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Ryan Dahle

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About Ryan Dahle

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  1. My assumption is that there is a much greater risk of a woman getting pregnant from consensual intercourse than there is of getting in a car crash. So, like all analogies, the car ride isn't perfectly equivalent to the situation it is being compared with. It was simply meant to help illustrate that the agency of a woman in consensual intercourse does indeed play a large role in any burdens that may come to her in the event that she gets pregnant. It seems like you are trying to redirect any responsibility that women may have for avoiding risky behavior and placing it almost completely upon the men involved in such situations. That is what is clearly perplexing to those who are disagreeing with you, and you seem to be skirting the primary issue by focusing on the much rarer instances of deception or coercion, which several posters have made clear isn't what is being addressed. Even when the issue of deception is taken into account (such as when a man secretly removes a condom), the woman still holds some responsibility. Part of that responsibility comes from the fact that it is widely known that there is still a 2% chance of getting pregnant even when the device is properly used, and up to a 15% chance of getting pregnant when it is improperly used. Then there is the variable possibility that a male partner might be deceptive during intercourse. If that wasn't a real phenomenon, we wouldn't be talking about it on this discussion board. Many women know that this is a tendency among some men, and those who are aware of that fact have some responsibility to assess the integrity of their partner before engaging in intercourse. If a women knew that by entering into a vehicle there was a 2 to 15% chance that it might crash, depending on the competence and integrity of the driver, she would clearly be knowingly engaging in risky behavior by entering into the vehicle, and even more so if she had any doubts about the driver. Lets leave the analogy and I'll state my position clearly: 1. When a man and a woman engage in consensual intercourse and there is neither deception nor coercion involved, they are mutually and equally responsible/accountable/culpable for any unwanted pregnancy that results from that act. This is true whether they mutually decide to use a contraceptive or not. 2. When a man and a woman engage in consensual intercourse and one partner fails to use a method of contraceptive properly, simply due to ignorance or a lack of competence, they are still mutually and equally responsible/accountable/culpable for any unwanted pregnancy that results from that act. Both partners essentially have an equal responsibility to ensure that any sort of contraceptive is properly used and that the other partner knows how to use it. 3. When a man and a woman engage in consensual intercourse and one partner knowingly and deceptively misuses or fails to use a contraceptive, then the partner who engages in the deception is much more responsible/accountable/culpable for any unwanted pregnancy that may result. However, the deceptive partner is not solely responsible, seeing that there was an inherent risk of getting pregnant, even without the deceptive act. Moreover, if the non-deceptive partner knew that there was a real possibility that the other partner might deceptively increase the risk of pregnancy, the non-deceptive partner would be somewhat responsible for taking that added risk, even though such a scenario wouldn't equalize the blame/responsibility (the deceptive partner would still be much more culpable, in my view). 4. When one partner physically forces or otherwise coerces (via drugs, blackmail, threats, etc.) another partner to engage in intercourse, the one engaging in coercion is entirely (or almost entirely, depending on the degree of coercion) responsible/accountable/culpable for any unwanted pregnancy that may result. I acknowledge that women are disproportionately burdened by unwanted pregnancies, and that even though many societies are currently seeking to reduce this disproportionate burden, it still exists. I think it is good for society to do all it can to equalize that burden when both parties are mutually at fault. The fact is, though, that society can't change the fact that women are biologically burdened to carry and nurture a baby in their bodies. That being the case, I'm not sure why men would have more of a responsibility to ensure that women aren't unduly burdened by unwanted pregnancies than women do themselves. Again, it seems that responsibility for ensuring that these unfair outcomes don't transpire is mutually and equally held by both genders. Whether or not the value of the life of the unborn child outweighs rights to privacy and the liberty to live one's own life as one desires is a separate but very related matter. That is because how responsible a woman is for having an unwanted pregnancy somewhat plays into the debate about whether or not abortion is justified in certain circumstances. Many people are much more willing to countenance abortion when the pregnancy was the result of rape or coercion than when it was merely the result of consensual intercourse. It would seem that those who want to place the responsibility for unwanted pregnancies entirely on men would get increased moral leverage to advocate for the justification of abortion in all circumstances. When women are not only seen as disproportionately burdened by unwanted pregnancies but also as complete victims (in all cases) rather than fully consensual participants in the act that caused this unfair burden, then society will be more sympathetic to unrestricted abortions.
  2. That is too vague. I can't tell precisely what you mean.
  3. I think the analogy should probably be more along these lines: What if the wife knew that by getting into the car she would inherently have a high risk of getting into a crash, and what if she also knew that there was a real risk of the driver intentionally texting the whole time (against her wishes), thereby adding increased risk to an already risky activity. And what if there was nothing coercing or forcing her into the vehicle and no reason that she had to get into the vehicle, other than the pleasure of taking a drive. The negligent driver would certainly be "entirely" responsible for his own risky behavior and for increasing the risk of harm to another through his negligence. But the wife would also be "entirely" responsible for engaging in what she knew at the outset was risky behavior and for knowingly and willingly getting into the vehicle with someone that she knew might be prone to text and drive. While she certainly would be somewhat less responsible than the negligent driver for any harm caused to her, she would still be highly responsible herself for taking such an unnecessary risk.
