The family treasures that Laban stole clearly were not necessary to the family (that they leave without them when they go the first time, and that they never recover them is an explicit statement by the text of their non-necessity). We don't know if there was an available judicial avenue to regain their possessions (the Book of Mormon has no interest in the question). So here, Grotius would not side with Nephi over the issue that the stolen property could contribute to the justification for Laban's death.

2: Nephi is stealing Laban's property. While Nephi does provide a justification of sorts for taking some of it - I'll get to that in a moment - the immediate action was that Nephi killed Laban and "took the garments of Laban and put them upon mine own body; yea, even every whit; and I did gird on his armor about my loins." (1 Nephi 4:19). So Nephi kills Laban and steals his property.

3: When Grotius discusses one of the few conditions under which he believes it is appropriate to kill a thief, he writes this (Book 1, Chapter 3, Section 2):

Quote

It seems clear that this ordinance, which makes so careful a distinction, not only assures impunity but also explains the law of nature, and that it is not founded upon a special divine mandate, but grounded in common equity. Hence, we see, other nations also followed it. Well known is the provision of the Twelve Tables, undoubtedly taken from the ancient Attic law: ‘If a theft has been committed at night, and anyone has killed the thief, be it that the thief was rightly slain.’ Thus by the laws of all peoples known to us, the person who in peril of his life has by means of arms defended himself against an assailant is adjudged innocent. An agreement so manifest furnishes in itself the proof that in it there is nothing in conflict with the law of nature.

Now this section is important for a couple of reasons. By ordinance, Grotius is referring to his principles of Natural Law - that a person is allowed to defend themselves by violence only when there are no alternative options. But the situation described here is the reverse of what is in the Book of Mormon. It is Nephi who is the thief. It is Nephi who is out in the night - see 1 Nephi 4:5 where Nephi records "And it was by night; ... I, Nephi, crept into the city and went forth towards the house of Laban." Had Laban awoken and killed Nephi he would have been completely justified in doing so according to Grotius. There is something more interesting here. This is the appeal to natural law (and the reason why I am interested in this discussion in Grotius). Grotius wants us to understand that natural law - the principle that drives his entire discussion in these three volumes is "grounded in common equity" and not "a special divine mandate". And this is fascinating because if we could make an argument about Nephi's killing of Laban here, it would entirely revolve around the notion of a special divine mandate. So for example, 4:12 - "And it came to pass that the Spirit said unto me again: Slay him, for the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands." Which brings us to the other major point that Nephi raises in his own defense: "It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief." So we have this argument that it is okay to kill Laban because the eventual outcome of that killing will be the saving of a lot of people (an entire nation). So how does Grotius feel about this? Book 2 Chapter 1 Section 3 argues that War is justified in the defense of life. But then in Section 4, Grotius clarifies this:

Quote

It has been well said by Thomas [Aquinas] – if he is rightly understood – that if a man in true self-defence kills his assailant, the slaying is not intentional. The reason is not that, if no othermeans of safety is at hand, it is not sometimes permissible to do with set purpose that which will cause the death of the assailant; it is, rather, that in such a case the inflicting of death is not the primary intent, as it is in the case of procedure by process of law, but the only resource available at the time.12 Even under such circumstances the person who is attacked ought to prefer to do anything possible to frighten away or weaken the assailant, rather than cause his death.

The Book of Mormon makes it very clear that this isn't the case. Laban is passed out drunk. He is not a threat. He is not an assailant. And Grotius doesn't recognize this idea of unbelief as an assailant. In Section 5, Grotius narrows this even further. War in defense of life is permissible when:

Quote

The danger, again, must be immediate and imminent in point of time. I admit, to be sure, that if the assailant seizes weapons in such a way that his intent to kill is manifest the crime can be forestalled; for in morals as in material things a point is not to be found which does not have a certain breadth. But those who accept fear of any sort as justifying anticipatory slaying are themselves greatly deceived, and deceive others.

And this is where Nephi's actions go off the rails as far as Grotius is concerned. If the danger is not immediate or 'imminent in point of time' there is no justification. Is there any doubt that Nephi's killing Laban in this context is an "anticipatory slaying"?

There are other issues. In Section 9, Grotius points out that we should try even harder to avoid killing a "person useful to the state". Such an argument is made in Laban's designated position as such an important person (that he can command fifty, and even potentially that he has possession of the Brass Plates, and so on).

So here in this narrative, over and over again, I find a text that presents a scenario that contradicts a great deal of what Grotius has to say - to the point that I do not believe that Grotius would be holding out this sort of example as a representation of what a just private war would look like.

Edit: I just wanted to add that there is another layer to this. The Book of Mormon clearly (in my opinion) deliberately alludes to the narrative of David and Goliath. I haven't yet gotten into the question of how that reading impacts the idea that Grotius wrote this - but I think that it is an important consideration. In his entire volume on war and peace, there is no mention of David or Goliath or their relevance to any of the issues raised by Grotius in the three volumes of his work.

Edited by Benjamin McGuire
Posted (edited)

I appreciate being tagged on this. My newest book on just war in the Book of Mormon discusses Grotius a great deal. Its been well reviewed thus far and you can read those reviews and find a link to the book here: https://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2024/12/reviews-of-my-new-book.html

I've been working a great deal so I can't go into extensive detail but I've got a few points worth mentioning about the topic.

The major thrust of my book doesn't simply show congruency. As Ben has explained (many, many times) I think people tend to see what they want to see so the comparisons aren't very useful. What I did was use the keen insights of Grotius to better explain under studied elements in the Book of Mormon, and then in turn use those extra insights from the Book of Mormon to comment on matters of just war. Its a conversation among great thinkers more than finding comparisons. 

To cite one specific topic with two examples we might look at the concept of preemptive war. I know most people think the Book of Mormon dismisses the concept out of hand. But the most frequently cited verse in Mormon 4, actually condemns the heart that makes the strategy not the strategy. The Nephites lost a great deal on the defensive too. I found 9 other verses that discuss the concept and show its use. I don't want to get too off in the weeds but if you want you can read more about it here: https://squaretwo.org/Sq2ArticleDeaneKishkumenDagger.html

Probably the most important scriptures for this discussion are Alma 46:30 when Moroni justifies his capture attempted capture of Amalickiah, and Helaman's servant in Helaman 2 that preemptively kills the assassin before he kills Helaman. 

These are important for how they interact with Grotius. Most justifications for preemptive war, outside of some more extreme views like Vattel, Gentili, or the Chinese Shizi, focus on the present. According to these theorists, if a nation focused on the past to justify preemptive war leaders would claim that they are reacting to the nefarious nature of the opposing regimes that are warlike and bloodthirsty and thus must be attacked first before they attack again (see Epaminondas for example). A focus on the future would be similar to the Thucydides trap, where Athens, WW1 Britain, WW2 Germany are respectively worried about a rising Sparta, Germany, and Russia. They have to attack now to prevent some greater calamity in the future. But the present is the more accepted position. You can read this from Walzer or in the Caroline Standard, but Grotius' criteria is still the most useful when he said that an enemy must have intent, means  and the defending nation must face an imminent attack. Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83-84.

This is where both examples from the Book of Mormon matter. If you read Alma 46:30, you see that all of Moroni's concern's are in the future. Amalickiah has been defeated and is running away, there is no imminent attack, only future problems:

 Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any more strength; therefore he thought to cut off the people of Amalickiah, or to take them and bring them back, and put Amalickiah to death; yea, for he knew that he would stir up the Lamanites to anger against them, and cause them to come to battle against them; and this he knew that Amalickiah would do that he might obtain his purposes.

This might seem like really obscure theory, but if Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon he wouldn't include details and narratives that contradicted his ideas of imminency. In fact,  many people dissented from the Lamanite king and then seized the "place of arms" (Alma 47:2; 5). So you could argue Amalickiah didn't have means either and many Lamanites didn't have the intent. So Grotius wrote a narrative that contradicts his theory of preemption, and then provided narrative details where Amalickiah fulfilled every worry that Moroni had, thus undermining his own theories even more.      

The second verse regards Helaman's servant who preemptively killed Kishkumen during his assassination attempt on Helaman. This one is even more clear because Grotius wrote about robbers as a reason for law enforcement and not deadly preemption: if the conspirators “formed a plot, prepar[ed] an ambuscade, poisoning, or readied a false accusation [the planner] cannot lawfully be killed either if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if [the ruler] thought delays could afford remedies.” (Ibid.) In other words, if the plot can be neutralized by the defenders using other remedies, then they likely haven't gathered the means, shown intent, and attack it isn't imminent enough to warrant deadly force. 

