I feel like we all should agree on this one regardless of where we are with the truth claims of the Church

[Duncan]

2 minutes ago, DBMormon said:

no, I deeply believe there are members of the Church who are so loyal to their religion that they would sanction and assist any effort on the Church's part.  One only need to look to Gordon Smith who coined the term "Church Broke" claiming he was and would assist in any way out of loyalty.

Gordon Smith admitting being Church Broke

It only takes one judge who gets such cases to side on the less reasonable end.

he didn't coin that term, I heard Elder Holland use it a very long time ago and I doubt he coined it either

[DBMormon]

in regards to Notre Dame - they also acknowledge "The court said in unanimous ruling that the private university's police department isn't a public agency that falls under the state open records law. "  this is very different from what BYU is on record claiming.  

"In a 2014 ruling, the Utah Supreme Court agreed with BYU that its traffic cadets and supervising police officers were performing a "government function" under a Provo ordinance when a 2008 traffic crash near BYU's football stadium led an injured motorcyclist to sue the school. The court threw out the motorcyclist's lawsuit because he had not filed a notice of claim with Provo."

When BYU Police perform "government functions" they self admit wanting to be under Government regulations and privileges. 

Edited July 19, 2018 by DBMormon

[Unaffiliated]

I just noticed the Original Post has disappeared.

[DBMormon]

10 minutes ago, Duncan said:

he didn't coin that term, I heard Elder Holland use it a very long time ago and I doubt he coined it either

CFR on Holland having used it earlier.  Is there a hard copy reference to this of just your personal experience

Edited July 19, 2018 by DBMormon

[DBMormon]

5 minutes ago, Unaffiliated said:

I just noticed the Original Post has disappeared.

hmmmmmmmmm

[JulieM]

10 minutes ago, Unaffiliated said:

I just noticed the Original Post has disappeared.

Which post?

I noticed a bunch disappeared today too (on another thread between jkwilliams and Juliann).  Weird stuff!!!  They were there one minute (I’d just read through them) and gone the next.  Maybe there are glitches on the site today causing posts to get deleted?  It’s been slow loading for me lately too.

Edited July 19, 2018 by JulieM

[Unaffiliated]

Just now, JulieM said:

Which post?

I noticed a bunch disappeared today too (on another thread between jkwilliams and Juliann).  Weird stuff!!!  They were there one minute (I’d just read through them) and gone the next.

The thread was started by FearlessFixer. Now it looks like the thread was started by Calm.

[JulieM]

13 minutes ago, Unaffiliated said:

The thread was started by FearlessFixer. Now it looks like the thread was started by Calm.

You’re right!  Have all of Fearless Fixer’s posts been deleted or just the OP?

Weird stuff combined with all the other missing posts too 

Edited July 19, 2018 by JulieM

[Duncan]

44 minutes ago, DBMormon said:

CFR on Holland having used it earlier.  Is there a hard copy reference to this of just your personal experience

http://scottwoodward.org/Talks/html/Holland, Jeffrey R/HollandJR_AStandardUntoMyPeople.html

he says "Church broken" which is the same thing

[smac97]

1 hour ago, DBMormon said:

Quote

I may have missed it being discussed in this thread, but didn't BYU argue the exact opposite of what it's arguing in this case in Mallory v. BYU in 2014?  Namely, didn't it argue that it was a government agency under the direction of Provo PD?

yes but dont let the facts get in the way

You're wading into some deep waters here, methinks.  Here's the legal analysis from the Mallory case:

Quote

Here, Mallory argues that Defendants are not protected by the GIAU and that, therefore, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. On appeal, we must decide whether the trial court correctly concluded that the facts alleged in the Complaint, together with the affidavits, establish that Defendants were protected by the GIAU, including its notice of claim requirements.

II. Agents Must Be Under the Significant Control of a Governmental Entity to Be Entitled to GIAU Immunity.

¶ 17 When interpreting this state's statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Utah Legislature. See Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder Cnty., 2011 UT 18, ¶ 18, 251 P.3d 804. To discern that intent, we begin by examining the plain language of the statute at issue. See id.; see also State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ¶ 12, 240 P.3d 780. If that language, interpreted “in light of its linguistic, structural, and statutory context,” is clear, we apply the statute accordingly. See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465. “ ‘{S}tatutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another. Thus, we should give effect to any omission in the [statutory] language by presuming that the omission is purposeful.’ “ State v. Houston, 2011 UT App 350, ¶ 12, 263 P.3d 1226 (quoting Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2004 UT 98, ¶ 30, 104 P.3d 1208).

