Whacky Lawsuit Against the Church Goes Awry

[smac97]

3 hours ago, Michael Sudworth said:

Sorry to disappoint you my dude. But the mods suspended me for "abuse behavior" because I pointed out that both Smac and Zeezrom share the same profession.  Oh well.  

 

A profession shared by Pres. Oaks, Pres. Faust, Pres. Hunter, and more.

[Scott Lloyd]

6 minutes ago, smac97 said:

A profession shared by Pres. Oaks, Pres. Faust, Pres. Hunter, and more.

Including Elder Christofferson.

 

[mfbukowski]

6 hours ago, Michael Sudworth said:

This is pure nonsense.  The field of Logic is an extremely well-defined field of philosophy and math.

I think the Enlightenment provided a very good record of showing us what is rational and not rational.  Correspondence theory builds bridges.  Pragmatism makes philosophers like William James more tolerable at fancy Harvard cocktail parties.

Absolutely false.   He made no such claims.

You would do well to study up on Kant's discussion of noumenon and phenomenon. I think you would find it interesting.

Good grief man.  Are you really trying to use Pragmatism and "language games" to support your view?  The properties of a virus are not a product of language.  Language is a symbolic representation of those properties.  Incomplete, yes.  Untrue? No.

Whether they have a name or not, red blood cells exist and do their thing. Language has absolutely nothing to do with it.  We don't work on vaccines based on "what works" in Pragmatic terms.  We study them scientificaly using the correspondence theory of truth. 

You want to have it both ways by playing these really strange rhetorical games.

 

Unfortunately I no longer have time to discuss that with you.

Ok you win! Congratulations! I cower before your brilliance 

Correspondence theory? 

Oh my goodness! Enlightenment?

Just a few hundred years behind 

And where did math come from? Platonic forms?

And Kant? Study up on the synthetic a priori 

No time for that.

I have posted a lot here on correspondence.

Correspondence to an invisible world no one can experience?

Good luck supporting that.

I hope you enjoy philosophy 102 next semester. All my best,seriously.

You will give me great experience ignoring trolls

Edited May 26, 2020 by mfbukowski

[mgy401]

4 hours ago, Scott Lloyd said:

Including Elder Christofferson.

 

Also Denver Snuffer.  Which is where I’ll bet this discussion is *really* headed, given enough time . . .  

[mfbukowski]

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mathematics/

I said:

Quote

Empiricism says that the way we know about the world is to study the world.  But Kant and the boys say you KANT  can't   do that, because the way your mind sees things determines every perception, so what you see is largely in your mind, and not in the world.

Stanford Encyclopedia says:

The practices that yield the paradigmatically synthetic and a priori judgments of the science of mathematics are grounded in and explained by the very nature of human sensibility, and, in particular, by the spatio-temporal form of all (and only) the objects of human experience (Van Cleve 1999).

Quote

 

2.2 Kant's answer to his question “How is Pure Mathematics Possible?”

Kant asks two related leading questions of his critical philosophy: (1) How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?; and, (2) How is metaphysics possible as a science (B19; B23)? Mathematics provides a special avenue for helping to answer these questions by providing a model of a codified scientific discipline the possibility of which is clear and, moreover, guaranteed by its own achievement of cognition that is both synthetic and a priori. In other words, an explanation of how synthetic a priori judgments are affirmed in mathematical contexts, together with the resulting and related explanation of how a systematic body of demonstrable knowledge comprises such judgments, allow mathematical truth to be invoked as a paradigm of the substantive yet necessary and universal truths that metaphysics hopes to achieve. Kant's theory of mathematical concept construction (discussed above) can only be fully appreciated in conjunction with his treatment of such broader questions about the very nature and possibility of mathematical and metaphysical knowledge.