Yet the servant of Helaman didn't take any other remedies. He was "out by night" and seemingly had plenty of advanced notice (Helaman 2:6). Kishkumen let his guard down and there was time as they "were going forth" to the judgement seat (2:9). A chapter before Nephite leaders seized incipient rebels like Paanchi  and killed them (Helaman 1:8; notice the preemption of the Nephites leaders as they seized him when he was "about" to flatter). Yet the narrative says Helaman's servant killed Kishkumen. We don't exactly know why he didn't call for the guards instead of killing them. But if Grotius wrote the narrative, we would assume that he would clearly articulate his previously stated beliefs that there was enough time to "use other remedies." Some might argue that the narrative doesn't clearly endorse this story as righteous so why bother. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that Moroni's dramatic use of omission about Helaman's servant, while simultaneously detailing the nefarious Gadianton plot, highlights the righteousness of Helaman's servant: https://interpreterfoundation.org/nameless-mormons-dramatic-use-of-omission-in-helaman-2/ 

Here are a couple examples where extremely specific details from Grotius are entirely contradicted by the Book of Mormon text. I don't like simply showing congruency, or authorship based on poorly thought out similarities. As you can see just from two small examples, a careful study of scriptures, and using those scriptures to have a conversation with the best philosophers, brings new insights and deepens faith. I know I'm biased, but given the positive reactions to my book, and how I've independently published or presented 7 different times based on material from the book, I think its incredibly fruitful. 

 

Edited by morgan.deane
Posted
10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

I don't think that this is the most logical approach - but it really doesn't matter. Nephi's encounter with Laban is a narrative that I am very familiar with. I am not sure what parts of Book 1 Chapter 3 you think are relevant in Grotius.

I'm happy to let you choose the next discussion topic, then. (I was hasty in pointing out Book 1, Chapter 3. I meant to refer to Book 2, Chapter 1 as you have identified.)

10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

A large part of Nephi's argument revolves around property. I can summarize - Nephi wants the property in the hands of Laban. He offers to buy it, and has his own property stolen. He then kills Laban to take the property that he wants (and not the property that was stolen from him). All of these points are of interest because in various ways, Grotius comments on them. Nephi uses the fact that his property had been stolen as part of the justification for his killing Laban:

Grotius does hold that killing someone in self defense isn't merely a just cause for private war - he holds that it is a natural law (completely moral) for someone to kill someone in personal self defense. I will come back to this in a moment - because this is very narrow - and the narrowness in Grotius is important for the discussion of the Book of Mormon here.

But, on the issue of property, Grotius's point of view is very clear and not that narrow at all. This is from Book 2, Chapter 1, Section 13:

Here you are presenting a snippet that doesn't provide the entire context. Early on in Section 2, when speaking of justifiable causes of war, Grotius says, "Justifiable causes include defence, the obtaining of that which belongs to us or is our due, and the inflicting of punishment". Of particular relevance is "that which belongs to us" (obviously Nephi's family's property fits in this category) and "or is our due" (the brass plates may fit into this category).

Then in Sections 11, 12, and 13 he expands on his assertion from Section 2, but applies it to "private war." And he explains it under three different systems: 1) Natural Law (Section 11), 2) Mosaic Law (Section 12), and 3) Law of the Gospel (Section 13).

Section 11: "By the law of nature it is permissible to kill in defence of property". Here he is talking about "expletive justice" which essentially alludes to a state in which there is no higher power to administer justice--a hypothetical primitive state. By the natural law, then, Nephi clearly has a right to kill Laban in order to retrieve his property.

Section 12: "How far defence of property is permitted by the law of Moses" sets some limitations to rights that aren't limited from the natural law perspective. The limits come partly because there is an administrative state to help catch a thief and administer justice--"attributive justice"--that seeks a balanced justice attuned to the greater public good.

Section 13: "Whether, and under what limitations, it is permissible, according to the law of the Gospel, to kill in defence of property" (the section you quoted from) provides further limitations to our rights when dealing with a thief. These limitations are there because of NT teachings. But note that the option to kill a thief still remains open in extraordinary circumstances: "Wherefore, if a thing belonging to us can be saved in such a way that there seems to be no danger of causing death, it may rightly be defended; if not, then the thing should be given up, unless perchance it is of such a sort that our life and the life of our family is dependent on it and it cannot be recovered by process of law, since the thief is unknown, and also that there is some prospect that recovery will be made without slaughter."

So where does Nephi fit into this? Which system of law is he subject to? Probably not to the Law of the Gospel. But the truth is that Nephi really doesn't fit into any of these law systems because he had the ultimate extenuating circumstances--the Lord commanded him to kill Laban. The brass plates were so important to the Nephites that the Lord judged that Laban's life was fair game. This brings up another issue, which is that Nephi wasn't killing Laban to retrieve the property that had been seized, he was after Laban's property. So, since this story covers ground that Grotius doesn't  even contemplate in DJB, we can't really know how he would perceive this particular situation. What we do know, however, is that Grotius was not absolutely opposed to killing somebody to obtain "that which belongs to us or is our due" even if that person didn't represent an immediate threat to life or limb. He just had a high bar for when that was permissible. I would argue that that bar was met and far surpassed in Nephi's case.

14 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

1: We can say with some certainty I think that Nephi ticks all of these boxes which would not allow him to kill Laban under Grotius's principles here. The family treasures that Laban stole clearly were not necessary to the family (that they leave without them when they go the first time, and that they never recover them is an explicit statement by the text of their non-necessity). We don't know if there was an available judicial avenue to regain their possessions (the Book of Mormon has no interest in the question). So here, Grotius would not side with Nephi over the issue that the stolen property could contribute to the justification for Laban's death.

2: Nephi is stealing Laban's property. While Nephi does provide a justification of sorts for taking some of it - I'll get to that in a moment - the immediate action was that Nephi killed Laban and "took the garments of Laban and put them upon mine own body; yea, even every whit; and I did gird on his armor about my loins." (1 Nephi 4:19). So Nephi kills Laban and steals his property.

3: When Grotius discusses one of the few conditions under which he believes it is appropriate to kill a thief, he writes this (Book 1, Chapter 3, Section 2):

Now this section is important for a couple of reasons. By ordinance, Grotius is referring to his principles of Natural Law - that a person is allowed to defend themselves by violence only when there are no alternative options. But the situation described here is the reverse of what is in the Book of Mormon. It is Nephi who is the thief. It is Nephi who is out in the night - see 1 Nephi 4:5 where Nephi records "And it was by night; ... I, Nephi, crept into the city and went forth towards the house of Laban." Had Laban awoken and killed Nephi he would have been completely justified in doing so according to Grotius. There is something more interesting here. This is the appeal to natural law (and the reason why I am interested in this discussion in Grotius). Grotius wants us to understand that natural law - the principle that drives his entire discussion in these three volumes is "grounded in common equity" and not "a special divine mandate". And this is fascinating because if we could make an argument about Nephi's killing of Laban here, it would entirely revolve around the notion of a special divine mandate. So for example, 4:12 - "And it came to pass that the Spirit said unto me again: Slay him, for the Lord hath delivered him into thy hands." Which brings us to the other major point that Nephi raises in his own defense: "It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief." So we have this argument that it is okay to kill Laban because the eventual outcome of that killing will be the saving of a lot of people (an entire nation). So how does Grotius feel about this? Book 2 Chapter 1 Section 3 argues that War is justified in the defense of life. But then in Section 4, Grotius clarifies this:

The Book of Mormon makes it very clear that this isn't the case. Laban is passed out drunk. He is not a threat. He is not an assailant. And Grotius doesn't recognize this idea of unbelief as an assailant. In Section 5, Grotius narrows this even further. War in defense of life is permissible when:

And this is where Nephi's actions go off the rails as far as Grotius is concerned. If the danger is not immediate or 'imminent in point of time' there is no justification. Is there any doubt that Nephi's killing Laban in this context is an "anticipatory slaying"?

There are other issues. In Section 9, Grotius points out that we should try even harder to avoid killing a "person useful to the state". Such an argument is made in Laban's designated position as such an important person (that he can command fifty, and even potentially that he has possession of the Brass Plates, and so on).