¶ 18 Utah Code section 63G–7–201 provides, “Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, each governmental entity and each [E]mployee of a governmental entity are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function .”⁷ Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–201(1) (Supp.2012) (emphasis added). Thus, this section of the GIAU plainly states that to fall within the scope of the GIAU, an individual must be an “[E]mployee of a governmental entity” engaged in a “governmental function.” Id.

¶ 19 While Mallory concedes that “traffic direction on public roads is a governmental function,” he disputes that the “authorization to perform a governmental function makes the actor an agent of the government granting the authorization,” and he further challenges the assumption that “[a]ll agents are automatically [E]mployees of the authorizing government under the [GIAU].” In contrast, Defendants assert that the trial court correctly concluded that they are Employees of Provo City. They first note that BYU is a corporation and “can only act through [its] agents, be they officers or employees.” See Orlob v. Wasatch Mgmt., 2001 UT App 287, ¶ 18, 33 P.3d 1078 (internal quotation marks omitted). Next, they contend that because Robinson, as an employee of BYU, was authorized by ordinance to direct post-event traffic, they are both entitled to immunity based on the Provo City ordinance. See Provo City, Utah, Code § 9.10.060(2)-(3) (2012). In particular, Defendants argue that they were acting as servants or agents of Provo City. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–102(2)(a)(i), –201(1) (2011 & Supp.2012) (granting immunity from suit to government Employees, including “servants,” when performing a “governmental function”).

¶ 20 To determine whether Defendants are Employees of Provo City, “we must read the plain language of the [definition section of the GIAU] as a whole” and “construe [its] provisions in harmony with other provisions in the [GIAU].” See Archuleta v. St. Mark's Hosp., 2009 UT 36, ¶ 8, 238 P.3d 1044 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 63G–7–201 provides immunity to a governmental entity and its Employees for “any injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function.” See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–201(1). In turn, a “governmental function” is defined as “each activity, undertaking, or operation performed by a department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity.” See id. § 63G–7–102(4)(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the scope of immunity provided under the GIAU explicitly includes protection to a governmental entity and its Employees for claims arising out of the acts of the entity's agents. However, the only individuals entitled to assert that immunity are those who are classified as a governmental entity's Employees. See id. § 63G–7–102(2)(a), –201(1) (providing that “each governmental entity and each [E]mployee of a governmental entity are immune from suit”). The definition section of the GIAU provides in relevant part, “ ‘Employee’ includes: ․ a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, or commissioners ․ whether or not the individual holding that position receives compensation.” Id. § 63G–7–102(2)(a), (b) (emphases added). And the statute further indicates that “ ‘Employee’ does not include an independent contractor.” Id. § 63G–7–102(2)(c).

¶ 21 Although the Utah Legislature did not expressly list “agent” as an example of an “Employee” who is entitled to immunity, Defendants ask us to assume that the Utah Legislature inadvertently omitted that term and intended to grant immunity to both servants and all other agents. Compare id. § 63G–7–102(2) (listing who may qualify as an Employee under the GIAU), with id. § 63G–7–104(4)(b) (providing that governmental functions include acts performed by a governmental entity's agents), and id. § 63G–7–201(1) (providing immunity to governmental entities and Employees for injuries resulting from “the exercise of a governmental function”). They contend that the legislature's use of the word “includes” in the definition of “Employee” indicates that the list provided is not exclusive. See, e.g., Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 27, 251 P.3d 810 (“When ‘including’ precedes a list, its common usage is to indicate a partial list.” (citing Black's Law Dictionary 777–78 (8th ed.2004))). While the use of “includes” does generally indicate a nonexhaustive list, it does not justify adding terms that are “inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature” or “repugnant to the context of the statute.” See Utah Code Ann. § 68–3–12(1)(a), (f) (2011). Thus, we must “look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute” when we consider whether such a contrary intent is evident here. See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 23, 1 P.3d 1074 (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we do not lightly assume that the legislature overlooked “agents” when listing examples of governmental Employees, but remembered to include it in the definition of governmental function located in the same section of the GIAU. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–102(2)(a) (defining “Employee”), with id. § 63G–7–102(4)(b) (defining “[g]overnmental function”). Rather, we begin with the assumption that the different terms were used advisedly. See Due South, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2008 UT 71, ¶ 33, 197 P.3d 82.

