Midgley, Novak, Remembrance, And Modernity

[volgadon]

http://maxwellinstitute.byu.edu/publications/review/?vol=19&num=2&id=658#r16

I recently came across this essay, and have some reservations regarding it which I'd love to discuss with Louis Midgley, and anyone else, of course.

I do appreciate the warning voice Novak and Midgley raised about forgetting the mighty acts of God in history, and Yerushalmi's essay is a tour de force, a modern classic, but the more I read Novak and Midgley's essay, the more I find that its over reliance on Yerushalmi's "Zakhor" skews its portrayal of the Jewish encounter with modernity and history, as a result of which not only is the understanding of that process hindered, the application of any conclusions to the "New Mormon History" and Mormon studies is questionable.

These issues touch close to home for me on many levels. After all, I am both Israeli and LDS, so both topics can be personal.

At any rate, the essay places history at the forefront of the destruction of Jewish identity by modernity. I strongly disagree, and the factors must be sought elsewhere. Not least of these was the increasingly inward and insular trend in the orthodox world of Eastern Europe. There was also a range of reactions to history which are neglected by the authors, possibly because Yerushalmi never mentioned them. I also think of Martin Buber, who spoke frequently, eloquently, and passionately about God being the God of history, and the God of this hour, and of Israel's unique role, yet he was unobservant of Jewish customs and traditions. He even worked on his Hasidic anthology during Yom Kippur!

[volgadon]

Martin Buber voiced an early form of Yerushalmi's criticism, in his essay, "The Demand of the Spirit and Historical Reality."

"The ideocratic certainty of Saint-Simon did not hold its own for long. Since then with ever greater proximity we have become acquainted with that which massively opposes and resists the spirit; this is usually but misleadingly called 'history.' What is meant is that world which in the last hundred years liberated itself anew and ever more completely from all spiritual control, resolved on actual conquest and exercise of power. The demand for the Value-freedom' of sociology has resulted in a resignation that may be formulated in these words : The spirit is still effective indeed, but only in so far as it places itself under the sway of powerful groups, under the dictates of what rules in history, that is, of power we wish, therefore, to define its limits as a sphere where spirit is not to act but only to know, and within this sphere to guarantee still its independence."

Buber's books on Zion, on the prophetic faith, and various essays on the Bible all emphasise the perception of a God active in history. Yet, despite all this, Buber routinely broke even the most sacrosanct of Jewish ritual observances.

http://books.google.com/books?id=VBuFygk2C-AC&pg=PA366&dq=martin+buber+yom+kippur&hl=en&sa=X&ei=jAIwUYb9I4PTyAGFkYDQBQ&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=martin%20buber%20yom%20kippur&f=false

The modern historical concept drawn from enlightenment Europe, then, can't be the sole or chief acid corroding Jewish faith in its encounter with modernity. Other explanations must be sought.

[volgadon]

I think that improperly understanding history in this case could actually be somewhat detrimental to "defending the King and His Kingdom," as it leads to a misunderstanding and exaggeration of the effects of historiography.

[volgadon]

Oh well, I guess that the "uncivil war" is more engrossing.

[Calm]

You are so informed and balanced, what is left to say?

[volgadon]

You are so informed and balanced, what is left to say?

Haha, maybe I should froth at the mouth more...

[Maidservant]

Yes, you have 152 views, volgadon . But most are not prepared to comment knowledgeably on matters Jewish/Israeli and etc. But I'm guessing we enjoyed what you had to say and are pondering on it.

[volgadon]

I'll discuss some examples drawn from the lives of Kafka, Jiri Langer, Micah Joseph Berdichevsky, R. Hayim of Volozhin, and Yitzhak Nahum Twersky, but I am reminded of an interview I saw with Moshe Idel, a preeminent expert on the history of Jewish mysticism.