So here in this narrative, over and over again, I find a text that presents a scenario that contradicts a great deal of what Grotius has to say - to the point that I do not believe that Grotius would be holding out this sort of example as a representation of what a just private war would look like.

Edit: I just wanted to add that there is another layer to this. The Book of Mormon clearly (in my opinion) deliberately alludes to the narrative of David and Goliath. I haven't yet gotten into the question of how that reading impacts the idea that Grotius wrote this - but I think that it is an important consideration. In his entire volume on war and peace, there is no mention of David or Goliath or their relevance to any of the issues raised by Grotius in the three volumes of his work.

Grotius allows for extenuating circumstances and I think a good argument can be made that Nephi qualifies under these. But having said that, it doesn't matter all that much because God commanded Nephi to kill Laban. We really ought be asking whether God, in Grotius' view, would ever command such a thing. Another way of asking this question is: assuming that God only issues just commands, would Grotius' view of divine justice contradict the justice of Nephi's god?

Posted
5 hours ago, morgan.deane said:

I appreciate being tagged on this. My newest book on just war in the Book of Mormon discusses Grotius a great deal. Its been well reviewed thus far and you can read those reviews and find a link to the book here: https://mormonwar.blogspot.com/2024/12/reviews-of-my-new-book.html

I've been working a great deal so I can't go into extensive detail but I've got a few points worth mentioning about the topic.

The major thrust of my book doesn't simply show congruency. As Ben has explained (many, many times) I think people tend to see what they want to see so the comparisons aren't very useful. What I did was use the keen insights of Grotius to better explain under studied elements in the Book of Mormon, and then in turn use those extra insights from the Book of Mormon to comment on matters of just war. Its a conversation among great thinkers more than finding comparisons. 

To cite one specific topic with two examples we might look at the concept of preemptive war. I know most people think the Book of Mormon dismisses the concept out of hand. But the most frequently cited verse in Mormon 4, actually condemns the heart that makes the strategy not the strategy. The Nephites lost a great deal on the defensive too. I found 9 other verses that discuss the concept and show its use. I don't want to get too off in the weeds but if you want you can read more about it here: https://squaretwo.org/Sq2ArticleDeaneKishkumenDagger.html

Probably the most important scriptures for this discussion are Alma 46:30 when Moroni justifies his capture attempted capture of Amalickiah, and Helaman's servant in Helaman 2 that preemptively kills the assassin before he kills Helaman. 

These are important for how they interact with Grotius. Most justifications for preemptive war, outside of some more extreme views like Vattel, Gentili, or the Chinese Shizi, focus on the present. According to these theorists, if a nation focused on the past to justify preemptive war leaders would claim that they are reacting to the nefarious nature of the opposing regimes that are warlike and bloodthirsty and thus must be attacked first before they attack again (see Epaminondas for example). A focus on the future would be similar to the Thucydides trap, where Athens, WW1 Britain, WW2 Germany are respectively worried about a rising Sparta, Germany, and Russia. They have to attack now to prevent some greater calamity in the future. But the present is the more accepted position. You can read this from Walzer or in the Caroline Standard, but Grotius' criteria is still the most useful when he said that an enemy must have intent, means  and the defending nation must face an imminent attack. Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Stephen Neff trans., (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 83-84.

This is where both examples from the Book of Mormon matter. If you read Alma 46:30, you see that all of Moroni's concern's are in the future. Amalickiah has been defeated and is running away, there is no imminent attack, only future problems:

 Now Moroni thought it was not expedient that the Lamanites should have any more strength; therefore he thought to cut off the people of Amalickiah, or to take them and bring them back, and put Amalickiah to death; yea, for he knew that he would stir up the Lamanites to anger against them, and cause them to come to battle against them; and this he knew that Amalickiah would do that he might obtain his purposes.

This might seem like really obscure theory, but if Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon he wouldn't include details and narratives that contradicted his ideas of imminency. In fact,  many people dissented from the Lamanite king and then seized the "place of arms" (Alma 47:2; 5). So you could argue Amalickiah didn't have means either and many Lamanites didn't have the intent. So Grotius wrote a narrative that contradicts his theory of preemption, and then provided narrative details where Amalickiah fulfilled every worry that Moroni had, thus undermining his own theories even more.      

The second verse regards Helaman's servant who preemptively killed Kishkumen during his assassination attempt on Helaman. This one is even more clear because Grotius wrote about robbers as a reason for law enforcement and not deadly preemption: if the conspirators “formed a plot, prepar[ed] an ambuscade, poisoning, or readied a false accusation [the planner] cannot lawfully be killed either if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if [the ruler] thought delays could afford remedies.” (Ibid.) In other words, if the plot can be neutralized by the defenders using other remedies, then they likely haven't gathered the means, shown intent, and attack it isn't imminent enough to warrant deadly force. 

Yet the servant of Helaman didn't take any other remedies. He was "out by night" and seemingly had plenty of advanced notice (Helaman 2:6). Kishkumen let his guard down and there was time as they "were going forth" to the judgement seat (2:9). A chapter before Nephite leaders seized incipient rebels like Paanchi  and killed them (Helaman 1:8; notice the preemption of the Nephites leaders as they seized him when he was "about" to flatter). Yet the narrative says Helaman's servant killed Kishkumen. We don't exactly know why he didn't call for the guards instead of killing them. But if Grotius wrote the narrative, we would assume that he would clearly articulate his previously stated beliefs that there was enough time to "use other remedies." Some might argue that the narrative doesn't clearly endorse this story as righteous so why bother. But a recent Interpreter article suggests that Moroni's dramatic use of omission about Helaman's servant, while simultaneously detailing the nefarious Gadianton plot, highlights the righteousness of Helaman's servant: https://interpreterfoundation.org/nameless-mormons-dramatic-use-of-omission-in-helaman-2/ 

Here are a couple examples where extremely specific details from Grotius are entirely contradicted by the Book of Mormon text. I don't like simply showing congruency, or authorship based on poorly thought out similarities. As you can see just from two small examples, a careful study of scriptures, and using those scriptures to have a conversation with the best philosophers, brings new insights and deepens faith. I know I'm biased, but given the positive reactions to my book, and how I've independently published or presented 7 different times based on material from the book, I think its incredibly fruitful. 

Glad to have you be part of this discussion. You bring up several interesting items that I think will be interesting to discuss. I have to say, though, that I'm going to try hard to keep this discussion focused on one issue at a time. This is for my own selfish reasons--basically I have limited bandwidth and want to have the time to do the necessary research as I formulate my responses. Chasing multiple topics will wear me out or drive me crazy.

Posted
3 hours ago, JarMan said:

Here you are presenting a snippet that doesn't provide the entire context. Early on in Section 2, when speaking of justifiable causes of war, Grotius says, "Justifiable causes include defence, the obtaining of that which belongs to us or is our due, and the inflicting of punishment". Of particular relevance is "that which belongs to us" (obviously Nephi's family's property fits in this category) and "or is our due" (the brass plates may fit into this category).

No, this really doesn't work. The reason why is that in Book 2, Chapter 1, Section 2, we don't have any of what Grotius's views are. Grotius writes: "Authorities generally assign to wars three justifiable causes, defence, recover or property, and punishment." It is this premise that Grotius then goes on to take apart over the next several sections - where he shows where war in each case is justified, and where it is not, and tries to clearly delineate between justifiable and unjustifiable war. We can see this in the last sentence of Section 2: "The first cause of justifiable war, then, is an injury not yet inflicted, which menaces either person or property." And if this was the end of it, you would be right. But it isn't the end of it. Each of the subsequent sections is an examination of different facets of these claims - and it is in these sections that Grotius denies to some extent the justifications listed at the end of Section 2. Sections 11 through 13 detail his beliefs on killing over property - and they are variously titled: "11 Killing in defence of property," "12 How far the defence of property is permitted by the law of Moses," and "Killing in defense of property according to the law of the Gospel." And it is in these sections that we find Grotius's personal views that:

Quote

if a thing belonging to us can be saved in such a way that there seems to be no danger of causing death, it may rightly be defended; if not, then the thing should be given up, unless perchance it is of such a sort that our life and the life of our family is dependent on it and it cannot be recovered by process of law, since the thief is unknown, and also that there is some prospect that recovery will be made without slaughter. ... we do not doubt that the opinion which we have just set forth was held by the early Christians.