¶ 22 The only listed category of Employee upon which Defendants rely is “servants.” See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–102(2)(a). In addition, they contend that as Provo City's agents for traffic direction, they are immune by implication even if they do not fall within an express category of Employees. To determine whether the GIAU includes all agents as Employees, we first compare the reach of the statute if only servants of a governmental entity are included as Employees to its reach if all agents are also entitled to immunity. Second, we review whether any limitation created by including only servants is consistent with the legislative purpose of the GIAU. Finally, we interpret the GIAU consistent with that purpose to determine whether the trial court was correct in dismissing the Complaint.

A. The Difference Between Servants and Agents

¶ 23 The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that “a servant is defined as a ‘person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the other's control or right to control.’ “ Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P.2d 809, 811 (1949) (quoting Restatement (First) of Agency § 220 (1933)); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1490–92 (9th ed.2009) (defining servant as “[a] person who is employed by another to do work under the control and direction of the employer”). Servants include both employees and “agents with limited powers.” See Intermountain Speedways, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 101 Utah 573, 126 P.2d 22, 24 (1942); see also Black's Law Dictionary 602 (9th ed.2009) (defining employee as “[a] person who works in the service of ․ the employer[ ] under an express or implied contract for hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance”). Accordingly, if Defendants were acting under the control and direction of Provo City, they are agents of the city acting as its servants and are expressly covered by the GIAU.

¶ 24 The term “agent” is susceptible to both a broad and narrow meaning. Under its expansive definition, “agent” can be used generally to refer to “[o]ne who is authorized to act for or in place of another; a representative.” Black's Law Dictionary 72 (9th ed.2009); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. b (2006) (noting that “agency” is often used in a broad sense to include “parties who serve any intermediary function”). This use of the term covers a broad spectrum of relationships, ranging from those where the principal maintains strict control to those where the agent has significant discretion. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (“[A] person may be an agent although the principal lacks the right to control the full range of the agent's activities, how the agent uses time, or the agent's exercise of professional judgment.”). “ ‘An agent who is not subject to control as to the manner in which he performs the acts that constitute the execution of his agency’ “ is an independent contractor. See Dowsett, 207 P.2d at 811 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Restatement (First) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1933)). When agency is used in its broadest sense, independent contractors are agents. Thus, if BYU and Provo were authorized to act for Provo City, they are its agents in this broad sense.

¶ 25 However, in a more technical sense, an agency relationship requires that a person is “authorized by another to act on his behalf and subject to his control” and a “manifestation of consent to create an agency relationship.” See Stamper v. Johnson, 2010 UT 26, ¶ 18, 232 P.3d 514 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006) (defining agency as “the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act”). When the term “agent” is used in this strict legal sense, i.e., to denote a “true agency,” the definition excludes relationships that allow one person to act on behalf of another, where “one or more of the defining elements of agency are not present.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. b (2006). Thus, under this more restrictive definition, an agent must be subject to the control of the principal, and an independent contractor is not an agent. Under this definition, Defendants are only agents if they were subject to Provo City's control and agreed to its request that they act on the city's behalf.

¶ 26 In summary, when used in its broad sense, the term agent can include all persons acting on behalf of a governmental entity, from servants, on the closely controlled side of the spectrum, to independent contractors, on the other extreme. Our review of the GIAU convinces us that the Utah Legislature did not intend to extend immunity to all agents of a governmental entity under this expansive definition.

B. The Use of the Terms “Servant” and “Agent” in the GIAU

¶ 27 By listing “servants” and “employees” as examples of the types of individuals who may invoke the protections of the GIAU, but excluding “independent contractors,” the Utah Legislature has narrowed the applicability of the GIAU's individual immunity to a subset of the more expansive definition of agent. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–102(2)(a)(i), (2)(c) (2011). The difference between those individuals expressly included as Employees and those explicitly excluded is the extent of the governmental entity's control. Where the entity can exercise the level of control to create a servant or employee relationship, the individual is entitled to the protection of the GIAU. Cf. Dowsett, 207 P.2d at 811. But if the governmental entity does not retain control over the manner of performance, the individual is an independent contractor not entitled to immunity under the GIAU. Cf. id. Accordingly, the plain language of the GIAU includes some, but not all, broadly defined agents as Employees.

