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The Non-Imperative for a historical Book of Mormon


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On 3/11/2019 at 2:38 PM, Ryan Dahle said:

Is this stance widely accepted by academic historians themselves? If you are claiming that is what the field of academic history is collectively claiming for itself, CFR please. 

I'm not making a claim that a particular historian or group of historians has voiced it in that way. Historians usually focus on their historical area, not themselves. I'm simply saying what should be obvious to all. Biologists do biology. Chemists do chemistry. Anthropologists do anthropology. Historians do history. Theologians do theology. Prophets do prophecy.

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2 hours ago, Rich Hansen said:

I wouldn't worry about it.  It's more than likely those debates never really took place.

I am very much a fan of George Berkeley and his "positive idealism." Therefore I think this whole thread is just is simply an idea perceived in my mind!   "It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world; yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?" The great perceiver - George Berkeley!

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22 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

You've never heard a historian speculate or say "possibly"? Or that two historians disagree? The mere fact there's academic disagreement entails that historians are making historic claims without establishing them as historical.

Sure, but "possibly" isn't a historical claim. While historians may have different views, they are basing their views on their interpretation of evidence when making historical claims.

 

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 But that's exactly the problem. You're saying only academics matter and that consensus and memory about what happened isn't relevant even though that's what most people appeal to. To say my memory of yesterday isn't really what happened seems rather odd.

No, I'm saying only academics matter when it comes to their field of expertise.

Your memory of yesterday isn't "history". Even if your memory is pretty accurate.

 

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No when people make claims that something is historical they're making a claim that it actually happened, not that they can find an academic paper.

How does one determine that it actually happened? By guessing? Reading tea leaves? Praying? That's not how you get at history. History is a reconstruction of the past using historical methods and evidences.

 

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I think you're trying to limit the word in an odd way, doubly odd since as I recall from last year I was the one who suggested you were usually appealing to academic claims. But academic history don't determine what actually happened any more than physics determines what the actual regularities in the universe are. To make a claim of what is or what was can be done without academics. 

A claim about the past without supporting evidence isn't history either.

 

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Surely you don't want to say that we can only know what happened by appeal to academics yet that's certainly what you're effectively arguing.

Anyway, this seems primarily a semantic argument where you want the *word* historical to only mean academic historical agreement. But that's not how people use the term - it's certainly not the dictionary use which is useful as a first order approximation for social use. People when you use *historical* usually mean past events.

History is an academic pursuit, so obviously an appeal to academics is the only rout to getting at history. By definition.

If you want to say the Book of Mormon is historical but you only mean it's a story about the past, I think you'll find most people are understanding you to be making a historical claim, rather than the colloquial meaning you seem to prefer.

"I have a testimony that the events in the Book of Mormon really happened" is a theological notion about the past. It shouldn't be confused with history.

Edited by Gray
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7 hours ago, CA Steve said:

My younger sister and I have spirited discussions about how particular events happened in our family. One time she was correcting me with how she thought something occurred. She was quite sure of her own memory of the event until I reminded her that she had not been born yet.

I have frequently told this story about a good friend of mine who is in the music business who used to travel with Frank Sinatra and Co. As my friend got off the bus one day, he asked Sammy Davis for change for a $20.00 so he could buy a soda. Sammy replied "Babe, $20.00 is change." The other day I told my friend how much I enjoyed telling about his encounter with Davis, to which my friend replied; "that never happened."  

A great example of this is the story of BY's transfiguration in Nauvoo. We have 1st person accounts of this from people we know were not there.

It was a conversation that my dad and brother walked away from with completely opposite impressions of a very concrete idea (whether or not a family loan would be paid by a certain date) that has led me to insist on everything written (when possible) when making plans so I can go back and reread info and pushing people to give quotes rather than paraphrases of what others have said.  Don't trust anyone's recollection these days, especially myself.

My memory of when the Priesthood Ban was lifted is three years too early and wrong time of year.  I suspect I have confused it with a discussion of the Ban.

Edited by Calm
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2 hours ago, Gray said:

I'm not making a claim that a particular historian or group of historians has voiced it in that way. Historians usually focus on their historical area, not themselves. I'm simply saying what should be obvious to all. Biologists do biology. Chemists do chemistry. Anthropologists do anthropology. Historians do history. Theologians do theology. Prophets do prophecy.

Are you defining a historian as someone who uses academic methodology (and thus a professional historian might not be a historian by that definition and someone who does research as a hobby using such methodology would be).  Thus it might be better written "those who do history are historians"?

Edited by Calm
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7 hours ago, Gray said:

Sure, but "possibly" isn't a historical claim. While historians may have different views, they are basing their views on their interpretation of evidence when making historical claims.

Why isn't it?  When is what a historian asserts a historical claim and when is it not? Can't historians also discuss what historical process were inevitable and which were contingent? When a historian speaks of of historical alternatives, is that no longer doing history? Further isn't saying that a few possibilities are most likely and dismissing others making a historical claim?