In both the Preamble to the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the B-Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces the analytic/synthetic distinction, which distinguishes between judgments the predicates of which belong to or are contained in the subject concept and judgments the predicates of which are connected to but go beyond the subject concept, respectively. In each text, he follows his presentation of this distinction with a discussion of his claim that all mathematical judgments are synthetic and a priori.^[4] There he claims, first, that “properly mathematical judgments are always a priori judgments” on the grounds that they are necessary, and so cannot be derived from experience (B14). He follows this with an explanation of how such non-empirical judgments can yet be synthetic, that is, how they can serve to synthesize a subject and predicate concept rather than merely explicate or analyze a subject concept into its constituent logical parts. Here he famously invokes the proposition “7 + 5 = 12” and argues negatively, claiming that “no matter how long I analyze my concept of such a possible sum [of seven and five] I will still not find twelve in it”, and also positively, claiming that “One must go beyond these concepts [of seven and five], seeking assistance in the intuition that corresponds to one of the two, one's five fingers, say…and one after another add the units of the five given in the intuition to the concept of seven…and thus see the number 12 arise” (B15). He takes it to follow that the necessary truth of an arithmetic proposition such as “7 + 5 = 12” cannot be established by any method of logical or conceptual analysis (Anderson 2004), but can be established by intuitive synthesis (Parsons 1969). He follows this discussion of arithmetic reasoning and truth with corresponding claims about Euclidean geometry, according to which the principles of geometry express synthetic relations between concepts (such as between the concept of the straight line between two points and the concept of the shortest line between those same two points), neither of which can be analytically “extracted” from the other. The principles of geometry thus express relations among basic geometric concepts inasmuch as these can be “exhibited in intuition” (Shabel 2003, Sutherland 2005a).

Elsewhere, Kant also includes geometric theorems as the sorts of propositions (in addition to geometric principles) that count as synthetic (Friedman 1992, Friedman 2010). But Kant's account of the syntheticity of such theorems is not transparent. Having denied that the principles (Grundsätze) could be cognized analytically from the principle of contradiction, he admits that mathematical inference of the kind needed to establish geometric theorems does proceed “in accordance with the principle of contradiction”, and also that “a synthetic proposition can of course be comprehended in accordance with the principle of contradiction” though “only insofar as another synthetic proposition is presupposed from which it can be deduced, never in itself” (B14). So, while he is clear that all mathematical judgments, including geometric theorems, are synthetic, he is less clear about exactly what it means for such propositions or the inferences that support them to “accord with” the principle of contradiction, derivability from which he takes to be the paradigm test of analyticity. This leads to an interpretive disagreement as to whether demonstrable mathematical judgments follow from the synthetic principles via strictly logical or conceptual inference—and so in strict accordance with only the principle of contradiction—or whether they are deduced via inferences that are themselves reliant on intuition, but which do not violate the law of contradiction. There is thus disagreement over whether Kant is committed merely to the syntheticity of the axioms of mathematics (which transmit syntheticity to demonstrable theorems via logical inference), or is also committed to the syntheticity of mathematical inference itself. The former interpretive position is associated with Ernst Cassirer and Lewis White Beck; the latter position with Bertrand Russell (Hogan forthcoming). Gordon Brittan (Brittan 2006) conceives both such positions “evidentialist”, which is his label for any interpretation according to which intuitions provide indispensable evidence for the truth of mathematics, whether that evidence is provided in support of axioms or inferences, or both. According to his alternative “objectivist” position, intuitions do not provide evidence but are rather semantic vehicles of singular reference and “objective reality” (Brittan 2006).