  4. This provides a helpful overview from a different perspective: https://knowhy.bookofmormoncentral.org/knowhy/is-the-book-of-mormon-like-other-ancient-metal-documents I think Thomas's biggest problem is in the loaded assumptions in his concluding statements: First of all, the bolded text is a much broader issue than his article addresses. Evaluating the Book of Mormon's "status as a translation of an ancient document" is a topic that requires exhaustive investigation into numerous lines of evidence (i.e. anthropology, linguistics, literary studies, etc.) that goes well beyond the scope of Thomas's article. His statement merely serves to demonstrate his general assumption about the text. In other words, he is saying that the findings in his article support what he already assumes (rather than what has already been demonstrated) about the text's historicity. And then he attempts to justify his claim with the following: Thomas is essentially saying that the Book of Mormon is "most unlikely" to be an ancient document because it doesn't have a perfect match with known metal documents from the ancient Near East/Mediterranean, and with Israel-Judah in particular. Yet he never explains why his criteria for evaluation is valid. Does the Book of Mormon have to have a perfect match from the same place, time, script, and genre for it to be a plausible ancient metal document? Most of the essential ingredients for creating the Book of Mormon or a document like the Brass Plates are attested from the ancient Near East/Mediterranean. These include: numerous ancient metal documents fairly lengthy ancient metal document ancient metal documents written in Hebrew and adapted forms of Egyptian ancient metal documents buried in stone boxes ancient metal documents bound with D-shaped rings ancient metal documents that were doubled and sealed and ancient metal documents that for the most part contain the genres described on the Brass Plates. Thomas capitalizes on the fact that we don't have a lengthy "literary text" written on metal plates. But he doesn't say why that feature alone should be dispositive. I find his conclusion especially faulty because lengthier metal documents naturally would have required much more time and resources to create than shorter ones, making them inherently less likely to turn up in the archaeological record. Moreover, there are ancient metal documents that are more comparable in length to the Book of Mormon. They just don't happen to fit the right time, place, and genre simultaneously. From the KnoWhy cited at the beginning: One important question that Thomas never addressed is whether the length of any of these known metal documents is typical or usual for their literary milieus? The answer, I believe, is clearly not. Thus, by Thomas's rationale, these documents should all be "most unlikely" to exist, and yet there they are. In essence, his evaluation that the Book of Mormon is a "most unlikely" document relies far too heavily on an absence of evidence for a "perfect match" and upon unnecessarily minimizing the many similarities that the Book of Mormon does have with a variety of ancient metal documents. Some of these similarities, like the Book of Mormon's affinity with doubled, sealed documents and its use of D-Shaped rings, aren't things that Joseph would likely have known from the information available in his day, even though a number of other features of metal documents were known. It should also be remembered that even though all these features of ancient metal documents are known today, the vast majority of people don't know about most of them. I assume the same was generally true in Joseph Smith's day. Potential accessibility doesn't equate to likely derivation. Overall, I think Thomas's article is interesting and informative, but that his conclusion is clearly flawed.
  5. Alma 37 41 Nevertheless, because those miracles were worked by small means it did show unto them marvelous works. They were slothful, and forgot to exercise their faith and diligence and then those marvelous works ceased, and they did not progress in their journey; 42 Therefore, they tarried in the wilderness, or did not travel a direct course, and were afflicted with hunger and thirst, because of their transgressions.
  6. There isn't? What are the differences? And why are those differences material? And why must the similarity be between a first trimester fetus and an adult person? What if we compare a first trimester fetus to a one-day-old child? The latter has attained personhood (and hence protections under the law), but the former has not. Why? What is/are the material difference(s)? I think this question is at the heart of the debate. Why specifically do people almost universally feel it is immoral to take the life of a newborn baby and (for many people) the life of a viable baby, but far fewer people are concerned about taking the life of non-viable babies? It seems that the essential reason for not taking the life of newborns or viable babies in utero has to do with what the developing child is as well what it has the potential to be. A child born with a severe mental disability or health problem and who is almost certain not to live more than a few years is still almost universally valued as a person (in modern Western society, at least), despite the child's near-zero potential to develop into a fully functioning adult. One can go down the pain route, but if there were a condition that caused a newborn (or an adult, for that matter) to not feel pain, we still wouldn't feel it moral to kill it for convenience. Thus arguing that it is moral to kill a zygote because it can't feel pain seems illogical. We can go down the cognitive awareness route, but newborns have limited cognitive awareness, and we often preserve the life of adults who may be temporarily in comatose. One could argue that it is the combination of physical/cognitive dissimilarities between non-viable babies and functioning humans (newborn to adults) that categorizes the non-viable babies as non-persons, but if in each case those dissimilarities are found to be non-determinitive qualifiers of personhood in analogous situations, how does the combination of them suddenly disqualify the non-viable baby as being a person?