Even those who criticize discussion of probabilities or counterfactuals don't typically say it's not part of history. They just say it's marginal rather than central. So Richard Evans in Altered Pasts is one example. However others disagree. While I don't do that much reading in philosophy of history, what brought my thoughts was "The Possibilities of History" by Daniel Nolan that I'd read. The other sense of possibility I was getting at was more epistemological humility. That is a historian might think conclusion is most likely but also think that others are possible. One has reduced and constrained possibilities yet not fully established everything.

Recognize that within history as a field a major position is the view that historians can't objectively represent the past. This moves to a more hermeneutical approach to history in which pointing out the ways evidence can be read is the duty of the historian when doing history. In that case rather than merely making positive claims about what happened history as done by historians is all about possibilities in interpretation.

Now of course to anticipate your rejoinder one might say not all historical claims are claims about knowledge as a way of dealing with these criticisms. While that might handle aspects of the historical hermeneutics approach, I don't think it really deals with claims about counterfactuals or limiting possibilities of what did happen.

7 hours ago, Gray said:

No, I'm saying only academics matter when it comes to their field of expertise. Your memory of yesterday isn't "history". Even if your memory is pretty accurate.

But this is begging the question. What is the field of expertise for a historian? I hope you don't say writing papers. The papers are about something. What is that something?

7 hours ago, Gray said:

How does one determine that it actually happened? By guessing? Reading tea leaves? Praying? That's not how you get at history. History is a reconstruction of the past using historical methods and evidences.

Talking to someone who knows seems like a reasonable way to discern whether something really happened. If they are trustworthy and there's not reasons to doubt then that seems like justification. If I ask my wife if she went to the store yesterday I feel I can say I'm justified in my belief she went if she says she went. Now I suppose you might say that's a historic method or you might say it's what really happened but not history. But that just gets us back to my claim there's an equivocation over the term "history." (i.e. academic history vs. justified claims of what happened)

7 hours ago, Gray said:

History is an academic pursuit, so obviously an appeal to academics is the only rout to getting at history. By definition.

Give me the definition because that's not what my dictionary says. 

noun, plural his·to·ries.

• the branch of knowledge dealing with past events.
• a continuous, systematic narrative of past events as relating to a particular people, country, period, person, etc., usually written as a chronological account; chronicle: 
a history of France; a medical history of the patient.
• the aggregate of past events.
• the record of past events and times, especially in connection with the human race.
• a past notable for its important, unusual, or interesting events: 
a ship with a history.
• acts, ideas, or events that will or can shape the course of the future; immediate but significant happenings:
Firsthand observers of our space program see history in the making.
 
Now as I said earlier I recognize the limits of a dictionary for word use. I'd just note that none of the dictionary entries fit your use.
 
7 hours ago, Gray said:

If you want to say the Book of Mormon is historical but you only mean it's a story about the past, I think you'll find most people are understanding you to be making a historical claim, rather than the colloquial meaning you seem to prefer.

"I have a testimony that the events in the Book of Mormon really happened" is a theological notion about the past. It shouldn't be confused with history.

But of course that's not what I claim. I claim it is an account of actual past events albeit with some inaccuracies.

7 hours ago, Gray said:

My distinction isn't really about the credentials of the historian, only whether or not a historian is following the methods historians use.

Is there a set of explicit methods historians use or are there different movements within history with different methods?

 

 

Edited by clarkgoble
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7 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Oh, I agree. I think there is room for deduction and all sorts of more complex forms of reasoning. But ultimately, as far as I can tell, all logic boils down to induction in the end.

Again I'd just ask what one means by induction. Different people use different definitions. Some see induction as extrapolating from the common case. So if I know "most marbles in the bag are blue" and I pick a marble I can claim "it is likely blue." Others expand it to any argument where it gives a degree of support but not total confidence (unlike deductive logic). That is very broad and with that definition I'd agree with you. Some use induction to mean Bayesian approaches to logic in which case it wouldn't be true. One could point for instance to say a neural net where a computer can learn to predict with an extremely high degree of accuracy but which can't be reduced to what typically was called inductive logic in the 19th century discussions of logic. Some see this ability to guess accurate as abductive logic opposed to inductive logic following the famous logician C. S. Peirce. In that case neural nets and machine learning are likely abduction and not induction at all.

If by induction we just mean justified logic that's not deduction then I'd agree with you. As you hint but don't come out and say, even when doing deductive reasoning we typically are fallible and make inductive leaps.

 

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10 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

 

 

 

I'm never quite sure what to make of these deeper philosophical debates between Clark and mfbukowski.

I see things pretty simply. For me, everything is based on inductive reasoning. We reach general conclusions based on the perceived consistency of our individual experiences. We can't really know anything with absolute certainty. But it seems that there are plenty of reasons to believe we live in a shared objective reality. Language often tries to approximate that reality, which is really just a product of our minds trying to approximate that reality. Language is a product of inductive reasoning that has been institutionalized. We need common labels for things that we all believe are present in our shared reality. Of course, language is fluid and relative and so forth. But, in so many instances, it seems to usefully and accurately communicate ideas that individuals in the perceived shared objective reality can mutually relate to and benefit from. In other words, language isn't some sort of spontaneous human creation. Its basis is in the same inductive logic that leads individuals to conclude that we indeed live in an objective reality, and language was created to approximately represent that shared reality in all its past, present, future, analogous, and hypothetical forms. 