Idel related how his house is frequented by many rabbis and kabbalists, who engage him in discussions about the Kabbalah, which Idel has studied for decades from an academic perspective. Idel said that they must find some value in his insights, and added that they probably feel comfortable doing so as he doesn't tell them anything which would be hard for them to bear. That is, he doesn't force history down their throats as proof that their faith is man-made.

In other words, there can be religious value and insights to be gained even from secular history, such as Mormon studies which seeks for the meeting ground between believers and non-believers. We can draw our own conclusions from history without it acting as acid corroding our faith.

Edited March 2, 2013 by volgadon

[Maidservant]

We can draw our own conclusions from history without it acting as acid corroding our faith.

And I appreciate the vice versa. I don't know what is common 'out there' in the academic/university world, but at the place where I got my history degree, I feel like I was blessed with teachers who took religious experience seriously. That is, they took it on its own terms and at face value. There was absolutely no effort to take, for example, a vision experience of St. Bridget and deconstruct it or cast it in a so-called 'secular' light. There was not presented to us a dichotomy of religious or secular. Rather, I would say that we tried to uncover what a historical subject's own relationship to their own experiences was; and how that then was a piece in larger historical developments (whether classically categorized, i.e. say, the Renaissance; or whether as a thread to challenge classic categories of historical development); although it must be remembered that for any given historical subject, when they were acting in real time, they did not view that development, and it is only ourselves in the present who actually make the development frames--it is OUR paradigm, not theirs, even as we try our very best to look through their eyes in the bits.

In reading the essay in the OP, I came away with a lot of questions and concerns regarding it actually. Some of which likely reflect holes in my own knowledge.

But I will just offer one concern and that is that thousands of years of Jewish history and experience is contracted and imagined static and 'named' and is then compared to an expanded, dynamic image of a much shorter timeline (of Jewish experience) (which is also 'named'). I think that contracting and staticizing a timeframe is a foundational mistake from which point one can only veer off and never find one's way back, so to speak, in terms of a conclusion to any given presentation and an elicitation of any truth hoped for from the material in the contracted and staticized timeframe.

Edited March 3, 2013 by Maidservant

[Maidservant]

Takeaway, the thing I appreciated the most about the essay was the reminder that we should not confine ourselves to "categories" simply in service of categorizing and in service of fundamental, unexamined assumptions in the order of business of approaching the past--and again, the opportunity we have of taking experiencers on their own terms and how they understood their own experiences. Especially when the experiences are us with our own history connected to a group identity that we live in the present. That we have the opportunity not only of examining our past but of fashioning our own tools for the examination.

Maybe this was not how historiography was being conducted in 1984 (when this essay was drafted), but has it improved since then?

[Maidservant]

Another thing that I found unclear in this essay, though, was the idea of modernity. Now, here is where it may reflect on my own lack of knowledge. Are the references to modernity a certain commonly accepted time period (of which I can't remember are supposed to be, I think we are post-modern or post-post-modern or out somewhere near Pluto now)? Or are the references to modernity not so much a time period but a collection of paradigms particularly as applies to a set of historigraphical tools?

So I don't know what the answer to the above question is, but I do find the use of the word modernity to be problematic. It seems like it is being used as meaning "something newer", which again is problematic. Why? Because everything is always "something newer" to something else. So to cast that contracted, staticized thousands of years of Jewish experience in the mists of the past as NOT something that was ever something newer cannot be sustained, I think.

Because in the essay, we are situating a Jewish history effort written as early as in the 1600s as the first wave of modernity upon Jewish identity; and then we take Joseph Smith who is in 1800s (well past 1600s), and saying that this is "the past" and only in the 1980s do we reach modernity. So it seems to me by this that modernity is thus only imagined as "something newer"? Because I am thinking that if something in the 1600s can be situated as "modernity", then by the same token so can Joseph Smith . . . is he a bit of "modernity" too? what identity is he assaulting? Or how do we keep it straight?

I'm sure I'm missing something, hmmmm.