Attention to this interpretive issue in Kant's philosophy of mathematics is vital for the light it sheds on the more general question of what makes synthetic a priori cognition possible, the central question of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. With respect to this more general question, it is important to differentiate Kant's use of the terms “analytic” and “synthetic” to mark a logico-semantic distinction between types of judgments—which Kant uses to defend the distinctive thesis that mathematical cognition is synthetic a priori—from his use of the same terms to mark a traditional mathematical distinction, between analytic and synthetic methods (Beaney 2012). He deploys the latter distinction in order to identify two distinct argumentative strategies for answering the question of the “possibility of pure mathematics.” The analytic method is characterized by reasoning that traces a given body of cognition, such as mathematics, to its origin or sources in the mind. By contrast, the synthetic method aims to derive real cognition directly from such original cognitive sources, which sources or powers are first explicated independently of any particular body of cognition (including mathematics) that the powers might ultimately produce. Kant adopts the former method in his Prolegomena, arguing from the synthetic and a priori nature of mathematical judgment to the claim that space and time are the forms of human sensibility; he adopts the latter method in the Critique of Pure Reason, arguing that the forms of human sensibility, space and time, provide the basis from which to derive synthetic and a priori mathematical judgments (Shabel 2004). These arguments, together with the details of his account of the synthetic and a priori nature of all mathematical judgment, provide an answer to the question of the possibility of mathematics: the practices that yield the paradigmatically synthetic and a priori judgments of the science of mathematics are grounded in and explained by the very nature of human sensibility, and, in particular, by the spatio-temporal form of all (and only) the objects of human experience (Van Cleve 1999).

 

 

Edited May 26, 2020 by mfbukowski

[smac97]

11 hours ago, mgy401 said:

Quote

Including Elder Christofferson.

Also Denver Snuffer.  Which is where I’ll bet this discussion is *really* headed, given enough time . . .  

Also Jack Welch.  And Kevin Barney.  And Nathan Oman.  And Blake Ostler.  

I've heard Mr. Snuffer's movement is moving to finance the construction of a temple.

Thanks,

-Smac

[Kenngo1969]

5 hours ago, smac97 said:

Also Jack Welch.  And Kevin Barney.  And Nathan Oman.  And Blake Ostler.  

I've heard Mr. Snuffer's movement is moving to finance the construction of a temple.

Thanks,

-Smac

Interesting.  I wonder if he claims to possess any keys to effectuate ordinances therein.

[mfbukowski]

On 5/26/2020 at 1:15 PM, Kenngo1969 said:

Interesting.  I wonder if he claims to possess any keys to effectuate ordinances therein.

He just needs to invent a couple of angels- no problem. 

 

[topcougar]

On 5/23/2020 at 10:52 AM, Michael Sudworth said:

LOL.  You are busting me up.  Ha. @Robert F. Smith presents arguments.   Smac uses a lot of words that essentially mean nothing.

 

I agree.  I am don't have the stamina to match Smac's nonsense.  He's driven many good posters away through his sophistry by simply wearing them down with Zeezrom-esque language and tricks.

Most sensible people disagree with Smac's posts on this board.

Poppycock, so I am issuing an official CFR.  As I said, @Robert F. Smith and @Kevin Christensen are intellectuals with solid reasoning skills.  Smac is lawyer who uses underhanded and disingenuous rhetoric to win arguments.  Winning arguments does not equal truth; something folks with quality reasoning skills understand.

Peril? LOL

Oh man.... this post made my day

I appreciate SMAC's post because they are subtantive. Like me, he has the disability of a legal training, but that is very helpful when it comes to evaluating a lawsuit. SMAC is better than I am at explaining these lawsuits in layman terms - this is hardly a rhetorical trick.   From a legal standpoint I find that I agree with almost all of his analysis.  Explaining how the court views this lawsuits is helpful for lay people.  The media descriptions of lawsuits is almost always wrong and people that can only read what is written by reporters will often not have an accurate view of what is happening in a legal proceeding. 

Edited June 1, 2020 by topcougar

[Robert F. Smith]

On 5/24/2020 at 5:08 PM, mfbukowski said:

Oh no, not for an instant, it was clearly the spirit

...................................

Phew!  If you actually read this, you can stop now. 

That has the makings of an abstract for your forthcoming book, Mark.

Well stated.