And this is Grotius's position - that killing in the defense of property is allowed only in very narrow circumstances where natural law makes such a thing moral. But, for Grotius, natural law doesn't allow for killing in defense of property outside of those very narrow contexts. Now this would be just fine if we could place that narrow context in the narrative in 1 Nephi 3-4. But we can't. If anything, the context in 1 Nephi is written to be clearly outside of those exclusions that Grotius carves out. And so you cannot apply Grotius to Nephi's family property. Nephi has already excluded the necessity of this property explicitly. We get this detail most vividly when Nephi writes:

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therefore let us go down to the land of our father’s inheritance, for behold he left gold and silver, and all manner of riches. (1 Nephi 3:16).

Grotius writes that you can kill for your property if "perchance it is of such a sort that our life and the life of our family is dependent on it." If Lehi abandoned it in his departure from Jerusalem, it is impossible to make this claim. The claim is also rejected by the fact that Nephi never recovers that property - choosing instead to take Laban's armor, his sword, his garments, and the Brass Plates (not to mention his servant Zoram). So, we can say conclusively that this was never a consideration on Nephi's part. This is what the problem is. The citation of 2.1.2 isn't particularly helpful here.

4 hours ago, JarMan said:

Section 11: "By the law of nature it is permissible to kill in defence of property". Here he is talking about "expletive justice" which essentially alludes to a state in which there is no higher power to administer justice--a hypothetical primitive state. By the natural law, then, Nephi clearly has a right to kill Laban in order to retrieve his property.

And this isn't the case. The reason why, as you suggest, is that this natural state of warfare (you should read Grotius's contemporary Hobbes on this one), doesn't exist. It alludes to a condition where every man is for himself. The challenge with that natural state is that it doesn't exist in the Book of Mormon narrative. And in section 11, Grotius puts in a clear qualifier: "if we have in view this right only ..." But not only do we not have this right only in view, the narrative in the Book of Mormon makes it clear that this isn't a killing that is based on the theft of property. How do we know this? Because the property is never discussed subsequent to Laban's death. Nephi doesn't go to Laban's servant and ask for the property that was taken from him. So while we can look at Grotius as allowing the defense of property as a justifiable cause for killing, Grotius only allows it in that hypothetical primitive state (where there is no society between men). And Grotius only allows for it in defense of property - which isn't what the Book of Mormon narrative suggests at all. So this doesn't work in the Book of Mormon narrative. The second paragraph in Section 11 is also really important to understanding Grotius's view - it reads:

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If, furthermore, we leave divine and human law out of account, regard for others, viewed as a principle of conduct, interposes no hindrance to such action, unless the stolen property is of extremely slight value and consequently worthy of no consideration. This exception is by some rightly added.

And this is really important - because what Grotius is saying here is that for us to accept this idea - that we can kill in the defense of property in the natural state - we have to ignore or discount both the existence of human law (which comes with society) and divine law (the commandment from God not to kill). And of course that last bit is that some who ignore the legal and divine aspects of the question suggests that this natural condition shouldn't be allowed to apply when it comes to things of very little worth. You can see here that Grotius is looking for ways to constrain this idea of the natural condition of man. Hobbes may well be one of those that Grotius recgonizes as not recognizing any limitations since he writes in Leviathon that in the state of war "nothing can be unjust. (Chap. 13)."

At any rate, the point of all of this is that this section cannot apply to the situation in the Book of Mormon for many reasons. The two broadest ate that the narrative doesn't support this condition (the state of war) and the narrative doesn't have Nephi recovering the stolen property - that is, Nephi's reasons for killing Laban are not to recover that stolen property at all. And we do get an entire section of the narrative in which Nephi presents his rationale for the action.

4 hours ago, JarMan said:

Section 12: "How far defence of property is permitted by the law of Moses" sets some limitations to rights that aren't limited from the natural law perspective. The limits come partly because there is an administrative state to help catch a thief and administer justice--"attributive justice"--that seeks a balanced justice attuned to the greater public good.

What is really amazing about Section 12 is that it so closely follows the narrative in the Book of Mormon. Here is the first bit of what Grotius wrote:

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[T]he Twelve Tables . . . forbids the killing of a thief by day, but adds the exception: unless he defend himself with a weapon. The presumption against a thief at night is, therefore, that he has defended himself with a weapon.

What is fascinating about this is that in the context of this description, it is Nephi who is the thief. Laban doesn't have a weapon. He is not threatening Nephi at the time that Nephi kills him. In fact: "and as I came near unto the house of Laban I beheld a man, and he had fallen to the earth before me, for he was drunken with wine." And Nephi takes from Laban (while he is still alive) his weapon - so Laban isn't just passed out, he is unarmed. The text makes it clear that we cannot presume that Nephi is acting at all in self-defense in this narrative. This presumption of self-defense is really important because, as Grotius notes in this section:

Quote

If, however, there should chance to be witnesses, through whom it can be established that the man who killed the thief was not brought into peril of life, in such a case the presumption will cease to be valid and the slayer will be held on the charge of murder.

And this is interesting to us because that witness in this case is Nephi himself. This is part of the focus of my essay, in which I noted this (among other things):

Quote

I believe that this is the wrong question. Whether or not we believe the law in Exodus applied to Nephi is to some extent irrelevant to what Nephi believed. The fact that he includes several distinct references to the passage would suggest that he did, in fact, think it was applicable. So, we should be asking in what way Nephi thought it applied to his situation, not whether in fact it applied at all.

My conclusion was that Nephi applied a different standard to his actions than the commandments given in Exodus through his comparison of his action to that of David's in Samuel. But we can see here that Grotius is discussing the Exodus text (referring to the commandments given to Israel). The contrasts don't end here. Grotius continues in Section 12:

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The law of the Twelve Tables further required that the man who had detected a thief, whether by day or by night, should make the fact known by shouting, undoubtedly that . . . magistrates or neighbours might if possible hasten to the place in order to give aid and to serve as witnesses. But because people are more easily brought together by day than by night, . . . the one who alleges the endangering of life at night is more readily believed.

And this is interesting because Nephi does not take these steps. The one witness to at least some of these events is Zoram. And, here we get this really interesting part of the narrative in the Book of Mormon:

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And it came to pass that when the servant of Laban beheld my brethren he began to tremble, and was about to flee from before me and return to the city of Jerusalem. And now I, Nephi, being a man large in stature, and also having received much strength of the Lord, therefore I did seize upon the servant of Laban, and held him, that he should not flee. And it came to pass that I spake with him, that if he would hearken unto my words, as the Lord liveth, and as I live, even so that if he would hearken unto our words, we would spare his life.

The witness has to be prevented from going to the authorities (again, this is part of our recognition that there are authorities that Nephi could have gone to over the issue of his stolen property). And Nephi threatens Zoram's life if he continues to try to return to give his testimony. They take the witness with them. This is not the action of a man who has just had a justifiable encounter. Whatever else Zoram knows, he now knows that Nephi has stolen not only Laban's clothing and weapon, but also the brass plates.

The point of all of this? Section 12 cannot apply in these circumstances. Even if we start by suggesting that Nephi encounters a thief (Laban) in the night, nothing else falls in behind this - and everything else speaks against this sort of interpretation. We would have to believe that this is Grotius pushing to expand as much as possible the Old Testament prohibition on killing. And yet this seems to go against what Grotius intends in his book.

Finally,

4 hours ago, JarMan said:

Section 13: "Whether, and under what limitations, it is permissible, according to the law of the Gospel, to kill in defence of property" (the section you quoted from) provides further limitations to our rights when dealing with a thief. These limitations are there because of NT teachings. But note that the option to kill a thief still remains open in extraordinary circumstances: "Wherefore, if a thing belonging to us can be saved in such a way that there seems to be no danger of causing death, it may rightly be defended; if not, then the thing should be given up, unless perchance it is of such a sort that our life and the life of our family is dependent on it and it cannot be recovered by process of law, since the thief is unknown, and also that there is some prospect that recovery will be made without slaughter."