[volgadon]

That is, they took it on its own terms and at face value. There was absolutely no effort to take, for example, a vision experience of St. Bridget and deconstruct it or cast it in a so-called 'secular' light. There was not presented to us a dichotomy of religious or secular. Rather, I would say that we tried to uncover what a historical subject's own relationship to their own experiences was; and how that then was a piece in larger historical developments (whether classically categorized, i.e. say, the Renaissance; or whether as a thread to challenge classic categories of historical development); although it must be remembered that for any given historical subject, when they were acting in real time, they did not view that development, and it is only ourselves in the present who actually make the development frames--it is OUR paradigm, not theirs, even as we try our very best to look through their eyes in the bits.

Exactly!

[volgadon]

Another thing that I found unclear in this essay, though, was the idea of modernity. Now, here is where it may reflect on my own lack of knowledge. Are the references to modernity a certain commonly accepted time period (of which I can't remember are supposed to be, I think we are post-modern or post-post-modern or out somewhere near Pluto now)? Or are the references to modernity not so much a time period but a collection of paradigms particularly as applies to a set of historigraphical tools?

So I don't know what the answer to the above question is, but I do find the use of the word modernity to be problematic. It seems like it is being used as meaning "something newer", which again is problematic. Why? Because everything is always "something newer" to something else. So to cast that contracted, staticized thousands of years of Jewish experience in the mists of the past as NOT something that was ever something newer cannot be sustained, I think.

Because in the essay, we are situating a Jewish history effort written as early as in the 1600s as the first wave of modernity upon Jewish identity; and then we take Joseph Smith who is in 1800s (well past 1600s), and saying that this is "the past" and only in the 1980s do we reach modernity. So it seems to me by this that modernity is thus only imagined as "something newer"? Because I am thinking that if something in the 1600s can be situated as "modernity", then by the same token so can Joseph Smith . . . is he a bit of "modernity" too? what identity is he assaulting? Or how do we keep it straight?

I'm sure I'm missing something, hmmmm.

While somewhat nebulous, modernity is both a time period, and a paradigm. Yerushalmi here is using it to refer to the profound changes affecting Jewish society in the period between the 18th and mid-20th centuries. A lot of it came from greater mobility and integration into the non-Jewish world (things like emancipation), and some of it came from the impact of new technologies and ideological currents. As an example, when electricity first appeard, several rabbis allowed its use on the Sabbath, as it wasn't exactly fire. The nascent orthodox movement, however, was extremely reactionary (what is new is forbidden by the Torah, as one motto goes) opposed such leniency in matters of faith and observance, and thus forbade the use of electricity on the Sabbath.

[mfbukowski]

Another thing that I found unclear in this essay, though, was the idea of modernity.

I just found this thread but haven't read the article yet.

"Modern philosophy" is actually not all that modern at all as seen in philosophy- it mostly refers to the enlightenment and rationalism. This period is usually seen as ending perhaps in the early 1950's, with postmodernism. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_philosophy

There is a lot out now about contemporary thought being post-postmodernism.

If I were to summarize the distinction between modernism and postmodernism it would of course be an over-simplification but in 25 words or less, modernism is identified with rationalism- that reason rules all, and all answers may be found by the application of scientific logic to any problem.

Post modernism questions the role of reason in solving problems, largely because postmodernists typically sees truth and falsity in a relativistic way, and dependent on the interpretation of linguistic expressions.

In short, both of us- you and me, are postmodernists more than anything.

Post-post modernism is still evolving, but I think it represents kind of a movement back toward a common sense view of the world which values a limited kind of rationalism, moderated by an understanding of what language can and cannot do.

That's kind of the twitter version of some extremely complex issues

Edited March 3, 2013 by mfbukowski

[Maidservant]

While somewhat nebulous, modernity is both a time period, and a paradigm.

Okay. Thank you, and that's what I thought. But, is this how it is being used in the essay?

Yerushalmi here is using it to refer to the profound changes affecting Jewish society in the period between the 18th and mid-20th centuries.