We only create our own world of understanding (at least in the way I think Mark is implying) in the sense that we have good reasons to believe that our inductive conclusions about reality are often flawed (i.e. inconsistent with the shared objective reality that we have good cause to believe in). Yet, to me, it seems unhelpful to overemphasize epistemic uncertainty or the limitations of language in a generalized way, as if all processes of induction or communication are equally flawed and unreliable on all levels. My inductive logic tells me that certain processes of induction in certain contexts have a greater propensity to accurately reflect reality than other processes in other contexts. Our fundamental logic is built upon layers and layers of inductive reasoning, and sometimes when we find that a specific layer isn't working, we back up a layer and reassess the deeper layer's validity.

It seems to me that most philosophical debates that I encounter (at least the ones that deal with logic and epistemology at a general level) can be fairly easily resolved or helpfully clarified when I recast them using the language and structure of my own philosophical assumptions. For this reason, I've never really been all that interested in pursuing an in depth view of various philosophical theories. It's not that I don't think they are useful to know about, generally speaking; its just that they rarely shed new light or change my perspective about the subjects that I'm interested in.

For whatever that all is worth. 

 

I agree but why care if you are closer to reality or not when such a thing is unknowable?

Things are as they seem.

What you see and experience is what you get. That is the essence of William James "radical empiricism."

Yeah sometimes we make mistakes and try to drink out of a mirage. But one that sand hits our tongue we figure out pretty much that we were mistaken at our perceptions. 

But still when the sand hits our tongue we know this is still our perception of sand hitting our tongue.

How can anyone postulate a reality no one has ever experienced?

All we can know is human experience not what is beyond it

All we can do is human experience not what is beyond it

All we can know is human experience not what is beyond it.

Three times.

Beyond it is literally meta - physics, the unknowable.

I cannot possibly make it clearer. When I first heard it from all the postmoderns it struck me between the eyes like a brick wall, instantly.

For the life of me I don't understand why people don't see it instantly, and insist there is a reality beyond experience to which propositions "correspond" thereby making them  "more accurate" than what we experience.  All we can know is what we experience, and nothing Beyond it.

Sure we make further experiments and carry out investigations but those are still human experience examining human experience more closely.

I really don't understand at all why this is so difficult 

We can't know anything beyond human experience.

That's four or more.

 

 

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8 hours ago, Navidad said:

I feel so much better! I am not now the only one you have told to "get over it!" Phew!

Well if it makes you happy I'll be glad to tell everyone on the board that actually believes in the correspondence theory of Truth to get over it

It doesn't work and never has. :)

To have a correspondence theory of truth one needs a theory of how we can know that truth or what it is, to see if it corresponds or represents it.

But if we had that why would we need it's representation, when we had the real thing in front of us?

What they don't get is that we do!

That is called "direct experience."

People think some propositions can be "closer to objective reality", but then they cannot explain objective reality.

One statement is "more accurate" than another, but there is no definable standard of what that means.

Go figure.

To me it is a mass of confusion. 

Get over it. :)

 

Edited by mfbukowski
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14 hours ago, Calm said:

Are you defining a historian as someone who uses academic methodology (and thus a professional historian might not be a historian by that definition and someone who does research as a hobby using such methodology would be).  Thus it might be better written "those who do history are historians"?

Yes, that's fair. Sometimes professional, credentialed historians stray from the methodology of their area, in which case they are not acting as historians. Those who do history are historians, regardless of what degrees they have.

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9 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Why isn't it?  When is what a historian asserts a historical claim and when is it not? Can't historians also discuss what historical process were inevitable and which were contingent? When a historian speaks of of historical alternatives, is that no longer doing history? Further isn't saying that a few possibilities are most likely and dismissing others making a historical claim?

Even those who criticize discussion of probabilities or counterfactuals don't typically say it's not part of history. They just say it's marginal rather than central. So Richard Evans in Altered Pasts is one example. However others disagree. While I don't do that much reading in philosophy of history, what brought my thoughts was "The Possibilities of History" by Daniel Nolan that I'd read. The other sense of possibility I was getting at was more epistemological humility. That is a historian might think conclusion is most likely but also think that others are possible. One has reduced and constrained possibilities yet not fully established everything.

Recognize that within history as a field a major position is the view that historians can't objectively represent the past. This moves to a more hermeneutical approach to history in which pointing out the ways evidence can be read is the duty of the historian when doing history. In that case rather than merely making positive claims about what happened history as done by historians is all about possibilities in interpretation.

History isn't "things that happened in the past." It's a reconstruction of past events. It's the closes we can get to a past that no longer exists.  It's an interpretation, using historical criteria to evaluate evidences and construct theories. Very much like any other area of critical scholarship.