And while I have already addressed this - it is clear that Nephi's property is not necessary to the life of the family. The argument is that the Brass Plates are necessary - but those were never Nephi's property to begin with. And the idea here would have to be that it is perfectly okay to steal (and to kill in the process of stealing) for that which is necessary for your own life. This is acceptable (according to Grotius) only in the circumstance of the natural state of war. But, we have advanced out of that state and through the Old Testament and are now here in the New Testament era of Christianity. This idea is completely alien to Grotius's thought.

Further, lets emphasize another couple of points. Grotius writes that one condition of killing a thief in the act of thievery (this isn't at all about an afterwards revenge killing) is that we don't know who the thief is ("the thief is unknown). And yet Nephi knows who the thief is. 1 Nephi 3:25 pinpoints this fact. The reason why not knowing who the thief is is that it makes it hard to make a legal claim against them. Just as importantly, when Nephi goes out into the night and encounters Laban, he recognizes him (1 Nephi 4:8): "And when I came to him I found that it was Laban."

So, I don't see in any of these three sections material that I find in the Book of Mormon. Back to your comments:

5 hours ago, JarMan said:

So where does Nephi fit into this? Which system of law is he subject to? Probably not to the Law of the Gospel. But the truth is that Nephi really doesn't fit into any of these law systems because he had the ultimate extenuating circumstances--the Lord commanded him to kill Laban. The brass plates were so important to the Nephites that the Lord judged that Laban's life was fair game. This brings up another issue, which is that Nephi wasn't killing Laban to retrieve the property that had been seized, he was after Laban's property. So, since this story covers ground that Grotius doesn't  even contemplate in DJB, we can't really know how he would perceive this particular situation. What we do know, however, is that Grotius was not absolutely opposed to killing somebody to obtain "that which belongs to us or is our due" even if that person didn't represent an immediate threat to life or limb. He just had a high bar for when that was permissible. I would argue that that bar was met and far surpassed in Nephi's case.

And here is the problem (and of course part of my arguments in my essay on this narrative). By placing Nephi outside all of these issues, we move the Nephi narrative away from Grotius. And if you can see this, then we have to ask ourselves why in any case we should think that this is something that Grotius produced. There is something that Grotius wrote in his prologue:

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On the contrary,war ought not to be undertaken except for the enforcement of rights; when once undertaken, it should be carried on only within the bounds of law and good faith.

And there is none of this here. It seems to me clear that you really don't understand some of Grotius's arguments - because the bar that Grotius puts out there isn't met and certainly isn't surpassed (at least you haven't made a convincing argument to that effect). Rather than basing his argument on rights, Nephi instead chooses to recast his encounter with Laban as a David versus Goliath scene. That he does so suggests a lot about the intentions of the narrative (as I point out in my essay). And, just as importantly for me, I see nothing in Nephi's text that draws me back to Grotius as the author. Instead, I feel that you start with that position - and try to find the places were Nephi and Grotius might agree - but it all seems superficial once we actually look.

5 hours ago, JarMan said:

Grotius allows for extenuating circumstances and I think a good argument can be made that Nephi qualifies under these. But having said that, it doesn't matter all that much because God commanded Nephi to kill Laban. We really ought be asking whether God, in Grotius' view, would ever command such a thing. Another way of asking this question is: assuming that God only issues just commands, would Grotius' view of divine justice contradict the justice of Nephi's god?

Grotius does allow for extenuating circumstances - he deliberately carves them out and minimizes them as much as he can. And, no, I don't think that an argument can be made that Nephi qualifies under these extenuating circumstances. This is of course, part of the argument. Why is Grotius wanting to illustrate something that he believes in by deliberately pushing the boundaries away from his core beliefs and values? This is an important question. You admit that the core of this is things that Grotius never contemplated in this text. So why here? And why do it in a way that so badly undermines his earlier positions?

The challenge you have is that your commentary on Grotius's belief in God's commands and Grotius's view of divine justice is misplaced. There is a valuable comment in Neff's introduction:

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The second principal feature of the rationalist tradition was the idea that the content of natural law arises out of reason itself, independently of will. That natural law is not a product of human will is obvious enough. Less obvious is that it is not a product of divine will either. The content of natural law is no more changeable by God than are the laws of mathematics. Indeed, as Grotius famously pointed out in the Prologue (p. 4), even if there were no such thing as God, there would still be natural law precisely as we now have it. Grotius has sometimes been hailed as an innovator by virtue of his articulation of this point – as the person who ‘secularised’ natural-law thought by cutting it loose from theology. Such a view is simply incorrect. Grotius was merely reiterating a long-held tenet of the rationalist stream of natural-law thought extending back to Aquinas. (p. xxvi)

This illustrates part of what I am trying to convey. Grotius spent his time working on natural law theory trying to create a rationalist basis for law and peace. A basis that would come independently of the need to claim the existence of God - a basis for law that would apply to everyone, everywhere. Here in this Book of Mormon narrative we could argue, as you do, that what God wants in the immediate here and now is the basis for moral and ethical decisions. It is this immediacy that plays out in much of Nephi's writings - including his idea of reinterpreting scripture into current contexts (the likening of scripture). I think that Grotius would be horrified to have this sort of capitulation of his life's work attributed to him.

Posted
15 hours ago, morgan.deane said:

............................ So Grotius wrote a narrative that contradicts his theory of preemption, and then provided narrative details where Amalickiah fulfilled every worry that Moroni had, thus undermining his own theories even more.      

The second verse regards Helaman's servant who preemptively killed Kishkumen during his assassination attempt on Helaman. This one is even more clear because Grotius wrote about robbers as a reason for law enforcement and not deadly preemption: if the conspirators “formed a plot, prepar[ed] an ambuscade, poisoning, or readied a false accusation [the planner] cannot lawfully be killed either if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if [the ruler] thought delays could afford remedies.” (Ibid.) In other words, if the plot can be neutralized by the defenders using other remedies, then they likely haven't gathered the means, shown intent, and attack it isn't imminent enough to warrant deadly force. 

.............................
 

I am reminded of the 1967 actions by Egypt:  closing the Straits of Tiran, removing U.N. peacekeeepers from the Sinai, and bringing the Egyptian Army into the Sinai, which were considered by the Israelis as acts of war, and which led to the successful preemptive attack by the Israelis.

Posted
5 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

.......................... We would have to believe that this is Grotius pushing to expand as much as possible the Old Testament prohibition on killing. ..............................

The OT does not forbid killing, but murder.  The KJV mistranslated "You shall not murder." Ex 20:13

5 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

And while I have already addressed this - it is clear that Nephi's property is not necessary to the life of the family. The argument is that the Brass Plates are necessary - but those were never Nephi's property to begin with. And the idea here would have to be that it is perfectly okay to steal (and to kill in the process of stealing) for that which is necessary for your own life. This is acceptable (according to Grotius) only in the circumstance of the natural state of war. But, we have advanced out of that state and through the Old Testament and are now here in the New Testament era of Christianity. This idea is completely alien to Grotius's thought.

Further, lets emphasize another couple of points. Grotius writes that one condition of killing a thief in the act of thievery (this isn't at all about an afterwards revenge killing) is that we don't know who the thief is ("the thief is unknown). And yet Nephi knows who the thief is. 1 Nephi 3:25 pinpoints this fact. The reason why not knowing who the thief is is that it makes it hard to make a legal claim against them. Just as importantly, when Nephi goes out into the night and encounters Laban, he recognizes him (1 Nephi 4:8): "And when I came to him I found that it was Laban."

........................

And here is the problem (and of course part of my arguments in my essay on this narrative). By placing Nephi outside all of these issues, we move the Nephi narrative away from Grotius. ....................

If Grotius were the author of a fictional Book of Mormon (I don't think he was), he would surely feel free to engage exceptions to his well-stated rules.  It is precisely because of his rules that he would carve out careful exceptions which fall outside his rules.

Posted
1 minute ago, Robert F. Smith said:

If Grotius were the author of a fictional Book of Mormon (I don't think he was), he would surely feel free to engage exceptions to his well-stated rules.  It is precisely because of his rules that he would carve out careful exceptions which fall outside his rules.

As far as this discussion goes, I think that we should try and avoid the term fiction. Fiction (at least as far as we use the term today) as you note, leaves us with very little access to the intentions of an author. The intentions of the characters in the text do not have to have any connection to the intentions of an author (they are at least twice removed). And claims of authorship very quickly get bogged down into language as the only real point of comparison. Since the Book of Mormon is alleged here to be a translation, it would introduce an entirely different set of arguments. And, of course, we would have to answer the question of why Grotius would want to write this fiction in the first place.