Okay, good to know, since I am not going to be reading this author, only as was quoted in the essay.

I guess part of my confusion is: 1) does Yerushalmi present these changes against a backdrop of "everything else that happened in Jewish history back to Adam", so to speak? or 2) is his backdrop a much shorter timeframe, i.e. perhaps beginning at the point at which we actually can account for texts in the hands of a Jewish identity, religious and/or historical? or? what is is his starting point;

then, does the OP essay adopt the Yerushalmi "backdrop timeframe" or does the essay imagine it's own point of beginning and fish net of inclusion against which Jewish identity lost its way? because, again, I resist the idea that Jewish identity was conceived of monolithically (by itself) and unequivocally faithfully until these modern moments violated that. Or at least that would be my question until I could read more.

A lot of it came from greater mobility and integration into the non-Jewish world (things like emancipation), and some of it came from the impact of new technologies and ideological currents. As an example, when electricity first appeard, several rabbis allowed its use on the Sabbath, as it wasn't exactly fire. The nascent orthodox movement, however, was extremely reactionary (what is new is forbidden by the Torah, as one motto goes) opposed such leniency in matters of faith and observance, and thus forbade the use of electricity on the Sabbath.

Makes sense. Of course, electricity I don't think failed at being a catalyst to pretty much any development frame we want to take a picture of, so, not surprising. But here the question is not just development, but identity, of course.

Interesting.

Edited March 3, 2013 by Maidservant

[Maidservant]

I just found this thread but haven't read the article yet.

"Modern philosophy" is actually not all that modern at all as seen in philosophy- it mostly refers to the enlightenment and rationalism. This period is usually seen as ending perhaps in the early 1950's, with postmodernism. http://en.wikipedia....dern_philosophy

There is a lot out now about contemporary thought being post-postmodernism.

If I were to summarize the distinction between modernism and postmodernism it would of course be an over-simplification but in 25 words or less, modernism is identified with rationalism- that reason rules all, and all answers may be found by the application of scientific logic to any problem.

Post modernism questions the role of reason in solving problems, largely because postmodernists typically sees truth and falsity in a relativistic way, and dependent on the interpretation of linguistic expressions.

In short, both of us- you and me, are postmodernists more than anything.

Post-post modernism is still evolving, but I think it represents kind of a movement back toward a common sense view of the world which values a limited kind of rationalism, moderated by an understanding of what language can and cannot do.

That's kind of the twitter version of some extremely complex issues

Thanks, that is a helpful refresher.

As a historian, I self-identify as a constructionist, a word I may very well have made up, not sure, ha ha ha. And if you ask me what that it is, two years ago when I was in the middle of university, I probably could have produced a ten page cogent explanation; these days, I'm pretty sure I would not get past, "um . . something to do with hammer and nails . .?" But in any case, it does relate to language and paradigm, yes, but there is more to it when in application of actually practicing academic history, such as the building upon the historiography of "recovering voices/(point of view)" which was popular for some decades and which produced such things as Women's Studies and Minority Studies which were important, critical even, at their time, but we are not stopping there, but now asking the question, now that we have 'allowed' these voices--what do we do with what is now in our hands? We . . . construct. I have not met anyone who is as 99.9 % constructionist as I am--I've just given in to it, and it's rather beautiful. You think you are doing to drown, but are rather surprised when you float and swim .

[mfbukowski]

Thanks, that is a helpful refresher.

As a historian, I self-identify as a constructionist, a word I may very well have made up, not sure, ha ha ha. And if you ask me what that it is, two years ago when I was in the middle of university, I probably could have produced a ten page cogent explanation; these days, I'm pretty sure I would not get past, "um . . something to do with hammer and nails . .?" But in any case, it does relate to language and paradigm, yes, but there is more to it when in application of actually practicing academic history, such as the building upon the historiography of "recovering voices/(point of view)" which was popular for some decades and which produced such things as Women's Studies and Minority Studies which were important, critical even, at their time, but we are not stopping there, but now asking the question, now that we have 'allowed' these voices--what do we do with what is now in our hands? We . . . construct. I have not met anyone who is as 99.9 % constructionist as I am--I've just given in to it, and it's rather beautiful. You think you are doing to drown, but are rather surprised when you float and swim .