 

9 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Now of course to anticipate your rejoinder one might say not all historical claims are claims about knowledge as a way of dealing with these criticisms. While that might handle aspects of the historical hermeneutics approach, I don't think it really deals with claims about counterfactuals or limiting possibilities of what did happen.

But this is begging the question. What is the field of expertise for a historian? I hope you don't say writing papers. The papers are about something. What is that something?

Talking to someone who knows seems like a reasonable way to discern whether something really happened. If they are trustworthy and there's not reasons to doubt then that seems like justification. If I ask my wife if she went to the store yesterday I feel I can say I'm justified in my belief she went if she says she went. Now I suppose you might say that's a historic method or you might say it's what really happened but not history. But that just gets us back to my claim there's an equivocation over the term "history." (i.e. academic history vs. justified claims of what happened)

The equivocation is yours. You keep using the term history to give your theological beliefs unmerited weight outside of their theological realm. Otherwise why use academic terms like historicity to describe a theological text which cannot past muster as a historical document?

 

9 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

Give me the definition because that's not what my dictionary says. 

noun, plural his·to·ries.

• the branch of knowledge dealing with past events.
a continuous, systematic narrative of past events as relating to a particular people, country, period, person, etc., usually written as a chronological account; chronicle: 
a history of France; a medical history of the patient.
• the aggregate of past events.
• the record of past events and times, especially in connection with the human race.
• a past notable for its important, unusual, or interesting events: 
a ship with a history.
• acts, ideas, or events that will or can shape the course of the future; immediate but significant happenings:
Firsthand observers of our space program see history in the making.
 
Now as I said earlier I recognize the limits of a dictionary for word use. I'd just note that none of the dictionary entries fit your use.
 

 

The first two definitions are what I've been saying all along.

The sacred creation myth in Genesis notes that God created the first humans from the dust. Is that biology? If not, how is a revelation about the past "history"?

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2 hours ago, Gray said:

History isn't "things that happened in the past." It's a reconstruction of past events. It's the closes we can get to a past that no longer exists.  It's an interpretation, using historical criteria to evaluate evidences and construct theories. Very much like any other area of critical scholarship.

I think you're equivocating even more now.

2 hours ago, Gray said:

The equivocation is yours. You keep using the term history to give your theological beliefs unmerited weight outside of their theological realm. Otherwise why use academic terms like historicity to describe a theological text which cannot past muster as a historical document?

Not at all. I make no claims that religious claims about Nephite history are academic history. I do think them history though. But I'm being rather clear in my uses and not conflating them. 

Historicity is a perfectly normal word that just means "historical actuality." (Websters) It's not an academic neologism.

2 hours ago, Gray said:

The first two definitions are what I've been saying all along.

The sacred creation myth in Genesis notes that God created the first humans from the dust. Is that biology? If not, how is a revelation about the past "history"?

 Those definitions don't limit it to the academic discipline.

The context of Genesis 1 & 2 entail it's not biology nor history - although people can certainly dispute those points. I'm not sure I'd call it myth, depending upon what you mean by that. I think myth is a rather misused term and we have to be careful how we use it. The Book of Mormon does not in the least present itself the way Genesis 1 & 2 do so I'm not sure that's a terribly helpful parallel.

There's simply more options here than "academic history" or "myth." That's all I've really been arguing. It's fine of course to dispute whether revelation can give somewhat accurate knowledge of the past. My sense is that's your real point. But the way you are making it by appealing to too narrow or equivocal uses of words just is a poor way to go about making that claim.

Edited by clarkgoble
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4 hours ago, clarkgoble said:

There's simply more options here than "academic history" or "myth." That's all I've really been arguing. It's fine of course to dispute whether revelation can give somewhat accurate knowledge of the past. My sense is that's your real point. But the way you are making it by appealing to too narrow or equivocal uses of words just is a poor way to go about making that claim.

I agree. I would even say that asserting everything is "historical" that can be or has been assessed using the methods of academic historians creates its own problems. For instance, such an overly strict definition would put Grey's own views in a bind because he would have to admit that the experience of the Three and Eight Witnesses are indeed historical. Of course, he would want to clarify that they are only "historical" in the sense that the accounts left by the witnesses and those who talked with them can be and have been evaluated using academic historiography, just as believing Latter-day Saints would want to clarify that the Book of Mormon is only "non-historical" in the sense that we don't have any corroborating historical documents which can be used to help assess its claimed historicity.

In each case, either party might be concerned that such a narrow academic use of "historical" might give a general audience the wrong impression, and so would want to add qualification to resolve any potential misunderstanding. The fact that qualifying statements would likely seem needful to various parties in certain contexts, suggests that Grey's insistence on such a narrow and exclusive definition is not nearly as favorable or helpful or obviously correct as he seems to think. Nor does such an exclusive definition seem to  be insisted upon by academic historians themselves, who often use the term "historical" in a variety of non-academic contexts. Grey's personal semantic prescription concerning the appropriate range of meaning for this particular word seems to have been contrived solely to benefit a certain ideology in a certain debate. Of course he is free to personally use the term in the way he deems necessary, but he shouldn't be surprised if others don't enthusiastically follow his lead or agree with his arbitrarily constrictive definition. 