But, Jarman has been relatively consistent in his view that the Book of Mormon should be understood as an allegory of sorts - that the Book of Mormon is being written by Grotius to address contemporary issues - and it is on the basis of that suggestion that we are moving forward in this direction. So, I think that we want to be careful about labeling the text as fiction.

As far as carving out exceptions though, I think we would expect that the Book of Mormon as a text by Grotius would do so as a continuation of, or an exploration of his thought. If the Book of Mormon doesn't (and I believe that it doesn't) then there isn't anything compelling in the text that would lead us to assume an authorship by Grotius. This is the crux of this discussion.

Posted (edited)

@Benjamin McGuire Let me better explain what my argument is when it comes to the Laban story and DJB because I think you are jumping to some incorrect conclusion about what my position is. I think we are mostly in agreement that the situation Nephi is in is not something that Grotius directly addresses in the sections we have been referencing. But I don't think the implications of this are what you think they are. I don't think this is evidence that the story couldn't have been written by Grotius.

To show that Grotius likely didn't write the Laban story one thing you can do is show that the story is philosophically inconsistent with DJB. It doesn't matter that the Laban storyline isn't a perfect match for the sections we've been discussing. The fundamental question is whether or not God's command to kill Laban is contradicted by Grotius in DJB? You haven't really addressed this core issue, but have instead put much of your focus on irrelevant matters such as who is stealing from whom.

One question we can ask is if it is ever permissible to kill another person if that person is clearly not a threat to your immediate safety. I think there are a lot of people who would answer this in the negative. Both DJB and the BOM answer in the affirmative. DJB says it's permissible to kill in order to reclaim property if "it is of such a sort that our life and the life of our family is dependent on it and it cannot be recovered by process of law..." (This is not as narrow as it might seem, as it is foundational for justly initiating wars to reclaim land taken by another state.) The specific reasons given by God to Nephi are 1) "the Lord slayeth the wicked to bring forth his righteous purposes." and 2) "It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief." These justifications aren't that similar to each other, but that is because we are comparing apples to oranges.

I look at Nephi's killing of Laban as a punishment and as having a utilitarian purpose. As you have pointed out, it was obviously not done to reclaim stolen property. Laban had tried to kill them and had stolen their property, thus he deserved punishment from God's pov. In addition, Nephi's future people needed the brass plates. So what can DJB tell us about these circumstances?

In Chapter 20 of Book 2 we get Grotius' theory of punishment. When it comes to punishment, Grotius grants people a certain right and responsibility to inflict punishment on bad actors. God, on the other hand, can punish people for whatever reason he pleases (paragraph 4). God's punishment of Laban through Nephi is thus consistent with the sweeping authority he admits of God for enacting punishment.

 

Edited by JarMan
Posted
On 1/31/2025 at 12:41 PM, Benjamin McGuire said:

But, Jarman has been relatively consistent in his view that the Book of Mormon should be understood as an allegory of sorts - that the Book of Mormon is being written by Grotius to address contemporary issues - and it is on the basis of that suggestion that we are moving forward in this direction. So, I think that we want to be careful about labeling the text as fiction.

I am not exactly sure what you mean by allegory. When I think allegory I think of something like Animal Farm where historical events are portrayed by fictional characters. I don't think the BOM is an allegory in that sense, but I do think the story of Abinadi is an embedded historical allegory. If by allegory you mean a narrative meant to convey moral truths, then my view is that the BOM fits that definition. Clearly, though, I don't believe the BOM describes actual events so I don't see a problem with labeling it as fiction from my point of view.

Posted
8 hours ago, JarMan said:

To show that Grotius likely didn't write the Laban story one thing you can do is show that the story is philosophically inconsistent with DJB.

And I have done this.

8 hours ago, JarMan said:

I don't think this is evidence that the story couldn't have been written by Grotius.

Couldn't have, and wouldn't have, are two very different things. As I noted earlier, if Grotius is writing fiction, then he could have written anything. But this clearly seems like something he wouldn't have written. And I have made that argument - and you aren't really responding to it.

The details matter - at least in part - because I don't have much faith that you understand the philosophical thinking of Grotius.

8 hours ago, JarMan said:

To show that Grotius likely didn't write the Laban story one thing you can do is show that the story is philosophically inconsistent with DJB. It doesn't matter that the Laban storyline isn't a perfect match for the sections we've been discussing. The fundamental question is whether or not God's command to kill Laban is contradicted by Grotius in DJB? You haven't really addressed this core issue, but have instead put much of your focus on irrelevant matters such as who is stealing from whom.

I'll try and explain the larger context.

1: In terms of natural law, Grotius believes that natural law creates a foundation for ethics and morality that transcends God. The prohibition against killing unjustly is inherent in the nature of things and isn't dependent on divine command.

2: Grotius believed that God's command must be consistent with natural justice. He actually goes a bit further than this in Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 10:

Quote

The law of nature, again, is unchangeable – even in the sense that it cannot be changed by God. Measureless as is the power of God, nevertheless, it can be said that there are certain things over which that power does not extend; for things of which this is said are spoken only, having no sense corresponding with reality and being mutually contradictory. Just as even God, then, cannot cause that two times two should not make four, so He cannot cause that that which is intrinsically evil be not evil.

In other words, Grotius is not in the camp that believes that something is just because God says that it is just. Morality is rational and not arbitrary (similar to Thomas Aquinas).

3: So for us to lay out the unjustness of the act (in Grotius's thought) is to say that Grotius believes that God could not make it just by commanding it. Grotius would reject the idea that you could kill someone in an arbitrary or unjust way. When I detail all of the ways that Grotius would see the act as arbitrary and unjust, I am piecing together precisely the argument that shows that Grotius would be philosophically opposed to the narrative of Nephi and Laban.

This is the reason why the details are important and why they (at least in my view) challenge the idea that the Book of Mormon is philosophically aligned with Grotius. In particular, it is a denial that Grotius would have believed that God could have commanded Nephi to do this thing.

9 hours ago, JarMan said:

One question we can ask is if it is ever permissible to kill another person if that person is clearly not a threat to your immediate safety. I think there are a lot of people who would answer this in the negative. Both DJB and the BOM answer in the affirmative. DJB says it's permissible to kill in order to reclaim property if "it is of such a sort that our life and the life of our family is dependent on it and it cannot be recovered by process of law..." (This is not as narrow as it might seem, as it is foundational for justly initiating wars to reclaim land taken by another state.) The specific reasons given by God to Nephi are 1) "the Lord slayeth the wicked to bring forth his righteous purposes." and 2) "It is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief." These justifications aren't that similar to each other, but that is because we are comparing apples to oranges.

The problem here is that the Brass Plates were never Nephi's property. You could make a tenuous argument that the Nephites needed the Brass Plates, but, you cannot argue that Nephi is trying to "reclaim property" in acquiring them. So raising this issue in the context of Nephi killing Laban is a non-starter. Because this isn't about Nephi's property. This is not an obstacle that can be overcome. Nephi kills Laban so that he can steal something from Laban (and in fact he steals several somethings) - property that ostensibly belonged to Laban. If we thought that Grotius was the author, we would expect to see some sort of legal claim to the property, or perhaps the idea that the Brass Plates had been in Lehi's possession and were part of the property stolen by Laban. But it just isn't there.

9 hours ago, JarMan said:

I look at Nephi's killing of Laban as a punishment and as having a utilitarian purpose. As you have pointed out, it was obviously not done to reclaim stolen property. Laban had tried to kill them and had stolen their property, thus he deserved punishment from God's pov. In addition, Nephi's future people needed the brass plates. So what can DJB tell us about these circumstances?

Grotius was not a utilitarian. And given that the earliest Utilitarianism doesn't show up until a century after Grotius dies, this sort of claim raises all sorts of problems. Further, Grotius doesn't believe that death is an appropriate punishment for stealing property. He says this very clearly - and it's the bit that comes right before what you quote from Grotius (2.1.13):

Quote

Wherefore, if a thing belonging to us can be saved in such a way that there seems to be no danger of causing death, it may rightly be defended; if not, then the thing should be given up

Taking property is not something that is worthy of death. It is that simple. This rule applies to God as much as it applies to all of us in Grotius's thought.

9 hours ago, JarMan said:

In addition, Nephi's future people needed the brass plates. So what can DJB tell us about these circumstances?