¶ 28 While Defendants are correct that the GIAU defines governmental function as including the acts of all “agent{s}” of a governmental entity, the omission of that term in the definition of “Employee” does not indicate an oversight by the Utah Legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–102(2), (4)(b). Rather, the Legislature has simply defined the scope of immunity under the GIAU more expansively than the group of individuals who are protected by that immunity. While only individuals under the supervision of the governmental entity are Employees who enjoy immunity, those Employees are “immune from suit for any injury that results from” their own activities and the actions of any agent of a governmental entity. See id. § 63G–7–201 (Supp.2012); see also id. § 63G–7–102(4)(b) (2011) (defining “[g]overnmental function” as “each activity, undertaking, or operation performed by a department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity”). This means that although an agent over whom the entity does not exercise sufficient control to create a master-servant relationship, such as an independent contractor, may be sued, the plaintiff cannot bring claims against the governmental entity or its Employees as a result of that individual's conduct.

¶ 29 In the absence of immunity, a principal can be sued for direct or vicarious liability as a result of the actions of its agent. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.03 (2006) (listing the requirements for direct and vicarious liability). Furthermore, direct liability can arise “either from the principal's relationship with an agent whose conduct harms a third party or from the agent's failure to perform a duty owed by the principal to the third party.” Id. § 7.03 cmt. b. Direct liability can also arise from the principal's own negligence in selecting or supervising the agent. See id. In turn, the principal is subject to vicarious liability when its true agent “commits a tort while acting within the scope of employment.” See id. § 7.03(2)(a); see also Diversified Holdings, LC v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ¶ 36, 63 P.3d 686 (“ ‘A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.’ “ (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1958))). By including the acts of a governmental entity's “agents” within the definition of “governmental function,” the GIAU provides immunity from all of these claims. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G–7–102(4)(b), –201(1). However, to be individually protected by the GIAU, the agent must be sufficiently under the control of the governmental entity to qualify as its servant. See id. § 63G–7–102(2). This distinction is consistent with the purpose of the GIAU.

¶ 30 By enacting the GIAU and its predecessor, the UGIA, “the ‘legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to the protection of [governmental entities] in rendering the many and ever increasing number of governmental services.’ “ See Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 14, 24 P.3d 958 (quoting Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976)) (discussing the UGIA specifically and sovereign immunity generally). Affording a governmental entity immunity for the acts of its agents generally advances this purpose by protecting its resources for the provision of services to the community. See generally Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 32, 116 P.3d 295 (recognizing the preservation of “the treasuries of the state and its political subdivisions” as a “legitimate governmental purpose” under the GIAU). However, extending immunity to an agent acting on behalf of the governmental entity, but not under its control, does not. Unlike the governmental entity, the independent contractor's assets will not be used to provide public services if not paid in damages. Consequently, barring suit against the independent agent does not further this goal of the GIAU.

¶ 31 In turn, the purpose of granting immunity to individuals acting in an official capacity “is to avoid making ‘public officials unduly fearful in their exercise of [discretionary] authority and discourag[ing] them from taking prompt and decisive action.’ “ Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, ¶ 44, 5 P.3d 616 (alterations in original) (quoting George A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 Colum. L.Rev. 1175, 1178 (1977)), as modified by denial of rehearing, 2000 UT 55. Furthermore, governmental entities, like corporations, can only act through individuals. By adding “servants” to the group of persons individually covered by the GIAU, the Utah Legislature has extended immunity to the individuals acting under the direction of the governmental entity who do not meet the traditional definition of an employee. As a result, both employees and servants are able to act according to the entity's direction without fear of being sued. In contrast, an agent acting on behalf of the governmental entity, but not under its direction, is free to make its own decisions concerning the performance of the task. If the agent's independent decisions result in injury to a third party, allowing the agent to assert immunity does not advance the governmental entity's interest in assuring that individuals will carry out the directives of governmental entities.