Edited by Ryan Dahle
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1 hour ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I agree. I would even say that asserting everything is "historical" that can be or has been assessed using the methods of academic historians creates its own problems. For instance, such an overly strict definition would put Grey's own views in a bind because he would have to admit that the experience of the Three and Eight Witnesses are indeed historical. Of course, he would want to clarify that they are only "historical" in the sense that the accounts left by the witnesses and those who talked with them can be and have been evaluated using academic historiography, just as believing Latter-day Saints would want to clarify that the Book of Mormon is only "non-historical" in the sense that we don't have any corroborating historical documents which can be used to help assess its claimed historicity.

In each case, either party might be concerned that such a narrow academic use of "historical" might give a general audience the wrong impression, and so would want to add qualification to resolve any potential misunderstanding. The fact that qualifying statements would likely seem needful to various parties in certain contexts, suggests that Grey's instance on such a narrow and exclusive definition is not nearly as favorable or helpful or obviously correct as he seems to think. Nor does such an exclusive definition seem to  be insisted upon by academic historians themselves, who often use the term "historical" in a variety of non-academic contexts. Grey's personal semantic prescription concerning the appropriate range of meaning for this particular word seems to have been contrived solely to benefit a certain ideology in a certain debate. Of course he is free to personally use the term in the way he deems necessary, but he shouldn't be surprised if others don't enthusiastically follow his lead or agree with his arbitrarily constrictive definition. 

Your dichotomy is it true one and makes my point easy.

In fact post-modernism makes the dichotomy disappear. It simply looks at narratives as contextual and as largely defined by the writer.

Each narrative is flawed by differences in memory and individual circumstances.

We simply need to learn that there is no such thing as "objective is truth" , only contextual narratives about flawed human experience. 

But that's okay I'm confident our grandchildren will no longer believe in such mythologies as "objectivity."

We are already post-postmodern.

If members of the church could simply learn that then all these silly arguments about geography, history and "correct" translations would disappear, and we could enjoy scriptures for what they are: marvelous and edifying spiritual narratives confirmed by the spirit of God within us, to enrich our lives and take us down God's path. 

 

 

Edited by mfbukowski
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57 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Your dichotomy is it true one and makes my point easy.

In fact post-modernism makes the dichotomy disappear. It simply looks at narratives as contextual and as largely defined by the writer.

Each narrative is flawed by differences in memory and individual circumstances.

We simply need to learn that there is no such thing as "objective is truth" , only contextual narratives about flawed human experience. 

But that's okay I'm confident our grandchildren will no longer believe in such mythologies as "objectivity."

We are already post-postmodern.

If members of the church could simply learn that then all these silly arguments about geography, history and "correct" translations would disappear, and we could enjoy scriptures for what they are: marvelous and edifying spiritual narratives confirmed by the spirit of God within us, to enrich our lives and take us down God's path. 

This post-modern approach can work in my opinion, but it requires that Mormons be willing to relinquish claims of objectivity.  You can't have apologists producing pseudo scientific materials that are quite rigorous within apologetic circles, but that fail to meet a broader standard of scholarship, and at the same time make the assertion that objectivity doesn't exist when it comes to religion.  

What you're calling for is a dramatic change of culture from the ground up.  From primary to the missionary proselyting messages to the general conference addresses from church leaders.  All of these messages are built on assumptions that run contrary to a purely postmodern approach to religion.  I would even say that many members are hostile to the postmodern approach.  

I'm all for approaching scripture as literature, but I think there is also value in approaching scripture by attempting to understand the historical milieu that the original authors intended.  Both approaches have their merits, and I think approaching the BoM through a 19th century lens has more merit than through any other time period.  

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25 minutes ago, hope_for_things said:

This post-modern approach can work in my opinion, but it requires that Mormons be willing to relinquish claims of objectivity.  You can't have apologists producing pseudo scientific materials that are quite rigorous within apologetic circles, but that fail to meet a broader standard of scholarship, and at the same time make the assertion that objectivity doesn't exist when it comes to religion.  

What you're calling for is a dramatic change of culture from the ground up.  From primary to the missionary proselyting messages to the general conference addresses from church leaders.  All of these messages are built on assumptions that run contrary to a purely postmodern approach to religion.  I would even say that many members are hostile to the postmodern approach.  

I'm all for approaching scripture as literature, but I think there is also value in approaching scripture by attempting to understand the historical milieu that the original authors intended.  Both approaches have their merits, and I think approaching the BoM through a 19th century lens has more merit than through any other time period. 

I think the problem with such assertions is that there are too many variations and degrees of post-modernism. Many Latter-day Saint scholars have adopted or utilized various fundamental postmodern tenets in their scholarly research, without adopting hyper-skeptical or hyper-relative strains of postmodernism--strains which, in my understanding, really better reflect post-modern culture than most post-modern scholarship. 