The challenge here is that Grotius doesn't believe that you can claim a non-immediate justification for killing someone. It has to be immediate, because otherwise there is the possibility of finding alternatives. And this is especially true of God. After all, if God can provide a Liahona, then why can't God provide an alternative to the Brass Plates ... In Grotius's thought, this is a challenge.

9 hours ago, JarMan said:

In Chapter 20 of Book 2 we get Grotius' theory of punishment. When it comes to punishment, Grotius grants people a certain right and responsibility to inflict punishment on bad actors. God, on the other hand, can punish people for whatever reason he pleases (paragraph 4). God's punishment of Laban through Nephi is thus consistent with the sweeping authority he admits of God for enacting punishment.

Here is section 4 (Book 2, Chap. 20):

Quote

 

Another question is concerned with the purpose aimed at in punishments. What we have said thus far does at least show this, that injustice is not done to the guilty if they are punished. Nevertheless, it does not follow that they are in every case to be punished. This in fact is not true; for God and men pardon many things in many guilty persons; and for this cause they are wont to be praised.

Now, these things are true in the case of men who inflict punishment, for one man is so bound to another by ties of common blood that he ought not to do harm to another save for the sake of attaining some good.With God, the case is otherwise. . . . For the actions of God can be based upon the right of the Supreme Power, particularly where a man’s special desert is concerned, even if they have in view no end outside themselves. . . . But when man punishes a man who is his equal by nature, he ought to have a definite purpose in view.

 

You seem to be misapplying this idea. Grotius does believe that God can apply punishments arbitrarily and unjustly. And what Grotius says here is that even if divine punishment may not have its purposes visible to us, they are known to God. But this is not suggesting that God would punish Laban with death for stealing Nephi's property - that would be an arbitrary and unjust punishment for Grotius, and not attributable to God.

Posted
8 hours ago, JarMan said:

I am not exactly sure what you mean by allegory. When I think allegory I think of something like Animal Farm where historical events are portrayed by fictional characters. I don't think the BOM is an allegory in that sense, but I do think the story of Abinadi is an embedded historical allegory. If by allegory you mean a narrative meant to convey moral truths, then my view is that the BOM fits that definition. Clearly, though, I don't believe the BOM describes actual events so I don't see a problem with labeling it as fiction from my point of view.

Here is the problem. We tend to divide literature into genres. The genre of a text is identified by a range of factors including the way that we read the texts. We have a tremendous amount of material that Grotius wrote - none of it is something we would call fiction. Fiction is an important genre for us because the characters in fiction are separated from any sort of reality (even in realistic fictional). When you read fiction, there is no reason to associate the views of the fictional characters with the actual views of an author. We can write fiction in which the main character's points of view are nothing at all like our own. And so we cannot say that the views expressed by a character are those of the author. This is especially obvious from works of fiction where different characters have opposing views. Trying to answer the question of which character should be seen as representative of the author is engaging in the intentional fallacy. So if all we are claiming is that Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon as a work of fiction, then we might as well stop having this discussion - because there is no way to assert what in the Book of Mormon is reflecting Grotius's viewpoints and what is not. The only way to move forward with authorship claims is the more mechanical process of looking at language and its usage - and there the Book of Mormon fails at every level (since the Book of Mormon is a Late Modern English text). If we were going to argue that the Book of Mormon is a Late Modern English edition of an Early Modern English translation of a non-English original (Latin or Dutch perhaps) written by Grotius, then we would need to start identifying (in a mechanical way) the features of the text that allow us to identify that Early Modern English text - and from there the Dutch or Latin original, and then we could do that mechanical comparison with the body of Grotius's work to see how similar they in fact are. And at each step of the way we would need to estimate the likelihood that the current text is in fact an edited Early Modern English text, and that that Early Modern English text was in fact a translation from Dutch or Latin, and so on. And, frankly, I don't think you have any interest in that discussion.

However, if the genre isn't fiction - if the text is in some way an allegory or a parable, then we can start to talk about the intentions of the author as reflected in the text, and this sort of discussion becomes meaningful - and I am more than willing to engage (even if I think that we are to some extent doing this the wrong way). Under this premise we can identify the ideas in the text - the philosophical meanings and so on, and see to what extent they look like Grotius's thought. And they have to look like Grotius - we can't have some sort of novel idea that Grotius decided to include - because the moment we start to go down this route is the moment that we can no longer assert that we have something to actually compare it to (we are right back to the intentional fallacy).

This is the problem with labeling something as fiction. If you believe it is fictional, then the discussion is over - and nothing about the ideas in the text really matters for authorship attribution.

And yes, this is a very technical approach to that term - but I think it is important because these kinds of technical distinctions are critical when we are dealing with literary theory and its application.

Posted
On 1/31/2025 at 10:32 AM, Robert F. Smith said:

I am reminded of the 1967 actions by Egypt:  closing the Straits of Tiran, removing U.N. peacekeeepers from the Sinai, and bringing the Egyptian Army into the Sinai, which were considered by the Israelis as acts of war, and which led to the successful preemptive attack by the Israelis.

I almost mentioned Israel at several points in my post. Their most recent strike against Hezbollah was a classic case of justified preemption. They had an avowed enemy with thousands of rocket launchers targeted and ready to strike. Its absolutely ridiculous to argue that Israel was supposed to sit back and say, "well this is really dangerous but lets just see where they're going with this." Or the more ridiculous Mormon version, "we have to renounce war and proclaim peace so we have to let them attack three times." No, they have a figurative "charging assailant with sword in hand" as Puffendorf wrote so they preemptively struck. The Six Days War is another example of that as you mentioned. 

Posted (edited)
On 1/31/2025 at 12:22 AM, JarMan said:

Glad to have you be part of this discussion. You bring up several interesting items that I think will be interesting to discuss. I have to say, though, that I'm going to try hard to keep this discussion focused on one issue at a time. This is for my own selfish reasons--basically I have limited bandwidth and want to have the time to do the necessary research as I formulate my responses. Chasing multiple topics will wear me out or drive me crazy.

That's great actually. I mostly offered my post because I was tagged, I had specific expertise on the subject, and I rarely get a chance to talk about my book or Grotius. That seemed worthwhile, but if I can be brutally frank, talking to you does not seem worthwhile. As I told him, Ben has far more patience than me. Between this and the two other threads I've read, you and Ben have gone around in circles dozens of times and I ran out of patience after about two posts. I think you see what you want to see in parallel mania, you ignore disqualifying contrasts and stronger alternative theories like basic military science that every culture follows. And no matter how many times people explain it, you keep doing it. So no thanks. Good luck! 

Edited by morgan.deane
typo
Posted
9 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

Here is the problem. We tend to divide literature into genres. The genre of a text is identified by a range of factors including the way that we read the texts. We have a tremendous amount of material that Grotius wrote - none of it is something we would call fiction. Fiction is an important genre for us because the characters in fiction are separated from any sort of reality (even in realistic fictional). When you read fiction, there is no reason to associate the views of the fictional characters with the actual views of an author. We can write fiction in which the main character's points of view are nothing at all like our own. And so we cannot say that the views expressed by a character are those of the author. This is especially obvious from works of fiction where different characters have opposing views. Trying to answer the question of which character should be seen as representative of the author is engaging in the intentional fallacy. So if all we are claiming is that Grotius wrote the Book of Mormon as a work of fiction, then we might as well stop having this discussion - because there is no way to assert what in the Book of Mormon is reflecting Grotius's viewpoints and what is not. The only way to move forward with authorship claims is the more mechanical process of looking at language and its usage - and there the Book of Mormon fails at every level (since the Book of Mormon is a Late Modern English text). If we were going to argue that the Book of Mormon is a Late Modern English edition of an Early Modern English translation of a non-English original (Latin or Dutch perhaps) written by Grotius, then we would need to start identifying (in a mechanical way) the features of the text that allow us to identify that Early Modern English text - and from there the Dutch or Latin original, and then we could do that mechanical comparison with the body of Grotius's work to see how similar they in fact are. And at each step of the way we would need to estimate the likelihood that the current text is in fact an edited Early Modern English text, and that that Early Modern English text was in fact a translation from Dutch or Latin, and so on. And, frankly, I don't think you have any interest in that discussion.