Yes- that is accurate- it is called Constructivism or Linguistic Constructivism. Go ahead and google it- there are journals and all kinds of cool stuff related to this line of thought!

Edit: here you go http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_constructivism

Edited March 3, 2013 by mfbukowski

[volgadon]

Okay. Thank you, and that's what I thought. But, is this how it is being used in the essay?

That is one of the things which I hope that Louis Midgley would clarify.

Okay, good to know, since I am not going to be reading this author, only as was quoted in the essay.

If you ever get the chance, do read Yerushalmi, Zakhor is a classic.

I guess part of my confusion is: 1) does Yerushalmi present these changes against a backdrop of "everything else that happened in Jewish history back to Adam", so to speak? or 2) is his backdrop a much shorter timeframe, i.e. perhaps beginning at the point at which we actually can account for texts in the hands of a Jewish identity, religious and/or historical? or? what is is his starting point;

Zakhor was actually originally delivered as a lecture, it focuses on the role of memory in the Jewish identity, from the meaning of the word "remember" in the Bible, down through the medieval tales of martyrs and expulsions to the encounter of the traditional role of providential memory with the new historical disciplines emerging in 18th and 19th century Europe. In other words, it looks panoramically at the interplay between memory and and historiography.

then, does the OP essay adopt the Yerushalmi "backdrop timeframe" or does the essay imagine it's own point of beginning and fish net of inclusion against which Jewish identity lost its way? because, again, I resist the idea that Jewish identity was conceived of monolithically and unequivocally faithfully until these modern moments violated that. Or at least that would be my question until I could read more.

Novak and Midgley's essay (at least as I read it), generalises a generalisation, so to speak, and uses it is a springboard to caution against the dangers of secular histories of Mormonism.

I resist the idea of a monolithioc Judaism, too. Hence the thread!

Makes sense. Of course, electricity I don't think failed at being a catalyst to pretty much any development frame we want to take a picture of, so, not surprising. But here the question is not just development, but identity, of course.

Very much so. I'll return to this point later, but even works that in and of themselves were very supportive of a traditional Jewish identity were bitterly rejected by the orthodox movement if the identity of the authors was a modernising one.

[Maidservant]

orthodox movement

Would this be a (relatively) recent movement as well (i.e. possibly reactionary within the same time frame Yerushalmi uses for outlining a modernising development)? Even if we cannot properly define it as modern depending on the definition of modern we are using.

Edited March 3, 2013 by Maidservant

[volgadon]

Would this be a (relatively) recent movement as well (i.e. possibly reactionary within the same time frame Yerushalmi uses for outlining a modernising development)? Even if we cannot properly define it as modern depending on the definition of modern we are using.

Yes, in the form known today it is a recent movement, though (naturally) with plenty of antecedents.At the beginning of the 19th century the Chatam Sofer reacted harshly against any change and innovation in Jewish life and practice. His ideas gained momentum in certain circles in Europe until they became dominant. It is interesting that at the time, Sefardic rabbis in Muslim lands were far more lenient and open to innovation than their Eastern European counterparts. The Orthodox movement began as a reaction ot modernity, and it had far-reaching consequences.

[volgadon]

The fourth chapter of Yerushlami's "Zakhor" opens with a quote from Franz Kafka's letter to his father. "You really had brought some traces of Judaism with you from the ghetto-like village community; it was not much and it dwindled a little more in the city and during your military service; but still, the impressions and memories of your youth did just about suffice for some sort of Jewish life... Even in this there was still Judaism enough, but it was too little to be handed on to the child; it all dribbled away while you were passing it on."