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18 minutes ago, hope_for_things said:

This post-modern approach can work in my opinion, but it requires that Mormons be willing to relinquish claims of objectivity.  You can't have apologists producing pseudo scientific materials that are quite rigorous within apologetic circles, but that fail to meet a broader standard of scholarship, and at the same time make the assertion that objectivity doesn't exist when it comes to religion.  

What you're calling for is a dramatic change of culture from the ground up.  From primary to the missionary proselyting messages to the general conference addresses from church leaders.  All of these messages are built on assumptions that run contrary to a purely postmodern approach to religion.  I would even say that many members are hostile to the postmodern approach.  

I'm all for approaching scripture as literature, but I think there is also value in approaching scripture by attempting to understand the historical milieu that the original authors intended.  Both approaches have their merits, and I think approaching the BoM through a 19th century lens has more merit than through any other time period.  

Oh no, we need to take it all as if we are preliterate. Let's start drawing bulls on our house walls. ;)

Unfortunately however even that is "representationalist." ;)

I notice you are saying that there is no objectivity  " in religion" as if it exists somewhere else as in physics, yet even physics cannot define "ultimate reality."

To believe in ultimate reality one has to say that Kuhn was totally wrong, and there exists at least in principle - a once for all times objective view of reality which will never change which is "accurate" and infallible.

Many physicists say that we never will know about ultimate reality perfectly. Observation itself changes what is observed. In many cases those observations tend to be more about how we observe that anything else.

In contrast my view would be that there are narratives about human experience, which work better than others in certain contexts to get things done, and are able to predict future human experiences more consistently

But it is all based on human experience it is not based on being closer to "objective reality."

And yes the revolution needs to be as basic as the Copernican revolution.

But I think it's inevitable.

Cartesianism just plain doesn't work in any form or dilution.

Ultimately it becomes metaphysics and speaking about what is unknowable and what it cannot be observed

How can we know anything about ultimate objective reality when such a term cannot even be defined? 

And if it cannot be defined how can we know that the theory we have "corresponds" to it or "represents" it??

We have not really advance in this area much above drawing bulls on cave walls, but at least those who drew them knew that they were spiritual and that you could not actually eat them. ;)

We want spiritual bulls that we can eat, and so what we get is...... Nevermind. ;)

 

 

 

 

 

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26 minutes ago, Ryan Dahle said:

I think the problem with such assertions is that there are too many variations and degrees of post-modernism. Many Latter-day Saint scholars have adopted or utilized various fundamental postmodern tenets in their scholarly research, without adopting hyper-skeptical or hyper-relative strains of postmodernism--strains which, in my understanding, really better reflect post-modern culture than most post-modern scholarship. 

I'm a novice on philosophy and wouldn't claim to be aware of the many variations of postmodernism.  But wouldn't you agree that most orthodox members are opposed to the concept generally especially when it comes to moral relativism?  

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20 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Oh no, we need to take it all as if we are preliterate. Let's start drawing bulls on our house walls. ;)

Unfortunately however even that is "representationalist." ;)

I notice you are saying that there is no objectivity  " in religion" as if it exists somewhere else as in physics, yet even physics cannot define "ultimate reality."

To believe in ultimate reality one has to say that Kuhn was totally wrong, and there exists at least in principle - a once for all times objective view of reality which will never change which is "accurate" and infallible.

Many physicists say that we never will know about ultimate reality perfectly. Observation itself changes what is observed. In many cases those observations tend to be more about how we observe that anything else.

In contrast my view would be that there are narratives about human experience, which work better than others in certain contexts to get things done, and are able to predict future human experiences more consistently

But it is all based on human experience it is not based on being closer to "objective reality."

And yes the revolution needs to be as basic as the Copernican revolution.

But I think it's inevitable.

Cartesianism just plain doesn't work in any form or dilution.

Ultimately it becomes metaphysics and speaking about what is unknowable and what it cannot be observed

How can we know anything about ultimate objective reality when such a term cannot even be defined? 

And if it cannot be defined how can we know that the theory we have "corresponds" to it or "represents" it??

We have not really advance in this area much above drawing bulls on cave walls, but at least those who drew them knew that they were spiritual and that you could not actually eat them. ;)

We want spiritual bulls that we can eat, and so what we get is...... Nevermind. ;)

Objectivity exists within science for all practical purposes.  I thought you were a pragmatist?  I don't know of any scientists that claim 100% certainty on topics, just levels of confidence based on the best current evidence.  

Getting into discussions about ultimate reality and ultimate certainty I see as a perfectionist fallacy that misses the practical.  So to compare subjective and personal religious experience to science is a category error in my opinion as the two are very different methods of experience.  I thought we agreed on this point from prior discussions?  

As for hieroglyphs of bulls on cave walls, I'm not sure we know exactly what the artists were attempting to accomplish through the drawings.  Are they attempting to record history, or are they telling a fictional narrative for entertainment purposes, or are they worshiping the bulls in a prehistoric form of religion, or a combination of all three.  I don't know..... 

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1 minute ago, hope_for_things said:

I'm a novice on philosophy and wouldn't claim to be aware of the many variations of postmodernism.  But wouldn't you agree that most orthodox members are opposed to the concept generally especially when it comes to moral relativism?