¶ 32 For these reasons, we are convinced that the Utah Legislature carefully selected the terms it used to define the individuals entitled to protection and the extent of the immunity granted to them. While the immunity granted to Employees of a governmental entity is broad enough to insulate the governmental entity and the individuals through whom it acts from claims arising from the acts of all agents of the entity, that immunity is not available to every agent in the broadest definition of that term. Instead, agents not acting under the direction of the governmental entity can be sued for their independent decisions. Because we conclude that this distinction is consistent with the purposes of governmental immunity and the plain language of the GIAU, we reject Defendants' suggestion that the legislature inadvertently omitted the term agents from the definition of Employee. Instead, the GIAU provides that agents who are also servants due to the level of control the entity retains over their performance are Employees, while agents who are only independent contractors are not.

¶ 33 While our conclusion that the plain language of the statute itself negates the need to consider the legislative history of the GIAU, see State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 15, 84 P.3d 1171, it also suggests that the Utah Legislature thoughtfully differentiated between persons entitled to immunity and the scope of that protection. The predecessor to the GIAU was originally codified in 1965.⁸ The act's original definition of Employee was “any officer, employee or servant of a governmental entity.” See Utah Code Ann. § 63–30–2(4) (1968). Since then, the legislature has amended the act's definition of Employee several times but has not added “agent,” a term used in other provisions of the same section of the act. Indeed, when a definition of “governmental function” was added in 1987, providing that such a function could “be performed by any department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity,” see id. § 63–30–2(4)(b) (1989) (emphasis added), the legislature did not add “agent” to the list of individuals expressly included as an Employee of a governmental entity.

¶ 34 In 2004, the legislature conducted a comprehensive overhaul of the immunity act, repealing and reenacting it. See generally Jenkins v. Jordan Valley Water Conservancy Dist., 2012 UT App 204, ¶ 84, 713 Utah Adv. Rep. 37. In so doing, it noted in the Senate Journal that the revision was an “effort to completely repeal, rethink, reorganize and then enact a new Governmental Immunity Act.” Senate Journal, Gen. Sess. Day 38, at 10 (Utah Feb. 25, 2004). The revision was the result of “hundreds of hours” of meetings and drafting. See id. at 11. Again, however, the Utah Legislature did not add the term “agents” to the express list of Employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 63–30d–102(2) (2004).⁹ In light of this careful and extensive review of governmental immunity, we are further convinced that the Utah Legislature intentionally omitted the generic term “agents” from the definition of “Employee.” Rather than exhibiting inadvertence, the express exclusion of “independent contractors” and the omission of “agents” suggest that the Utah Legislature was aware of the imprecision in the use of the term “agent” and carefully selected language designed to limit immunity to those relationships where the governmental entity exercises control over the manner in which the work is performed.

C. Application of the GIAU to Defendants

¶ 35 Defendants assert that because Robinson was authorized as a BYU employee to direct post-event traffic, she and BYU were acting as agents of Provo City. See Provo City, Utah, Code § 9.10.060 (2012) (allowing “a person who is employed by a college or university” to “direct [post-event] traffic on public streets while under the supervision of a peace officer employed by the same college or university”). As discussed, however, an agency relationship alone is not enough to establish the applicability of the GIAU and the correctness of the trial court's dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, the determination of whether the GIAU applies is dependent on the degree of control Provo City maintained over Defendants' traffic control activities. For example, the indicia of a master-servant relationship include the “right to discharge” the individual, the “nature of [the] work,” and whether the relationship is “for a definite piece of work.” See Intermountain Speedways, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 101 Utah 573, 126 P.2d 22, 24 (1942). The most important consideration, however, is the ability to control the “means and method of performance.” Id. “ ‘Those rendering service but retaining control over the manner of doing it are not servants.’ “ Dowsett v. Dowsett, 116 Utah 12, 207 P.2d 809, 811 (1949) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Restatement (First) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (1933)); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 (1958) (“A servant is an agent ․ whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master.”).

¶ 36 If Defendants were acting merely as independent contractors for Provo City, they are not entitled to assert immunity under the GIAU, even though they were acting as its agents in the broad sense. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G–7–102(2)(c). Under those circumstances, Defendants would not be protected by the GIAU and Mallory's failure to file a notice of claim would not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. Thus, Defendants must establish that they were acting as agents under the control of Provo City with respect to traffic control, i.e. as servants.