The letter reflects Kafka's personal tragedy- his strained relationship with his father, and his feeling of alienation- but it is also emblematic of his generation's experience. Kafka himself recognised that fact. "The whole thing is, of course, no isolated phenomenon. It was much the same with a large section of this transitional generation of Jews, which had migrated from the still comparatively devout countryside to the cities."

From the 1870s onward, Bohemian Jews witnessed an interesting phenomenon. A significant portion of Jews from the Bohemian villages moved to Prague, set up business ventures, prospered, and integrated themselves to a large degree into Czech and German society. Their attitude towards their Jewish religion grew lax, to say the least. Children of Kafka's generation grew up with a minimal, nominal Jewish identity at best. Synagogue attendance could be as infrequent as a few days a year. "Four days a year you went to the synagogue, where you were, to say the least, closer to the indifferent than to those who took it seriously, patiently went through the prayers as a formality, sometimes amazed me by being able to show me in the prayer book the passage that was being said at the moment..." That was the synagogue. The situation at the Kafka household was "even poorer." The only thing observed was the first Passover Seder, which, "more and more developed into a farce, with fits of hysterical laughter, admittedly under the influence of the growing children. (Why did you have to give way to that influence? Because you had brought it about.)"

Even when they attended synagogue services, it seemed to the young Kafka a "purely social event," his father going through mere motions. Kafka's father, Franz later realised, did have a genuine attachment of sorts to Judaism, but it was related more to childhood nostalgia and a sense of social status more than any inherent religious meanings or values.

"It was also impossible to make a child, overacutely observant from sheer nervousness, understand that the few flimsy gestures you performed in the name of Judaism, and with an indifference in keeping with their flimsiness, could have any higher meaning. For you they had meaning as little souvenirs of earlier times, and that was why you wanted to pass them on to me, but since they no longer had any intrinsic value even for you could do this only through persuasion or threat; on the one hand, this could not be successful, and on the other, it had to make you very angry with me on account of my apparent obstinacy, since you did not recognize the weakness of your position in this."

I'll share again the quote used by Yerushalmi, this time without the ellipsis.

"You really had brought some traces of Judaism with you from the ghetto-like village community; it was not much and it dwindled a little more in the city and during your military service; but still, the impressions and memories of your youth did just about suffice for some sort of Jewish life, especially since you did not need much help of that kind, but came of robust stock and could personally scarcely be shaken by religious scruples unless they were strongly mixed with social scruples. Basically the faith that ruled your life consisted in your believing in the unconditional rightness of the opinions of a certain class of Jewish society, and hence actually, since these opinions were part and parcel of your own nature, in believing in yourself. Even in this there was still Judaism enough, but it was too little to be handed on to the child; it all dribbled away while you were passing it on. In part, it was youthful memories that could not be passed on to others; in part, it was your dreaded personality."

Kafka wryly summed up the lack of a vibrant, meaningful, and spiritual experience of Judaism, when he said, "this was the religious material that was handed on to me"

Is it any wonder that Kafka then remarked, "how one could do anything better with that material than get rid of it as fast as possible."

Note that none of this has anything to do with modern historiography as applied to Judaism.

What Kafka's loss of identity boils down to is that a scarcely observant father could not browbeat or guilt his son into accepting a faith to which the former attached so little meaning.

http://site.douban.com/113918/widget/notes/1857805/note/183418920/

[Maidservant]

Would you say that "Remembrance" has a place in the Latter-Day Saint identity and is it comparable in any way to how remembrance might be conceived or experienced in Judaism?

[volgadon]

Would you say that "Remembrance" has a place in the Latter-Day Saint identity and is it comparable in any way to how remembrance might be conceived or experienced in Judaism?

I would say so. Remembrance is a weekly ritual in the church.

[JeremyOrbe-Smith]

Not to mention the Temple, with the primordial First Time that gives purposive context to subsequent history.

[volgadon]

Not to mention the Temple, with the primordial First Time that gives purposive context to subsequent history.

Very true.