Again, it depends on how one defines moral relativism. Most Latter-day Saints understand, implicitly, that the morality of some behaviors is based on relative contexts. For instance, most orthodox members feel that it is okay to not wear garments while swimming, but that to remove garments for a casual game of ping pong is inappropriate. Latter-day Saints typically adopt (unknowingly) a variation of Divine Command Theory which allows for moral imperatives to vary based on circumstance. In this, they follow the lead of Joseph Smith himself who stated:

Quote

That which is wrong under one circumstance, may be, and often is, right under another. God said, ‘Thou shalt not kill’; at another time he said, ‘Thou shalt utterly destroy.’ This is the principle on which the government of heaven is conducted, by revelation adapted to the circumstances in which the children of the Kingdom are placed. Whatever God requires is right, no matter what it is, although we may not see the reason thereof till long after the events transpire. 

https://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/history-1838-1856-volume-d-1-1-august-1842-1-july-1843/284

That being said, I don't think most orthodox members of the Church really think about this much. Some have a hard time reconciling Joseph Smith's teaching on that topic with other orthodox emphases on eternal truths and the unchanging nature of divine laws. 

My personal view is that there are certainly eternal truths and that objective morality exists but that those eternal truths have many provisions for when certain behaviors are or are not acceptable, and that with our limited mortal perspectives we aren't privy to all the exceptions or allowances that various contexts might evoke. We are invited to come to know and trust God so that he can help refine, enlighten, and direct or limited moral sensibilities. Of course, it typically requires very real, discernible, and consistent spiritual experiences to develop that type of trust, especially when God's commandments, from time to time, grate against our own moral intuitions. 

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4 hours ago, hope_for_things said:

Objectivity exists within science for all practical purposes.  I thought you were a pragmatist?  I don't know of any scientists that claim 100% certainty on topics, just levels of confidence based on the best current evidence.  

Getting into discussions about ultimate reality and ultimate certainty I see as a perfectionist fallacy that misses the practical.  So to compare subjective and personal religious experience to science is a category error in my opinion as the two are very different methods of experience.  I thought we agreed on this point from prior discussions?  

As for hieroglyphs of bulls on cave walls, I'm not sure we know exactly what the artists were attempting to accomplish through the drawings.  Are they attempting to record history, or are they telling a fictional narrative for entertainment purposes, or are they worshiping the bulls in a prehistoric form of religion, or a combination of all three.  I don't know..... 

Yes I'm a Pragmatist, with a capital p not a small one. And that's why I said what I said.:)

Objective reality may exist practically until suddenly the paradigm changes and suddenly objective reality is not quite what they thought it was.

Oops.

Speculating on the motivations of the people who drew the murals in, say, Lascaux, might be fun but it is highly presentist.  

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4 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Again, it depends on how one defines moral relativism. Most Latter-day Saints understand, implicitly, that the morality of some behaviors is based on relative contexts. For instance, most orthodox members feel that it is okay to not wear garments while swimming, but that to remove garments for a casual game of ping pong is inappropriate. Latter-day Saints typically adopt (unknowingly) a variation of Divine Command Theory which allows for moral imperatives to vary based on circumstance. In this, they follow the lead of Joseph Smith himself who stated:

https://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/history-1838-1856-volume-d-1-1-august-1842-1-july-1843/284

That being said, I don't think most orthodox members of the Church really think about this much. Some have a hard time reconciling Joseph Smith's teaching on that topic with other orthodox emphases on eternal truths and the unchanging nature of divine laws. 

My personal view is that there are certainly eternal truths and that objective morality exists but that those eternal truths have many provisions for when certain behaviors are or are not acceptable, and that with our limited mortal perspectives we aren't privy to all the exceptions or allowances that various contexts might evoke. 

Then they are not "objective". :)

 

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10 minutes ago, mfbukowski said:

Speculating on the motivations of the people who drew the murals in, say, Lascaux, might be fun but it is highly presentist.  

Ha!  Perhaps the bull drawings were presentist speculations that their culture was engaging in as they observed archeological finds of previous people’s and their fascination with bovine worship practices.  

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6 hours ago, hope_for_things said:

This post-modern approach can work in my opinion, but it requires that Mormons be willing to relinquish claims of objectivity.  You can't have apologists producing pseudo scientific materials that are quite rigorous within apologetic circles, but that fail to meet a broader standard of scholarship, and at the same time make the assertion that objectivity doesn't exist when it comes to religion. 

A lot of Mormons like things that sometimes get put under the postmodern rubric - although I'd also note that few like the term postmodernism because of its appropriation particularly in literary fields by people doing shoddy thinking. Not to mention the Sokal Affair. There are ways to get something like objectivity. The end of Derrida's Limited Inc (full pdf of text) which was considered one of the great postmodern works has him offering something like objectivity even if it's not objectivity proper. The text is somewhat complex and involves an engagement with the philosophers Austin and Searle. However at the end there's an interview with Derrida and he actually speaks fairly clear and straightforward. (Which is rare in his texts) Right around page 146 things get going pretty well. (Emphasis mine in the text)

  • In other words, how can he discuss, and discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer is simple enough: this defini­tion of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread. Then per­haps it will be understood that the value of truth (and all those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. And that within interpretive con­ texts (that is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example, socio-political-institutional - but even beyond these determinations) that are rel­atively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy. I should thus be able to claim and to demonstrate, without the slightest "pragmatic contradiction," that Searle, for example, as I have already demonstrated, was not on the "right track" toward understanding what I wanted to say, etc. (146)

Earlier he says some interesting things.