However, if the genre isn't fiction - if the text is in some way an allegory or a parable, then we can start to talk about the intentions of the author as reflected in the text, and this sort of discussion becomes meaningful - and I am more than willing to engage (even if I think that we are to some extent doing this the wrong way). Under this premise we can identify the ideas in the text - the philosophical meanings and so on, and see to what extent they look like Grotius's thought. And they have to look like Grotius - we can't have some sort of novel idea that Grotius decided to include - because the moment we start to go down this route is the moment that we can no longer assert that we have something to actually compare it to (we are right back to the intentional fallacy).

This is the problem with labeling something as fiction. If you believe it is fictional, then the discussion is over - and nothing about the ideas in the text really matters for authorship attribution.

And yes, this is a very technical approach to that term - but I think it is important because these kinds of technical distinctions are critical when we are dealing with literary theory and its application.

I think you are using the term fiction more narrowly then I normally use it. I would consider allegory to be fictional. But if you want to consider it as something different, then for the purposes of this discussion that's fine. Grotius does have at least three works that are allegory (if that's the term we want to use). They are The Exile of Adam, The Passion of Christ, and Joseph (in Egypt). So allegory is not outside of Grotius' wheelhouse. Interestingly, all three of these things make an appearance in the BOM.

Posted
9 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

And I have done this.

Couldn't have, and wouldn't have, are two very different things. As I noted earlier, if Grotius is writing fiction, then he could have written anything. But this clearly seems like something he wouldn't have written. And I have made that argument - and you aren't really responding to it.

The details matter - at least in part - because I don't have much faith that you understand the philosophical thinking of Grotius.

I'll try and explain the larger context.

1: In terms of natural law, Grotius believes that natural law creates a foundation for ethics and morality that transcends God. The prohibition against killing unjustly is inherent in the nature of things and isn't dependent on divine command.

2: Grotius believed that God's command must be consistent with natural justice. He actually goes a bit further than this in Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 10:

In other words, Grotius is not in the camp that believes that something is just because God says that it is just. Morality is rational and not arbitrary (similar to Thomas Aquinas).

3: So for us to lay out the unjustness of the act (in Grotius's thought) is to say that Grotius believes that God could not make it just by commanding it. Grotius would reject the idea that you could kill someone in an arbitrary or unjust way. When I detail all of the ways that Grotius would see the act as arbitrary and unjust, I am piecing together precisely the argument that shows that Grotius would be philosophically opposed to the narrative of Nephi and Laban.

This is the reason why the details are important and why they (at least in my view) challenge the idea that the Book of Mormon is philosophically aligned with Grotius. In particular, it is a denial that Grotius would have believed that God could have commanded Nephi to do this thing.

Your are making an apples to oranges comparison so you haven't shown an inconsistency. In order for this to be apples to apples, Nephi would have to justify killing Laban based on reason, without being commanded by God.

And you go too far in saying that Grotius' natural law transcends God. Grotius believes that natural law can be derived using reason without appealing to God. This is different than saying that God must follow the same rules of conduct as man. Grotius clearly does not believe that to be the case. More on this later.

10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

The problem here is that the Brass Plates were never Nephi's property. You could make a tenuous argument that the Nephites needed the Brass Plates, but, you cannot argue that Nephi is trying to "reclaim property" in acquiring them. So raising this issue in the context of Nephi killing Laban is a non-starter. Because this isn't about Nephi's property. This is not an obstacle that can be overcome. Nephi kills Laban so that he can steal something from Laban (and in fact he steals several somethings) - property that ostensibly belonged to Laban. If we thought that Grotius was the author, we would expect to see some sort of legal claim to the property, or perhaps the idea that the Brass Plates had been in Lehi's possession and were part of the property stolen by Laban. But it just isn't there.

 None of this is relevant here because Nephi's justification for killing Laban was that he was commanded by God.

10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

Grotius was not a utilitarian. And given that the earliest Utilitarianism doesn't show up until a century after Grotius dies, this sort of claim raises all sorts of problems. Further, Grotius doesn't believe that death is an appropriate punishment for stealing property. He says this very clearly - and it's the bit that comes right before what you quote from Grotius (2.1.13):

I'm not claiming Grotius was a utilitarian. I'm saying that he granted that God could act for whatever purposes he wants to, which would include utilitarian purposes. I'm also not claiming that Grotius believed it was proper for men to punish stealing or attempted murder with the death penalty. But this is not what the BOM is claiming either. Nephi isn't punishing Laban per se, he is simply God's hand. God is inflicting the punishment.

10 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

Taking property is not something that is worthy of death. It is that simple. This rule applies to God as much as it applies to all of us in Grotius's thought.

No, this is the Platonic position, which Grotius explicitly rejects. We see this in Book 2, Chapter 20, Paragraph 4 with the following heading: "That punishment having in view some advantage must among men be inflicted differently than by God; and why".

"Now these things are true in the case of men who inflict punishment, for one man is so bound to another by ties of common blood that he ought not to do harm to another save for the sake of attaining some good. With God the case is otherwise, although Plato wrongly extends to Him the principles that have been stated. For the actions of God can be based upon the right of the Supreme Power, particularly where a man's special desert is concerned, even if they have in view no end outside themselves.

"Nevertheless, even if we follow the more generally accepted interpretation it comes to the same thing, so that God is said to have made all things for His own sake, that is by right of the highest freedom, not seeking or regarding any perfection outside Himself; just as God is said to be 'self-existent' because He is not born of any one. Assuredly, Holy Writ bears witness that the punishments of those that are irretrievably lost are not exacted by God for any other purpose, when it says that He derives pleasure from their woe, and that the impious are derided and mocked by God."

11 hours ago, Benjamin McGuire said:

The challenge here is that Grotius doesn't believe that you can claim a non-immediate justification for killing someone. It has to be immediate, because otherwise there is the possibility of finding alternatives. And this is especially true of God. After all, if God can provide a Liahona, then why can't God provide an alternative to the Brass Plates ... In Grotius's thought, this is a challenge.

Here is section 4 (Book 2, Chap. 20):

You seem to be misapplying this idea. Grotius does believe that God can apply punishments arbitrarily and unjustly. And what Grotius says here is that even if divine punishment may not have its purposes visible to us, they are known to God. But this is not suggesting that God would punish Laban with death for stealing Nephi's property - that would be an arbitrary and unjust punishment for Grotius, and not attributable to God.

You are reading into Grotius what you want to see. The quotes I just provided clearly show that you have this wrong.

Posted
7 hours ago, morgan.deane said:

That's great actually. I mostly offered my post because I was tagged, I had specific expertise on the subject, and I rarely get a chance to talk about my book or Grotius. That seemed worthwhile, but if I can be brutally frank, talking to you does not seem worthwhile. As I told him, Ben has far more patience than me. Between this and the two other threads I've read, you and Ben have gone around in circles dozens of times and I ran out of patience after about two posts. I think you see what you want to see in parallel mania, you ignore disqualifying contrasts and stronger alternative theories like basic military science that every culture follows. And no matter how many times people explain it, you keep doing it. So no thanks. Good luck! 

It does take a special type of patience and vulnerability to carefully read, consider, and respond to arguments from somebody you disagree with. Clearly this is not for everyone.

Posted (edited)

Nvm… I am just an observer

Edited by Calm
Posted
On 1/31/2025 at 12:41 PM, Benjamin McGuire said:

As far as this discussion goes, I think that we should try and avoid the term fiction. Fiction (at least as far as we use the term today) as you note, leaves us with very little access to the intentions of an author. The intentions of the characters in the text do not have to have any connection to the intentions of an author (they are at least twice removed). ..................

Even Hollyweird hack writers try to be original and offbeat.  There is no reason to assume apriori that the Book of Mormon is fiction, and even if fiction that it is an allegory.  Grotius (ore any other proposed author) must be allowed to exercise his creative impulses -- even when they leave convention behind.

On 1/31/2025 at 12:41 PM, Benjamin McGuire said:

As far as carving out exceptions though, I think we would expect that the Book of Mormon as a text by Grotius would do so as a continuation of, or an exploration of his thought. If the Book of Mormon doesn't (and I believe that it doesn't) then there isn't anything compelling in the text that would lead us to assume an authorship by Grotius. This is the crux of this discussion.

QED ??  This discussion is about whether Grotius was the author.  That is the crux.  I don't believe he was, but that is not a conclusion which everyone has reached.

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