As you can see, the legal issues here are fairly complex.  The question of BYU PD's status as a law enforcement entity is not an all-or-nothing, up-down, black-or-white, yes-or-no kind of thing.  

Thanks,

-Smac

Edited July 19, 2018 by smac97

[smac97]

1 hour ago, DBMormon said:

in a few years when those redactions are uncovered you will see.  Guess we play the waiting game.

Meanwhile, your accusations are apparently nothing but hostile conjecture, prejudice (literally, as it turns out) and spite.

I am curious how you would treat, say, Muslims.  Is it okay to blithly and ignorantly and baselessly accuse a random Muslim of being a terrorist?  After all, it might be true, so why worry about a little thing like evidence?

-Smac

Edited July 19, 2018 by smac97

[Stargazer]

1 hour ago, Unaffiliated said:

I just noticed the Original Post has disappeared.

A mod chimed in to say that he/she was combining two threads.  That's probably what happened.

[Calm]

1 hour ago, Unaffiliated said:

I just noticed the Original Post has disappeared.

Threads were combined...his title with my old, but still active thread, so it is in here.  I have edited the opening post to reflect that...not going to change the title the mods chose even if I hate it as I do (so vague)...and added a tag for the subject.

Linked to his opening post as well, but here it is again:

http://www.mormondialogue.org/topic/70782-i-feel-like-we-all-should-agree-on-this-one-regardless-of-where-we-are-with-the-truth-claims-of-the-church/?do=findComment&comment=1209835321

 

Edited July 19, 2018 by Calm

[JulieM]

5 minutes ago, Calm said:

Threads were combined...his title with my old, but still active thread, so it is in here.  I have edited the opening post to reflect that...not going to change the title the mods chose even if I hate it as I do (so vague)...and added a tag for the subject.

Linked to his opening post as well, but here it is again:

http://www.mormondialogue.org/topic/70782-i-feel-like-we-all-should-agree-on-this-one-regardless-of-where-we-are-with-the-truth-claims-of-the-church/?do=findComment&comment=1209835321

 

Thanks, Calm!

How about jkwilliam’s and Juliann’s posts?  Are they somewhere else too?

Edited July 19, 2018 by JulieM

[Calm]

1 hour ago, JulieM said:

Which post?

I noticed a bunch disappeared today too (on another thread between jkwilliams and Juliann).  Weird stuff!!!  They were there one minute (I’d just read through them) and gone the next.  Maybe there are glitches on the site today causing posts to get deleted?  It’s been slow loading for me lately too.

Hadn't realized they were gone, just thought no new posts were posted because we all were tired of the subject.  I am guessing they got reported as really off topic because they were.  My bad for taking it there.

[Calm]

5 minutes ago, JulieM said:

Thanks, Calm!

How about jkwilliam’s and Juliann’s posts?  Are they somewhere else too?

Looks like they are completely gone after a certain point, possibly one or more of mine as well as I am remembering I said something on the subject after the last time, but not sure.  

[Tacenda]

2 hours ago, Duncan said:

http://scottwoodward.org/Talks/html/Holland, Jeffrey R/HollandJR_AStandardUntoMyPeople.html

he says "Church broken" which is the same thing

That almost seems like a negative thing for a church leader to say of another member of the church, or I'm not understanding the meaning well.

[Storm Rider]

3 hours ago, DBMormon said:

in a few years when those redactions are uncovered you will see.  Guess we play the waiting game.

Have you reverted to your old self? The trial of faith for some is a daily battle while others fight the battle once, encounter God, and then stop fighting for it - it just is.  What is your objective now in life?  

I grew up in the mission field. My testimony was never built on Joseph Smith for its foundation. As a missionary, I was one of those that strived to live the spirit of the law. I never got involved in politics within the Church or without. Though I think there are some individuals that do not question the Church I am not one of them. However, I also don't spend my time analyzing the Church's actions.  The focus continues to be about Jesus Christ and striving - though failing - to be like him. I don't see how others have time for these kinds of pursuits nor do I see their value.

It is my belief that some leaders will be damned by their actions in the same way that everyone else will be.  I leave it to God to handle those things.