  7. Right, but then, in the absence of his qualification, you went on to assert that his rather general and vague response was specifically influenced by an agenda to control the agency of women. And my point is that such a presumption is unwarranted.
  8. I dunno, exactly. But I think it would be wise to hear his own explanation before presuming that it must stem from any particular ideology, despite any perceived similarities that it may have (at a general level) with the rhetoric commonly used by political ideologues that one disagrees with. Moreover, I'm not sure he articulated his views on sex ed, contraception, etc. Did he?
  9. I similarly find efforts to ascribe the particular pro-life sentiments expressed on this thread as part of some agenda to "control the agency of women" to be unnecessary and disconcerting. Most of us are influenced in complex and nuanced ways by a variety of ideological perspectives, a fact which should make us less inclined to naively stereotype others. There is no evidence that I can see that smac97 subscribes (consciously or unconsciously) to an agenda which "prioritizes the agency of men over women." I believe one would have to make a number of over-generalizations to reach such a conclusion.
  10. Smac, The following points are my attempt to track the essence of your position: You are arguing that we should change the law and essentially grant the legal rights of "personhood" to babies in utero at the time of fertilization (as accurately as that time can be deduced). Your rationale is that the same core arguments for viewing a newborn baby as a person (a status that is essentially not debated) can logically be extended back to the moment of fertilization. You find arguments to deny the status of personhood to babies in utero based on dissimilarities between them and recognized persons (newborns to adults) to be flawed, because essentially all of the dissimilarities are found to not effect the status of personhood in analogous situations (e.g. the mere lack of fully developed cognitive capacities, full awareness, etc. are non-determinative features of personhood). You find counterarguments that essentially rely upon current laws and interpretations of the law to be essentially a moot point because your whole argument is that the law should be changed. You have used the social shift regarding the legal and social perception of slaves as an analogy for how this shift might take place regarding the view of babies in utero. You find appeals to the complexity of navigating moral issues (appeals to the arbitrary, nebulous, capricious, subjective nature of moral reasoning, both generally and in relation to this topic) to also be a moot point because we, as a society, still have to decide how we will act in regard to a number of moral issues, including this one. You are waiting for a response to your fundamental argument, which is that the core reasons for viewing a newborn baby as a person logically extend back to the moment of fertilization. Is that more or less correct? It's hard to keep track of what is actually being argued with so many quibbles and tangential issues raised in the thread.
  11. As far as I know, Book of Mormon Central had nothing to do with the creation of the video.
  12. FYI Your Droopy quote may need a little peer review: "You're" should likely be "Your." And "to" in "anyone to takes issue" should probably be "who." 😉
  13. Obviously, based on my past talking points on this issue, I don't believe Joseph could have produced the text and therefore whatever rhetorical purposes its archaism may have had, it didn't come from him. I think you and I are just talking about different things, and are essentially in agreement.
  14. You seem to be conflating a text's readability in a certain time period with the likelihood that a specific author (Joseph Smith) produced it in that same time period. Carmack and Skousen obviously don't think their findings indicate that the text is "not good" or not "a fluid translation" or that it is "lousy." In fact, they have been impressed by the way the text draws upon archaic usages that would have been discernible (if not readily producible) by a 19th century audience. Skousen has talked about the text being massaged, meaning that its archaisms seem to have been carefully selected to not be incomprehensible for a 19th century audience. It employs many KJV usages better than other pseudobibilcal texts of the time, and yet it transcends them by consistently utilizing a suite of extrabiblical syntax, grammar, and lexis. I think it is a brilliant text in the way that it is both comprehensible to 19th/21st century audiences and yet distinctively archaic. As for reaching definitive conclusions about the rhetorical purpose(s) of its archaic style, there are still too many unknowns. We can't be sure what process was used to produce the text or even who its primary audiences are. Whatever the answer is, I believe our collective thinking has usually been too narrow in scope. We need to think bigger. How long will the Book of Mormon be read in English? How will it be viewed in 500 years or 5,000 years? What will English be like in later periods (considering that its current grammatical prescriptions have afforded it a notable degree stabilization)? Is an English text utilized on the other side of the veil, and, if so, how does it correlate to its editions/translation on this side of the veil? When did it first become available to individuals on the other side of the veil? Etc. All I can say is that we may be too mortality-centric and pre-millennium-centric in our views about the English text. If some divine process produced it, we might do well to broaden our thinking about what factors may have influenced its rhetorical purposes.
  15. I'm not sure exactly what you mean. What I'm saying is that there seems to be validity to the idea that some 19th century authors intentionally utilized archaic language for rhetorical purposes. That is likely why the genre of pseudo-biblical literature exists. Maybe you agree with that notion and are talking about something else.
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