  • What is called "objectivity," scientific for instance (in which I firmly believe, in a given situation), imposes itself only within a context which is extremely vast, old, powerfully established, stabilized or rooted in a network of conventions (for instance, those of language) and yet which still remains a context. And the emer­ gence of the value of objectivity (and hence of so many others) also belongs to a context. We can call "context" the entire "real-history-of-the-world," if you like, in which this value of objectivity and, even more broadly, that of truth (etc.) have taken on meaning and imposed themselves. That does not in the slightest dis­credit them. In the name of what, of which other "truth," moreover, would it? One of the definitions ofwhat is called deconstruction would be the effort to take this limitless context into account, to pay the sharpest and broadest attention possible to context, and thus to an incessant movement of recontextualization. The phrase which for some has become a sort of slogan, in general so badly understood, of deconstruction ("there is nothing outside the text" [il n'y a pas de hors-texte]), means nothing else: there is nothing outside context.

Part of the problem is that of course postmodernism is such a broad category filled with so many different views (much like feminism) that it's almost meaningless in terms of specifying a position. This 1980 interview with Derrida in the Literary Review of Edinburgh is worthwhile here as well.

Quote

Q: It might be argued that deconstruction inevitably leads to pluralist interpretation and ultimately to the view that any interpretation is as good as any other. Do you believe this and how do you select some interpretations as being better than others? 

JD: I am not a pluralist and I would never say that every interpretation is equal but I do not select. The interpretations select themselves. I am a Nietzschean in that sense. You know that Nietzsche insisted on the fact that the principle of differentiation was in itself selective. The eternal return of the same was not repetition, it was a selection of more powerful forces. So I would not say that some interpretations are truer than others. I would say that some are more powerful than others. The hierarchy is between forces and not between true and false. There are interpretations which account for more meaning and this is the criterion. 

Q: You would reject, then, the view that meaning is any response whatever to a sign? That meaning is determined by the person who reads the sign? 

JD: Yes, of course. Meaning is determined by a system of forces which is not personal. It does not depend on the subjective identity but on the field of different forces, the conflict of forces, which produce interpretations. 

Q: You would, therefore, reject the theory of authorial intention as determinate of meaning? 

JD: Yes. I would not say that there is no interest in referring to the intentional purpose. There are authors, there are intentionalities, there are conscious purposes. We must analyse them, take them seriously. But the effects of what we caul author's intentions are dependent on something which is not the individual intention, which is not intentional. 

Q:There is a pragmatic aspect to this question of intentionality. It has been suggested that it is only in the field of literary theory that reader-based theories of interpretation are taken seriously, that all other fields of discourse accept author-based intention. Reader-based theories of interpretation tend, therefore, according to this view, to partition off literary speculation from the rest of experience and thus to trivialise literary speculation. What are your views on this? 

JD: I do not accept this opposition between reader-based and author-based meaning. It comes from a misunderstanding of deconstruction, one which sees deconstruction as free interpretation based only on the fantasies of the reader. No one is free to read as he or she wants. The reader does not interpret freely, taking into account only his own reading, excluding the author, the historical period in which the text appeared and so on. 

Q: So you would not consider yourself an anti-historicist? 

JD: Not at all. I think that one cannot read without trying to reconstruct the historical context but history is not the last word, the final key, of reading. Without being anti-historicist, I am suspicious of the traditional concepts of history, the Hegelian and Marxist concepts.

 

 

4 hours ago, Ryan Dahle said:

Again, it depends on how one defines moral relativism. Most Latter-day Saints understand, implicitly, that the morality of some behaviors is based on relative contexts.

Exactly. What we call eternal law is just moral claims that apply in all contexts. But certainly some claims depend upon only certain contexts - say the divine command to build an ark. It's quite possible to create a moral code in this notion. (As Derrida does above)

5 hours ago, mfbukowski said:

To believe in ultimate reality one has to say that Kuhn was totally wrong, and there exists at least in principle - a once for all times objective view of reality which will never change which is "accurate" and infallible.

To believe in Kuhn is to believe in an object fact - a kind of reality and to make a claim that Kuhn applies to all contexts. So isn't the appeal to Kuhn in this way self-refuting? The idea that Kuhn entails "no reality" requires that Kuhn's claims are real.

 

Edited by clarkgoble
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51 minutes ago, hope_for_things said:

Ha!  Perhaps the bull drawings were presentist speculations that their culture was engaging in as they observed archeological finds of previous people’s and their fascination with bovine worship practices.  

I never knew bovines worshiped anything.

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