[Duncan]

9 minutes ago, Tacenda said:

That almost seems like a negative thing for a church leader to say of another member of the church, or I'm not understanding the meaning well.

To me, he seems to be saying that his wife was indifferent to what was going on or possibly she was like better you than me! but I don't know what he means for sure!

[Calm]

3 hours ago, Tacenda said:

That almost seems like a negative thing for a church leader to say of another member of the church, or I'm not understanding the meaning well.

Is it a bad thing for a dog to be housebroken or a good thing?

[Tacenda]

1 hour ago, Calm said:

Is it a bad thing for a dog to be housebroken or a good thing?

That is an excellent explanation, thanks, you'd make wonderful teacher, well, you already are.

[Scott Lloyd]

13 hours ago, Calm said:

Threads were combined...his title with my old, but still active thread, so it is in here.  I have edited the opening post to reflect that...not going to change the title the mods chose even if I hate it as I do (so vague)...and added a tag for the subject.

Linked to his opening post as well, but here it is again:

http://www.mormondialogue.org/topic/70782-i-feel-like-we-all-should-agree-on-this-one-regardless-of-where-we-are-with-the-truth-claims-of-the-church/?do=findComment&comment=1209835321

 

The thread title strikes me as presumptuous. I don’t blame anyone for not wanting to be associated with it. 

[Scott Lloyd]

On 5/14/2018 at 10:48 PM, Calm said:

https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/05/14/should-brigham-young-universitys-police-department-be-subject-to-utahs-open-records-law-a-judge-will-soon-decide/

Me, I think I side with the Trib on this...if it has police authority, it should be treated like government police.  

Edit:  thread was combined with another, feel I should give full credit for his title to Fearless Fixer.  Part of it is I would never post such a vague title with no info on what was to be discussed, the librarian in me revolts...but the Mods chose it and so not touching it.  

Here is his post to go with the title:

http://www.mormondialogue.org/topic/70782-i-feel-like-we-all-should-agree-on-this-one-regardless-of-where-we-are-with-the-truth-claims-of-the-church/?do=findComment&comment=1209835321

 

The headline writer in me revolts because the title is way too long. 

[Anijen]

23 hours ago, smac97 said:

You're wading into some deep waters here, methinks.  Here's the legal analysis from the Mallory case:

As you can see, the legal issues here are fairly complex.  The question of BYU PD's status as a law enforcement entity is not an all-or-nothing, up-down, black-or-white, yes-or-no kind of thing.  

Thanks,

-Smac

As I learned in law school, the reasonably best answer is; "it depends."

[Is_this_really_True]

SMAC97

Maybe it is too simple for me. Lets take the Mallory Case. As I read the Supreme Court case and its non-detailed accident account, I can only guess at a few thing. The appeals court documents I believe support some of my assumptions. Facts as I believe them. 1. Mallory was on a motorcycle and stopped in a parking lot. 2. Traffic cadet Robinson directed Mallory to turn left onto University Ave (Supreme Court description of street). 3. Mallory was injured in a collision with a car due to turning onto the street.

There may be many things missing here, I don't have and cannot find, (after googling several times for Mallory, suing BYU, traffic accident, etc.) the police report to see what was written down and even then it may not describe all of the facts. Think recent police reports on shootings and how folks change their stories a little each time they talk about it.

Regardless of the court filing and deadlines and with whom he should have filed and when, the facts as i see then, are he followed a BYU traffic cadets directions and was injured by following her direction. By the court case pleadings, BYU is saying, "this is not our fault even though it was caused by one of our people" or worse yet to me "it is our fault but we are not to blame because the claim was not filed properly". BYU appears not take responsibility for the actions of its personnel. I remember an Apostle giving a general conference talk or maybe it was a BYU talk I heard, about a time when he was a lawyer and was represent a time when 2 partners were dissolving a company and on partner positioned himself, via lawyers, to make more money on the sale that the other partner, represented by the GA. His comments were that we should treat each other honestly. To me this is not honest and the GA's have direct authority over BYU. So this is what the GA's are saying to me, "It is our fault but we are not taking responsibility because the law allows us to."

Now, does this reasoning have echos of other cases the church is facing or has faced in the past?  

If I have gotten any of this incorrect, please let me know.